

The Trade-offs between Security and Civil Liberties in Russia's War on Terror: The Regional Dimension

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Abstract: This article focuses on Russia's antiterrorist campaign in 2000–04 to discern and analyze dynamics in the trade-offs between security¹ and liberties. An analysis of these trade-offs in four separate regions of the Russian Federation demonstrates that enhancing the powers of the security apparatus at the expense of liberties may help reduce the threat of terrorism in the short-term, as local agents of terror divert part of their operations to freer regions. However, such a strategy eventually backfires at the local level, as suppression of liberties generates political resentment, one of the root causes of terrorism.² The repressive laws and practices presented by the authorities as the price the public has to pay in the war on terror can bring only limited short-term gains in this war, while producing a lasting detrimental effect on freedoms and civil liberties in Russia. Moreover, given the fact that Russia is in a state of transition, the intended and unintended effects of the authorities' antiterror policies in the researched period, and beyond, could determine the course of Russia's political development.

Key words: civil liberties, political violence, Putin, regions, Russia, terrorism

This article begins by outlining our methodology, including an explanation of the criteria used to select the research period and the regions³ to be studied, as well as a list of the watch points used to evaluate the scale of terrorist threats, the effectiveness of authorities' responses to these threats, and the impact on civil liberties.

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This article has an overview of the horizontal escalation of the terrorist threat in Russia, the authorities' responses to this escalation, and the impact of their responses on liberties in 2000–04. The empirical data covering the regions in question—the Chechen Republic (Chechnya), the Republic of Dagestan, Moscow, and St. Petersburg—came not only from open sources, but also from interviews with experts and officials, inquiries with relevant government agencies, and extensive field research.

This article explains why official antiterrorist efforts largely failed in three of the four regions over the researched period, and has policy recommendations on what authorities should do to break the vicious circle of suppression and resentment. The recommendations are followed by appendixes that list and describe the most significant terrorist attacks in the Chechen Republic, the Republic of Dagestan, Moscow, and St. Petersburg in 2000–04.

Methodology

Definition of Terrorist Attack

There are differences in the expert and academic communities as to what constitutes a terrorist attack. This article uses the definition that is common among experts on this subject: an act of political violence that inflicts harm on noncombatants, but is designed to intimidate broader audiences, including official authorities, and is an instrument of achieving certain political or other goals.

Researched Period

The terrorism threat in Russia made a qualitative leap in 1999, when a wave of apartment building bombings rocked three Russian cities, including the capital. We chose, however, to analyze the period of 2000–04, because it coincides with President Vladimir Putin's first term in office.⁴ Although Putin formulated the executive branch's antiterror policy after becoming director of the Federal Security Service (FSB) in 1998, he did not have the opportunity to implement his vision until he was elected president in the spring of 2000.

During his first term, Putin slowly reversed the policies of his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin. Yeltsin preferred a decentralized administrative model for ruling the country, giving broad powers to the regions, while largely avoiding the suppression of civil liberties—except in Chechnya—even during the first Chechen war. Putin, by contrast, believes that only a highly centralized government can prevent the disintegration of Russia at the hands of North Caucasian separatists and terrorists. He continues to act on this belief, staunchly implementing a national security model for fighting terrorism that suppresses civil liberties for the collective good.

Researched Regions

The research in this article focuses on two Russian territories—the Chechen Republic and the Republic of Dagestan—and two cities—Moscow and St. Petersburg.

Dagestan and Chechnya are paired together because both suffer from terrorism and a suppression of civil liberties. Both republics are largely Muslim and their political, economic, and social realities are shaped by clan rivalries. Both are behind

the majority of other Russian regions in terms of economic and social developments and both have a mountainous terrain that is advantageous for terrorists.

Moscow and St. Petersburg are paired together because these cities are the largest business, cultural, and administrative centers in Russia. They outperform other territories in terms of economic and social developments. Their residents enjoy a relatively high level of freedom. Both cities have a large community of people from the North Caucasus, but only in Moscow have people from this community assisted in organizing terrorist attacks. St. Petersburg has not experienced a terrorist attack, even though it has a number of symbolic targets comparable to Moscow's.

One factor that has made St. Petersburg thus far immune to terrorism emanating from the North Caucasus is that the community of North Caucasus natives in St. Petersburg is more conservative and less transient than the community of natives in Moscow, as the city offers fewer opportunities for those looking to make quick money and leave.

In comparison, there are more opportunists in Moscow. They are more prepared to sacrifice the opportunity to return to the city if asked to help their compatriots in some illegal operation, as they are neither financially—nor in any other way—attached to the city in the long term.⁵

Watch Points

This article uses the following watch points to measure the level of a terrorist threat, responses to the threat, and the level of individual and collective civil liberties in the aforementioned four regions of the Russian Federation:⁶

- the number and scale of terrorist attacks;
- the number and strength of terrorist groups and other violent groups, as well as the dynamics of their motivation and capabilities;
- the number and strength of law enforcement agencies tasked with fighting terrorist organizations and other violent groups, local antiterror and security laws used by law enforcement agencies in the fight and their practices;
- and the level of individual liberties, which include the freedoms of speech, expression, assembly, movement, and the right to impartial justice and suitable living conditions.

Russia's Antiterror Campaign: Key Trends in 2000–04

Russians elected Vladimir Putin as their president in 2000 partly, if not mostly, because he promised to curb terrorism in the wake of the apartment bombings that shocked the nation less than a year before. Then, both Putin and part of the traumatized public equated terrorism with Chechen separatism, and it was the latter that the Russian army successfully defeated during the first years of Putin's presidency. However, while putting an end to the self-proclaimed Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Russian armor did not eradicate terrorism there. As Russia's Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov observed in 2004, army units fighting terrorist groups is "like chasing flies with a sledgehammer."⁷

Moreover, terrorist networks, once based mostly in Chechnya and dominated by ethnic Chechens, have now proliferated across the North Caucasus, with

natives of neighboring republics forming their own cells to fight local and federal authorities. This trend was accompanied by the formation of tactical and strategic alliances among local and foreign jihadist elements, separatists, members of organized crime rings, and “avengers”—those whose relatives have been killed or abused by law-enforcement and military troops. People from different republics, not only the North Caucasus,⁸ but also ethnic Russians,⁹ have come together to fight a guerilla war and stage terrorist acts in the hopes of driving Russia out of the region. Many of these militants dream of establishing an Islamic state in the region and beyond. Together, they have bombed Russian cities and staged horrendous terrorist attacks, such as the Beslan massacre in North Ossetia in September 2004.¹⁰

While Russian authorities’ count of terrorist attacks is flawed (it includes attacks on combatants and excludes some politically motivated assassinations), it is still useful in tracing the dynamics of the terrorism threat in Russia. According to the Emergency Situations Ministry, more than 650 people died in what it defined as terrorist attacks in the first eleven months of 2004, two and a half times more than the number of those killed in such attacks over the same period in 2003.¹¹

A cursory glance at the terrorism statistics for the four researched regions (see appendix) demonstrates that the number of terrorist attacks increased during the researched period. Incorporating terrorist attacks in other regions into these statistics would reveal the escalating trend more dramatically.

The number of casualties from terrorist attacks also grew, but not steadily (see appendix). However, adding casualties from terrorist attacks in North Ossetia, Ingushetia, and the Voronezh region, which were ostensibly related to the insurgency in Chechnya, would demonstrate a steady rise in casualties during the researched period.

While escalating their attacks, the underground networks operating in the North Caucasus have also enhanced their capability to carry out conventional operations, staging devastating attacks in Ingushetia’s largest city, Nazran, and in the Chechen capital of Grozny in the second half of 2004.¹²

Almost every major terrorist attack in Russia has sparked a debate among policymakers on how to stem the tide of terrorism. With Putin’s ascent to the presidency, and the subsequent consolidation of the executive and legislative branches, this debate ended with calls for new laws boosting law enforcement’s powers at the expense of individual liberties.¹³ Even the Beslan massacre failed to convince federal authorities that terrorism cannot be reined in by mechanical increases in law-enforcement agencies’ budgets and powers.¹⁴

Admittedly, the Kremlin’s post-Beslan policy was more multifaceted than previous responses to terrorist attacks. The authorities, for example, attempted to identify the root causes of this horrific act rather than dismiss it as an act of fanaticism. Overall, however, the government continued to rely on a heavy-handed approach, calling for the further centralization of the Kremlin’s power at the expense of regional administrations and strengthening its coercive forces (i.e., law-enforcement agencies) at the expense of individual liberties. Instead of being subjected to fundamental, systemic reform, the law-enforcement agencies are

routinely given more power and money in the hope that their abilities to prevent terrorist attacks will improve.

Among other measures, the Putin administration has scrapped the popular election of governors, eliminated single-mandate districts in national and regional parliamentary elections, and restricted media coverage of terrorist acts. While submitting these and other measures in the form of bills to the Parliament, President Putin and members of his government also put pressure on regional elites and the mass media to toe the Kremlin's line on what it describes as a "war against international terrorism."¹⁵ For instance, Putin accused one of Russia's national channels of making money on blood after NTV broadcast from the Dubrovka theater in Moscow seconds before a

commando raid.

Following that terrorist act, the Russian Parliament passed a raft of amendments to federal laws on media and on terrorism that would have imposed severe restrictions on coverage of terrorist acts. Putin vetoed the bill in November 2002, but he made it clear that he was upset with the coverage.

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Russia's leading broadcast media responded in April 2003 by adopting a convention that set strict rules for covering terrorist acts and antiterrorist operations.¹⁶ The coverage of the Beslan massacre differed from the Dubrovka attack. NTV was the only national channel that provided almost nonstop coverage of the tragedy in Beslan, where more than 1,200 hostages were held by a group of terrorists. One of NTV's anchors, Ruslan Gusarov, humbly asked a security officer in a live interview if the official thought NTV had committed any violations in its coverage.

The law on countering extremism has become a landmark in terms of expanding law enforcement's powers in the day-to-day war on terror. The law, passed in July 2002, has such a broad definition of terrorism that law-enforcement agencies can apply it to a broad spectrum of political and religious organizations and individuals. The law bans the dissemination of information that "substantiates or justifies ethnic or racial superiority,"¹⁷ regardless of whether this information poses a threat. This provision allows prosecutors to classify many religious texts as extremist material.¹⁸ This provision obstructs an individual's right to collect and disseminate information.¹⁹

The law also defines any activity that "undermine[s] the security of the Russian Federation"²⁰ as extremist. Law-enforcement agencies have used this vaguely worded definition to harass environmental whistle-blowers who have exposed cases of toxic and radioactive waste dumped by the Russian military. This provision can also be used to prosecute anyone who harshly criticizes the conduct of individual officials or the authorities and, thus, it obstructs the freedom of speech.

Another provision of this law expands the range of groups and individuals who can be prosecuted for assisting in extremist activities. This assistance can be defined very broadly, covering, for instance, those whose only relationship with a terrorist is as a landlord, or even someone who provides funds or office equipment without knowing that they would be used for extremist activities. Such people can be identified as extremists and found liable under this law.

The law also allows the authorities to liquidate any organization suspected of extremist activities, violating citizens' right to association. The Prosecutor General's Office or Justice Ministry can find an organization in violation of the law and issue it a warning. If the warning remains unheeded, either agency can issue a second warning and, then, go to court and ask for the organization to be shut down. The law also allows prosecutors to suspend the organization's activities without a warrant, but the organization can appeal such a decision.

The procedure for closing a media outlet is very similar to shutting down an organization suspected of extremism. A warning may be issued in response to a publication or broadcast that supervisory authorities consider to be "substantiating or justifying a need for extremist activities."²¹ There have been cases when law-enforcement and security agencies have gone beyond this wide range of powers granted to them by the antiextremism law and other legislation.²²

Two other key bills passed in 2000–04 by the Parliament and signed into law by President Putin as part of the legal response to the escalation of terrorism include numerous amendments to the Criminal Code and the Criminal Procedures Code and give longer sentences to convicted terrorists. These amendments allow police to keep terrorism suspects in custody for up to thirty days without charging them. In comparison, those suspected of other crimes can be detained for up to three days without being charged. This measure clearly violates the freedom of movement and an individual's right to impartial justice, allowing investigators to put more pressure on a suspect in custody and giving them time to produce evidence in cases where they lack it.²³ In 2004 the State Duma passed an initial draft of a new and more repressive Law on Countering Terrorism that replaced the existing 1998 law. The bill would allow the FSB to declare a state of emergency in an area threatened by terrorist danger for up to sixty days, based on information—even if unverified—about preparations for a terrorist attack.²⁴

Law-enforcement officials in the North Caucasus have relied on existing laws in their efforts to fight terrorism. They also abused their powers by cracking down on dissent that is unrelated to terrorism, as demonstrated in the Dagestan section. In Chechnya, law-enforcement agencies have conducted extrajudicial executions during the shift from large-scale operations to seek-and-destroy patrols.²⁵

During the researched period, Russian authorities gave the law-enforcement and defense agencies tacit approval to assassinate suspected terrorist leaders both in Russia and abroad. While the FSB did not hesitate to assume responsibility for killing Jordanian-born warlord Khattab in Chechnya, no Russian agency would admit to killing the vice president of Chechnya's self-proclaimed separatist government, Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, in Qatar in February 2004. While refusing to assume responsibility, Russian authorities demanded, and succeeded in obtain-

ing, the transfer of two Russian agents convicted of the assassination back to Russia under a Qatari court order.

Overall, despite some targeted operations, law enforcement's response to the escalation of terrorist attacks and conventional guerilla operations remains excessive and indiscriminate.

There should be no doubt that the federal authorities are aware of the scale of abuses suffered by residents of the North Caucasus at the hands of local authorities and law enforcement, especially in Chechnya, Dagestan, and Ingushetia.

