

Limited Choices

Russian Opposition Parties and the 2007 Duma Election

NICKLAUS LAVERTY

Abstract: Despite new incentives brought about by the 2005 electoral reforms in Russia, opposition parties failed to strategically adapt before the 2007 Duma election. This failure is connected to ideological and organizational impediments within the parties and to the hegemonic role of the Russian presidency and its client parties in the Russian party system.

Keywords: cartel party, client parties, Duma, electoral rules, opposition parties, United Russia

The December 2007 Russian Duma election, which Russian President Vladimir Putin's United Russia Party (YeR) won in an overwhelming fashion, did not use the same electoral rules that had structured parliamentary elections from 1993 until 2003.¹ Before 2005, when the change was implemented, the 450-member Duma was selected through a combined electoral system in which half the seats were filled via a party list and half were drawn from single-member districts (SMDs) in Russia's eighty-nine regions. This system produced party ballots with frequently fluctuating numbers of parties, and SMD ballots with large numbers of independents. In an effort to expedite the party consolidation process, the 2005 law abolished SMD seats and extended the party lists to encompass all 450 seats. In addition, the vote threshold required for representation was increased from 5 percent to 7 percent—one of the highest thresholds in the world (rivalled by the 7 percent required for the Polish Sejm and exceeded by the 10 percent required for the Turkish Grand National Assembly). To ensure the maintenance of "partyiness," the law also stipulated that parliament members could not change their party affiliation after getting elected and that the candidates themselves must undergo a two-stage evaluation process by the Central Election Commission. Finally, the law prohibited the formation of party blocs, requiring each party to possess official registration, dovetailing with the 2001 law, On Political Parties, that raised the number of members and regional branches required for registration.² All of these changes obviously pose a strategic problem for Russia's political parties: they must learn to adapt to the new rules to remain relevant as representational organizations.

Nicklaus Laverty is a doctoral student at the University of Massachusetts Amherst. He is also a Jack Kent Cooke graduate scholar. Copyright © 2008 Heldref Publications

Most of all, the new electoral formula was a challenge to the opposition parties that saw their support decline in the 2003 Duma election—namely, the democratic parties Yabloko and Union of Rightist Forces (SPS), and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF).³ In this article, I explore how these parties have responded to the electoral changes and what factors have influenced these strategies. The first part of this article examines Yabloko and the SPS, both of which failed to individually pass the 5 percent threshold in the 2003 election and were unable to combine into a single party for the 2007 election as a means of overcoming the daunting 7 percent threshold. I also look into the decline of the KPRF, which suffered a major reversal of support in the 2003 election that continued into the 2007 election. Finally, because the setbacks for these parties have not occurred in a vacuum, the last part of this article deals with the nature of the system itself and how it has limited opposition parties' choices. This includes a discussion of the hegemonic influence of the Putin regime (and, by extension, YeR), its use of *administrative resource*, and the role of client parties (the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia [LDPR] and Just Russia) in shaping party system outcomes. Even in the absence of the opposition parties' strategic failures (of which there are many), the election rules militate against opposition party success.

Theoretical Background

Before moving on to the main discussion of the opposition parties and their electoral challenges, it would be prudent to first outline some basic theoretical considerations of Russian party system analysis. Much of the existing literature on party systems explicitly deals with Western Europe and North America, and adapting the models used therein to the Russian context is fraught with certain difficulties, such as the nature of the post-Communist transition itself and the resultant conflict between representation and effectiveness in the party system. As Jack Bielasiak notes, the immediate aftermath of the 1991 fall of Communism was an explosion in the number of parties designed as vehicles for representation that moved into the newly opened political space.⁴ This high degree of political fragmentation (higher than all other cases of political transition) leads to associated problems of party volatility (in which a much higher percentage of voters shift party loyalty from election to election) and nonrepresentation (as an exceedingly large proportion of voters end up voting for parties that fail to cross the voting threshold and gain representation).⁵ This overall volatility and fragmentation exists alongside profound social and economic dislocations in the post-Communist cases, which increase the demand for governmental effectiveness, making it almost impossible for the party system to come to the gradual equilibrium between representation and effectiveness that occurred in Western Europe. Russian political elites, responding to the problems of transition, decided to “curb the representativeness impulse,” often using legal mechanisms such as party registration laws and higher electoral thresholds.⁶ In addition to the particular challenges presented by the post-Communist transition and how this impacts party development, there is also the issue of broader party development over time. Mark Blyth and Richard Katz note that in Western Europe, parties developed in response to a series of *coordination problems*:

Modern political parties were “invented” to address three coordination problems in representative democracies. The first problem to arise was what we call the “internal dilemma”: the problem of coordination of action within assemblies of nominal equals. . . . The second coordination problem was what we term the “external dilemma”: that of organising and coordinating large numbers of activists, both within a given geographic area and across space. . . .

Taken together, these “internal” and “external” coordination problems led, in turn, to a third, “network,” problem: that of connecting the simultaneously evolving parliamentary parties and their supporting coalition of extra-governmental political activists into a permanent and adaptive organisational form.⁷

The resolutions to these coordination problems arose over the course of roughly a century in Western Europe, beginning with the elitist cadre parties that solved the “internal dilemma” and the mass parties that solved the external and network dilemmas, and moving on to the postwar *catch-all parties*. Catch-all politics developed a network problem of their own because of the inherently limited nature of the distribution of public goods, which was in turn solved by the advent of the *cartel party* that partially insulated parties from social demands.⁸ Russian party development has not followed this pattern, so it is difficult to see how such historically contingent models can be usefully applied in the post-Communist context.

The presence of these complications should not cause us to dispense entirely with this classificatory schema, however. Even though it refers to a specific historical process in Western Europe, that does not undermine its use in constructing ideal types. Understanding political party systems is ultimately about understanding one of the central concepts of democratization that Robert Dahl presents in his classic text *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*: the presence of an organized opposition that is legitimately capable of competing for political power.⁹ Although existing party models may not be applicable in the post-Communist experience, they nevertheless offer us important heuristic tools for understanding similarities and differences. The democratic parties Yabloko and the SPS (and a number of other small parties) can be conventionally understood as archetypical *programmatic cadre parties*, whereas the organizational and membership inheritance of the KPRF largely resembles the *class-based mass party* of old. Perhaps most intriguing is how the preexisting party models can be adapted to help understand the quintessential post-Soviet party type, the *party of power* (specifically YeR) and its *satellite parties*.¹⁰ Because party development has been forced to occur in a very compressed timeframe in post-Communist societies, the coordination problems outlined by Blyth and Katz have occurred simultaneously, leading to unusual hybrid parties. For example, YeR possesses qualities characteristic of catch-all parties (e.g., bland and ambiguous ideological platform, reliance on modern media campaigning) and also qualities reminiscent of cartel parties (state-party interpenetration and interdependency). One concept that has been used to describe certain European party systems (mainly in Italy) but may also be quite useful in analyzing the Russian party system is Jean Blondel’s notion of *partitocracy*. *Partitocracy* can be thought of as a broader “cartelization” of the party system in which either parties invade and capture the state or the state invades and captures parties.¹¹ This interdependence between parties and the government changes the manner in which policies are made and appointments and patronage are distributed, effectively blurring the difference between political parties and the state.¹² The Italian example demonstrates the state capture side of the partitocracy continuum, whereas the Russian example shows the predatory potential of the state in a partitocratic system:

