

U.S. Terrorism, International Security, and Leadership: Toward a U.S.-EU-Russia Security Triangle

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The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States marked the beginning of a new era in world politics.¹ Since then the international academic community has sought to devise plans to face the global threat of terrorism. In a world of increasing interdependence, security issues require collective responses to protect the democratic states against extremist groups, religious fundamentalists, or rogue states.

With American leadership, the international community's search for security and stability should start with several fundamental questions that Hans Morgenthau posed four decades ago: "What is the purpose of America? What does America stand for? What distinguishes it from other nations."² Above all, America has the military muscle and means, and has shown willingness, to act. The post-cold war framework will emerge from the general guidelines of American grand strategy. Yet, this framework might impose a certain reorientation of American foreign policy priorities.

The terrorist blow that caused the loss of thousands of lives has reminded everyone that world politics still bears features of the Hobbesian world of primitive instincts, intolerance, extremist and irrational behavior, and inability to engage in constructive political discourse. What is more, the attacks have dramatically put into question the applicability of American policies, principles, and values on a worldwide basis. They have also raised the need for a framework to build strategic alliances among the key geopolitical partners in their quest for security.

In this article I will focus on the European Union (EU) and Russia for several reasons. First, the EU is a product of a long integrative process, an effort the United States supported with the Marshall Plan in the post-World War II era. Second, since then, EU-U.S. relations have reached a degree of collaboration, despite differences, that allows them to act jointly against common threats. Third, the EU is creating the blueprint for a superstate with intergovernmental and supranational

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characteristics and is bound to play an active role in world politics. The creation of a European Rapid Reaction Force will enable the EU to pursue "European" policies on the old continent. The United States is bound to support the European integration because its failure might Balkanize the European security landscape. In that case America would be expected to intervene once again.

Fourth, the end of the cold war and the disintegration of the Soviet Union resulted in the emergence of Russia as the most powerful successor state, whose development and process in democratization significantly affect European and global security. At the strategic level a partnership with the EU and Russia will allow the United States to focus on the new challenges to international security.

American Foreign Policy, an Overview

Historically, American foreign policy motives have ranged from isolationist to universalist based on the ultimate moral imperative for leadership. One could identify those trends within a paradigm that extends from political realism to altruistic pluralism. The current post-11 September conditions raise questions concerning the imperatives of American foreign policy and the consequences of American strategy for the world.

The two polar opposites of American foreign policy exemplified by Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson serve as a framework for defining America's role in the new millennium. Theodore Roosevelt's foreign policy constituted an operational application of American realpolitik, while Woodrow Wilson's foreign policy choices revealed an altruistic motive to shape a world system according to American ideals and values on a consensual basis.³

Conventional wisdom has focused on four alternative strategies that the United States may pursue: unilateral preeminence, restraint, selective engagement, and cooperation.⁴ In the post-cold war era, the challenge that arises out of the old dichotomy is whether American foreign policy itself should be readjusted to the new geopolitical reality, in a way that would provide sound world leadership and at the same time meet European allies' expectations of equal partnership. Just as after World War I, when Wilson introduced new ideals, America needs a new consensual national interest framework to persuade allies that a world under American leadership will be a better and safer one for everyone.

The question is whether a unilateral preeminence strategy will make America more secure in the long run. Supporters of such a strategy base their choice on American military preponderance and Europe's long-time inability to formulate a common foreign and security policy. It has often been suggested that Russia's dreams of grandeur make it a potential threat if Russia is not a part of the general planning.

The cooperative, constructive leadership model is based on building alliances and joint planning with strategic partners. However, the reality of world politics does not allow a totally inclusive framework of strategic planning. Involving all nations in the strategy for the new millennium would be a welcome but utopian goal, ideologically related to Wilsonian principles. That leads us to seek the general guidelines of American post-cold war grand strategy.

The EU and the U.S. Strategic Axis: New Challengers

Since the end of the World War II, the United States has become the most reliable strategic partner of European nations. American administrations have invested all of their efforts into restructuring postwar Europe, and at the same time the United States has become a "European power" since the old continent was the battleground of two world wars. The lack of Soviet danger has led Europeans to reconsider their long-established partnership with the United States and at times to adopt policies that do not necessarily facilitate the American grand strategy.⁵ Although it is a "civilian power,"⁶ with no distinctive military might or common foreign policy,⁷ the EU has become a reliable strategic partner of the United States. As one observer pointed out, "the European Community's response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 offered what seemed to many to be a clear example of both the relative strengths but, crucially, also the ultimate weakness of civilian powers."⁸ Nevertheless, that operation would have been extremely difficult without the logistical and financial support of America's allies.

Elections in Germany in September 2002 demonstrated that foreign policy is a matter of domestic politics.⁹ German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder built his electoral campaign on a collision course with American foreign policy while German officials made incomprehensible statements about the American president, a fact that tarred bilateral relations.¹⁰ German policy should not be seen in isolation from the overall EU policy, as Germany is the engine that drives European integration. Moreover, Germany seeks closer ties with Moscow, a fact that makes Russia a desirable EU partner. European public opinion has often expressed its discontent with American choices, as in the mass demonstrations across Europe against American military action in Iraq.¹¹

Why do European nations and a growing part of political elites reject U.S. policy choices? To what extent does this affect the national policies of EU member states? The answer to those questions should be sought at different levels of national politics and in the inability of the United States to pursue a successful communication strategy.