However, the Kremlin ignores these abuses in a tacit trade-off, whereby Moscow provides weapons, funds, and a legitimacy that comes with being a government employee while local authorities demonstrate loyalty by brutally suppressing political dissent. However, this arrangement is failing. The dynamics of terrorist networks in these three regions and several neighboring areas in the North Caucasus clearly demonstrated in the researched period that they were on the brink of becoming failed republics. Local leaders are as abusive and corrupt as leaders in the 1990s, but they are also becoming increasingly impotent. They cannot curb the escalation of terrorism.²⁶

Paradoxically, federal and local authorities, while broadening their powers to react and, to a far lesser extent, interdict terrorist groups, do relatively little to deter terrorism, especially through economic and financial development. Companies and organizations whose associates are found guilty or charged with terrorism can expect investigations into their finances. As of 2005, Russian law prohibited the indiscriminate confiscation of property of convicted terrorists, which could be a much more effective tool for discouraging potential sponsors or accomplices than fines or liquidation of companies. One reason such a repressive measure had not been introduced as of 2005 is that the Russian public largely opposes confiscation, fearing extension of this measure to other crimes. Yet the Prosecutor General's Office and other law-enforcement agencies repeatedly called for the reintroduction of confiscation in the researched period.²⁷

In fact, the collateral damage inflicted on liberties and freedoms in this war on terror raises questions about the potential for further damage. One question is whether the authorities are striving to tighten their grip on the Russian public, which is, on one hand, becoming less sensitive to the growing death toll in the ongoing war on terror in the North Caucasus,²⁸ but, on the other, is prepared for a further curtailment of liberties if it stems terrorism. A nationwide poll conducted by the independent Levada Center after the Beslan tragedy revealed that 58 percent believe that the moratorium on capital punishment should be lifted. Another 26 percent responded that terrorist's relatives should be punished. Thirty-three percent would ban Chechens from either traveling or living in Russian cities.²⁴ A nationwide poll on terrorism conducted by the state-controlled All-Russia Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM) revealed an even greater preparedness to sacrifice freedoms for security. The September 2004 poll showed that 84 percent would favor the execution of terrorists even though a moratorium on capital punishment is a prerequisite for Russia's membership in the Council of Europe (CoE). Another 44 percent said they would support media censorship to support the war

on terror. Thirty-five percent would support tougher ID checks, phone tapping, and body searches.³⁰

Thirty-three percent indicated they would support the suspension of opposition political organizations to fight terrorism. Such a formidable percentage demonstrates how incumbent officials can use the war on terror when running for reelection.

The repressive laws and practices presented by authorities as the price that the public has to pay in the war on terror can bring only limited short-term gains in this war, while producing a lasting detrimental effect on freedoms and civil liberties in Russia. Moreover, given the fact that Russia is in a state of transition, the intended and unintended effects of the authorities' antiterror policies could determine the course of Russia's political development.

The case studies below discuss both the authorities' legal responses and their antiterror practices, as well as the impact of these on the four regions.

Case Studies

The Case of Chechnya

Russian authorities insist that an antiterrorist operation has been underway in Chechnya for several years, in what has given both local and federal law-enforcement agencies carte blanche to suppress individual liberties on a large scale. In the absence of effective public and official oversight, the republic has become an authoritarian state. However, security threats here are the highest of the four researched regions.

Nature and Scale of the Security Threat in Chechnya

An analysis of the violence in Chechnya shows that local militant groups almost exclusively target military and police servicemen, as well as civil servants, whom they view as collaborators. Additionally, these militant groups, made up of so-called "Wahabbists,"³¹ target religious figures in Chechnya, such as muftis and mullahs who practice traditional Islam. An analysis of the terrorism statistics shows that attacks and casualties peaked in 2002–03. It had become clear that the terrorists' conventional warfare against Russian troops would not lead to the latter's withdrawal. Suicide bombers carried out the majority of attacks in this period, which indicates an increase in the motivation strength of the terrorist networks, on par with the growth of the religious component in its ideology.

There was only one terrorist attack in Chechnya in 2004, which indicates that terrorists in Chechnya, apparently feeling that the effect of terror in the republic would be stifled by the authorities, opted to carry out attacks outside the region.

Still, not a month goes by in Chechnya without a local official being assassinated by a terrorist group. According to *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, a Russian newspaper, more than forty civil servants, employed by either federal agencies or Chechnya's pro-Moscow administration, were assassinated from May 2000 to May 2002.³² Attacks on combatants are more frequent, with both military servicemen and policemen attacked every week. As a result of such attacks, the Defense Ministry lost 1,418 servicemen in Chechnya between January 2001 and

October 2004, according to official statistics.³³ However, while assassinating officials and attacking troops and police, the terrorists largely try to spare noncombatants to avoid alienating parts of the population that view the terrorists as freedom fighters and provide them with food and shelter.

Because authorities have taken pains to censor news coming out of the region, terrorists have largely refrained from indiscriminate, large-scale terrorist attacks that would maximize the psychological impact on the population outside Chechnya. Without being able to intimidate the Russian public or put significant pressure on federal authorities as they could in Moscow, major terrorist attacks in Chechnya are useless. However, when they cannot target combatants and collaborators, terrorists do not hesitate to launch indiscriminate attacks that cause collateral damage if there is a high probability that a legitimate target will be destroyed. This was the case with the attempted assassination of then-president of Chechnya, Akhmad Kadyrov, in May 2003. A female suicide bomber infiltrated a crowd of Muslim worshippers, but was stopped by President Kadyrov's security detail and blew herself up, killing seventeen.

The majority of attacks in Chechnya, including the major offensive on Grozny in August 2004, in which rebels killed more than one hundred people, cannot be classified as terrorist activities because they did not target noncombatants. From 2000 to 2004, there were only ten major attacks in Chechnya in which rebels killed civilians in addition to combatants and collaborators.³⁴ Some 240 people were killed and 700 wounded in these ten attacks, six of which were carried out by suicide bombers. Suicide bombings have remained the weapon of choice of militant Salafites, while the secular wing of the Chechen-based insurgency has mostly limited itself to conventional, nonsuicidal terrorism.³⁵

Russian military and police estimated that, as of 2004, the total personnel strength of militant and terrorist groups based in Chechnya was between 500³⁶ and 1,500.³⁷ It is impossible to generate a rough estimate of how many members of these groups could be referred to as terrorists. It is evident, however, that among terrorist groups based in Chechnya, groups either commanded by or associated with Chechen warlord Shamil Basayev were both the most capable and motivated. These groups have not only coordinated their activities, but also share fighters. Basayev, the informal leader of Chechnya's Wahabbists, has claimed to be fighting a holy war to establish a caliphate in the region. He maintained that some of these groups are completely independent from others. He has, in fact, established several brands that he uses to claim responsibility for different types of attacks, catering to different groups of potential sponsors, supporters, and volunteers, both in the North Caucasus and beyond. For instance, he created the Riyadh us-Saliheyn Martyrs' Brigade to claim responsibility for most of the suicide attacks carried out on his orders. Basayev remained the most powerful of the Chechen warlords and maintained close ties with international terrorist networks, despite the deaths of important allies such as Arab militants Khattab and Abu Walid.

After Basayev, the general consensus was that Ruslan Gelayev was the second most powerful of the Chechen warlords, until he was killed in early 2004. Gelayev had specialized in conventional guerilla operations and refrained from terrorism,

as had Chechen rebel leader Aslan Maskhadov, whom Russian authorities dismissed as a figurehead with control over only a small faction of Chechen rebels.³⁸ As of mid-2005, only Chechen warlord Doku Umarov was considered to be on par with Basayev in terms of the strength of his groups.³⁹ Umarov is as radical as Basayev in his aspirations, but he is arguably more inclined to frame his activities as a fight for an independent Chechnya rather than the establishment of a caliphate in the North Caucasus.

Interdependence between Liberties and the Authorities' de Jure and de Facto Responses to Security Threats

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Terrorist attacks occurred regularly in Chechnya despite the efforts of federal troops and police units under the command of the pro-Moscow administration. As of early 2005, after several troop reductions in 2003 and 2004, there were 80,000 federal forces in Chechnya.⁴⁰ Federal forces included Interior Ministry troops and Defense Ministry

troops, as well as FSB personnel. Most of these units report to the Regional Headquarters of the Antiterrorist Operation, located in Khankala, a town outside Grozny. In addition, the Chechen republic has its own police force, which totals 15,000, while another 5,000 servicemen reported directly to Chechnya's first deputy prime minister, Ramzan Kadyrov as of early 2005.⁴¹

When compared with other Russian regions, the relative strength of the local police force was outstanding as of early 2005: there was one policeman per fifty residents.⁴² The ratio is more impressive because most of the federal forces were actively involved in law-enforcement operations as of early 2005. The command of what the Kremlin insists is an antiterrorist operation had been initially placed under the Defense Ministry. When high-intensity warfare subsided, it was transferred to the FSB in January 2001, and then to the Interior Ministry in September 2003. The federal units of the Interior Ministry were gradually shifting the burden of policing to local law enforcement in early 2005. The transfer of command functions to the FSB and then to the Interior Ministry contributed to a shift in focus from wide-scale operations to more rigorous intelligence gathering and seek-and-destroy operations, which helped kill a number of senior warlords. Overall, however, the change in command centers did not lead to a qualitative breakthrough in fighting terrorists, even though local and federal troops in Chechnya enjoy enormous powers granted to them by Russia's antiterror laws. These laws designated Chechnya a zone of antiterror operations, where all antiterror measures are applied in full force, depriving the local population of many basic civil liberties. Freedoms of movement, assembly, and speech are among the freedoms that can be suspended indefinitely.

In its assessment of the 1998 “Law on Fighting Terrorism,” which remained in force as of 2005, the Moscow Helsinki Group, a Moscow-based human rights watchdog, pointed to the absence of legal regulations detailing and governing the implementation of this law. The group’s 2002 assessment also stated that Russian authorities were reluctant to fill this legal vacuum, acting on the belief that only the uncontrolled use of force by state actors and associated strongmen, such as the republic’s deputy prime minister, Ramzan Kadyrov,⁴³ served as an effective tool for destroying terrorists and deterring local residents from joining terrorist groups. According to the Moscow Helsinki Group, the law had provisions that established a cause-and-effect relationship between the actions of government agents, including those who infringed on freedoms and liberties, and the actions of terrorists; however, the far-reaching extent of the counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya—in terms of both time and space—had ultimately divorced cause (terrorist actions) from consequence (response by government agents).⁴⁴

Federal and local security forces regularly abused their power. Numerous cases of torture, kidnapping, and even extrajudicial executions have been documented by human rights organizations in Chechnya. Human Rights Watch conducted a two-week study researching some fifty abduction cases in the second half of 2004. The study concluded that local police, including units loyal to or under the command of Ramzan Kadyrov, known as *kadyrovtsy*, were responsible for two-thirds of these abductions. Federal troops were responsible for the other third.⁴⁵

Local residents were often too intimidated to file complaints against *kadyrovtsy*, fearing reprisals. When they turn to prosecutors for justice, victims of abuse and their relatives find it difficult to identify the culprits, as both *kadyrovtsy* and federal servicemen often wear masks during their operations in residential areas.

The fact that federal servicemen are regularly rotated in Chechnya makes it difficult for prosecutors to solve crimes. By the time an investigation is underway, a culprit could be hundreds of miles away. One far-reaching consequence of this practice is the export of police abuse from Chechnya to the rest of Russia. Servicemen who committed crimes in Chechnya and were not punished sometimes try to replicate the brutal and unlawful practices they employed during their time in the republic after returning to their home regions. Servicemen who fought rebels in Chechnya are also more likely to harass natives of the North Caucasus outside the republic, as some of them developed racist attitudes while fighting there. These men, who sometimes suffer from posttraumatic stress syndrome, are also less fearful of possible prosecution if they were able to commit abuses in Chechnya and not be punished.

A 2005 report by Memorial, a respected human rights organization, indicates that some of the crimes committed by servicemen in Chechnya are not prosecuted. The report found evidence of 396 abduction cases in 2004. However, Chechnya’s interior minister, Ruslan Alkhanov, said that only 168 people were kidnapped in the republic in 2004, while Prosecutor General Vladimir Ustinov put the number at 218. Meanwhile, Chechnya’s chief prosecutor, Vladimir Kravchenko, announced in February 2005 that a total of seven ethnic Chechen law-enforcement officers were convicted for involvement in abductions in 2004.⁴⁶

The contrast between the number of kidnappings that human rights organizations have attributed to law-enforcement officials and the number of policemen convicted of such crimes in 2004 clearly demonstrates that there is no rule of law in Chechnya.

In addition to the unspoken assumption that all federal law-enforcement bodies in Chechnya should support each other, another reason prosecutors in the republic do not rigorously investigate crimes is because they are rotated in and out and, thus, have little incentive to excel during their stints in Chechnya.

When servicemen accused of crimes against Chechen civilians stand trial outside Chechnya and evidence of their guilt is overwhelming, there is still no guarantee that they will be convicted. This was the case with Captain Eduard Ulman and three other Russian army commandos who were acquitted in April 2004 of shooting six Chechen civilians, even though they admitted in court they had mistakenly opened fire on the van in which the civilians were riding. The jury in the southern Russian city of Rostov-on-Don accepted the officers' defense that they were following orders, and some of them even applauded as the four were released.⁴⁷ In addition to highlighting the fact that Chechens are often denied the right to due process, this verdict also demonstrated the ethnic divisions in the Russian public's consciences, reflecting a growing phobia of Chechens and natives of the North Caucasus in general among ethnic Russians, who made up the bulk of the jury.⁴⁸

The numerous crimes committed by servicemen against civilians in Chechnya demonstrate that there was a disturbing lack of official oversight during the researched period. The military prosecutor's office, which is responsible for ensuring that the police and army comply with the law, has largely turned a blind eye to abuses of civilians by police and soldiers. Moreover, police and military groups also carried out seek-and-destroy operations in Chechnya without informing Chechnya's Interior Ministry. The local prosecutor's office was either unaware of their activities or turned a blind eye to them. Those groups included the so-called Joint Special Groups, which consist of officers from the FSB and commandos from the Interior Ministry. These forces, which were tasked with hunting and killing rebels, reported to the Regional Headquarters of the Antiterrorist Operation in Khankala. There were also the so-called Temporary Specialized Operative Groups (TSOGs), which consisted of Interior Ministry central staff officers that reported to the ministry in Moscow rather than to the Regional Headquarters of the Antiterrorist Operation. Tasked with killing rebels, the TSOGs were not required to document their activities, except through photographs.⁴⁹

There was no sufficient public oversight over the conduct of the police and troops or of the authorities in general. There are no publicly available official statistics on the number of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) registered and operating in the republic. According to the editor of Chechnya's most influential independent newspaper, there were 300 NGOs registered in Chechnya as of 2004, including ten large organizations that focused on the monitoring and protection of human rights.⁵⁰ Additionally, some twenty international NGOs, including both humanitarian aid and human rights organizations, were active in Chechnya as of

2004.⁵¹ However, reports about abuses of the civilian population compiled and disseminated by these NGOs had a limited effect on the local law-enforcement and public administration systems. Moreover, NGOs' attempts to protect the local population's human rights provoked a backlash from the authorities, who are willing to use any pretext to shut out critical voices.

Due to this intolerance of criticism, there is virtually no independent media in Chechnya. As of 2004, there were only two independent local newspapers, *Chechen Society* and *Voice of the Chechen Republic*.⁵² There were forty-eight print media outlets in Chechnya as of April 2005, or one paper per every 20,800 citizens.⁵³

The authorities rigorously control local broadcasts and online media. The federal television channels portray a rosy picture of Chechnya, omitting the ongoing abuses of local residents: both the local branch of the All-Russian State and Radio Television Company (VGTRK) and the State Television and Radio Company of the Chechen Republic (GTRK ChR) provide virtually no critical coverage. Of all the national news channels available in Chechnya, only Ren-TV offers independent coverage, but this privately owned channel has little political influence due to its limited viewership. There were no independent radio stations in Chechnya as of 2005. With the exception of two Internet cafes in Grozny, Chechen residents did not have Internet access as of early 2005. Obviously, in the absence of independent media, NGOs cannot influence public opinion or exert pressure on the authorities.