The party of power is not the party of power because it is the formal organization that, having succeeded in getting its candidates elected, exerts power as a coherent unit of people’s representatives in the legislative or in the executive branch of government. The party of power is the actual group whose members wield power in and through the executive branch of government,

and which creates an “electoral branch” in order to hold on to power by organizing adequate support in the legislative branch of government.¹³

This effectively reverses the traditional relationship between party and government, in which individuals are able to gain power in the state through the intermediary of political parties. Instead, individuals receive places in the party of power or the “electoral branch” based on a prior position in the state and the active cooptation of higher-ranked officials—what Hans Oversloot and Ruben Verheul appropriately term a period of “outplacement” the precedes accession to an even higher rank in the state.¹⁴ Additionally, as Vladimir Gelman points out, although YeR party officials oversee the day-to-day administration of the party, all major YeR strategic decision making tends to be done by “extraparty rulers” (i.e., officials in the presidential administration).¹⁵ The partitocratic model further recommends itself as a means of understanding the Russian situation because, as Blondel fully recognizes, a partitocracy may be constructed as a political vehicle for a single, powerful individual (in this case, Putin).¹⁶ Finally, it is crucial to recognize the broader ramifications of the cartelization of the party system that partitocracy entails. As Blondel notes, parties conforming to the partitocratic model have much weaker programmatic commitments, because their relationship with the state insulates them from the social demands that would tend to sharpen and define ideological platforms.¹⁷ The subsequent electoral success that these parties enjoy through their privileged relationship with the state tends to undermine those parties that do not conform to the model, eroding the programmatic tendencies of the party system as a whole. This has clearly happened in Russia, as the abundant success of YeR and its surrogate parties (either *satellite parties* or *favoured opposition parties* in Oversloot and Verheul’s terminology¹⁸) have substantially reduced the electoral space available to parties that actually attempt to compete on the basis of a clear ideology. Other electoral tactics taken by the regime to marginalize these parties or the strategic decisions taken by the opposition parties themselves notwithstanding, the structural nature of the Russian party system tends to militate against opposition party success in general. Recognizing the unique nature of Russian party system development (e.g., the troubles of the transition and the simultaneous emergence of the coordination problems) accompanied by the circumspect application of certain party models borrowed from the Western European context helps us to establish this common background, through which subsequent analysis should be understood.

Divided We Fall?

Following their 2003 electoral debacle, many commentators speculated that Yabloko and the SPS should join forces as a united democratic opposition, rather than diluting their influence by remaining separate. This was not the first time the notion of a democratic coalition had been raised; in 2000, Vladimir Lukin of Yabloko and Irina Khakamada of the SPS came to a provisional agreement concerning a united electoral list and coordination at the local, regional, and federal level.¹⁹ This proposed coalition eventually sputtered, however, because the two parties failed to overcome their disagreements, epitomized by Yabloko leader Grigory Yavlinsky’s rejection in 2003 of a last-ditch attempt at a unified electoral list put forward by the SPS’s Boris Nemstov.²⁰ Before that, several different SPS predecessors attempted to form a coalition with Yabloko, including Yegor Gaidar’s Russia’s Choice party in 1995, which Yabloko repudiated because it viewed Gaidar as tainted by the failure of his economic reforms (Gaidar later became an SPS member).²¹ Accordingly, it was no

surprise when Yabloko and the SPS began negotiating in late 2005 over a possible unification for the 2007 election. The institutional incentives that previously worked against unification had changed much in the interim—both parties had previously been relatively confident of their ability to gain 5 percent of the vote and therefore saw unification as less pressing.²² Despite these incentives, however, the parties failed to come to an agreement, announcing in early 2007 that they planned to separately contest the Duma election.²³ Why, despite the compelling circumstances of the new electoral system, did the democratic parties remain apart?

A large part of the answer is ideological: although outsider observers commonly consider Yabloko and the SPS part of the same family, this is not necessarily the case. According to Yabloko officials (it is usually Yabloko that rebuffs talk of unification), the two parties do find their roots in the liberal tradition, but Yabloko supports a much stronger social policy for welfare services whereas the SPS is oriented more as a party of orthodox economic liberalism.²⁴ In this respect, asking Yabloko and the SPS to unify is akin to asking the U.S. Democratic and Republican parties to unify against an authoritarian party. Moreover, Yabloko has consistently attempted to define itself in contrast to the economic liberals, emphasizing different policy options during “shock therapy” (the rapid program of economic liberalization that the Yeltsin administration adopted in the early 1990s) and the privatization binge of the 1990s.²⁵ Even if the two parties were able to overcome these considerable ideological differences to form a coalition, this does not take into account the ideological differences of their respective electorates. As David White observes, the SPS is the party of businesspeople and entrepreneurs, whereas Yabloko caters to academics and teachers (and state officials who have been negatively impacted by the economic transition).²⁶ Yabloko voters could potentially opt for another leftist party, rather than a unified Yabloko-SPS ticket.²⁷ Yabloko officials are concerned about alienating their base by forming a coalition with the SPS—a worry that has been confirmed by the negative responses of Yabloko supporters to a potential Yabloko-SPS alliance in focus groups.²⁸ Attempts at unification are further complicated by the fact that whereas Yabloko has remained a steadfast opposition group, the economic liberals have had less difficulty associating openly with the regime.²⁹

Another part of the reason is historical and personal. The leaders of Yabloko and the SPS do not much like each other, as a consequence of personal feuds and party competition. This stems from the fact that Boris Yeltsin chose Gaidar over Yavlinsky to guide the economic reforms of the early 1990s (Yavlinsky and Gaidar vehemently disagreed over the proper way to proceed), but it has since deepened to a greater animosity. The SPS phase of this rivalry was really initiated when Anatoly Chubais (the person who presided over the quasi-criminal privatization schemes of the mid-1990s and later became a SPS member) essentially accused Yavlinsky and Yabloko of treason in a November 1999 televised debate