There are several factors contributing to the U.S.-EU differences. First, Europe has come a long way along the path of "multilateralism" over the last fifty years, during the quest for European integration. Furthermore, the EU is a treaty-based union of sovereign states, operating through collective institutions and, above all, mutual compromises. EU member states are becoming accustomed to applying principles of multilateralism, despite inefficiencies. Second, the United States and the EU have set themselves divergent priorities and view the world from different perspectives.

On the other hand, the United States tends to view the world through a great power prism. European political elites widely acknowledge that having a Republican president in the White House was not a desirable outcome. European public opinion regards Republican presidents as "less cooperative," more "unilateralist," and prone to use military power at the expense of diplomacy. The need for President Bush to deal with terrorist strongholds and the potential threat from Iraq exacerbated those negative stereotypes.¹²

Selective Multilateralism Versus Unilateralism

Adoption of common policies requires power-sharing. That is a key concept for the success of American foreign policy in the post-cold war era. Those countries that are left out of the inclusive approach, even among West European states, may tolerate the presence of anti-American groups.¹³ The degree to which American administrations will be willing to adopt a common course of action and share responsibilities will determine the success of American grand strategy. Yet, a defining factor will also be the willingness of European allies to accept their share in economic cost and potential loss in human terms when military action is required. To this day, the American side sets the rules of the game, but it is also the one that counts human losses and bears most of the cost of military operations.

After both World Wars, new ideals emerged and provided the ideological and institutional ground for understanding among ex-rivals. Yet the post-cold war world leaders face new security challenges as the enemy is not clearly defined, at least at the military level. Rather it takes the form of cultural or pseudo-cultural, religious, and political upheaval against the spread of Western values. The dramatic changes that took place in the 1990s have substantially altered the international political arena and left the United States the only superpower, with unique capabilities and a number of opportunities.

The vast majority of analyses on the appropriate response to 11 September have focused almost exclusively on the military response, with hardly any space for constructing a strategic collective approach to combating terrorism. However, a military response alone fails to deal with the intellectual root of anti-Western feelings in certain societies.

The collective response to terrorism should first look for causation patterns and then develop common strategies among the partners. This means that American national security requirements are examined in relation to other policy alternatives. Thus, it is of paramount importance to pinpoint the expectations of the American side, so that other actors can recognize and eventually adopt policies compatible with them.

The prospect of positive interaction raises the issue of the way Americans have viewed themselves. In her 1996 book *Transatlantic Relations*, Beatrice Heuser portrays the Americans as those who “see themselves and their country as the beacon of liberty in the world and their foreign policy as one that brings this light to all the corners of the earth.”¹⁴ This strictly positivist view of the world implies that it may be viewed in one way only. This vision is unacceptable for those who do not culturally identify themselves as “westerners” or who reject the universality of western (mainly American) ideals, since those should not and cannot be the only ideals in the world. They impose a dogmatic political and cultural orthodoxy that leaves no space for alternative views of the world. The West is indeed unique but should not be forcibly universal, as to do so would alter the pluralistic character and multicultural diversity of the world community.

Leading the world and spreading one's own values means that in the process alternative values might have to be eliminated, a fact that not everyone is willing to accept, particularly in the non-western world. As a result, the West becomes a

target by its very *raison d'être*. In the world of acute inequalities and asymmetric capabilities, the West's self-proclaimed and long-established destiny to provide single-handed leadership comes into question.

The key to a lasting American leadership lies in sharing power with strategic allies. American "persuasive credibility"¹⁵ cannot be applied solely by the use of force, but should build bridges that would marginalize radical elements.

The new world order presents America with novel tasks. Yet, this world operational imperative generates reactions on a regional or even global scale. The end of the cold war provides opportunities for both America and its European allies, particularly in sharing responsibilities and burdens through co-exercising power. America will remain a world leader and feel safer if it adapts to the new reality and learns "to reconcile the old ideas with the new facts."¹⁶ Hans Morgenthau wisely observed that "a nation must continuously re-examine and reformulate the ideas of the past in the light of the experiences of the present and the anticipated demands of the future, always risking failure."¹⁷

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He also spoke of the "sommambulistic self-deception of a nation which is unaware both of the dangers that threaten it and of the opportunities that await its action."¹⁸

The United States has substantial power; "it possesses the authority and the capacity to set the rules of the game and to determine how others will play the game. Those who attempt to play other games can be persuaded or coerced to conform only by those with superior structural power."¹⁹ That statement sets American foreign policy in a realist, unilateral framework. Undeniably, in terms of structural power, the United States retains global dominance, yet this strategic advantage cannot by itself protect it from irrational responses or guarantee the cooperation of West European states in the long run.

America should focus on avoiding "global soul-less despotism"²⁰ and unilateralism that may lead to collective or individual anti-western outbursts. Contempt toward historical allies such as the West European states and marginalization of former but still potential foes such as Russia may prove risky. American efforts should be focused on spreading liberalism and democracy and on enhancing sustainable development through capitalism. Such an approach might prove more effective in dealing with global threats since it will go straight to their cause.