While common in Russia the lack of checks on the executive branch of power in Russia is especially striking. Not only are local courts not independent, the republic did not even have a parliament as of early 2005. Given the massive vote-rigging reported during the federal parliamentary elections in 2003, and the presidential election in 2004,⁵⁴ there was no doubt that the republic's parliament, which Chechens elected in the fall of 2005, was filled with loyalists who do not question the conduct of the executive branch.⁵⁵

As stated above, law enforcement and the military have been empowered by law to restrict the movement of civilians within Chechnya, as long as it remains an antiterror operation zone. They continuously exercised this right in the researched period through roadblocks and checkpoints, as well as imposing curfews in individual settlements. The number of roadblocks has been reduced, but bribes are often extracted for passage at these roadblocks, which continue to operate even though terrorist groups can easily bypass them. In some cases, terrorists have reportedly bribed their way through these checkpoints. However, these roadblocks and curfews hindered the lives of law-abiding civilians and severely restricted their freedom of movement.

Freedoms of speech and political association were seriously limited in the researched period. Branches of several national parties, including the pro-Kremlin United Russia (YeR), the Union of Right Forces (SPS) and the liberal Yabloko, were officially registered in Chechnya as of 2005. However, there was no political party representing those who favored independence for Chechnya but rejected the use of violence to achieve it as of early 2005. Meanwhile, a Chechen Sinn Fein would not only allow moderate separatists to participate in politics, but would help curb terrorism, as repression and the lack of political

representation are among the major factors that fuel terrorism, as some authoritative papers on the subject argue.⁵⁶

The effective ban on nontraditional religions and allowing people to practice only Sunni Islam and Russian Orthodox Christianity, significantly limits religious freedom. Other religious organizations cannot preach or hold services without registering with the Justice Ministry's local branch. Such limitations leave little alternative for those Muslims who do not wish to be a part of the local, government-sponsored Sunni hierarchy but to join an underground Islamist organization.

Finally, as of early 2005, a formidable number of Chechen civilians continued to be denied the right to appropriate living conditions.⁵⁷ The last Chechen refugee camp in Ingushetia was shut down in June 2004. Local authorities managed to convince or coerce most of the refugees to return to Chechnya or settle elsewhere. However, the authorities have been slow to compensate Chechen residents whose houses or apartments were destroyed. As a result, thousands of people could not return to Chechnya or they had to live in temporary dormitories for internally displaced refugees. It should be noted that ethnic Russians have also suffered from the lack of appropriate living conditions. An estimated three hundred thousand ethnic Russians left Chechnya in the 1990s to escape fighting and discrimination in Chechnya. The lack of appropriate living conditions is exacerbated by rampant unemployment, which was as high as 80 percent as of 2005,⁵⁸ as compared with the national average of 8.5 percent.⁵⁹ The fact that the Federal Statistics Service⁶⁰ had no data on the number of small businesses in the republic demonstrates that there are virtually no small businesses registered in impoverished Chechnya. Poverty, along with slow growth, helps terrorist recruitment, according to an authoritative and extensive study of factors explaining which countries risk sinking into a civil war.⁶¹

Conclusion

Chechnya shows how ineffective it is to respond to terrorism by constantly expanding the powers of security services at the expense of individual freedoms. Nowhere else in Russia did the security services enjoy such enormous powers with minimal oversight, public and official, in the researched period. Nowhere else is the executive branch so dominant, with a judicial branch that simply toed the official line and a legislative branch that has yet to be formed. Nowhere else are liberties and freedoms so suppressed for the sake of fighting terror. And, yet, nowhere else did insurgents and terrorists strike so often and on such a large scale, all the while using Chechnya as a recruitment pool and springboard for deadly strikes in neighboring regions, as well as locations as far away as Moscow in the researched period.

The Case of Dagestan

Dagestan is second only to Chechnya, and possibly Ingushetia, in terms of the breadth of the local security service's powers. However, despite being given a virtual *carte blanche* by the authorities, the Dagestani security services have failed to stem the rise of terrorism. Violent attacks against officials and official buildings were reported almost weekly.

Nature and Scale of Security Threats in Dagestan

Dagestan remains a battleground between competing clans that form the local ruling elite, organized crime gangs, religious groups representing different brands of Islam—including proponents of establishing a caliphate in the region—and individuals who seek to avenge personal grievances caused by the authorities. In such a landscape of multiparty conflicts, it is often difficult to discern whether a particular attack was intended to terrorize the public, an episode of gangland conflict, or an act of revenge against a local strongman and his retinue.⁶²

Local law enforcement classify any attack on the local authorities as a terrorist attack perpetrated by the Wahhabists, even if the attacked official is part of a commercial dispute, which routinely end in contract killings.⁶³ The republic's prosecutors initially qualified more than one hundred attacks as terrorist acts in 2000–04. Some of these cases were reclassified as investigators identified possible motives and suspects.

One reason why Wahhabism is perceived to be so strong in Dagestan is that religious radi-

cals are very motivated and not prone to negotiations. Religious dissent in Dagestan was competing fiercely with the so-called traditional Islam that had been adapted to accommodate the local culture and social norms. This required preachers that Russian authorities brand as Wahhabists to compete for hearts and minds.

Islam has traditionally been strong in Dagestan, when compared with other Russian regions. This is probably due to the long history of Islam in the area. The first preachers of Islam are believed to have appeared in Dagestan in the eighth century. Also, there was an Islamic state in Dagestan established along Sharia rules in the mid-nineteenth century by Imam Shamil.

Islam in Dagestan persisted through the Soviet period and soared after its disintegration. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Dagestanis constituted two-thirds of the people from Russia who made pilgrimages to Mecca. Casualties from terrorist attacks in Dagestan fell in 2002. If the number of attacks against Dagestani security services in 2003–04 are taken into account,⁶⁴ it is obvious that violence increased.

Unlike Chechnya, where the antiterror campaign in the researched period was waged predominantly by the federal military, police, intelligence agencies, and local servicemen, who report to senior officials in the republic, fought the terrorists in Dagestan. Because Dagestani security services committed abuses, the majority of attacks in Dagestan were directed at them rather than federal officials.

In addition to the religious motives behind terrorist attacks in Dagestan, ethnic and clan rivalries remain a strong factor behind the violence. Some experts on Dagestan assert that armed underground factions, divided along ethnic lines

“The effective ban on nontraditional religions and allowing people to practice only Sunni Islam and Russian Orthodox Christianity, significantly limits religious freedom.”

have penetrated the security services and used them to garner power by attempting to direct crackdowns against rival factions.⁶⁵

The deadliest attack during 2000–04 was the bombing of a military parade in the town of Kaspiisk on May 9, 2002. A powerful roadside bomb exploded near a military unit that was marching in commemoration of Russia's Victory Day. The bomb killed forty-three people and wounded some 170. Of those killed in this blast, at least sixteen were servicemen, while the rest were civilians, including twelve children.

Local security services accused one of Dagestan's leading Wahhabists, Rapani Khalilov, of ordering the attack, but he has denied this.

The Kaspiisk explosion is strikingly different from the attacks in Chechnya, where local groups try to avoid civilian casualties. This attack demonstrated that the Dagestan-based groups will kill large numbers of civilians to maximize casualties among combatants. Another example is the 1999 apartment building bombing in Buinaksk. Six Dagestanis, some of them tied to the Chechen warlord Khat-tab, were convicted in this bombing in 2001.⁶⁶

While prepared for collateral damage resulting from their attacks, the Dagestani-based groups of extremists and terrorists generally prefer to target those whom they perceive as legitimate targets, such as local officials, predominantly from security agencies, and federal servicemen stationed in Dagestan.

The most prominent victim of the assassination campaign in Dagestan in 2000–04 is Magomedsalikh Gusayev, the republic's minister for interethnic policy, information, and foreign affairs. Gusayev died in an explosion caused by a bomb placed on the roof of his car in August 2003. Dagestani prosecutors have accused local Wahhabi leaders of ordering the attack, but no suspects were detained as of April 2005.⁶⁷

While civilian officials, such as Gusayev and Makhachkala Mayor Said Amirov, are victims of attacks, it is police and security officers who are targeted most often by extremist and terrorist groups, as well as by personal avengers. In 2003–04 more than sixty officers of Dagestan's Interior Ministry and the regional branch of the FSB were killed in terrorist bombings, ambushes, drive-by shootings, and shootouts.⁶⁸

The perpetrators of the majority of these murders have ties to Dagestani Wahhabi leaders such as Khalilov and Rasul (a.k.a. "Muslim") Makasharipov, a close associate of Chechen warlord Shamil Basayev.⁶⁹ Some members of these groups—which mostly target senior police and FSB officers investigating organized crime, religious extremism, and terrorism—are motivated by personal grievances rather than religious ideas.⁷⁰ In addition to revenge seekers, such groups also attract socially disadvantaged and religiously radical youth.

The nature and scale of terrorism in 2000–04 demonstrates that terrorist networks are strongly motivated, well equipped, and well financed. They are resilient and increasingly audacious in their campaign against local law enforcement, despite brutal responses that are intended to intimidate potential recruits.

Interdependence between Liberties and the Authorities' de Jure and de Facto Responses to Security Threats

Attacks against officials and official buildings became increasingly frequent during the researched period, despite the fact that the personnel strength of the law-enforcement and security task forces in Dagestan is among the highest nationwide.⁷¹ There are 25,000 Interior Ministry personnel in Dagestan or one policeman per one hundred citizens—one of the highest ratios in Russia.⁷² Dagestan is also the only Russian region that has a specialized department to fight religious extremism.

Information on the number of security officers in the republic is not publicly available, but judging by media reports about antiterrorist activities in Dagestan, it is obvious that the local branch of the FSB is well equipped. Investigative teams sent from other regional branches of the FSB and from Moscow reinforce local agents.

Dagestan is also home to four military brigades and several units of the Federal Border Guard Service, which are stationed at the Azeri and Georgian borders.

In December 2000, the Dagestani government ordered the administrations of each of the republic's twenty-two rural districts and seven cities to hire a special deputy head whose responsibilities would include local security and coordinating the actions of civilian authorities with the police and military.

Dagestani law enforcement recruits locally and is an active participant in local power struggles. This circumstance may perpetuate assassinations, as the strongest political players in Dagestan do not fight terrorism, but instead they seek ways to exploit assassinations for their own political benefit.⁷³

In September 1999, Dagestan became the first Russian region to pass its own law designed to fight different forms of extremism. The law, titled "On Countering Wahabbism and Other Extremist Activity," was passed by the Parliament shortly after Islamist militants, led by Shamil Basayev, invaded Dagestan from then-independent Chechnya. The initiative was unveiled by the Spiritual Board of Dagestani Muslims, and instantly won support from its allies in the Parliament.

The law has been severely criticized by Islamic scholars and human rights groups because it permits prosecuting people for their religious beliefs. The law was also criticized for its vagueness—it provides no clear definition of Wahhabism or extremism, which allows local law enforcement to apply it to a wide variety of individuals and groups. The law also grants executive powers to the local pro-government religious organization, the Spiritual Board of Dagestani Muslims.⁷⁴

This law has provided a pretext for massive crackdowns on practicing Muslims, which routinely ended with extortion and abuses. It allows police to detain individuals on charges such as possession of extremist literature. The law also allows security services to decide what constitutes an act of extremism.⁷⁵

These and other actions by the authorities have obstructed freedoms of religion, speech, and assembly.⁷⁶ With attacks against government targets increasing, law enforcement has been gradually widening the scope of its crackdowns to target Muslims who preach independently. This move has backfired, with dozens of abused, young Muslim men joining antigovernment groups or creating their own. The right to due process is consistently violated in Dagestan. Both prosecutors

and judges ignore most of the numerous complaints filed by citizens concerning the illegal detention and torture of suspects.

Detainees suspected of belonging to radical Muslim groups are often kept in custody for periods of time that far exceed those allowed by law, and they are denied the right to an attorney.⁷⁷ These facts indicate there is no official oversight of law enforcement, either by locally designated officials or officials at the federal level.

Representative government bodies that could oversee law-enforcement officials, such as the Parliament, have abandoned this responsibility since they are beholden to the executive branch.

Under Dagestani law, citizens were not allowed to participate in the election of the governor, while the local parliament was formed on the basis of ethnic quotas, which were granted to only fourteen of the more than sixty ethnic groups in Dagestan. This provision violates the constitutional right of citizens to representation in government bodies. Also, citizens do not have equal access to the civil service because existing legislation and tacit agreements among the republic's elite have put state jobs in the control of local clans. They failed to ensure rotation of the representatives of ethnic groups in these posts as the previous version of Dagestan's constitution required.⁷⁸

These legal provisions have helped several clans dominate all three branches of power and preserve the status quo. Investigations into officials' actions could upset the existing balance of power and are therefore avoided. Putin's decision to appoint regional leaders and have local parliaments elected on party tickets threatens this balance in Dagestan and exacerbates the possibility of ethnic conflict and a rise in terrorist attacks.⁷⁹ In a situation where oversight is virtually nonexistent, law enforcement—in an attempt to curb increasing violence—is highly likely to enhance its antiextremist measures and apply them more widely to new segments of society in Dagestan.

The federal authorities, likewise, did not attempt to curb unconstitutional practices in Dagestan: for example, while Putin has pressed all other regions to amend local laws that contradict federal legislation, an exception has been made for Dagestan, where the regional laws on fighting Wahhabism and other extremist activities, as well as the discriminatory system of forming regional government bodies, have been left intact.⁸⁰

Thus far, federal authorities responsible for oversight—such as the General Prosecutor's Office and the Parliament—have not addressed the situation in Dagestan, despite strong allegations in the national media that violence in the republic is partly provoked by the unconstitutional practices of Dagestani officials, notably law enforcement.⁸¹ Under these conditions, political opposition—particularly the kind that appeals to citizens' religious feelings—cannot help advance alternative social and political initiatives. Instead, it is forced underground, where options are limited.

Different forms of public oversight, such as a free press, are virtually nonexistent in Dagestan. As of April 2005, there were 337 print media outlets registered in Dagestan or one newspaper per 7,418 residents.⁸² However, the authori-

ties either directly own most of these print media or influence their coverage by providing discounted printing services and other perks. As a result, these newspapers and magazines largely toe the authorities' line, downplaying or turning a blind eye to abuses and corruption.⁸³

Dagestan did have two privately owned television channels, M5 and Platan, until 1999. M5 was sponsored by a prominent opposition figure, Nadir Khachilayev, and produced its own news programs. Both channels were closed after the start of the second conflict in Chechnya in 1999.