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for not supporting the second Chechen War more strongly.³⁰ Consequently, during later attempts at unification, Yabloko had no problem working with leaders like Nemstov or Khakamada, but it conditioned negotiation on the noninvolvement of Gaidar and Chubais. This personality-centered approach to party politics is largely because of the nature of Russia's post-Soviet political and economic transition. As Paul Christensen notes, "Shock therapy and privatization effectively stripped most people and social organizations of the resources necessary for political organizing. This lack of a sustained institutional presence and the 'unconsolidated' nature of political parties heighten the role and independence of party and organization leaders."³¹ This is especially applicable to Yabloko. Even though the party is far better organized than *divan parties* (parties so small that their entire membership could fit on a single couch in a Moscow apartment), Yavlinsky tends to run Yabloko in a highly uncompromising and autocratic fashion.³² More problematic than the personal rivalries, however, is the way that the SPS has conducted attempts at unification and electoral campaigns. Many Russians believe that the SPS made unification proposals to Yavlinsky knowing full well they would be rejected, simply to highlight the flexibility of the SPS and the intractability of Yabloko.³³ This opportunism seems to be confirmed by the fact that in subsequent electoral campaigns, the SPS seemed more interested in attacking Yabloko as a means of overcoming the vote threshold than aligning with Yabloko to criticize the regime or the Communists.³⁴ Such tactics are unlikely to build amity in the democratic camp, and they make the attempts at unification seem hollow.

The SPS's implicit charge that Yabloko is unwilling to make compromises for the purpose of electoral success seems particularly unfair, given how Yabloko's hesitancy is largely based on the backfiring of its past attempts at compromise. Yabloko, being a party almost completely based on *ideational capital* (the resource a party derives from its ideology), has always had to conduct a difficult balancing act so as to not compromise the nature of that capital.³⁵ This is demonstrated by the 1999 campaign, in which Yabloko made a number of elite alliances to ensure voters it possessed the capacity to govern without undermining its policy positions.³⁶ These included the popular former Prime Minister Sergey Stepashin, well-known Russian politician and former Democratic Party of Russia leader Nikolai Travkin, former Minister of Nationality and Regional Policy Vyacheslav Mikhailov, and prominent businessman Yuri Rummyantsev.³⁷ These pragmatic moves were balanced by then-Yabloko Vice-Chair (and campaign manager for the 1999 Duma elections) Vyacheslav Igrunov's purity campaign, which sought to oust party members and organizations that deviated from the Yabloko line. This campaign included much more stringent regulations for the membership process and ultimately culminated in the central Yabloko group's dissolution of eleven regional organizations.³⁸ This forfeit of *administrative capital* (the resource a party derives from its physical organizational structures and capacity to mobilize supporters) in favor of keeping ideational capital strong, along with the presence of the new notables, may have worked in any other campaign season, but it ended up costing Yabloko dearly in 1999. Starting out on the verge of major party status, the events leading up to the election that year (apartment bombings, the second Chechen War, Putin's rise) effectively derailed the campaign and exposed divisions in the party. Although Yavlinsky and Stepashin agreed on many social and economic policies, they differed on security policy and were caught off guard when security took a paramount place in the campaign. The lack of a clear party position, caused by Yavlinsky and Stepashin failing to coordinate their public statements, severely undermined Yabloko's ideational

capital and led to a disappointing fifth-place finish, just above the 5 percent threshold.³⁹ The catastrophic outcome of Yabloko's alliance-building efforts can then be seen as a factor explaining why the party has turned such a jaundiced eye toward subsequent unification proposals.

The preceding discussion is predicated on the idea that if the two parties were somehow able to overcome their considerable differences, they might be able to gain representation as a united democratic front. Even this is not necessarily the case. As Yusupzhon Abdurakhmanov puts it, even though it is premature to conceive of partisan affiliation in Russia in terms of historical-social cleavages (e.g., race, class, or the urban-rural divide), Russia's party system has generally been oriented along two continuums: post-1991 attitudes toward either liberalism or leftism, and the level of national patriotism displayed by parties.⁴⁰ The liberal-reformist quadrant, however, has seen its share of the electorate decline from 27.3 percent in 1993 to 8.5 percent in 2003 to a horrendous 2.6 percent in 2007, meaning that even the combined party would not garner 7 percent of the vote.⁴¹ Turning this decline around seems highly unlikely, given the abysmal membership levels of both parties (each has only a few thousand active members, with little regional penetration) and the fact that only around 30 percent of the Russian electorate identifies itself as strong or moderate partisans.⁴² Moreover, even many traditional Yabloko supporters are becoming disenchanted with the party's ineffectiveness, demonstrated by critical comments and awful polling numbers.⁴³ Although many factors have militated against what seems to be the most logical strategic response to the new electoral rules, even an ideal strategy would have failed to prevent another dismal electoral outcome.

Stalled Development

The KPRF's situation is not nearly as dire as that of the democratic parties. Although it saw its share of the vote effectively halved from 1999 to 2003, it retains one of the larger blocs in the Duma and is not in any immediate danger of falling below the 7 percent threshold. Its relatively consistent success (having scored over 10 percent of the vote in all Duma elections) is most likely due to the KPRF's status as the only party that can justifiably say that it has a "party on the ground," with 500,000 members throughout the Russian Federation.⁴⁴ KPRF electioneering heavily relies on local party branches drumming up support through contact with its constituency, and that constituency tends to be more ideologically cohesive than that of the other parties.⁴⁵ Ivan Kurilla notes that in some regions in which the KPRF is relatively strong, it actually operates as a civil-society substitute, providing social services—an impressive feat considering the general lack of such activity on the part of the federal government.⁴⁶ The mass membership of the party is linked to the fact that as the successor of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the KPRF has maintained many of the infrastructural features of the old party, including *raikom* (local committees), *gorkom* (city committees), *obkom* (regional committees), and *reskom* (republic-level organizations).⁴⁷ Accordingly, although the KPRF operates with the elite exclusivity of a cadre party, it has been generally able to take advantage of mass-party structures during electoral campaigns.