The underlying causes of unrest and turbulence may be identified as intercultural conflict, (mis)perceptions of U.S. hegemonic domination, poverty, and the lack of democracy. First, it is imperative to enhance democracy in areas where lack of democratic institutions provides fertile ground for the development of extremist responses to global and regional problems. Second, it is imperative to boost development, which will marginalize those elements within the societies

that would be willing to engage in terrorism. After all, poverty is not only a social problem but a potential source of militant responses to inequality. Third, it is essential to apply cooperative security modes based on inclusion of more partners to avoid reactions to unilateral policies.

Constructive, Cooperative Leadership

A potentially useful response to global challenges may be provided by the model of constructive, cooperative leadership. A *cooperative* leadership will provide the organizational framework for power-sharing, which in turn will entail responsibility and cost sharing. Collective *constructive* decision making will provide Europeans with the opportunity to support America in a more effective way.

America has led the way (the Gulf war, the Kosovo war) but at the same time was held responsible for any deficiencies in the application of policy choices. A joint decision-making framework will take part of the burden off U.S. shoulders and might provide a broader perspective for resolving global and regional issues. The consensual joint decision-making process might be more constructive, since all those involved will have the opportunity and the motive to influence policy choices based on their own social, political, strategic, and economic milieu.²¹

An expression of unilateral demands might deprive the American administration of alternative and possibly more constructive choices and will affect the legitimacy of unilateral action. Power-sharing with America's West European allies is probably the only feasible and cost-effective compromise the United States might accept. Such an approach might serve Western interests well. *A primus inter pares* and not *primus solus*, America should voluntarily involve West Europeans and Russia in the process of making decisions that affect international security.

A decade ago American intellectuals, scholars, and policymakers came to the conclusion that "America cannot retreat from the world, nor go it alone; interdependence is a fact of life."²² However, a common action framework will have to overcome not only the often divergent EU-U.S. interests in trade but also different visions of international politics. From this perspective, American choices will define the shape of the new world order.

Different visions of Europe among European political elites undermine the EU's global role.²³ Europe is still tormented by national policy incompatibilities²⁴ and ideological, structural, institutional, and operational dysfunctionalities and is often unable to adopt genuine common policies.²⁵ All this does not provide the required motive for the United States to regard it as an equal partner.

Nevertheless, the EU enlargement process is slowly creating a unified Europe. It appears to inaugurate a new era of EU-Russian relations and is making substantial steps toward bringing the Russian economy back to development orbit.²⁶ In the future, American unilateralism, on one hand, and gradual political integration of European nations on the other may lead to the alienation of two strategic allies.

An American - Russian Partnership?

In the post-bipolar world, Russia has been regarded as a potential threat and an ally to the West at the same time. In the late 1990s, Russian military and strate-

gic bravado became sometimes a target of intense criticism, based on cold war stereotypes.²⁷ The strategic and historic questions American policymakers must answer in regard to Russia policy are:

- Does the United States wish to build a relationship with Russia based on shared interests and the acknowledgment of Russian interests in the Caucasus?
- Do we all need Russia to build an anti-terrorism alliance?
- What would Russia's role be within such an alliance?
- To what extent should America take into account Europe's decision to build a strategic partnership with Moscow?²⁸
- How would the isolation of Moscow affect EU-U.S. relations?
- Can Moscow cause a rift between Brussels and Washington and under what circumstances?
- Can the United States bear all the cost of acting on its own out of strictly unilateral motives?
- Is it possible to define the prerequisites for a constructive Russian foreign policy framework? To what extent can the United States influence this framework?
- And finally, is Russia a potential foe by destiny?

Post-cold war American policy toward Russia has been wise and careful not to isolate Russia and has been built on continuity. It was introduced in the late 1980s with President Bush's strategic decision not to treat the defeated superpower and its most powerful successor, Russia, as a de facto failed opponent. This generated intense criticism, as one observer pointed out: "in our zeal to avert Russia's exclusion from the emerging international order, we allowed the Russian agenda to dictate our own and put ourselves in the position of trying to compensate Russia for lost influence."²⁹

The Clinton administration adopted a non-zero-sum policy and supported Russia despite the fact that Moscow found itself in a power vacuum due to the inability of Boris Yeltsin to govern the country. President Clinton elevated "Russia's internal transformation to first place in American global agenda."³⁰ American support of Russia during the George Bush and Bill Clinton administrations undeniably facilitated the task of Russian governments to proceed with reforms. That was a prudent policy toward a former foe that would be most helpful if it became a future ally.

In the late 1990s, Russia showed signs of an inward-looking country aiming at the grandeur of the past. However, in the new millennium Moscow is a strategic partner of the West despite its political, economic, and military shortcomings and reduced capabilities at the strategic level. At the domestic level, its role will be to a great extent determined by the quality and depth of its democratic institutions and the strategic priorities of Russian leaders. Those, in turn, will define the degree to which Russia will become a genuine partner in exercising power or a state eternally struggling to persuade friends and foes that after its loss of superpower status it has or should have a role in world politics.

On the other hand, it is the very strategic planning of the United States that will also affect Russia's choices in international politics. That implies that Rus-

sian interests in Eurasia will have to be taken into account. Failing to do so will enhance the position of hard-liners in Moscow who support policies aiming at the re-Sovietization of Russian foreign policy and the adoption of confrontational policies toward the United States.³¹

American-Russian strategic partnership will also be shaped by the divergence or convergence in their respective policies in the Caucasus.³² Russian policy in Central Asia likewise is perceived in a simplified fashion, presenting it in black and grey, rather than finding causation patterns to interpret it. The policies of the United States toward Russia will determine the degree of cooperative behavior Moscow will adopt and the extent of the shared goals and priorities between the two.