Soon after the incursion of Islamist militants from Chechnya into Dagestan in August 1999, then-Press Minister Magomedsalikh Gusayev demanded that all independent print media show him and his staff articles to be published in upcoming issues, establishing a de facto censorship of the press. Not a single editor objected to this. The practice was abandoned several weeks later, but the patron-client relationship between Dagestani officialdom and the media persists. Local journalists, including Dagestan-based stringers for national newspapers, who dare to write critical reports about the republic's government and the government-backed Muslim religious authorities, are routinely intimidated by government officials and senior clerics.⁸⁴

In addition to being among the most repressed of Russia's citizens, the residents of Dagestan are also among the poorest in Russia. As of 2004, there were only 1,400 small businesses registered in Dagestan,⁸⁵ or approximately one enterprise per 1,685 citizens. The republic had an unemployment rate of 26 to 27 percent in 2004, compared with a national average of 8.5 percent.⁸¹ These statistics suggest that Dagestanis are less capable of exercising the right to appropriate living and social conditions.

Moreover, there is a high degree of economic stratification in Dagestani society, which generates discontent and, eventually, contributes to the growth of extremism. Poverty, coupled with slow economic growth, is conducive to terrorist recruitment.

Conclusion

The case of Dagestan demonstrates the ineffectiveness of expanding the de facto powers of law enforcement and eliminating official and public oversight over law-enforcement officers' actions.

This lack of oversight has led to wide-ranging abuses of power by regional officials who are responsible for ensuring law and order. The government-led suppression of civil liberties has not resulted in a marked reduction of the security threat in Dagestan.

The Case of Moscow

Moscow is home to a wide range of extremist organizations, but the city did not have endemic terrorists as of early 2005. Moscow had one of the highest concentrations of law-enforcement and security agents in Russia during the researched period. Local law enforcement was well armed and Moscow city regulations gave it more powers than federal security laws. However, these powers were subject to

relatively robust official and public oversight. Meanwhile, over the researched period, Moscow became the primary target of North Caucasus terrorists.

Nature and Scale of Security Threats in Moscow

With the exception of Chechnya, no other territory has suffered as many terrorist attacks as Moscow in the researched regions. The number of terrorist attacks in Moscow grew steadily over the researched period, reaching its peak in 2004. Suicide bombers carried out all of the terrorist attacks in Moscow (except one), which demonstrates a high level of motivation.

The year 2004 also saw the highest number of casualties in Moscow—eclipsing 2002, when 130 hostages died at Moscow's Dubrovka theater.

Moscow has dozens of federal buildings, historic landmarks, and other highly symbolic targets. Extremist groups who believe they are fighting a war of independence, are inclined to try to strike at the capital of the enemy state.

More important, such groups figure that terrorist attacks in Moscow maximize the psychological impact—not only on the groups' own constituencies and the local authorities, as is the case in Chechnya and Dagestan, but also on the federal authorities, the general public, and the international community. The powerful impact of terrorist attacks is ensured by the relatively independent local media and foreign journalists, who have larger audiences than other Russian regions.

Thus, Moscow has continuously been targeted by groups that are either based in, or originate from, the North Caucasus, but want to influence decision making at the federal level through terrorism. They want to secede from Russia, compel the Kremlin to take part in peace talks with Chechen warlords, withdraw troops from Chechnya, and pursue other objectives at the national level.

From 2000 to 2004, North Caucasus-based groups attacked Moscow ten times. As a result, more than 290 people were killed and more than 200 were wounded (see appendix). Groups commanded by Chechen warlord Shamil Basayev, or associated with him, have either claimed responsibility for these attacks or have been accused by Russian law enforcement of organizing them.⁸⁷ Seven of the ten attacks were suicide bombings. (Suicide bombings have become the tactic of choice for terror networks in the past few years because they require little training and are hard to prevent.) All of these suicide attacks were designed to kill civilians; none attempted to assassinate individual officials.

Organizers of suicide bombings have attempted to force the Kremlin into conducting peace talks with Chechen separatists and withdrawing troops from Chechnya. The terrorists who took some 800 people hostage at Moscow's Dubrovka Theater in October 2002 put forward these same demands. Of all the terrorist attacks in Moscow during 2000–04, it was this episode that caused the most deaths. The organizers would often seek to portray suicide bombings as acts of martyrdom.⁸⁸ Investigations of the Dubrovka attack and other attacks revealed that members of these terrorist groups did not hesitate to solicit assistance from rogue or unsuspecting natives of their home regions living in Moscow.⁸⁹

Their ability to obtain such assistance, both from law-abiding citizens and members of organized crime groups, lies partly in the nature of Moscow's Chechen

diaspora, which appears to be more fluid and transient than in other cities, including St. Petersburg. As Russia's financial center and wealthiest city, Moscow offers more short-term opportunities for natives of Chechnya and other Russian regions to make fast money, both legally and illegally. One piece of evidence suggesting how attractive Moscow is to migrant criminals, known as *gastrolyory*, or people on tour, is that non-Muscovites committed 42 percent of all crimes in 2004.⁹⁰ Such opportunists, who do not value the chance to live in Moscow, would be more prepared to help people from their native communities in some illegal operations. Overall, however, Moscow's Chechen diaspora, which numbers around one hundred thousand, and natives of other troubled regions avoid any involvement in terrorism. Their leaders have repeatedly condemned terrorist attacks.

Although no terrorist networks operate in Moscow, it was home to a broad spectrum of extremist and radical organizations in the researched period. Of these organizations, it is racist groups that are most prone to violence. Violent attacks on dark-skinned foreigners and North Caucasus natives occur regularly in Moscow, where the number of skinheads was estimated at about 5,000 in 2003.⁹¹ Such groups increasingly sought to justify racially motivated assault—including a September 2004 attack on several Caucasus natives in the Moscow subway after the Beslan massacre as revenge for terrorist attacks by Caucasus natives. Paradoxically, the so-called skinheads and the perpetrators of these terrorist attacks shared a common goal: to inspire animosity between ethnic Russians and North Caucasus natives. While terrorist groups hoped this would lead to ethnic strife and the secession of the North Caucasus, skinheads strove to eventually drive all non-Slavs out of Moscow and other Russian cities. It must be noted that the skinheads' aspirations won tacit support from a significant number of Muscovites as the slogan "Moscow for Muscovites, Russia for Russians," gained popularity.⁹²

Radical leftist groups, such as the youth wing of the Russian Communist Labor Party (RKRП), have attacked symbolic targets. Members of this party bombed the FSB's public reception office in 1999. In the researched period, however, neither this party nor other leftist organizations staged such attacks, apparently because security and law-enforcement agencies began pressuring them. However, radical organizations, such as the National Bolshevik Party (NBP), continue to carry out symbolic attacks, such as seizing government buildings in Moscow and throwing food at government officials.⁹³ Law enforcement's response to these largely nonviolent acts has been increasingly brutal and excessive. Several NBP activists were charged with attempting to change Russia's constitutional order, which is punishable by a lengthy prison sentence, because they seized the Kremlin's public reception office in December 2004. Although these charges were later dropped, new charges have led to prison terms of up to two years. Such excessive punishment is radicalizing the NBP and other fringe groups, and could eventually prompt them to resort to violence.

Interdependence between Liberties and the Authorities' de Jure and de Facto Responses to Security Threats

The number of Moscow's police exceeded 100,000 as of early 2005. Moscow's "daylight population" totaled 12 million in the researched period, there was one

policeman for every 120 residents. There were also thousands of other law-enforcement officials, such as servicemen from the FSB's federal headquarters staff and the Interior Ministry. However, despite the mounting casualties from terrorist attacks, the bulk of this formidable army focused on the investigation of traditional crimes.

Moscow law enforcement officials are better equipped than average Russian police thanks to additional funding from the city government. In return, law-enforcement agencies are expected to enforce municipal laws that restrict access of non-Muscovites to Moscow and are vigorous in doing so. These laws and regulations have included such Soviet-style anachronisms as the requirement to register with authorities within three days of arrival—a rule Moscow police officers have used extensively to check and detain individuals whose behavior they find suspicious or if they wish to extort a bribe, although only so-called beat policemen have been authorized to conduct routine ID checks. Such regulations and the way they are applied clearly hinder citizens' freedom of movement. The registration requirement was eventually lifted by the federal government and the grace period was extended to ninety days, but police still have the right to detain a person for up to three hours to run an ID check.

In addition to their routine work, Moscow police are also regularly mobilized to carry out official antiterror operations, known as Vikhr-Antiterror, as well as informal but sweeping checks based largely on racial profiling. Such checks usually focus on dark-skinned Caucasus and Central Asian natives and have involved the fingerprinting of Chechens in the wake of a major terrorist attack. This attitude has trickled down to the media, including Moscow's city government-controlled TV Center television channel, where interviewed law-enforcement officials often make a point of disclosing that a suspect is a native of the Caucasus or looks like one.⁹⁴

While providing law-enforcement agencies with opportunities for abusing their powers and limiting civic freedoms, procedures and operations like those described above tend to net traditional criminals, but do not build insurmountable barriers for well-trained terrorist groups. The Dubrovka attack proves this point. A large group of terrorists not only managed to go undetected by local law-enforcement agencies while preparing for the attack, but also managed to drive to the theater in a van and several other vehicles with arms.

The Dubrovka tragedy underscores the problem of rampant corruption among Moscow law enforcement. In February 2004, a Moscow policeman was sentenced to seven years in prison for granting a temporary residency permit to one of the Dubrovka terrorists in exchange for a bribe.

Police and other law-enforcement officials use ID checks and citywide search operations to extract bribes from those suspected of minor offenses in an attempt to supplement their low wages. Moscow police also routinely torture suspects to extract confessions and close cases. This abuse of power is exacerbated by the practice of evaluating police performance on the basis of the percentage of registered crimes that they solve. "The need to report that crimes have been solved or that administrative violations have been discovered is one of the main motives for

illegal detention or use of violence by police," according to a 2004 study by a torture watchdog group in Russia.⁹⁵ The case of retired naval officer Aleksandr Pumane, who was beaten to death by his interrogators after being arrested for driving an explosives-laden vehicle in Moscow in the fall of 2004, is perhaps the best-known instance of police torture.⁹⁶

In the first eight months of 2004 citizens filed 6,585 complaints with Moscow's police force's internal affairs directorate. During the same period, Moscow city prosecutors opened 198 criminal investigations against police officers, in which 127 were later charged.⁹⁷

Abuses by the police violate basic human rights and freedoms and deepen the public's distrust of law-enforcement agencies. A 2005 nationwide opinion poll found that 70 percent of respondents do not trust law-enforcement agencies and fear them. Some 72 percent of the respondents believed they could fall victim to abuse.⁹⁸

However, when compared with residents of Dagestan and Chechnya, Muscovites did have better chances to exercise their rights, including the freedoms of assembly and religion, in the researched period. Muscovites have the greatest variety of political and public organizations in the country from which to choose. As of April 2005, there were 11,500 public organizations registered in Moscow, including forty federal political party regional branches and 720 religious organizations.⁹⁹ In general, whatever nonviolent, political, or religious convictions a Muscovite harbors, he or she can pursue them either by joining an existing organization or by setting up his or her own. Moscow authorities have shown greater leniency in granting political parties and NGOs permission to register and demonstrate. However, the authorities were not fully tolerant of all groups in the researched period. For instance, the city's authorities won a case in court to deny registration to the Moscow branch of the Jehovah's Witnesses in March 2004. The federal authorities have not banned this religious group, and its branches operate freely in other Russian cities and regions. Local Russian Orthodox Christian and Jewish leaders pressured Moscow's authorities to revoke a permit granted earlier to the Hare Krishna community to build a temple.

These are only exceptions, however, that confirm the rule: for the most part, Moscow authorities pursue organizations that are either violent or advocate violence. This was the case when the city banned the Russian National Unity Party (RNyE) in 1999 and the Russian National-Imperial Party (RNDP) April 2004, both are openly racist and anti-Semitic.

Muscovites were in a better position to exercise their freedom of speech and had better access to information in the researched period. As of April 2005, Moscow had 2,071 locally registered media outlets, including both print and broadcast media, but not including the so-called federal media, such as television channels with a nationwide audience and newspapers with a nationwide circulation. While national state-controlled television channels largely avoid critical analysis of law enforcement's performance and inability to prevent terrorist attacks, the more independent print media and some local broadcast media do not hesitate to provide it. Muscovites can watch only one more or less liberal television channel, Ren-TV, which is owned by a state-controlled power grid compa-

ny, Unified Energy Systems, but is relatively independent in its coverage.¹⁰⁰ Many Muscovites, however, have satellite dishes that enable them to watch international networks such as the BBC and CNN. There are also radio stations such as *Ekho Moskvy*, which has been taken over by Gazprom, a state-controlled gas company, but is staunchly independent in its coverage. Moscow residents have a great variety of independent newspapers from which to choose, ranging from liberal heavyweights like *Kommersant* to the small-circulation ultra-left *Generalnaya Liniya*, formerly *Limonka*. On top of this, Muscovites enjoy easy access to the Internet. The Internet offers access to insightful, independent Russian news portals, such as *Gazeta.ru*, or foreign media. Such a variety of independent media ensures that Muscovites can hope that journalists will report on grievances they have against the authorities.

It is also worth noting that the headquarters of most of Russia's leading human rights organizations, such as Memorial, as well as the Russian offices of international human rights groups in Russia, are located in Moscow.

The official and public oversight was more effective in Moscow than other regions, particularly the North Caucasus, during the researched period. The system of official oversight was also more effective in Moscow in the researched period.

The Moscow prosecutor's office not only prosecutes police misconduct on a regular basis, it has also challenged attempts by the mayor's office to implement regulations that would curb rights and freedoms in that contradict federal law. More important, the executive branch is less dominant in Moscow than in other regions, with both the judicial and legislative branches providing more checks and balances. The judicial and legislative branches also exercised greater oversight over law-enforcement agencies, particularly more than the North Caucasus in the researched period.

Although the city Duma (the local parliament), was dominated by mayoral loyalists as of early 2005, its opposition was robust compared with Dagestan's parliament. There is a general consensus that elections in Moscow are among the most transparent in Russia. Moreover, Muscovites had an opportunity to elect district councils, which Chechen cities and towns did not have as of early 2005.

Local courts have regularly ruled against the authorities in cases where plaintiffs challenged local regulations, such as a decree by the city government that required individuals who lived outside the city, but owned Moscow apartments, to pay hefty sums for permanent registration. Muscovites have better access to due process than residents of Chechnya and Dagestan do.