Nevertheless, the electoral changes that took effect in December 2007 pose problems for the KPRF, especially given the fact that the abolition of SMD seats undermines the Communists' greatest organizational asset (it also favors Moscow-based parties, such as YeR).⁴⁸ Despite this challenge, it does not appear that the KPRF has altered its strategy as a

means toward reinvigorating its electoral potential, with the exception of an aborted reorganization attempt in mid-2004 that almost split the party.⁴⁹ The continuity of strategy is also reflected by the dry and uninspiring Gennady Zyuganov maintaining his position as party leader (Zyuganov did not run in the 2004 presidential election as he did in the previous two elections, because he did not want to be humiliated by the unbeatable Putin; instead, he threw the unknown Nikolai Kharitonov to the wolves), despite grumblings among the party's base that Zyuganov no longer has any credibility.⁵⁰ According to Veronika Pasyukova, this organizational stasis can be attributed to the KPRF's post-Soviet evolution. The party rejected the social-democratic path of the Eastern European successor Communist parties,

“The [KPRF] rejected the social-democratic path of the Eastern European successor Communist parties, instead maintaining a Bolshevik outlook combined with Great-Russian nationalism and socially conservative values.”

instead maintaining a Bolshevik outlook combined with Great-Russian nationalism and socially conservative values.⁵¹ This schizophrenic worldview has attracted two types of constituents: those who place primary emphasis on Marxist-Leninist principles and those who focus on national patriotism without much regard for class struggle.⁵² This worldview also has made the KPRF's relationship to the regime highly ambiguous. The party has stated that it accepts democratic practice and constitutional law, but it retains a policy

program of regime change.⁵³ The problem of strategic and organizational immobilism is accurately captured by the evolution of the party's political program during the 1990s and early 2000s. In 1995, the party program “set forth an explanation of the Soviet collapse, a Marxist-Leninist analysis of current conditions in Russia and the world, a statement of the [K]PRF's ultimate goals of socialism and the (voluntary) reestablishment of the USSR, and a lengthy road map of how to get from the present to that ‘bright future.’”⁵⁴ These goals would be accomplished first through the legal attainment of power using constitutional means, after which social reforms would gradually be ushered in until the point where a full return to Socialism was possible.⁵⁵ As Luke March notes, the KPRF and Zyuganov emphasized the earlier stages of this plan and a conservative patriotism meant to aid coalition-building efforts while using bureaucratic maneuvers within the party's organization to sideline more radical and revanchist elements.⁵⁶ For a time, this strategy was successful, but it began to fall apart following Zyuganov's defeat in the 1996 presidential election. Serious changes to the party program were contemplated during the 1997 party congress, but these were blunted by the central leadership, leading to a simple reaffirmation of the 1995 principles. This, combined with the party's failure to confront Yeltsin and stop his policies between 1995 and 1999, exacerbated the divisions within the party and led to a growing chorus of rank-and-file dissent.⁵⁷ The next attempt to reorient the direction of the KPRF came with the contentious votes on Sergey Kirienko as Yeltsin's nominee for the position of prime minister and Yuri Maslyukov's defection from the party in his decision to serve in Yeltsin's government, both of which occurred in 1998. The more militant members of the KPRF precipitated a crisis in the party with the attempt to again adopt a more radical party program and to wrest some power away from Zyuganov and his coterie.⁵⁸ Both

of these moves were effectively blocked by an alliance between Zyuganov's supporters and the moderates, and the experience of dealing with internal party dissent hardened the leadership's attitude toward changing the party program. Moreover, as March notes: "The leadership compounded the issue. Zyuganov's bureaucratic persona remained a millstone in a personality-based presidential system. The nomenklatura background of the party hierarchy contributed to authoritarian leadership, and the party increasingly alienated independent allies such as the Kemerovo governor, Aman Tuleev, in order to preserve the leadership status quo, leading to a 'personnel famine' by 2000."⁵⁹

This uncomfortable balance between nationalism and Socialism has made the Communists exceedingly vulnerable to their own missteps and strategic attacks by the regime, which always viewed the KPRF as a party that should be relegated to the dustbin of history. The initial KPRF strategy in the 1990s was to act as a protest bloc, refusing to work with other parties except for its rural ally, the Agrarian Party. This strategy continued during the period of the "Red Duma" (1995–99), when the party unsuccessfully attempted to block policies put forth by Yeltsin and his Duma allies. This strategy changed after the 1999 election, however, with the KPRF seeking to act like more of a normal party in partnership with Unity, the political party that later merged with Fatherland–All Russia (OVR) to become YeR.⁶⁰ This hurt the party in the eyes of its base, especially when it was revealed that in striving for power, the party had begun to sell spots on its party list to oligarchs.⁶¹ Unity and the KPRF came together in 2000 to exploit their combined majority status and distribute Duma committee chairmanships amongst themselves, eschewing the informal norm of proportional distribution among the parties. This power play backfired in 2002, when Unity and OVR merged to become YeR and effectively froze the KPRF out in the notorious "portfolio putsch," during which Communists were ousted from all Duma chairs by YeR and Duma speaker and KPRF member Gennady Seleznev was only able to maintain his position by defying his party (leading to his expulsion from party ranks).⁶² This disastrous attempt at partnership, combined with a terrible campaign, can be seen as one of the prime factors contributing to the electoral implosion of 2003.⁶³ March aptly summarizes the litany of mistakes made by the party leading up to the 2003 election:

[T]he [K]PRF's 2003–4 electoral debacle cannot be blamed on external forces alone. Indeed, the party leadership's ineptitude surpassed many previous efforts and is probably the primary reason. They tilted their party platform leftwards, losing many of the moderate pro-market elements of 1999, but simultaneously adopted ostentatious gestures of moderation. In the context of their leftward tilt their renewed emphasis on modernity (for example, through web-campaigning) looked cosmetic, and the disastrously unconcealed parachuting of dollar millionaires on to the party list opportunistic. After the arrest of Yukos boss Mikhail Khodorkovskii in October 2003 initiated a surge of anti-oligarch sentiment, the [K]PRF became the staunchest defender of the oligarchs, with one of the most anti-oligarch platforms. The effect of this paradox is shown by the collapse in the communists' previously steady electoral rating in the weeks following the arrest. Party members could not understand where the \$30 million dollars allegedly received had gone: local party campaigns were poorly managed and funded.⁶⁴

No longer feeling the need to accommodate the Communists, the Kremlin then decided to more vigorously exploit the KPRF's odd position within the Russian party system. This involved creating front parties like the Pensioner's Party, which was intended to draw off some of the KPRF's elderly electorate (a substantial portion, considering the KPRF's demographics are significantly older than the other parties').⁶⁵ The far more lucrative

approach lay in exploiting the nationalist side of the KPRF's appeal, which was on full display in the 2003 election when YeR established nationalist positions, as did the left-nationalist bloc, Motherland (Rodina), which is essentially subordinate to the Kremlin and YeR and has received support from the Kremlin since its founding.⁶⁶ Rodina was cobbled together with members of a previous nationalist party, the Congress of Russian Communities, politicians loyal to the Duma, and ex-Communists who had been ousted by the KPRF leadership for cooperating with YeR.⁶⁷ This strategy proved extremely effective, especially given that the Russian electorate had shifted heavily toward the national-patriotic side of the political continuum, and it resulted in a triumphant 37.6 percent plurality for YeR and a healthy 9 percent for Rodina. The continued presence of these parties (with Rodina now part of Just Russia) in the 2007 electoral landscape was one of the key reasons that the KPRF found it so difficult to change its strategy under the new electoral rules. It cannot shift decisively toward national-patriotism, because it will be outflanked by the LDPR and rendered redundant by Just Russia, and the Socialists might defect to the Agrarians, but it also cannot seek to shore up Socialist positions, because the nationalists would pick off a large portion of its traditional electorate.