Moscow has shown that it wishes to be a part of the new world order. That was evident in the 1999 occupation of the Kosovo airport during the crisis. The advancement of Russian troops was meant to be a statement, namely that Moscow should not be left out of decisions concerning its near abroad.³³ On the other hand, there is a tendency within scholarly and policymaking circles in the United States to undermine the Russian role, based on the political, economic, and structural problems the country has faced in the post-cold war period.³⁴ Directly or indirectly, some consider Russia a foe by destiny, a failed superpower without a role in world politics. However, the Clinton and Bush administrations have repeatedly rejected the notion that there is any kind of negative predisposition toward Moscow, or a plan to marginalize it.

U.S.-Russian divergence stems from particular strategic choices of Washington's and Russia's interests in Eurasia. The most obvious is the Chechen problem, which is directly linked to Russia's stability and affects domestic politics.³⁵ Moreover, Moscow looks at allies and potential foes in terms of their attitude toward the Chechen problem, which it considers to be largely a domestic matter that needs to be dealt with on the political and diplomatic levels. Yet, a political solution has not been possible since the form that the Chechen war has acquired bears characteristics of a terrorist campaign that has affected many Russians.³⁶ That triggered intensification of Russian military operations, which cost the life of many Russians and Chechens, even among the civilian population.

Political realists would agree that foreign policy is not a wishful thinking process based on an altruistic expression of good will. That observation, applied to the Russian policy in Chechnya, would mean that Russian national interests in the region should be taken into account when formulating an American Eurasian strategy. American policy on the issue will determine to a great extent Moscow's grand strategy when it considers becoming a U.S. partner. The Russian side is not willing to accept what it regards as "interference" in a "domestic" issue that threatens the territorial integrity of the country. Moscow considers the Chechen issue a matter of self-defense against terrorists and religious fundamentalists.³⁷

Russia holds the key to the stability of Eurasia, namely Georgia,³⁸ Abkhazia, and Ukraine.³⁹ It has been acknowledged that "the key to the crisis in Abkhazia lies in Russia and we need to convince the Russians to modify their approach and

persuade the Abkhaz leaders to cooperate with Georgia.”⁴⁰ Yet, pragmatism suggests that the desired “cooperative mood” on the part of Moscow will depend on the recognition of Russian concerns over the Chechen issue, as well as other Russian interests in the Caucasus. As long as Russia feels sidelined and surrounded by foes it will not adopt constructive policies in the area that are strategically important to both the United States and Russia.

Moscow has the power⁴¹ to influence peaceful settlements in the Caucasus, particularly the efforts of Abkhazia to break away from Georgia.⁴² That effort overlaps with the Chechen desire to break away from Moscow, which is regarded as the most burning security threat for Russia’s stability. As pointed out, “the Russians are not likely to be particularly helpful on the Abkhaz issue when they see that the Georgians are failing to deal with the Chechens in the Pankisi valley.”⁴³ The strategic setting becomes even more complicated since Moscow implies that the insurgency in Chechnya and Dagestan stems from external interference, a misperception that turns the Russian noncooperative mood into a self-fulfilling prophecy.⁴⁴

American policy on this issue has been shaped by Washington’s overall strategy toward Moscow and the degree to which American interests are met by mutual understanding and trade-offs with Russia.⁴⁵ The March 2001 visit of the Chechen leader’s “foreign minister” in the United States may be regarded as part of an American stick-and-carrot approach. The visit was regarded as a blow in Moscow and, at the same time, enhanced Russia’s determination to deal with foes that threaten its territorial integrity. Such policies on the part of the United States strengthen the hard-liners in Moscow in their expression of Russian militarist bravado.⁴⁶

There are similarities between the attacks on the United States and those against Russian urban centers. First, Osama bin Laden has sponsored violence in both Russia and the United States.⁴⁷ Second, in both cases terrorists targeted civilians in urban centers.⁴⁸ Third, they aimed at terrorizing civilian population, affecting Russian public opinion, and redirecting foreign policy choices. Osama bin Laden’s lethal strategy toward the United States indirectly aimed at promoting Washington’s neo-isolationist policy, which would allow perpetrators to go unpunished.

That supposition implies that the American war on terrorism is not only desired but also necessary for international peace and stability. Similarly, the participation of Russia in the antiterrorism coalition is essential for several reasons:

- The multilateral “anti-terror shield” needs to be built on a long-term basis, since terrorism has no expiration date. After all, Osama bin Laden and his followers have not been physically eliminated⁴⁹ or ideologically weakened, at least in religious fundamentalist circles.⁵⁰
- America needs a strategic partner in Eurasia to make sure that the region will not become a new sanctuary for extremists ready to launch another irrational and brutal attack.
- Russia, the strongest successor state of the Soviet empire, may provide such a sanctuary if it is excluded and alienated.

Alternative options exist but they do not have the qualitative and quantitative advantages that Moscow can offer for international security. Pakistan proved to be useful during the attack on Afghanistan, but its long-term reliability is extremely dubious because of its undemocratic regime and because a substantial portion of its people support Islamic fundamentalists.