Muscovites appeared to be better equipped to exercise the right to appropriate social and living conditions. There were 184,000 small businesses registered in Moscow as of 2004,¹⁰¹ or approximately one enterprise per sixty-five residents. Moscow's small businesses accounted for 21.5 percent of small businesses registered in Russia. Moscow also has one of the highest per capita incomes in Russia and, as of 2004, an unemployment rate of only 0.6 percent,¹⁰² compared with the national average of 8.5 percent.¹⁰³

Conclusion

Moscow offered a higher degree of freedoms and rights to its residents than the regions of the North Caucasus regions in the researched period. This allowed radical groups to exist and operate on the margins of the legal and political spectrum. Yet the city has suffered a string of terrorist attacks, which suggests that it retains the greatest appeal for groups wishing to strike the country's most symbolic targets. Moreover, terrorists' motivations to attack targets in Moscow grew over the researched period. Their choice to attack Moscow allows us to extrapolate that certain conclusions drawn by terrorism scholars in relation to other countries apply to Russia as well.¹⁰⁴ Just as terrorist groups in poorer countries tend to attack richer nations, groups from the poorer regions in Russia strive to attack the country's richest region.

Despite an imminent terrorism threat, the bulk of Moscow's law-enforcement personnel remained focused on investigating traditional crimes and prosecuting radical, but largely nonviolent, political groups, while doing less to prevent terrorist attacks in the researched period. This approach cannot make Moscow better protected from terrorist attacks because terrorists can easily bypass ID checks and other barriers that law-enforcement officials have enacted. Moreover, while this approach helps apprehend traditional criminals, it also involves abusing citizens' rights, enables police officers to extort bribes, and radicalizes persecuted groups. Not a single terrorist has been apprehended through an ID check in Moscow, while racial profiling during ID checks creates resentment.¹⁰⁵

The Case of St. Petersburg

In St. Petersburg, the security services are more liberal than in Moscow. St. Petersburg's law-enforcement agencies are not on par with Moscow's in terms of equipment and personnel strength. Public oversight, however, is as strong as in Moscow. Yet St. Petersburg has not experienced a major terrorist attack, despite being Russia's second-largest city.

Nature and Scale of the Security Threat in St. Petersburg

The absence of terrorism in St. Petersburg is notable because the city has an abundance of symbolic targets related to its vast historical and cultural heritage. It is also the home city of President Putin and many other senior officials have a demonstrated emotional attachment to the city.

Security officials and Chechnya-based networks have warned of terrorist attacks more than once, but none of these warnings have materialized. There have been a few cases when city authorities claimed that explosive caches could have been planted by terrorist groups. However, none of these cases established a firm link between the explosives and terrorist groups.

There have been several assassinations of high-ranking officials in St. Petersburg, including the city's property chief, Mikhail Manevich, and State Duma Deputy Galina Starovoitova. However, no terrorist or extremist organization has claimed responsibility for these murders, which were suspected of being commissioned by the victims' business or political rivals.

It is possible to assume that there were no terrorist groups operating in St. Petersburg during the researched period. However, while free of terrorist groups, St. Petersburg has become home to a number of extremist political organizations, of which the skinhead networks are the most numerous and violent. There are more skinheads in St. Petersburg than in any other Russian city. The total number of these young extremists, who regularly attack dark-skinned Caucasus and Central Asian natives, has been put between 10,000 and 15,000.¹⁰⁶ In 2004, for example, seven people were killed and twenty-four were wounded in St. Petersburg from xenophobic attacks.¹⁰⁷

However, while posing a serious threat to public order and racial harmony, St. Petersburg's skinheads do not have any political demands. Their violence appears to be spontaneous and not part of a strategic campaign to force the government to take any sort of action.

Interdependence between Liberties and the Authorities' de Jure and de Facto Responses to Security Threats

The relative number of St. Petersburg law-enforcement personnel is less than in Moscow. The Interior Ministry's local branch has 35,000 officers, or one officer per 135 citizens. It is difficult to determine a precise means of comparing the two cities' security and intelligence capability; however, St. Petersburg's security personnel does not have the resources that Moscow's security personnel has.

St. Petersburg's authorities have not strengthened the registration regime as a means of preventing terrorists from entering the city. Document checks on the streets and the targeting of dark-skinned Caucasus and Central Asian migrants during security operations have not become a routine practice in St. Petersburg.

Certain social groups, such as the 18,000-strong Chechen diaspora, who are routinely seen in other big Russian cities as a potential gateway for terrorists, feel much less pressure from law enforcement in St. Petersburg than in other regions, even after a string of terrorist bombings in Russian cities 1999, which were attributed to Chechen rebels, and the beginning of the second war in Chechnya.¹⁰⁸

The local North Caucasus diaspora is less transient than in Moscow. St. Petersburg is a smaller and less wealthy city and, thus, it offers fewer opportunities, both legitimate and illicit, for making quick money and leaving. Such a conservative environment makes the Chechen diaspora more attached to the city as a source of long-term income. They are less likely to collude with opportunists from the North Caucasus, be they criminals or terrorist groups.

In contrast with the attempts by law enforcement in Chechnya and Dagestan to portray local religious radicals as extremists and criminals, senior law-enforcement officials in St. Petersburg, while acknowledging the presence of Muslim radicals in the city, have said that no organized Wahhabist groups operate there.¹⁰⁹

As opposed to the other researched regions, religious communities based in St. Petersburg have not suffered severe crackdowns by the authorities. For example, the local branch of the Jehovah's Witnesses continues to operate freely.

The freedoms of movement, assembly, and speech were not undermined by the city authorities in the researched period. A St. Petersburg court refused to

consider the case of eleven young men who participated in an unauthorized protest against President Putin on the eve of his reelection in March 2004, and ordered police to release them. The demonstrators, members of a local Communist group, were wearing Putin masks and T-shirts reading "Vova, go home," marched from Putin's former apartment building to Nevsky Prospekt, the city's main street.¹¹⁰

Local branches of radical political organizations, such as the NBP or radical leftist youth organizations, did not stage high-profile protests in St. Petersburg like they did in Moscow during the researched period.¹¹¹ Also, there have been no reports about their members being targeted by local security officials.

Furthermore, an analysis of media reports and research by St. Petersburg human rights and other watchdog groups does not indicate that there are particular political, ethnic, religious, or social groups that are systematically being denied the right to due process.

However, while not radicalizing existing public, political, and religious groups in the city through the brutal suppression of their activities, the local government has clearly failed to create an adequate response to extremist groups that do not abide by the law.

The lenience and inaction of city officials are exacerbating the growing number of skinheads in the city. Moreover, in most cases, senior city officials denied the nationalist component in the skinheads' violence. For example, St. Petersburg Governor Valentina Matviyenko has consistently denied that extremist groups have attacked dark-skinned foreign students and murdered respected anthropologist Nikolai Girenko, who headed a public commission of St. Petersburg scholars defending the rights of ethnic minorities. Instead, the city's top official has insisted that the xenophobic attacks were acts of "banditry and hooliganism."¹¹² Similarly, the leadership of the St. Petersburg police has claimed that skinhead attacks are motivated mostly by greed.¹¹³

Thus far, the authorities' strongest response to hate crime has been bringing criminal charges against Dmitry Bobrov, a leader of a neo-Nazi group, in 2003.¹¹⁴ In all other cases opened during the researched period, after attacks on foreigners and dark-skinned migrants, nationalistic or xenophobic motives were not reflected in the charges.

Judging by the publications of St. Petersburg-based human rights organizations, such as Memorial, skinhead attacks on ethnic minorities pose a major threat to the city.

While there is insufficient official oversight over law enforcement's actions, whose laxness has resulted in the emergence and proliferation of ultranationalist groups in St. Petersburg, public oversight, exercised mainly by the local media, remains strong.

The St. Petersburg media—who are scrutinized less closely than the media in Moscow—remains one of the most robust in Russia. The total number of print media outlets in the city was 4,287 as of April 2005, or one paper per 1,166 residents. There are six privately owned local television stations that produce their own news broadcasts. St. Petersburg is also home to the highly acclaimed Agency

of Investigative Journalists, Russia's first, which specializes in investigating organized crime and corruption in the city and beyond.

St. Petersburg also has a robust civil society. As of April 2005, there were 6,614 public organizations registered in the city, 329 religious organizations and forty-five political party branches.¹¹⁵ This broad array of organizations allows individuals to find interest groups that reflect their political views or religious feelings, and indicates the lenience of the authorities in allowing the formation of public-interest groups.

St. Petersburg residents are more likely than North Caucasus residents to exercise the right to appropriate social and living conditions. This is evidenced by the number of small businesses registered in the city: 89,600 as of 2004,¹¹⁶ or approximately one enterprise per fifty-six citizens. As of 2004, the city had an unemployment rate of only 0.8 percent,¹¹⁷ compared with the national average of 8.5 percent.¹¹⁸

Conclusion

It would be impossible to explain why St. Petersburg was not attacked during the researched period without taking into account the terrorists' strategic considerations. When selecting a target, terrorists prefer Moscow to St. Petersburg because attacking Moscow ensures a larger impact on their target audiences. This choice proves that the symbolic significance of a target outweighs the somewhat higher risk of getting caught.

With no attacks registered in St. Petersburg, the authorities have little motivation to enhance security at the expense of liberties. However, while lenient in their attitude toward civil society, the authorities are not dismantling groups, such as skinheads, that pose a threat to public safety and racial harmony. Extremist groups have not been involved in terrorist attacks and, in the absence of excessive pressure from the authorities, it is unlikely that they will.

Conclusion

Although this article's research is limited, it still possible to discern that the policy of suppressing liberties to enhance security is flawed.

The absence of stringent official and public oversight allows law-enforcement agencies to use excessive violence, which not only failed during the researched period to diminish the existing terrorist threat, but also radicalizes those groups and individuals who might have otherwise limited themselves to nonviolent means.

Despite a four-year antiterrorist campaign that has involved a suspension of basic freedoms and an expansion of law enforcement's powers, terrorism has persisted in Chechnya. Such an approach can check terrorism in the region in the short-term, but cannot provide a long-term solution. Heavy-handed methods of suppression could backfire because they generate resentment and turn people to extremist ideologies. Some corrupt law-enforcement officials are sympathetic to terrorists and other extremist groups, such as skinheads, which exacerbates the problem.

Repressive methods in Chechnya, coupled with law enforcement's enhanced powers, have led to the proliferation of terrorist networks in neighboring areas of

the North Caucasus. Terrorists' search for allies has been the most intensive in Dagestan, which is second only to Chechnya in the suppression of liberties, the brutality of local authorities, and Wahhabist tendencies.

Moreover, in their attempts to broaden their popular support base, terrorist groups often co-opt the rhetoric of civil liberties, which devalues these concepts in the eyes of the general public.

These groups' efforts to gain recognition as freedom fighters succeeded in regions where the opposition had been driven underground. Radical groups in Chechnya and Dagestan have won support not only by criticizing the suppression of religion and other freedoms but also by pointing out specific violations, such as grossly falsified election results. These criticisms would not sway public opinion in Moscow and St. Petersburg, which fare much better than the North Caucasus in terms of oversight and the observance of rights and freedoms.¹¹⁹

Although the law guarantees a certain degree of freedom in a region, terrorism will grow in the absence of public and official oversight of law-enforcement, as is the case in Dagestan. In comparison, the regions that have relatively abundant liberties and freedoms, and robust public oversight of law-enforcement, do not have endemic actors of terror, as is the case in Moscow and St. Petersburg.

Strong public oversight, however, would not be sufficient to rid these two regions of extremist groups in the absence of stringent official oversight of law-enforcement agencies. While robust public oversight can be effective in preventing and uncovering abuses by law-enforcement officials, it cannot force their inert agencies to dismantle extremist groups or to shift their focus from investigating traditional crimes to preventing terrorism. Only strong official oversight, not just by prosecutors but by the State Duma as well, can lead to such systemic change.

Nonetheless, such reform would not fully protect any region from terrorists. Terrorist groups in Russia would continue to target Moscow because they can achieve maximum impact on the government, people, and international community. A nearby region could have just as many symbolic targets and weaker law-enforcement, but terrorists would still target what they see as the largest *Schwerpunkte*¹²⁰ in the country.

Russia can fight terrorism without suppressing individual and collective freedoms if its law-enforcement and security agencies focus their powers and resources on interdicting terrorist attacks rather than harassing groups and individuals suspected of radicalism. However, these powers and resources should not be excessive and must be clearly defined. Antiterror and security legislation should set clear limitations on these powers, as well as on authorities' responses not only to attacks but also to the threat of attack. The legislation should define threats and specify appropriate responses to each type, including the duration of the response. The more detailed the legislation, the better. Vaguely worded laws, manuals, and procedures provide plenty of opportunities for abuse by law enforcement.

In addition to clearly defined legislation, robust official and civilian oversight would not only help prevent abuses and the illegal repression of liberties, but would also impel law enforcement to be earnest and focused in its work.

Furthermore, the criteria used to evaluate the performance of law-enforcement agencies must be changed. As of 2005, these evaluations were largely based on crime-solving rates, encouraging officers to cover-up crimes and abuse suspects to extract confessions. The performance of law-enforcement agencies engaged in fighting terror should be evaluated on their ability to stop attackers rather than punish them.

Finally, these changes will not be comprehensive or enjoy popular support if they are not transparent. Only if they are debated by the expert community and society at large, before being codified as law, will these reforms be effective, fair, and supported by the general public.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors thank Professor Louise Shelley, director of the Transnational Crime and Corruption Center, and Associate Research Professor Robert Ortung, the center's project director, for their insightful guidance and generous advice; Arthur Martyrosyan of the Mercy Corp's Conflict Management Group, Nikolay Petrov of the Carnegie Moscow Center, Monica Duffy Toft of Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Vladimir Pribylovsky of the Panorama think tank, and Enver Kisriev of the Caucasus department at the Center of Regional and Civilization Studies in the Russian Academy of Sciences for their insightful input and generous advice. The authors also thank Anthony Latta of the Transnational Crime and Corruption Center and Natalya Yefimova of the *Los Angeles Times* for their generous editorial advice.

APPENDIX

Chronology of major terror attacks in Chechnya in 2000–2004

Date: June 7, 2000

Organization(s): Chechnya-based groups

Target: Government building

Settlement: Alkhan-Yurt, Chechnya

Tactic: Bombing

Fatalities: 2

Injuries: 5

Description: Suicide bombers drove a car loaded with explosives to an OMON police barracks in the Chechen settlement of Alkhan-Yurt and detonated it.

Date: July 2, 2000

Organization(s): Chechnya-based groups

Target: Government buildings

Settlement: Gudermes, Novogroznensky, Argun, and Urus-Martan, all in Chechnya

Tactic: Bombing

Fatalities: 33

Injuries: 84

Description: Suicide bombers used five Ural trucks with explosives to carry out five terrorist attacks in one day, including two in Gudermes, one in Novogroznensky, one in Argun, and one in Urus-Martan.