Finally, the KPRF's prospects become even more dismal when one considers that this strategic paralysis has occurred at a time when the KPRF has experienced a decline even beyond the 2003 election's framework. According to William Clark, this is indicated by the facts that the KPRF was only able to win 12 of the 178 SMD seats in 2003 and that these winners did not win by virtue of their party affiliation, evidenced by their securing an average 37.6 percent of the vote, as opposed to the KPRF's average of 15.4 percent on the party list ballots in the same districts.⁶⁸ Moreover, for those KPRF candidates who lost their races, the terms of defeat have become worse with each election since 1995. In 1995, the KPRF candidate lost by an average 8.25 percent. This figure increased to 11.82 percent in 1999 and finally to 28.52 percent in 2003.⁶⁹ This widening gap also holds true for the party list portion of the vote, with KPRF trailing the leading party by an average 2 percent in 1995 and losing by a full 25 percent in 2003.⁷⁰ This decline cannot be solely explained by the success of Rodina/Just Russia, either. Although Rodina/Just Russia certainly ate into the Communist vote in urban centers (Rodina/Just Russia being an urban party), it received little support in the rural areas, where the KPRF has typically found its strongest support.⁷¹ Nevertheless, the Communists have seen their vote total similarly dwindle in the countryside, suggesting that there is more to their decline than Kremlin maneuvering. They cannot even rely on success in a supposed "Red Belt"—a number of regions in which the KPRF receives consistent support—because it seems that this Red Belt does not exist:

The geographic composition of the Red Belt has not been consistent over the three parliamentary elections under review here, and regions and districts once identified as "Red" have subsequently provided only meager support for the KPRF. Perhaps the best that can be said on the subject is that, if there really is a geographic clustering of KPRF support, the composition of these clusters has changed from election to election. Rather than there being a single Red Belt, perhaps it is more useful to think in the plural of "Red Belts" when comparing one election to another.⁷²

Instead, Clark finds that the most important indicator driving KPRF success is the strength (or rather, the weakness) of the economy; the party achieved its largest vote totals following the failings of shock therapy and the 1998 economic crisis. With the economy booming and the KPRF unable to find a strategic resolution to its electoral problems, it

appears likely that although it will remain the largest opposition party in the Duma under the new electoral rules, it will become increasingly irrelevant in the Russian party system, perhaps one day sinking into obscurity, as the regime desires.

The Predatory State

Understanding only the strategic decisions and political problems of the democratic parties and the KPRF under the new electoral rules cannot explain the outcomes of the Russian party system. Instead, one must understand how the system itself works, primarily through focusing on the dominant actors within the system—YeR and the Russian president. In many ways, the successful establishment of YeR as the party of power is ironic. During Yeltsin's tenure, each parliamentary election was marked by the Kremlin's attempt to build an appropriate party vehicle for the president's policies, and each of these attempts failed. When the 1999 election rolled around, a similar attempt was not initially made, and Unity was only created a couple of months before the election to act as a saboteur for the ambitions of OVR, an anti-Kremlin party of power run by Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov.⁷³ The Kremlin began trying to consolidate Unity as Putin's vehicle in the Duma only after Putin's popularity skyrocketed with the onset of the second Chechen War and Unity won a surprising 23 percent of the list vote. The success of this venture became increasingly assured as Unity absorbed OVR, ousted the Communists from the Duma committees, and began building a mass membership (albeit through a coercive campaign) that hit 300,000 in 2003 and is now claimed to be over 1 million.⁷⁴ With its 2003 electoral victory, YeR strengthened its grip on power by assuming command of all twenty-nine Duma chairmanships and all but three posts within the government itself.⁷⁵ YeR's overwhelming 2007 triumph only served to further consolidate this position of power.

This was only the public face of YeR and Putin's triumph, however. The real key behind it was what Russian political technologists euphemistically call *administrative resource*, which can be thought of as extralegal or informal means of securing electoral success.⁷⁶ The most visible manifestation of this approach was the 2003 shutout of opposition parties from television (the state now controls the three major national channels) and the strategic denial of certain candidates' registration and the refusal of their right to stand for election on the flimsiest of pretenses. The differential access to media, along with a general lack of free political discourse, was one of the key criticisms that the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) levied against the authorities in the 2003–4 election cycle.⁷⁷ As White notes, this dynamic was also in effect during the 1999 election, as the dueling parties of power (YeR and OVR) dominated the electoral landscape, generally marginalizing smaller programmatic parties that relied on media access to publicize their ideological platforms.⁷⁸ In 2003, this lack of media access was further compounded by other uses of administrative resource, most obviously in the case of the Yukos affair—Putin's crackdown on the disloyal oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky. Yukos was the source of around half of Yabloko's campaign funding (the KPRF also enjoyed some financial support from the oil magnate), and when Khodorkovsky was brought down, the party lost this funding stream and the campaigning materials that were seized from Yukos's public relations company.⁷⁹ The political damage caused by their association with the disgraced oligarch, and more mundane techniques employed by the state and the party of power, such as illegally using government offices as campaign resources and outright fraud (a parallel vote count found that Yabloko and the SPS crossed the 5 percent threshold), effectively doomed the opposition.⁸⁰

These strategies were employed again in the December election and in the municipal election held earlier in 2007 (widely seen as a dress rehearsal for the Duma election). Yabloko was banned from the St. Petersburg election (one of its traditional strongholds), and the SPS was denied registration in a number of regions and was probably subject to fraud in the Moscow election.⁸¹ The OSCE was not able to send in a full election observation team for the 2007 Duma election as it had for the 2003 election (the Russian government refused to provide entry visas), but the conclusions of the limited observation team sent in essentially mirrored the 2003 report (prompting the pro-Putin youth group Nashi to hilariously file an antidefamation suit against the European international government organization).⁸² A domestic Russian nongovernmental organization, Golos, also followed the election and compiled a list of complaints that voters submitted by telephone. These complaints include fairly widespread reports of illegal campaigning, irregularities in voter lists, voter coercion, and a number of other issues, such as lack of privacy during voting and bribery.⁸³ Although any electoral process is bound to be vulnerable to such irregularities (even in advanced democracies), past post-Soviet election experiences make it clear that this is not some one-off occurrence, but, rather, a consistent and endemic trait of the Russian political system.