At his meeting with President Bush in St. Petersburg, President Putin pointed out emphatically that fifteen out of the nineteen hijackers that hit America were Saudis,⁵¹ and studies of terrorism financing concluded that terrorists have raised money mainly in Saudi Arabia.⁵² American intelligence agencies also believe that the leading group of terrorist financiers consists of Saudis and Pakistanis, which

puts into question American support for Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.⁵³

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That is not the case with Russia despite the aggressive rhetoric expressed by a part of the clergy⁵⁴ and its post-imperialist rhetoric in the 1990s.⁵⁵ The attitude of the Russian people toward the United States has been sympathetic, keeping in mind the losses of

the Russian armed forces in Chechnya. It is a tragic coincidence that it is international terrorism that created the required psychological framework of rapprochement between the Russian and American peoples. The terrorist attacks against the United States were condemned by the entire society in Russia, a fact that provides America with a strategic partner in Russia, the Russian people. By simply not marginalizing Russian interests, American strategy will have at its side Russian public opinion, which holds the key to domestic politics. That would force even those who contemplate a hostile policy toward Washington to think twice.

A second positive side-effect of the 11 September attacks was the establishment of a personal relationship between Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin. This “personal framework of bilateral relations” bears serious strategic implications for both American and Russian policies in Central Asia and is bound to be based on trade-offs, mutual concessions, and gains.

A Trilateral Partnership?

Russia’s policy in the post-cold war era has clearly become Europe-oriented, showing that cooperation with the EU has become a strategic priority for Moscow. Despite the rhetoric of certain Russian officials, it is estimated that “the country’s strategic nuclear forces will have deteriorated by 2012.”⁵⁶ Russia may not be a direct threat to the United States and the EU, unless strategic isolation turns it into a smuggler of nuclear know-how and material. In that case, Russia will be totally isolated not only from the United States but also from Western Europe, whose security depends heavily on Moscow’s strategic posture. Keeping in mind

that the EU wants the involvement and leadership but not the hegemonic predominance of America in European and global affairs, a trilateral approach will enhance security on all sides and will tie Moscow to the Euro-Atlantic core. What is more, improved American-Russian relations after the 11 September attack gave President Bush a free hand in Central Asia.⁵⁷

On the other hand, a policy that leads to Russia's isolation will not be welcomed by EU states. Russia not only holds the key to European security but also is a strategic trade and energy partner for the EU, a fact highlighted at the tenth EU-Russia summit, which took place in November 2002. In the long run, an American policy that threatens the stability of Russia may become a source of serious friction between the EU and the United States. On the other hand, the United States will enhance its cooperation with the EU if it makes the strategic choice to include Moscow in a trilateral strategic axis that would defend common interests in Europe and Central Asia, two geopolitical regions of great importance to Washington.

The ultimate goal of American grand strategy is bound to be the isolation and containment of rogue states, the enhancement of international security, and avoidance of self-isolating policies. Thus the formula one (United States) plus two (EU, Russia) provides the opportunity for orchestrated action and potential control of Russia itself.

Inclusion of Moscow in such multilateral strategic planning requires democratization of Russia and its becoming a functional market economy. Furthermore, the West needs to formulate clear and distinct choices in world energy policy. Russia's importance as a world energy supplier, particularly for West European states, has increased substantially, to the extent that Moscow might soon replace Saudi Arabia as the key energy supplier.⁵⁸ The strategic landscape is becoming more complicated as OPEC and its energy policies are affected by Russia's increased annual oil output. Pursuing this course Russia may stabilize world oil prices and balance the ability of OPEC states to control the world oil market. That would be a desired outcome for West European importers of oil.

In energy policy, the United States is facing a strategic dilemma between the need to support a clearly undemocratic regime in Saudi Arabia, to ensure regular flow of oil,⁵⁹ and the need to recognize the emerging importance of Russia as energy supplier to West European allies. The decision will influence American and West European energy security, as well as Russia's global role. Moreover, it will affect the EU's support of American policies, since Russia matters to West Europeans a lot more than it does to Americans. Therefore, American strategic choices have long-term implications for the degree of cooperation among the EU, the United States, and Russia.

Conclusion

American leadership during the cold war aimed at providing strategic coordination of the West against a militarily and ideologically clearly defined enemy. The new, post-cold war role of world leader is more complex, as the enemy cannot be found in the strategic and geopolitical domain but takes the form of an irra-

tional cultural and religious reaction. Sharing power and responsibility emerges as a long term strategic necessity in the new post-cold war world.

A new "intercontinental equilibrium," as described by Raymond Aron several decades ago, may deal more efficiently with the temptation of power abuse and establish joint responsibilities with America's European allies.⁶⁰ Acting in concert creates symmetry in cost, too, and takes substantial political and financial burden off America's shoulders.

The task of leading the world alone may present a security dilemma for the United States. Already certain scholars have suggested that a unipolar world is unsustainable, since geopolitical conditions do not favor long-term unilateral leadership. Charles Kupchan has identified and focused on the slow but steady emergence of Europe as a *primus inter pares* with America and the decline of support for American internationalism.⁶¹

The integration process in Europe, despite intra-European divergent strategies and goals (widening versus deepening), is bound to lead to the formation of a super-state, allowing Europeans to advance common policies. That creates the ideological, structural, institutional, and operational requirements to challenge American leadership, particularly when European interests diverge from the American ones.⁶²

Russia and its role in the world may become an additional cause of divergence between the United States and the EU, particularly in view of the EU-Russian rapprochement of the last decade.⁶³ The United States will have to take into account strategic interaction between the EU and Russia in military and energy security in the long term. It is in the American interest not to allow Russia to become the cause of a rift with Brussels.