Date: December 9, 2000
Organization(s): Chechnya-based groups
Target: Public building
Settlement: Alkhan-Yurt, Chechnya
Tactic: Bombing
Fatalities: 21
Injuries: More than 20
Description: A car loaded with explosives was detonated on a square in front of the mosque in the village of Alkhan-Yurt, Chechnya. Investigators alleged that the attack was ordered by either Chechen warlord Arbi Barayev or Chechnya-based warlord Khattab.

Date: January 18, 2001
Organization(s): Chechnya-based groups
Target: Government building
Settlement: Gudermes, Chechnya
Tactic: Bombing
Fatalities: 0
Injuries: 7
Description: An attempt was made on the life of Akhmad Kadyrov, head of the administration of the Chechen Republic. A powerful explosive device was detonated as Kadyrov's motorcade passed by, damaging several of the cars. Kadyrov was not injured in the attack, although seven of his bodyguards were.

Date: October 10, 2002
Organization(s): Chechnya-based groups
Target: Government building
Settlement: Grozny, Chechnya
Tactic: Bombing
Fatalities: 25
Injuries: 6
Description: A bomb was planted inside the office of the Zavodskoi district branch of Grozny's police force.

Date: December 27, 2002
Organization(s): Riyad us-Saliheyn Martyrs' Brigade
Target: Government building
Settlement: Grozny, Chechnya
Tactic: Bombing
Fatalities: 72
Injuries: More than 210
Description: Two suicide bombers drove one truck and one car loaded with explosives to the Chechen government's headquarters in Grozny and detonated them.

Date: May 12, 2003
Organization(s): Chechnya-based groups
Target: Government building
Settlement: Znamenskoye, Nadterechnyi district, Chechnya
Tactic: Bombing

Fatalities: 60

Injuries: More than 200

Description: Two suicide bombers drove a Kamaz truck loaded with explosives to the local office of the Federal Security Service and detonated a bomb.

Date: May 14, 2003

Organization(s): Chechnya-based groups

Target: Government official

Settlement: Between Belorechye and Iliskhan-Yurt, Gudermes district, Chechnya

Tactic: Bombing

Fatalities: 18

Injuries: 72

Description: A female suicide bomber infiltrated a crowd of Muslim worshippers in an effort to assassinate the president of Chechnya, Akhmad Kadyrov, but was stopped by his security detail and blew herself up.

Date: June 20, 2003

Organization(s): Unknown

Target: Government building

Settlement: Grozny, Chechnya

Tactic: Bombing

Fatalities: 0

Injuries: 38

Description: Two suicide bombers drove a Kamaz truck loaded with explosives to the office of the Organized Crime Department of the Chechen Interior Ministry in the Strapromyslovsky district of Grozny.

Date: May 9, 2004

Organization(s): Basayev's Group

Target: Government official

Settlement: Grozny, Chechnya

Tactic: Bombing

Fatalities: 7

Injuries: 56

Description: A powerful bomb detonated at the Grozny stadium during a May 9 Victory Day parade killed Chechnya's president Akhmad Kadyrov and six others, including senior officials.

Chronology of major terrorist attacks in Dagestan in 2000–2004

Date: September 23, 2001

Organization(s): Unknown

Target: Unknown

City: Makhachkala

Tactic: Bombing

Weapon: Explosives

Fatalities: 2

Injuries: 15

Description: A car bomb killed two in Dagestan.

Date: January 19, 2002
Organization(s): Unknown
Target: Government
City: Makhachkala
Tactic: Bombing
Weapon: Explosives
Fatalities: 7
Injuries: 11
Description: A bomb went off on a city street as a truck with Russian servicemen in it passed by.

Date: May 9, 2002
Organization(s): Unknown
Target: Citizens and private property; government
City: Kaspiisk
Tactic: Bombing
Weapon: Explosives
Fatalities: 43
Injuries: Unknown
Description: A bomb went off on a city street as military parade marched by, killing servicemen and civilians.

Date: September 27, 2002
Organization(s): Unknown
Target: Police
City: Makhachkala
Tactic: Assassination
Weapon: Firearms
Fatalities: 3
Injuries: 0
Description: Unknown masked gunmen opened fire at a car carrying police colonel Akhberdilav Akilov, head of the Directorate for the Campaign against Terrorism and Extremism in Dagestan's Interior Ministry. Both he and his driver were killed, as well as a woman passenger on a passing shuttle bus.

Date: August 27, 2003
Organization(s): Unknown
Target: Government
City: Makhachkala
Tactic: Bombing
Weapon: Explosives
Fatalities: 1
Injuries: 1
Description: Magomedsalikh Gusayev, Dagestan's minister for ethnic policy, information, and public relations, was killed in Makhachkala when a bomb planted on the roof of his car exploded as he drove to work.

Date: September 3, 2003
Organization(s): Unknown
Target: Police

City: Makhachkala
Tactic: Assassination
Weapon: Firearms
Fatalities: 2
Injuries: 2

Description: Unidentified attackers gunned down Salikh Shamkhalov, a police officer who worked for a high-ranking member of the extremism and terrorism control department, and his wife as they returned home in Makhachkala.

Date: January 29, 2004
Organization(s): Unknown
Target: Police
City: Makhachkala
Tactic: Armed attack
Weapon: Firearms
Fatalities: 2
Injuries: 1

Description: The police department head of Makhachkala was killed when his vehicle came under fire. The driver of the vehicle, also a policeman, was killed in the attack and a woman passerby was injured.

Date: June 24, 2004
Organization(s): Unknown
Target: Government
City: Makhachkala
Tactic: Assassination
Weapon: Firearms
Fatalities: 1
Injuries: 0

Description: Kamil Etibekov, FSB department chief for Dagestan, was killed near the entrance to his house. He was a terrorism investigator and officials believe that his death was linked to his professional activities.

Date: August 23, 2004
Organization(s): Unknown
Target: Police
City: Makhachkala
Tactic: Bombing
Weapon: Remote-controlled explosive
Fatalities: 0
Injuries: 7

Description: A special operations police unit van hit a radio-controlled mine in Dagestan, injuring seven police officers.

Chronology of major terrorist attacks in Moscow in 2000–2004

Date: October 19, 2002
Organization(s): Riyad us-Saliheyn Martyrs' Brigade
Target: Restaurant
Tactic: Bombing

Fatalities: 1

Injuries: 7

Description: A car bomb exploded in Moscow outside a McDonald's, injuring at least seven people and killing one. Four members of this terrorist organization were charged and sentenced to fifteen to twenty-two years in prison.

Date: October 19, 2002

Organization(s): Riyad us-Saliheyn Martyrs' Brigade

Target: Theater

Tactic: Hostage-taking

Fatalities: Approximately 130

Injuries: Approximately 700

Description: More than forty terrorists from the Riyad us-Saliheyn Martyrs' Brigade, led by Chechen warlord Movsar Barayev, seized a musical theater located in southeast Moscow on October 23, 2002, taking more than 700 people hostage and demanding the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya. The Kremlin refused to meet this demand, even though the terrorists threatened to start killing the hostages. Russian commandoes stormed the theater on October 26, killing all the terrorists. At least 123 hostages died as a result of inhaling gas pumped into the building by Russian special forces to knock out the hostage-takers.

Date: July 5, 2003

Organization(s): Riyad us-Saliheyn Martyrs' Brigade

Target: Music festival

Tactic: Bombing

Weapon: Suicide explosive

Fatalities: 14 (including two terrorists)

Injuries: 50

Description: Two Chechen women blew themselves up at the Krylya rock festival at the Tushino airfield killing fourteen, including themselves, and wounding fifty. The women had intended to detonate the explosives belts concealed under their clothes inside the security perimeter, but blew themselves up outside after one of them realized they might not be able to pass through a metal detector at the entrance.

Date: July 10, 2003

Organization(s): Unidentified group of Chechen militants (possibly, Riyad us-Saliheyn Martyrs' Brigade)

Target: Popular shopping and dining area

Tactic: Bombing

Fatalities: 1

Injuries: 0

Description: A female suicide bomber tried but failed to detonate a belt of explosives in downtown Moscow on July 10, 2003. A sapper died when trying to defuse the bomb. The woman, a native of Chechnya, confessed to having been sent on orders of Chechnya-based groups to blow herself up, was tried in court and convicted of terrorism.

Date: December 9, 2003

Organization(s): Unidentified group of Chechen militants

Target: Parliament

Tactic: Bombing

Fatalities: 6

Injuries: 14

Description: A female native of Chechnya blew herself up in front of a downtown hotel near the Russian parliament after reportedly inquiring about the location of its lower chamber, the State Duma.

Date: February 6, 2004

Organization(s): Achemez Gochiyaev's group

Target: Subway

Tactic: Bombing

Fatalities: 41

Injuries: More than 100

Description: A native of Karachayevo-Cherkessia blew himself up inside a Moscow subway train. City prosecutors alleged that the young man was sent to Moscow by Achemez Gochiyaev, an ex-leader of Karachai Wahhabists in the republic of Karachayevo-Cherkessia who is wanted by Russian law enforcement for allegedly masterminding apartment bombings in Moscow in 1999.

Date: August 24, 2004

Organization(s): Riyad us-Saliheyn Martyrs' Brigade

Target: Bus stop

Tactic: Bombing

Fatalities: 0

Injuries: 4

Description: A bus stop was blown up on Kashirskoye Highway, injuring four people. The attack occurred the same day that two Russian airliners were blown up by suicide bombers from the Riyad us-Saliheyn Martyrs' Brigade.

Date: August 24, 2004

Organization(s): Riyad us-Saliheyn Martyrs' Brigade

Target: Airliner

Tactic: Bombing

Fatalities: 44

Injuries: 0

Description: A female member of the Riyad us-Saliheyn Martyrs' Brigade managed to sneak past security at Moscow's Domodedovo airport, board an airliner, and blow it up in the sky over the Tula region.

Date: August 24, 2004

Organization(s): Riyad us-Saliheyn Martyrs' Brigade

Target: Airliner

Tactic: Bombing

Fatalities: 46

Injuries: 0

Description: A female member of the Riyad us-Saliheyn Martyrs' Brigade managed to sneak past security at Moscow's Domodedovo airport, board a plane and blow it up in the sky over the Rostov region.

Date: August 29, 2004

Organization(s): Riyad us-Saliheyn Martyrs' Brigade

Target: Subway station

Tactic: Bombing

Fatalities: 10

Injuries: Approximately 50

Description: A female suicide bomber blew herself up outside the Rizhskaya metro station in northern Moscow, killing at least ten people and injuring more than fifty.

NOTES

1. While acknowledging that there is a broad spectrum of systemic threats to Russia's security, this article focuses on those posed by extremist and terrorist groups. These groups pose the most serious threat to Russia's national security, their actions are a pretext for the suppression of liberties in Russia. The article highlights trade-offs between liberties and security in four parts of Russia that are the most representative for this purpose; however, due to a lack of empirical evidence, this article is not a comprehensive nationwide study and should not be considered as such. There are simply not enough data in the public domain for a quantitative analysis, even by methods of basic multiple regression. There are myriad quantitative data on Russia as a country, making it possible to identify variables for a multiple regression comparing Russia to other nations (by using, for example, independent indexes of freedoms. However, such indexes are not available for individual regions of Russia).

2. While noting that resentment over suppression of freedoms and rights are among the root causes of terrorism, poverty, and slow economic growth make it easier to recruit terrorists, as argued in a recent authoritative and extensive study of factors that explain which countries run the risk of sinking into civil war. See James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 75–90. In fact, this article argues that political resentment is not among the factors that significantly increase the threat of a civil war. The focus is on the trade-offs between liberties and security and, thus, the authors do not dwell on economic factors. This article mentions the latter in passing, noting the stratification of society using the relative share of small businesses as a watch point—an indirect measurement of the overall level of liberties and freedoms—since, as a rule, the more liberal the regime, the easier it is to open a small business.

3. Russia consists of eighty-nine constituent territories, officially referred to as subjects of the Russian Federation. These territories differ in administrative status, including ethnic republics, regions, autonomous districts, and the country's two biggest cities, Moscow and St. Petersburg. The generic term commonly used to refer to all of the territories is regions.

4. The years 2005 and 2006 have also seen important developments in Russia's war on terror, mostly in the legislative domain.

5. For more information, see the correlation of transience and support for terrorists in the Moscow and St. Petersburg case studies.

6. These watch points are representative for the evaluation of trade-offs between liberties and security, but by no means should they be considered a full, comprehensive set of criteria. As mentioned earlier, the limited number of watch points is a result of the lack of publicly available empirical data necessary for a quantitative analysis.

7. Simon Saradzhyan, "Defense Minister Back's Putin's Plans," *Moscow Times*, October 27, 2004.

8. Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkariya, and Karachayevo-Cherkessiya comprise the North Caucasus.

9. One such suspected terrorist is Maksim Panaryin, who was detained on May 8, 2005, by police in the southern Russian city of Voronezh. He was allegedly communicating with members of the so-called Karachai Jamaat, a militant network composed largely of ethnic Karachais, via the Internet. Officials suspect Panaryin fought against Russian troops on the side of Chechen rebels in 1999–2002 and then left to settle in Voronezh in 2003. That year he helped organize three bombings in the city on orders from a senior operative of this jamaat, Nikolai Kipkeev, who died guiding a suicide bomber at Moscow's Rizhskaya subway station in August 2004. Panaryin confessed to the bombings and membership in the jamaat, and was awaiting trial as of June 2005. Sergei Egorov, *Gazeta.Ru* "U Karachayevskikh Terroristov Poyavilos Obschee Delo," June 25, 2005. http://www.gazeta.ru/2005/06/25/oa_161871.shtml (accessed August 4, 2006).

10. The terrorists in Beslan included not only Ingush and Chechens, but also one ethnic Ossetian, Vladimir (a.k.a. Abdulla) Khodov, who died in the fighting. Victims later described him as one of the most aggressive terrorists, even though he was of the same ethnic background.

11. *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, "Shoigu Proindeksiroval Terakty," December 15, 2004.

12. In June 2004, some 300 Ingush and Chechen insurgents simultaneously attacked eleven military and police facilities in Ingushetia, killing eighty-eight people, including sixty law-enforcement and military officers. Two months later, Chechen rebels attacked several police facilities in Grozny, Chechnya's capital, killing more than eighty policemen and soldiers. These raids demonstrated the terrorists' capability to plan and implement multipronged operations requiring a high degree of planning and discipline.

13. The Law on Countering Terrorism, which substantially increased law enforcement, security (particularly the FSB) and military agencies' powers, was signed by Putin in March 2006. Russian parliamentarians were considering new laws aimed at further restricting media coverage during terrorist crises as of the first part of 2006.

14. Such a demonstrative reaction helps create the impression that authorities are doing their best to protect the public from the menace of terrorism, especially when covered favorably by state-owned television channels, as is the case in Russia.