I previously discussed another approach that the Kremlin employed in the context of Rodina/Just Russia leeching KPRF votes, but this practice has expanded into a genuine attempt to build an “opposition” bloc that is also beholden to the president. In late 2006, Rodina merged with two smaller parties to form Just Russia and elected Putin ally Sergey Mironov as its head.⁸⁴ With active state support meant to establish Just Russia as the major party on the left, the new bloc performed very well in the municipal election, with its 15 percent of the vote trailing only YeR (45 percent) and the KPRF (16 percent), and it also succeeded in gaining the 7 percent necessary in the Duma election.⁸⁵ Yeltsin also tried to build a loyal two-party system in 1995, but he did not enjoy the same resources and popularity that Putin possesses, so the attempt failed miserably.⁸⁶ The new electoral rules can be seen not as an attempt to establish a true party system, but as an attempt to aggrandize the state-linked parties (YeR, Just Russia, LDPR) while marginalizing the real opposition.⁸⁷ This marginalization is further aided by the “harassment parties” (*mukhi* in Russian, or “flies”), which are not intended to gain representation as in the case of Just Russia but are instead designed to undermine opposition parties, usually by either adopting similar names or programs meant to confuse voters or by publicizing *kompromat*—compromising materials that can be employed against political opponents—on actual opposition candidates.⁸⁸ All of this is part and parcel of the type of system that the Kremlin has sought to construct around the YeR’s success.

Given all of this, how can YeR be explained as a political party? Although its use as a *party of power* is obvious, it nevertheless needs to attract votes to be effective (a difficult thing for past parties of power). One possible approach to defining YeR is to consider it a *catch-all party* in the way that Otto Kirchheimer envisioned. According to Kirchheimer, the *catch-all party* emerges as a result of the need for major political parties to marshal enough votes to gain power, and this entails eschewing the narrow interests of past cadre or mass parties in favor of a broader strategy.⁸⁹ Following Steven B. Wolinetz, this manifests itself in bidding for the support of diverse interest groups in society, and emphasizing the character of party leaders, which fits in well with YeR’s appeals to traditional Russian values and Putin’s wisdom (even though Putin himself is not a member).⁹⁰ The only

problem with considering YeR a catch-all party is that Kirchheimer himself specifically envisioned the catch-all party as a part of the evolutionary process in Western Europe, as cadre parties responded to new electoral incentives.⁹¹ Because Russia has not had the same history of party development as Western Europe, concepts such as catch-all parties must be considered as ideal types with specific features, rather than as outcomes of historically contingent political evolution.

Furthermore, the development of catch-all parties necessarily relies on what Kirchheimer called “de-ideologization,”⁹² or what Wolinetz would consider the fluidity of positions and policies consistent with a purely vote-seeking party.⁹³ YeR probably takes this lack of ideology a bit too far, as demonstrated by YeR leaders’ statements that the ideology of the party is the total lack of ideology⁹⁴ and the fact that YeR voters typically have no idea what the positions of the party are beyond support of Putin.⁹⁵ There have been recent efforts by the party to address this ideological vacuum, but they have met with only mixed success. The seventh YeR party congress, in 2006, attempted to adopt a more ideological party program, but the divisions that erupted between party factions led to this effort being abandoned.⁹⁶ The next major effort was made by the Kremlin’s chief ideologist, Vladislav Surkov, in promoting the concept of *sovereign democracy*, the idea of a socially oriented democracy in which the state’s power and its institutions are supreme.⁹⁷ It is hard to see how this ideology is anything but a rhetorical fig leaf; it barely differs from Putin’s previous statements on state power, and YeR’s leaders themselves did not adopt sovereign democracy as a party ideology until Surkov’s deputy, Vyacheslav Volodin, convinced them through behind-the-scenes lobbying. The economic elements of the ideology have been de-emphasized as YeR has continued to focus on an “amorphous ideological platform of ‘social conservatism.’”⁹⁸ Gelman argues that part of the reason that YeR has resisted the development of a coherent party ideology is because “[t]his ideology (or lack thereof) gave [YeR] wide room for political maneuvering that was not available to the disunited segments of the opposition.”⁹⁹ Another way to think of YeR is as a *cartel party*, as described by Richard Katz and Peter Mair.¹⁰⁰ A *cartel party* caters to a similar sort of diffuse electorate as a catch-all party does, but it largely relies on its relationship with the state, through funding and administrative support, as a means to success.¹⁰¹ This is not necessarily inconsistent with being a catch-all party, because, according to Kirchheimer, a catch-all party oscillates precariously between its role as a critic of the status quo and as a support structure for the political establishment.¹⁰² The shift to cartelization simply requires moving another step in this direction by further marginalizing the party on the ground in favor of the party in public office through subventions and state resources.¹⁰³ This seems more consistent with the Russian political system, because Russian parties (except the Communists) have never really had much in the way of parties on the ground, so the shift of staff to parliamentary and federal offices occurred from the beginning.¹⁰⁴ Moreover, it makes sense in the case of YeR, considering the aforementioned importance of administrative resource, which, although not capital in the sense that Katz and Mair intend, also indicates the interpenetration of party and state. This is not to say that Unity or YeR have not been state funded—they probably have been—just that money is not necessarily the most important force at play here.¹⁰⁵ The only real problem with the cartel party paradigm is that Katz and Mair largely envision cartel parties as smaller parties in coalitions that have evolved out of the Western European experience. One way around this would be to reconceptualize cartel parties around Wolinetz’s notion of office-seeking par-