It is also in the interest of America to envisage a multipolar world based on American leadership, not domination. Terrorist threat has shown that the United States needs partners and a redrawing of American grand strategy, which was built with the collaboration of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. The recent allegations of funding of terrorist activities by Saudi Arabia support the suggestion that it cannot be regarded as a reliable ally.

A second development favoring a multipolar approach is the gradual decline of American public support for internationalism.⁶⁴ To an average American such an approach has economic and social costs and forces American administrations to bear the burden of sustaining friendly regimes. The dramatic changes in the post-cold war world stress the need for leadership in partnership. The United States should continue to exercise leadership, avoid self-defeating strategies, and coordinate policy with European allies. A unilateral approach causes the unwillingness of Western European states to take military action against Iraq without previously exhausting diplomatic means.⁶⁵

John Gaddis epitomized American objectives vis-à-vis ex-rivals, defining them as an effort "to rehabilitate defeated adversaries and invite them into the international state system."⁶⁶ America's European partners have supported the policy of integrating Russia into European institutions, although they acknowledged deficiencies in the human rights field and democratic operation of the Rus-

sian political system. That “flexibility” was based on the need to avoid isolating Moscow, thus turning it into a potential threat to European security. Europeans estimate that inclusion of Russia will provide an institutional means to at least influence developments in Russia,⁶⁷ if not to control them.⁶⁸

In the recent past, the debate focused on whether Russia’s constructive involvement should be a matter of “inviting” or “integrating” Moscow into the new world order. “Integrating” is a task beyond American capacity and responsibility as it is related to domestic politics of the neophyte Russian democracy. Yet, “inviting” appears to be not only within America’s capabilities but should also be a strategic goal. That would contribute to the stability of Europe, which has always been a vital American interest, and would lay the foundation of a wider antiterrorist alliance.

Russia’s future is a matter of strategic speculation, but American strategy could provide incentives to turn that speculation into rational choice. On the other hand, an “Americanist” approach to foreign policy, supported by Republican circles, might deprive the United States of partners in global diplomacy.⁶⁹ William Wallace convincingly pointed out that “unilateral decisions carry costs. Even if they are successfully imposed on foreign states, they build up resistance to cooperation in other areas where U.S. interests are at stake. Multilateral leadership requires negotiation and compromise with partners who respect American leadership and whose contributions American policy-makers respect. America’s most dependable partners are the democracies in Europe, collectively organized through the European Union and NATO.”⁷⁰

European integration and EU enlargement have represented a dilemma for American administrations for several reasons. First, the quest for European unity has no guarantees that it will create a workable institutional and operational framework. Second, pro-Europeanist trends are gaining at the expense of pro-Atlanticist views, a fact to which American unilateral decisions have contributed. Third, lack of a long-term recognition of particular European interests might lead to the EU’s adopting divergent policies. American predominance and European cooperation should not be taken for granted.

Strategic analysis should take into account the prospect of challenging an America-centered international order. The emergence of failed states, nihilistic fundamentalists, and economic and social disorder in poor and dysfunctional states necessitates a broad alliance against terrorism and common attitudes toward security issues. A joint leadership by the United States and the EU and seating the EU on the UN Security Council may in the long term be a good choice.

The successful policy will be determined to a great extent by the willingness of the United States to support the United Nations and its coordinating mission. Multilateralism demands collective, cooperative choices, and sharing human and capital costs through a UN operational framework.⁷¹ In the long run, unilateralism is bound to bring world leader to confrontation with its partners.⁷² The new reality in the field of international security and the threat of terrorism demand cooperation. After all, “national security is not simply a matter of identifying threats and defending them. Security is international, and it is not a zero-sum

game.”⁷³ Although that statement is in harmony with the aims of the democratic leaders of the world, it does not imply that interests are in harmony, too.

The American vision of the “consensual international system” that President Bush talked about in the early 1990s, when he referred to the “new world order,” might be unipolar or multipolar. The end of the cold war left the United States with strategic advantages, yet this unique position “is not a licence for unilateralism.”⁷⁴ Building strategic partnerships might provide “the most fruitful guide to American policy,” since concerted action will be an expression of respect for other sovereign states and their legal rights.⁷⁵

Political realists would tend to support a policy that would allow the United States to prolong a unilateral world at any cost. However, the EU-Russian relations, the Sino-Russian communique on U.S. hegemony in the spring of 1997, the French policy in the EU,⁷⁶ and the threat of terrorism acquiring the form of a clash of civilizations constitute a clear opposition to a unipolar world. The United States has the historic opportunity to adopt a policy of selective inclusions and avoid isolation and unilateral acts that enhance anti-American feelings, particularly in Europe.⁷⁷

Woodrow Wilson set the intellectual, strategic and operational framework of sharing several decades ago when he stated: “We [Americans] are participants . . . in the life of the world. The interests of all nations are our own also. We are partners with the rest. What affects mankind is inevitably our affair as well as the affair of the nations of Europe.”⁷⁸ American grand strategy should strive to form “the broadest possible global coalition against terrorism.”⁷⁹ History seems to be not near its end but beginning a new chapter that is open ended and unpredictable.