15. President Vladimir Putin's Address on September 4, 2004. http://kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2004/09/04/1958_type8291`2_76332.shtml (accessed on August 4, 2006). NTV did not broadcast from the theater. NTV broadcast images of commandos taking positions outside the Dubrovka theater seconds before they initiated the raid.

16. The convention emphasized that during terrorist acts or antiterrorist operations, rescue efforts, and "the human right to life take priority over all other rights and freedoms." The convention said that media outlets have the "right and duty of contributing to the open discussion of the problem of terrorism" and that the threat of terrorism must not be used to restrict media freedoms, but it subjects signatories to limitations from the government and sets guidelines on issues ranging from interviews with terrorists to the tone of coverage. The Associated Press, "Media Firms Sign a Terrorism Pact," April 10, 2003, <http://www.medialaw.ru/publications/zip/105/6.htm> (accessed on August 3, 2006).

17. Law on Countering Extremist Activity, as published in the government-run *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, July 30, 2002. Russian language text is available at http://www.rg.ru/official/doc/federal_zak/114-fz.shtm (accessed on August 4, 2006).

18. The authors' April 29, 2005, interview with Lev Levinson, a State Duma legal expert and an analyst with the Moscow-based Institute for Human Rights.

19. In March 2005, a letter signed reportedly by 5,000 Russian public figures was submitted to the office of the General Prosecutor, demanding an investigation and the eventual closing of Jewish organizations in Russia. The authors of the letter referred to the Law on Countering Extremist Activities, saying that Judaism proclaims the superiority of Jews over other religions.

20. *Ibid.*

21. *Ibid.*

22. For example, a FSB senior officer FSB recommended to the Moscow-based publishing house Ultra.Kultura to stop distributing four book titles, claiming that they glorify terrorism. The titles included a seminal study, *Inside Terrorism*, by Bruce Hoffman, and a study of Chechen female suicide bombers, *Brides of Allah*, by Moscow journalist Yulia Yuzik. See “Gosnarkokontrol Razoryaet Izdatelstva,” *Kommersant*, March 16, 2004. In another instance, police in the city of Yekaterinburg attempted to ban the sale of *Why Allah Dislikes America*, a Russian translation of a collection of essays and interviews about Islamic fundamentalism edited by Adam Parfrey, “Iz Prodazhi Izyali 7 Knig, Otpечатanyh v Tipografii Uralsky Rabochy,” *Novy Region*, March 16, 2004.

23. According to personal accounts of several individuals convicted in Dagestan over the past two years for participation in terrorist groups and/or engaging in terrorist activities, investigators used the first weeks of detention to force the suspects to testify against themselves using torture. This was acknowledged by Dagestan’s Minister of Information, Zagir Arukhev, in an interview with the authors on October 10, 2004.

24. If passed into law, the bill will grant the security services the right to monitor private communications, ban demonstrations, and prevent the movement of people and vehicles in zones where a terrorist alert is declared. Under the bill, the power to declare a state of emergency would reside with the head of the counterterrorism operations headquarters, a ranking FSB officer appointed by the prime minister. In the final version of the law, signed by Putin in March 2006, the notion of a state of emergency was dropped. Heads of the regional FSB offices would become heads of the antiterrorism operational headquarters during terrorist attacks and were granted extraordinary authority over all branches of power for the duration of a terrorist crisis. Under the existing law, a state of emergency can be called for the duration of a counterterrorism operation. The bill does not specify how often a state of terrorist danger can be declared. The bill also sets out legal procedures allowing the military to participate in counterterrorism operations—including, for the first time, those beyond Russia’s borders—under the overall direction of the FSB, the country’s lead counterterrorism agency. The bill would oblige journalists to cover terrorist attacks only within limits set by the FSB’s counterterrorism operations headquarters. It was not clear from the bill whether all media outlets covering a terrorist attack, including those not reporting from the scene, would need to obtain FSB permission, or whether the headquarters would have the authority to block media coverage.

25. The introduction and impact of the law designating Chechnya a zone of counterterrorist operations is described in the Chechnya case study. The impact of a local law on countering Wahhabism and political extremism, passed by the Dagestani parliament in 1999, is described in the Dagestan case study.

26. In Kabardino-Balkariya, President Arsen Kanokov, appointed in 2005, fired Interior Minister Khachim Shogenov in early 2006 and demanded that local law enforcement stop brutal abuses against local citizens.

27. The state Duma voted on April 19, 2006, to pass a series of amendments that would reintroduce confiscation and allow the FSB to eavesdrop on phone calls, and search apartments without a court warrant, among other things in the first reading. The legislation—twelve amendments to federal laws—would reintroduce the confiscation of property from anyone convicted of not just terrorism, but of drug dealing and prostitution. It would also allow the FSB to tap phone lines and search apartments for two days without obtaining a court warrant during counterterrorism operations. The FSB would also be allowed to enter apartments and jam telecommunications without a court warrant under the same circumstances. The amendments, which the Duma is set to consider by mid-June in the second and third readings, could lead to abuse and corruption by law-enforcement officials, according to independent Duma members who voted against the bill. See Anatoly Medetsky, Simon Saradzhyan, and Oksana Yablokova, “Confiscations Could Be Commonplace,” *Moscow Times*, April 21, 2006.

28. Nikolai Petrov, a scholar with the Carnegie Moscow Center, described this insensitivity in his May 2005 peer review of this article as the “colossal inflation of the value of life.”

29. Yuri Levada Analytical Center, a respected Russian polling agency, surveyed 1,200 individuals in different Russian regions September 10–13, 2004. The margin of error was 3.2 percent.

30. VTsIOM surveyed 1,541 individuals in different Russian regions September 18–19, 2004. The margin of error was 3.4 percent.

31. Islamic radicals are commonly, but incorrectly, referred to in Russia as Wahhabists. Not all those that Russian officials and media brand as Wahhabists are followers of the cleric Al Wahhab and his teachings, and not all of those who are Wahhabists are preaching or practicing violence. It would be more appropriate to describe Islamic fighters, who seek to establish an Islamic state that would include all Muslim republics of the North Caucasus, as militant Salafites. Salafites are Islamists who stand for Salafiya, which means pure Islam. Many ascribing to Salafitism support radical actions in search of pure Islam. Again, we should note that not all Salafites in the North Caucasus are militant and ready to use force to establish an Islamic state. For instance, only 1,000 out of 21,000 Salafites in Dagestan could be described as militant as of 2000. See Alexei Malashenko, *Islamic Factor in the Northern Caucasus* (Moscow: Gendalf, 2001).

Due to all of the above factors, we will use as the term militant Salafites or put the word Wahhabi inside quotation marks to stress that it is the term used by Russian officials and media.

32. *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, “Nikto Ne Khotel Umirat,” August 28, 2002.

33. Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov’s address at a meeting of senior commanders on November 17, 2004, available at http://www.mil.ru/releases/2004/11/171230_8578.shtml.

34. See the appendix.

35. After the March 2005 killing of separatist leader Aslan Maskhadov, credit for which was claimed by the FSB, it has become increasingly difficult to discern a secular organizational component of the insurgency, which Maskhadov had previously embodied. The most influential Chechen warlords and the formal head of the self-proclaimed independent Chechen state, Abdul Khalim Saidullaev, frame their opposition to Russia predominantly in terms of a clash of civilizations rather than a neocolonial war.

36. In June 2004, Chechnya’s then-interior minister, Alu Alkhanov, put the number of insurgents at 500. See Interfax, “Chislennost Boyevikov Ne Prevyshaet 500,” June 18, 2004.

37. Then commander of federal forces in Chechnya, Colonel General Valery Baranov, estimated in February 2004 that the number of rebels does not exceed 1,200. *Strana.ru*, “V Chechne Ostalos Okolo 1,500 Boyevikov,” January 14, 2004, <http://kavkaz.stana.ru/news/208092.html> (accessed on August 6, 2006).

38. Maskhadov, the popularly elected president of the Chechen republic of Ichkeria, was killed during a raid by Russian commandos in the Chechen village of Tolstoy-Yurt in March 2005. The FSB assumed responsibility for the killing.

39. One piece of evidence indicating his significance is that in the summer of 2005 Umarov became vice president under Maskhadov’s designated successor, the president of the self-proclaimed Chechen republic of Ichkeria, Abdul Khalim Saidullaev.

40. “Voyennaya Gruppirovka v Chechne Usilivayetsya,” *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, March 23, 2005.

41. *Strana.ru*, “Dvukhglavaya Respublika,” November 11, 2004, <http://www.strana.ru/stories/02/02/15/2504/233938.html> (last accessed on August 6, 2006).

42. The official count of Chechnya’s population according to a 2002 census was slightly over 1 million residents. However, independent experts, such as Chechen human rights activist Ruslan Badalov, argue that this number had been inflated by Chechnya’s leadership to procure additional financing from Moscow.

43. Chechnya’s parliament unanimously confirmed Ramzan Kadyrov, a strongman accused of mass human rights abuses, as prime minister on March 3, 2006. “With Kremlin support, Kadyrov can rule Chechnya any way he pleases, especially since [Chechen President Alu] Alkhanov, who is responsible mainly for legislative initiatives and external relations, does not have the political will to oppose Kadyrov,” said global security con-

sulting firm Stratfor. See Reuters, "Kadyrov Takes Post as Prime Minister," March 6, 2006.

In October 2006, Kadyrov will turn thirty, the minimum age set by the Chechen constitution to be president. Expectations are high that President Vladimir Putin—who often displays a personal sympathy toward Kadyrov in public—will nominate him as president then.

44. The paper is available at the Moscow Helsinki Group's website at <http://www.mhg.ru/publications/18259E3> (accessed March 29, 2005).

45. The study is available at the HRW's website at <http://hrw.org/backgrounder/eca/chechnya0305> (accessed April 3, 2005).

46. Nabi Abdullaev, "Chechen Abductions Ignored, Activists Say," *Moscow Times*, February 17, 2005.

47. Kim Murphy, "Russian Officers Are Acquitted in Civilians' Deaths," *Los Angeles Times*, April 30, 2004. The four servicemen were being tried again as of February 2005 after a higher court overturned the Rostov-on-Don court's verdict.

48. In August 2005 the Supreme Court overturned the acquittal of these officers and ordered a retrial. And in April 2006 the Constitutional Court ruled that grave crimes committed by the military in Chechnya would be tried by military tribunals until the use of juries is introduced in the southern republic. It was Chechnya's president, Alu Alkhanov, who filed a motion to have all servicemen who have committed crimes in Chechnya to be tried there. Alkhanov also complained that military officers could be tried by a jury, but ordinary Chechens could not. He also suggested that crimes committed in Chechnya should be heard by Chechen juries. Trial by jury is to be available in Chechnya as of January 1, 2006. The complaint was filed after juries in the nearby Rostov region twice acquitted Ulman and his three fellow servicemen. See *Moscow Times*, "Army Tribunals to Hear Chechen Cases," April 7, 2006.

49. Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, "Tyazhely Feis i Drugie," *Moskovskie Novosti*, September 17, 2004.

50. The authors' interview with Timur Aliyev, editor of *Chechen Society*, February 22, 2004.

51. *Ibid.*

52. *Chechen Society* stopped distributing a print version in 2004. It began distributing an electronic form as of February 2005.

53. Written statement by the Moscow branch of the Federal Registration Service of the Justice Ministry to the authors of this article, April 20, 2005.

54. The August 2004 presidential elections, won by the Kremlin-backed candidate, Alu Alkhanov, featured a number of flagrant violations: an observer at the polling station in the village of Zakan-Yurt was forced to sign the protocol of the election results at gunpoint; another observer reported that only 350 people had voted at a village polling station where 2,000 voters had been registered, but the final protocol he was forced to sign stated that about 1,500 people voted. Timur Aliyev, "Official Results Give Alkhanov 74%," *Moscow Times*, August 31, 2004. For a broad and comprehensive study of vote-rigging in Chechnya during the 2003 and 2004 elections, see Vladimir Pribylovsky "Upravlyayemye Vyborny: Degradatsia Vyborov pri Putine," in *Rossiia Putina, Istoriya Bolezni* (Panorama Center: Moscow, 2004).

55. The November 27, 2005, election saw the pro-Kremlin United Russia party win the largest number of seats. This party won more than 61 percent of the vote. The Communist Party was second, with 12 percent, followed by the liberal Union of Right Forces, with nearly 11 percent. In the vote, more than 350 candidates contended for 58 seats in the two-chamber regional parliament. See the Associated Press "United Russia Leads in Chechnya," November 29, 2005. Many observers, however, said the vote was far from free and fair, and analysts say the new legislature will be nothing more than a rubber-stamp body for Chechnya's Kremlin-backed governing elite. Also, see *Moscow Times* "Putin Opens Chechen Assembly," December 13, 2005.

56. Anne Marie Baylouny, "Emotions, Poverty, or Politics? Misconceptions about Islamist Movements," *Connections* 3, no. 3 (September 2004): 69–77. Partnership for

Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany, March 2004.

57. As of November 2004, 1,116 individuals returned to Chechnya and applied for compensation for destroyed housing, but only thirty-two were compensated. *Regnum* "1,116 Vynuzhdennykh Pereselentsev Nuzhdayutsya v Kompensatsii," November 2004. Compensation payments were temporarily suspended in December 2004.

58. *Interfax*, "Uroven Bezrabotitsy v Chechen Dostig 80 Protsentov," April 5, 2005.

59. This is according to a 2004 employment report by the Federal Statistics Service. Official unemployment statistics are generally believed to be lower than the actual rate, as many unemployed people do not register as such, given the meager sum of the compensation to which they are entitled.

60. The Federal Statistics Service has no data on the number of small businesses in Chechnya for 2004.

61. Fearon and Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War."

62. Numerous assassination attempts Makhachkala Mayor Said Amirov demonstrate how diverse the motives of those who order these attacks can be: In one case, a former city council head was convicted for plotting to kill Amirov, whom he viewed as a political rival; in another case, a local businessman was convicted of ordering a hit and admitted in court that his motive was a personal vendetta against Amirov's family; several other attacks were attributed to Dagestani Wahhabists who bear a grudge against Amirov for his efforts to crack down on Islamists in the republic.

63. For example, the murder of the deputy speaker of the Dagestani parliament, Arsen Kammayev, in October 2001, was initially qualified as a terrorist act. Later, the charge was changed to assassination of a state official.

64. Assuming that police and security officials in Dagestan are waging a war against terrorism in the republic, they have a status of combatants, and attacks against them do not qualify as terrorist.

65. Interview with the head of the Caucasus department at the Center for Regional and Civilization Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences Enver Kisriev, on May 29, 2005.