ties, which allows for the presence of larger parties built atop patron-client relationships, or in terms of Blondel's *partitocracy*.¹⁰⁶ Katz and Mair's concern that cartel parties are vulnerable to challenges from antisystem or far-right parties is less relevant here, because far-right parties, such as the LDPR, have been integrated into the broader cartelization of the party system under YeR.¹⁰⁷ YeR's role as a catch-all/cartel hybrid and its ability to limit the options available to opposition parties rely on what many analysts have termed Russia's "super-presidency."¹⁰⁸ According to Anna Likhtenchtein and Natalia Yargomskaya, in a system in which a single actor (the president) is so dominant that all other actors cannot prevent him from implementing his policies, the parliament is undermined as an independent power center and becomes dependent on the executive branch.¹⁰⁹ The Duma's perceived lack of importance is partially captured in Putin's proposal to create an appointed Public Chamber that debates legislation and then forwards it to the Duma for rubber-stamping.¹¹⁰ This was the case even before the 2005 electoral reform, although regional political machines were able to mobilize support for candidates in the SMD portion of the ballot.¹¹¹ By the 2003 election, Putin had managed to centralize enough power in the federal executive that regional leaders could not risk opposing him and, in some of the cases when they attempted to, candidates the Kremlin judged unacceptable were simply denied registration or YeR was able to mobilize support even in the face of regional opposition.¹¹² Only in a few cases did regional opposition candidates make races competitive, and even this was not usually enough to defeat the center-anointed candidate.¹¹³ The electoral reforms, which eliminated SMD seats, and the post-Beslan hostage crisis reform, which allows the president to appoint regional leaders, have succeeded in removing this token resistance from the electoral arena.

If we accept Henry Hale's metaphor of the electoral market, the 2005 reforms finally pushed independent politicians linked to regional political machines and financial-industrial groups out of the electoral market in favor of parties, with an extraordinarily uneven playing field dominated by Kremlin-aligned parties.¹¹⁴ With these substitutes removed from the scene, the basis of competition shifted to the preexisting stocks of ideational and administrative capital possessed by each of the parties. Because YeR and other client parties act as conduits for the immense administrative capital of the super-presidency, opposition parties that rely primarily on ideational capital (the democratic parties and the KPRF) are effectively pushed out of the arena, because they cannot possibly compete. In this sense, the Kremlin has become the hegemonic electoral substitute, with Putin's stamp of approval acting as the guarantor of electoral success. The strategic failures of the opposition parties are not the only reason for their lack of electoral success, as the municipal election demonstrated earlier this year. The nature of the Russian party system, as epitomized by YeR and its client parties, and the institution of the super-presidency effectively limit the choices available to the opposition parties and their access to resources, such as the media, which may serve to publicize those choices.

Conclusion: Toward a "Virtual" Party System

The electoral reforms that Russia embarked on in 2005—eliminating SMD seats, raising the threshold for party representation, and more strictly regulating party registration—would seem to be exactly the kind of institutional changes that would change the behavior of political parties. This would appear to be even more so the case for opposition parties like Yabloko, the SPS, and the KPRF, all of whom needed to overcome poor per-

formances in the 2003 Duma election. However, despite these incentives for change, all of these parties failed to adapt their strategies to the new situation. The reason that Yabloko and the SPS failed to merge into a unified democratic party are the different ideologies and constituencies of the two parties, but the leadership's lingering personal feuds and Yabloko's negative past experiences with compromise and coalition-building also played a prominent role. In the KPRF's case, the tension between the party's two groups of core supporters, nationalists and socialists, caused organizational stagnation because of the fear that shifts in either direction would allow outside parties to pick off portions of the KPRF's traditional electorate. Thus, even though the incentives of reform were considerable for all three parties, the impediments to change were greater.

In the context of Russia's party system, however, these failings on the part of the democratic parties and KPRF may ultimately prove to be unimportant. This is because of the hegemonic role that the presidency and YeR, along with its client parties, play in shaping electoral outcomes and limiting the choices of opposition parties. The regime accomplishes this through the use of administrative resource, which works to promote the fortunes of favored parties while cutting off media access or preventing opposition candidates from registering. Andrew Wilson has aptly termed this phenomenon "virtual politics,"¹¹⁵ whereas Leonid Fishman argues that because Russia has not had adequate time to develop partisan cleavages of the type found in Western Europe, the regime has directed its sponsored parties towards "simulating" normal ideologies.¹¹⁶ This simulation has been the Kremlin's solution to the simultaneous emergence of the coordination problems that developed gradually in the West European context, and it has resulted in a partitocratic party system that effectively undermines the fortunes of programmatic parties. In the fifteen years since the Russian Federation's founding, the party system has moved from a kind of *feckless pluralism* to *dominant power politics*, to use the terminology of Gelman and Thomas Carothers.¹¹⁷ It is not a coincidence that this dichotomy almost perfectly mirrors Dahl's concepts of *competitive oligarchy* and *inclusive hegemony*, with the latter representing a decline in the viability of organized political opposition.¹¹⁸

Virtuality, or simulation, has a tendency toward expansion, as is demonstrated by the increasing domination of YeR and client parties like Just Russia and the LDPR. This is consistent with party theory; Kirchheimer speculated that one of the side effects of catch-allism was that it could spread to other parties under the pressure of electoral competition.¹¹⁹ Moreover, Katz and Mair were concerned that the emergence of cartel parties might cause the decline of real opposition through what they call the "governmentalization" of political parties.¹²⁰ Both of these possible outcomes were posited as a result of benign evolutionary processes in the European context, but in Russia, they have been driven by a conscious top-down strategy. If this strategy proves successful beyond the Putin era, it may produce a "simulated" moderate multipartism (a party on the left, center-left, center-right, and right) without having to deal with the inconvenience of actual opposition parties. Regardless of strategy or choice, parties like Yabloko, the SPS, and the KPRF will find themselves increasingly marginalized in the Kremlin's "virtual" party system.

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NOTES

1. YeR won 64.1 percent of the vote (and 70 percent of the seats), whereas the Communist Party received 11.6 percent (12.7 percent of the seats), the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) received 8.2 percent (8.9 percent of the seats), and the new bloc, Just Russia, received 7.8 percent (8.4 percent of the seats). All other parties fell below the 7 percent threshold and did not receive representation, including the democratic parties Yabloko, which received 1.6 percent of the vote, and Union of Right Forces (SPS), which received 1.0 percent of the vote.

2. See Centre for the Study of Public Policy, "Duma Election Law: Details," RussiaVotes.org, University of Aberdeen, http://www.russiavotes.org/duma/duma_election_law.php (accessed April 18, 2007).

3. I use the term *opposition parties*, even though Vladimir Gelman has characterized each of the three listed parties—Yabloko, the SPS, and the KPRF—as "semioopposition parties" because of each party's relationship with the regime at some point in their existence. Although this was certainly the case during Putin's first term, all three clearly moved into oppositional terrain during his second term. See Vladimir Gelman, "Political Opposition in Russia: Is It Becoming Extinct?" *Russian Politics and Law* 43, no. 3 (2005): 25–50.