NOTES

1. American administrations should inform the American public in a way that it becomes an attentive public. After all, the choices in the foreign policy domain have an effect—as shown by the dramatic loss of innocent lives in New York and Washington—on all Americans. Simply put, the American public should reinvent American foreign policy, which has not been one of the decisive factors for American voters in selecting a Democrat or Republican candidate

2. See Hans Morgenthau, *The Purpose of American Politics* (Vintage: New York, 1960), 4

3. *Ibid.*, 101.

4. See Michael E. Brown, ed., *America's Strategic Choices* (Cambridge, Ma.: MIT Press, 2000).

5. Incompatibilities include transatlantic trade disputes from beef to bananas, regulatory issues, tariffs on steel imports from Europe, environmental issues, American anti-missile defense, policies toward Iraq, and the UN.

6. The concept was articulated in the 1970s and was considered an attempt to demilitarize the superpower concept “emphasising the importance of the economic and commercial dimensions of international power.” See Francois Duchene, “Europe’s Role in World Peace” in *Europe Tomorrow*, Richard Mayne, ed. (London: Fontana, 1972), 57. For a full analysis see chapter 2.

7. For an in-depth analysis see Philip H. Gordon, “Europe’s Uncommon Policy,” *International Security* 22, no. 3 (Winter 1997–98): 74–100.

8. See Martin A. Smith, “The European Union and the United States in a Superpower

Context,” *European Security* 7, no.1 (Spring 1998): 55–73, at 59.

9. In the case of the United States, see Patrick Lloyd Hatcher, “Even Foreign Policy Is a Local Affair,” *ORBIS* 40, no. 1 (Winter 1996).

10. German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder’s efforts to patch up relations between the two countries received a rather cold welcome from the United States despite Berlin’s offer to assist American-led military operations against Iraq. See “U.S.-German Relations Are on Mend,” *Wall Street Journal*, 28 November 2002, A3.

11. See “Half-a-million march in anti-war rally in Italy,” Reuters, 10 November 2002.

12. Certain analysts consider them “dangerous” for the future of transatlantic relations. See Special Report, America and Europe, *The Economist*, 9 June 2001, 27.

13. There has been a slight change even in the usually Eurosceptic British mood toward unilateralism.

14. See Beatrice Heuser, *Transatlantic Relations, Sharing Ideals and Costs* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs and Pinter, 1996), 9.

15. See Ken Booth, *New Thinking About Strategy and International Security* (London: Harper Collins, 1991), xiii.

16. *Ibid.*, 6.

17. *Ibid.*

18. *Ibid.*, 5.

19. K. J. Holsti, *International Politics: A Framework of Analysis* (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1992), 62.

20. See Michael Doyle, “Liberalism in World Politics,” in *International Relations Theory, Realism, Pluralism, Globalism*, 2nd edition, edited by Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi (New York: Macmillan, 1993), 278.

21. One might be tempted to claim that such an approach may lead to inaction due to divergence of interests. In the case of the EU, such a claim cannot be plausibly supported because of the long-established political, cultural, and strategic ties that bring America and Europe together. In the case of Russia, though, it might create conflict, particularly if Moscow is sidelined and does not develop into a democracy. The existence of the above two factors simultaneously could set Russia as a threat.

22. See Graham Allison and Gregory F. Treverton, eds., *Rethinking America’s Security*, (New York: W. W. Norton, 1992), 447.

23. See “The EU’s Future, Dreams and Discords,” *The Economist*, 2 June 2001, 14.

24. See the problems of adopting common policies and a new EU operational and institutional framework during the EU Nice Summit. “Reform compromise ends marathon EU summit,” Reuters, 11 December 2000. Also, “EU executive says summit fell short of its goals,” Reuters, 11 December 2000 and G. Voskopoulos, “European Political Integration, From Cologne to Nice,” *Ethnikes Epalkseis (Greek Military Review of the Armed Forces)* (December 2001).

25. See George Voskopoulos, “Greece and Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union, Interaction Within and Between a Zone of Peace and a Zone of Turmoil as an Explanatory Factor,” Ph.D. Thesis, Exeter University, UK, 2001.

26. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) is negotiating with U.S. engine-maker Pratt and Whitney to invest in the Russian aviation sector. The EBRD also funded a Russian affiliate in Egypt that is constructing new airliners. Those efforts come at a time when the Russian aviation sector, once one of the most flourishing in world aviation, is struggling to revive. See Guy Chazan, “Russia’s Aviation Sector Needs Cash,” *Wall Street Journal*, 28 November 2002, A5.

27. See Sherman Garnett, “Russia’s Illusory Ambitions,” *Foreign Affairs* (March/April 1997).

28. The Ninth EU-Russia Summit in Moscow on 29 May 2002 “decided to establish a joint High-Level Group on the common European economic space chaired by the Commissioner Patten for the EU and Deputy Prime Minister Khristenko for Russia” to “elaborate a concept for a closer economic relationship between Russia and the EU, based on

the wider goal of bringing the EU and Russia closer together." See The EU's relations with Russia, Ninth EU-Russia Summit, Moscow, Joint Statement, 29 May 2002.