66. Nabi Abdullaev, "Buinaksk Apartment Bombers Convicted," *Moscow Times*, March 20, 2001.

67. Gusayev's successor, Zagir Arukhov, was killed by a bomb in May 2005. Arukhov's murder is not included in the account because it took place after 2004. Several members of the Islamist militant group Jamaat Shariah were arrested and charged in connection with this murder in 2005–06.

68. Sixty-two police officers were killed by insurgents in Dagestan in 2005.

69. Makasharipov was killed in a police ambush in the regional capital Makhachkala in June 2005.

70. Nabi Abdullaev, "A Murderous Cycle of Revenge in Dagestan," *Moscow Times*, March 15, 2005.

71. In the first half of 2005, seventy attacks were carried out against local and federal officials in Dagestan, while in 2004 this number was thirty, according to the report released by the Moscow Bureau on Human Rights in July 2005. *Interfax*, "Za Polgoda V Dagestane Soversheno 70 Teraktov," July 17, 2005.

72. In comparison, the southern Russian region of Volgograd has fewer than 8,000 policemen and 2.7 million people, or three times less proportionally than in Dagestan.

73. For example, Amirov, the Makhachkala mayor, used high-profile murders as a pretext to demand the ouster of Dagestani Interior Minister Adilgirei Magomedtagirov, who had ordered earlier that Amirov's personal militia be disbanded. Magomedtagirov and Amirov are an Avar and a Dargin, respectively, representing the two biggest ethnic groups in the republic.

74. The Spiritual Board of Dagestani Muslims is a religious NGO that publishes religious literature in Dagestan, arranges traditional yearly pilgrimages to Mecca, and

appoints imams (religious leaders) in about every third Dagestani mosque. Most members of the board are ethnic Avars and are followers of Sheikh Said Apandi Chirkeisky, one of several leading religious authorities in Dagestan. The head of the board, the mufti, who is elected by a council of traditionalist religious scholars and preachers, postures himself as a leader of the republican Muslims. However, even though the traditionalists are split between the followings of several sheikhs, the board's and mufti's authority are limited largely to Makhachkala and the surrounding parishes.

75. Konstantin Kazenin, "Krepok Li Tyl Rossii na Severnom Kavkaze?" *Regnum*, available at <http://www.regnum.ru/allnews/326969.html> (accessed February 2, 2005); Alexander Verkhovsky, "Islamophobia Posle 11 Sentyabrya," in *Rossiya Putina. Pristrastny Vzglyad*, ed. Ekaterina Mikhailovskaya, Vladimir Pribylovsky, and Alexander Verkhovsky. Moscow: Panorama Center, 2003.

76. While these infringements overwhelmingly target groups preaching Islam, representatives of other religions are allowed to exist in a less-constrained environment and some of them even proliferate. For example, according to statistical data provided by the Justice Ministry's Dagestan Branch, fourteen evangelical Protestant organizations, thirteen Orthodox Christian organizations, four Jewish organizations, and one Catholic parish, were registered in Dagestan as of late 2004.

77. Interviews with defense lawyer Sergei Kvasov and convict Gadzhi Abidov in Makhachkala on October 3, 2004.

78. The fact that Magomedali Magomedov served a fourth term as chairman of the State Council (Dagestan's top executive post), despite a requirement in the previous version of the republic's constitution for this post to be rotated among representatives of the fourteen so-called titular ethnic groups, is a testament to the strength of the informal deals between ruling clans.

79. Kisriev interview.

80. With Putin's initiative to scrap popular elections in the Russian regions coming into effect in 2005, the discussion about a need to dismantle Dagestan's legally established clan system of government has lost its acuteness.

81. In early 2006 the Kremlin facilitated passing over of the leadership in the republic to Mukhu Aliyev, a former Communist regional boss and a speaker of the local parliament since 1993. In one of his first public speeches, Aliyev admitted that extremism in Dagestan is, to important extents, conditioned by the brutal abuses and corruption among law enforcement. No personnel decisions by Aliyev had followed in the next two months, however.

82. Written statement by the Moscow branch of the Federal Registration Service of the Justice Ministry to the authors of this article, April 20, 2005.

83. Interview with Rumaniyat Elmurzayeva, chief editor of Dagestan's largest privately owned newspaper, *Novoye Delo*. May 29, 2005.

84. Interviews with Elmurzayeva and Sergei Rasulov, *Gazeta's* Dagestan-based correspondent October 4, 2004.

85. Data collected by the State Statistics Committee in 2004.

86. Federal Statistics Service 2004 employment report. Official unemployment statistics are generally believed to be lower than the actual rate, as many unemployed people do not register, given the meager compensation to which they are entitled.

87. There was another major attack bearing the hallmarks of a terrorist act in this period, but it remains unattributed. Unidentified assailants planted a powerful bomb in the underground passage leading to a Moscow subway station, killing thirteen and injuring more than one hundred in August 2000, but no organization has either assumed responsibility or been accused of complicity in this attack.

88. Some of the Chechen female suicide bombers ahead of the 2002 Moscow theater attack had their statements to this effect taped ahead of the attack. See them at <http://video.kavkazcenter.com/nord-ost/shaheeds.wmv>. Such claims of jihad allow organizers of the terrorist attack to assert that their cause is part of the global jihadist effort,

apparently with the aim to earn sympathy and support from abroad.

89. In one case, police detained Murat Shavayev, an ethnic Balkar who had allowed Nikolai Kipkeyev, an ethnic Karachai and a suspected organizer of the August 2004 suicide bombing outside the Rizhskaya metro station, to stay at his Moscow apartment. Shavayev, then a Justice Ministry official, was detained for several days in December 2004 on suspicion that he had assisted Kipkeyev, but was then released due to a lack of evidence. Shavayev insisted that he had not been aware of Kipkeyev's plans. Balkars, who mostly reside in the North Caucasian republic of Kabardino-Balkariya, and Karachais, who mostly reside in the North Caucasian republic of Karachayevo-Cherkessiya, are closely related.

In October 2004 Russian media reported that Ruslan Elmurzayev, an ethnic Chechen and an employee of a Moscow bank, was one of the main organizers of the Dubrovka theater attack and that it was financed through loans from his bank. Citing sources close to the investigation, *Izvestia* reported that Elmurzayev had provided funds to purchase the Ford Transit and Volkswagen Caravelle minibuses that the attackers drove to the theater, as well as to house them and to buy forged passports for them in preparation for the attack. The Moscow City Prosecutor's Office has identified Elmurzayev, who headed the economic security department of Prima Bank, as one of two organizers of the terrorist attacks in Moscow in the fall of 2002, including the Dubrovka attack on October 23. See Carl Schreck, "Prima Bank Linked to Dubrovka Attack," *Moscow Times*, October 27, 2004.

Another native of Chechnya was caught outside the theater allegedly briefing the gunmen inside on deployments of law-enforcement troops in the area and offering other assistance.

90. Nikolai Kulikov, head of the Moscow city government's department for cooperation with law-enforcement agencies, speaking at a Moscow press conference on May 25, 2005.

91. Vyacheslav Sedov, senior official of the Interior Ministry's organized crime and terrorism department, gave this estimate at a February 2003 press conference. Cited on the Interior Ministry's official Web site <http://www.mil.ru>.

92. Some 58 percent of the respondents of national polls conducted by Yuri Levada Analytical Center, a Moscow-based independent pollster, in 2005 supported the slogan "Russia For Russians." Lev Gudkov, "Xenophobia: Past and Present," *Russia in Global Affairs* 4, no. 1 (2006): 58-66.

93. The NBP, led by writer and political activist Eduard Limonov, has excelled in carrying out symbolic assaults on government officials and facilities, ranging from throwing food at Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov in December 2003 to seizing the premises of the Health Ministry in Moscow in August 2004. In Russia, the NBP has staged acts of protest against liberal economic reforms and the deconstruction of the welfare state. The party has also carried out several symbolic attacks in CIS countries, demanding more rights for ethnic Russians living there. Nabi Abdullaev and Simon Saradzhyan "Disrupting Escalation of Terror in Russia to Prevent Catastrophic Attacks," *Connections Quarterly* 4, no. 1 (2005): 111-30.

94. Speaking to reporters in Moscow in January 2005, the commander of the Moscow police force made a point of saying that natives of Chechnya and Ingushetia committed more crimes in the Russian capital in 2004 than residents of other Russian regions. He also noted that natives of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia committed more crimes than other foreigners in Moscow over the same period. *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, "Chem Bol'she Prazdnikov, Tem Bol'she Kriminala," January 31, 2004.

95. *Public Verdict*, "Tortures, Cruel and Humiliating Treatment by Russian Police: Reasons behind the Illegal Practices," December 11, 2004.

96. On March 29, 2006, a Moscow court convicted two police officers of negligence in the death of detainee Aleksandr Pumane, who was picked up driving a car rigged with explosives in 2004. *Moscow Times*, "2 Police Officers Found Guilty in Car Bomb Suspect's Death," March 30, 2006.

97. *Argumenty i Fakty*, "Natsionalnaya Cherta Stala Natsionalnoi Ugrozoi," September 22, 2004.

98. Yuri Levada Analytical Center, a respected Russian polling agency, surveyed 1,200 individuals in different Russian regions in January 2005. The margin of error in the poll, commissioned by Public Verdict, was 3.2 percent.

99. Written statement by the Moscow branch of the Federal Registration Service of the Justice Ministry to the authors of this article, April 20, 2005.

100. In June 2005, Ren-TV was jointly acquired by the privately owned Severstal metals giant and German television company RTL.

101. Data collected by the State Statistics Committee, later restructured into the Federal Statistics Service, in 2004.

102. "Zanyatost i Demograficheskaya Obstanovka," Moscow City Government Report, December 31, 2004, http://mos.ru/cgi-bin/pbl_web?vid=2&osn_id=0&id_rub=2061&news_unom=36914 (accessed August 6, 2006).

103. Federal Statistics Service 2004 employment report.

104. Alan B. Krueger, David D. Laitin, "Kto Kogo? A Cross-Country Study of the Origins and Targets of Terrorism," *Mimeo*, November 11, 2003.

105. Shamil Beno, a Chechen political activist in Moscow, reported increased harassment of Chechens in Moscow in the wake of the February 2005 subway bombing in the Russian capital. "People are very worried that pogroms, massacres are possible now, much more so than before." Every day since the attack on the subway, Beno has fielded reports of backlash—a friend who witnessed a young Chechen man being beaten on Moscow's outskirts by a group that included two uniformed police officers and his own son stopped hours after the explosion by the police and forced to take off his shoes and stand barefoot in the snow. See Susan Glasser, "Chechens Say Blast Reignites Backlash," *Washington Post*, printed in *Moscow Times*, February 17, 2004. When commenting on the Moscow police force's internal recommendation to limit the number of ID checks in 2003, a U.S. Embassy official familiar with the issue said there have been many complaints about U.S. citizens being stopped by the police for document checks and forced to pay bribes for ostensible offenses. Robin Munro, "Police Told to Ease Up on Checks," *Moscow Times*, March 27, 2003. In February 2004, German Galdetsky, a nineteen-year-old Moscow student, started an investigation into sexual harassment by metro police after watching two officers detain a girl in the Pushkin Square underpass after checking her documents. The girl told him the policemen threatened and harassed her, threatening to kill her if she told anyone. Galdetsky then uncovered similar incidents in several other metro stations and described them in an interview with *Novaya Gazeta*. But before the interview ran on April 8, he was attacked on March 25 by two unknown men, one of whom shot him twice in the head with rubber bullets. His supporters believe the attack, which reportedly left Galdetsky partially paralyzed, was connected to his campaign against police harassment. See Oksana Yablokova, "Mother Looks to Police for Answers," *Moscow Times*, June 24, 2004.

106. These figures were given by the Moscow Bureau for Human Rights on April 17, 2005. St. Petersburg police, for their part, have registered more than 1,200 members of eighteen skinhead groups active in the city. More information is available at www.fontanka.ru/131388 (accessed April 29, 2005). In an interview on May 25, 2005, Vladimir Pribylovsky of the Moscow-based Panorama think tank put the number of skinheads in St. Petersburg as high as 8,000–10,000. This number includes between 1,000 and 2,000 active and motivated followers of the movement, while others sympathize with it and join its actions "opportunistically."

107. "Nationalism and Xenophobia in 2004: Their Displays and the Politics of Countering Them," a report by the Moscow-based SOVA analytical center, available at <http://sova-center.ru/files/xeno/extrem2004%20final.zip> (accessed February 1, 2005). Three people were murdered and forty-two were wounded in xenophobic attacks in the city in 2005, according to the SOVA center.

108. Acknowledged by the president of the Congress of the Vainakh Diaspora in Russia and a leader of St. Petersburg's Chechen diaspora, Deni Teps, in an interview with Radio Liber-

ty, "Kavkaz: Pozitsiya Chechenskoi Diaspory" ["Caucasus: Position of the Chechen Diaspora"], October 21, 1999, available at <http://www.svoboda.org/programs/RTL/index.1299.asp> (accessed February 2, 2005).

109. Natalia Matveyeva, "Wahhabism on the Neva," *Versiya v Pitere*, May 19, 2003.

110. *St. Petersburg Times*, "Court Releases Anti-Putin Protesters," March 2, 2004.

111. In 2006, the NBP staged several high-profile nonviolent escapades in the city, demanding Putin's resignation.

112. RIA Novosti, "Ubiystva Girenko, Tadjikskoi Devochki i Vietnamskogo Studenta Matviyenko Nazvala Banditsko-Huliganskimi, a ne Extremistskimi Proyavleniyami," October 29, 2004.

113. *Interfax*, "Rukovoditel Podrazdeleniya GUV D Peterburga i Oblasti po Pravonarusheniyam Sovershennymi Inostrantsami i v Otnoshenii Nih, Andrei Stanchenko: Prestupleniya Protiv Inostrantsev Ukhudshayut Imidzh Peterburga," February 24, 2004.

114. For creating an extremist organization and inciting ethnic hatred, Bobrov was sentenced to six years in prison in December 2005.

115. Official response to a request submitted by the authors from the Justice Ministry Chief Directorate of the Federal Registration Service for St. Petersburg and Leningrad Region, April 29, 2005.

116. Data collected by the State Statistics Committee in 2004.

117. "Yezhegodnoye Poslanie Gubernatora Sankt-Peterburga V. Matviyenko Gorodskomu Parlamantu," March 30, 2005, http://www.abnews.ru/type_news_full.html?t=9600&data=news (last accessed August 6, 2006).

118. Federal Statistics Service 2004 employment report.

119. It should also be noted that there are cultural and historical differences among the researched regions. Comparing other North Caucasus republics with Chechnya and Dagestan would help advance the argument as residents of these regions have more in common culturally and historically and, thus, impact of social and cultural differences—as contributing factors—on the research and analysis would be minimized.

120. *Schwerpunkte* means "centers of gravity," a military term coined by Prussian strategist Karl von Clausewitz.