4. Jack Bielasiak, "Party Competition in Emerging Democracies: Representation and Effectiveness in Post-Communism and Beyond," *Democratization* 12, no. 3 (2005): 334–35.

5. *Ibid.*, 335, 340, 342.

6. *Ibid.*, 348.

7. Mark Blyth and Richard S. Katz, "From Catch-All Politics to Cartelisation: The Political Economy of the Cartel Party," *West European Politics* 28, no. 1 (2005): 34–35.

8. *Ibid.*, 38.

9. Robert Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1971).

10. Hans Oversloot and Ruben Verheul, "Managing Democracy: Political Parties and the State in Russia," *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 22, no. 3 (2006): 391–92. Others also make this point.

11. Jean Blondel, "Party Government, Patronage, and Party Decline in Western Europe," in *Political Parties: Old Concepts and New Challenges*, ed. Richard Gunther, José Ramón Montéro, and Juan J. Linz (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2002), 235–37.

12. *Ibid.*, 238–42.

13. Oversloot and Verheul, "Managing Democracy," 394.

14. *Ibid.*, 400.

15. Vladimir Gelman, "From 'Feckless Pluralism' to 'Dominant Power Politics'? The Transformation of Russia's Party System," *Democratization* 13, no. 4 (2006): 553.

16. Blondel, "Party Government, Patronage, and Party Decline in Western Europe," 243–44.

17. *Ibid.*, 254.

18. Oversloot and Verheul, "Managing Democracy," 392.

19. David White, "Going Their Own Way: The Yabloko Party's Opposition to Unification," *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 21, no. 4 (2005): 471.

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21. Henry Hale, "Yabloko and the Challenge of Building a Liberal Party in Russia," *Europe-Asia Studies* 56, no. 7 (2004): 999.

22. David White, "Going Their Own Way," 477.

23. "Russian Liberal SPS, Yabloko Parties to Run for Duma Separately," *RIA Novosti*, April 1, 2007, <http://en.rian.ru/russia/20070401/62909119.html> (accessed April 18, 2007).

24. David White, "Going Their Own Way," 464–65.

25. *Ibid.*, 464.

26. *Ibid.*, 466.

27. Hale, "Yabloko and the Challenge of Building a Liberal Party," 1015.

28. Stephen White, "Russians and Their Party System," *Demokratizatsiya* 14, no. 1 (2006): 17.

29. David White, "Going Their Own Way," 467.

30. *Ibid.*, 477–78.

31. Paul T. Christensen, "The Noncommunist Left, Social Constituencies, and Political Strategies in Russia," *Demokratizatsiya* 7, no. 1 (1999): 136.
32. *Ibid.*, 138.
33. David White, "Going Their Own Way," 470.
34. Hale, "The Challenge of Building a Liberal Party," 1013.
35. The idea of *ideational capital* versus *administrative capital* in the Russian party system comes from *Ibid.*, 996.
36. *Ibid.*, 1001.
37. *Ibid.*, 1002.
38. *Ibid.*, 1005–7.
39. *Ibid.*, 1011.
40. Yusupzhon Abdurakhmanov, "Ideological Orientations of the Russian Electorate in State Duma Elections," *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 6, no. 2 (2005): 210–12.
41. *Ibid.*, 220.
42. Stephen White, "Russians and Their Party System," 11–12.
43. *Ibid.*, 15.
44. *Ibid.*, 11.
45. Abdurakhmanov, "Ideological Orientations of the Russian Electorate in State Duma Elections," 221.
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48. William A. Clark, "Communist Devolution: The Electoral Decline of the KPRF," *Problems of Post-Communism* 53, no. 1 (2006): 23.
49. Pasyukova, "The Communist Party in Contemporary Russia," 246.
50. Stephen White, "Russians and Their Party System," 17.
51. Pasyukova, "The Communist Party in Contemporary Russia," 242.
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53. *Ibid.*, 242.
54. Joan B. Urban, "The Communist Parties of Russia and Ukraine on the Eve of the 1999 Elections: Similarities, Contrasts, and Interactions," *Demokratizatsiya* 7, no. 1 (1999): 113.
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61. Stephen White, "Russians and Their Party System," 17.
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63. Pasyukova, "The Communist Party in Contemporary Russia," 240.
64. March, "The Contemporary Russian Left after Communism," 437.
65. Abdurakhmanov, "Ideological Orientations of the Russian Electorate in State Duma Elections," 215.
66. Pasyukova, "The Communist Party in Contemporary Russia," 244.
67. Abdurakhmanov, "Ideological Orientations of the Russian Electorate in State Duma Elections," 219.
68. Clark, "Communist Devolution," 15–16.
69. *Ibid.*, 19.
70. *Ibid.*

71. Ibid., 22.
72. Ibid., 21.
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91. Kirchheimer, "The Catch-All Party," 52.
92. Ibid., 55.
93. Wolinetz, "Beyond the Catch-All Party," 151.
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104. Ibid., 123.
105. Hale, "The Origins of United Russia," 182.
106. Wolinetz, "Beyond the Catch-All Party," 152; Blondel, "Party Government, Patronage, and Party Decline in Western Europe."
107. Katz and Mair, "The Ascendancy of the Party in Public Office," 134.
108. See, for example, Mark Smith, "The Putin Presidency: Establishing Superpresidentialism," *Conflict Studies Research Center*, E110, February 2002.
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Transliterations: *Demokratizatsiya* employs the following journalistic transliteration style for the Russian language: я = ya, ю = yu, х = kh, ш = sh, щ = shch, ь, ъ = (omitted), ы = y, ı = ts, ж = zh, ч = ch, ё = e or yo.

- When the **Russian letter E** appears as the first letter in a word, in most cases it will be transliterated as Ye: Yeltsin, Yekaterinburg, Yedinstvo, Yegor.
- Russian **proper names** that end in ий, should be y, rather than iy or ii: Valery, Yevgeny, Dmitry. Exception: Yuri. Those ending in ой, ей, ай remain as oi, ei, ai.
- Use **Russian political divisions** by name whenever possible, such as oblast, krai, okrug, uyezd, obkom, etc., instead of region, administrative region, district, etc.
- **Acronyms** must be spelled out the first time they are used and, with few exceptions such as CPSU, must be written in the original language. Example: Military-Industrial Complex—VPK, Lithuanian Communist Party—LKP, Communist Party of Russia—KPRF
- The first time a person’s name appears in an article, please include **first name**, even though in Russia it is not customary. First names and the names of **publishers** should also be used in endnotes.