29. See "Mr. Bush Goes to Europe," *The Economist*, 9 June 2001, 9.

30. See Robert L. Hutchings, *American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 351.

31. Hardliners in Russia "insist on further development, modernisation, and enlargement of Russian nuclear arsenal." See Dmitri Pobedash, "U.S.A, European Union and Russia: Perspectives of Military Cooperation," e-publication of the South East European Institute of International Affairs <www.seeia.freesevers.com>.

32. In this respect, energy policies and the construction of pipelines in Central Asia become a qualitative prerequisite for cooperation.

33. A very useful insight is presented in Peter Calvocoressi, *World Politics 1945-2000* (London: Longman, 2000).

34. There have been, however, analyses that acknowledge Russia's pro-Western policy, its course to the stabilization of its political system and economy, and its economic growth in the last three years. See Daniel Treisman, "Russia Renewed?" *Foreign Affairs* (November-December 2002).

35. Putin's arrival to power was, inter alia, the result of his policy in Chechnya and affects Russian public opinion. See "A Shooting Star," *The Economist*, 23 October 1999.

36. These include terrorist attacks on Moscow since 1999, such as the Moscow opera theatre siege, which killed 23 people and injured 144 in March 2001.

37. See "More of the Same," *The Economist*, 31 March 2001, 32-33.

38. The expression of nonconstructive policies in the issue of Abkhazia and Georgia led some scholars to consider it a "neo-imperialist policy" on the part of Moscow. See K. Tsikhelashvili, "Russia's Heavy Hand on Caspian Oil," Civic Education Project, Selected Conference Papers, 1999, Budapest, 7-14.

39. Ukraine's long dysfunctions should not be attributed only to Moscow. In the past this has been acknowledged by American officials and defense scholars. It has been pointed out that "it is important to avoid extremes when discussing the delicate issue of Russian-Ukrainian relations and their impact on the stability of Ukraine. One extreme is to explain away many, if not most, of Ukraine's domestic difficulties by blaming the infamous hidden (or not so hidden) hand of Moscow." That implies that Moscow's ability to destabilize Ukraine in the past should have been taken at face value. See John Jaworsky, *Ukraine: Stability and Instability*, McNair Paper 42, August 1995 (Washington D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University), 45. The participation of Ukraine in NATO is a strategic decision that enhances the capabilities of the Atlantic Alliance but it should be made clear that it is not an attempt to isolate Russia.

40. See Transitions Online (TOL) at <www.tol.cz>. On Russia see also the Russian Mirror at <www.tolrus.ru>.

41. A Western diplomat stated to TOL that "we have to keep the Russians on board. Nothing can happen without an active Russian side." Ibid.

42. That has been acknowledged by scholars and journalists. See Robert McMahon, "Abkhazia dispute defies a UN solution," TOL, 15 November 2002.

43. Ibid.

44. For an analysis, see Rajan Menon and Graham E. Fuller, "Russia's Ruinous Chechen War," *Foreign Affairs* (March/April 2000).

45. With a view to dealing with Iraq, Russia appears to be willing to support an American only offensive—if necessary—should it be allowed to handle the Chechen issue "domestically."

46. Putin did not accept Chechnya's fugitive elected leader, Aslan Maskhadov, as a peace partner after the Moscow theater siege. U.S. officials stated that "Maskhadov's decision to re-ally with militants like Shamil Basayev—viewed in Moscow and Washington as a terrorist—rules him out of the peace process." See "Putin Sees Chechnya Peace Without Maskhadov," Reuters, 10 November 2002.

47. See Timothy J. Colton and Michael McFaul, "America's Real Russian Allies," *Foreign Affairs* (November/December 2001).

48. In a way, Russian territory became an "extended battlefield" as the war, under its new form, spread to the cities. It is not only the attacks of Chechens against urban centers that have been acknowledged as such by Moscow, but also mysterious explosions attributed to technical malfunctions and not terrorist actions.

49. For the gain-cost ratio analysis of the campaign against the Taliban see Michael E. O'Hanlon, "A Flawed Masterpiece," *Foreign Affairs* (May/June 2002).

50. It is of tantamount importance to pinpoint that a macro-strategic approach to security issues and particularly terrorism demands that the West makes clear that it does not focus on Islam. In such a case, adopted policies may lead to direct or indirect inter-civilizational conflict that might be a new threat to international security.

51. See Douglas Farah, "Saudis Face U. S. Demand on Terrorism: Halting Financiers May be Urgent," *Washington Post*, 26 November 2002, A1.

52. *Ibid.*

53. According to a senior U. S. official "Saudi Arabia is one of the epicenters of terrorist financing." *Ibid.* See also Dana Milbank and Glenn Kessler, "Bush Aides: Saudis Can Do More to Halt Terror Funds," *Washington Post*, 27 November 2002, A5.

54. See Pobedash, "USA, European Union and Russia."

55. In 1997 Sergei Karaganov, a member of the Russian President's Council of Russia stated that "a vitally important priority of Russia's foreign policy must be the reintegration of former Soviet territory into one unitary state or, at least, preservation of this zone as a sphere of Russia's exclusive influence. . . . Russia has no other way but to play a post-imperialist role." See Y. Fedorev, "Russia's Caspian Politics: To Elite Consensus," *Mnemie* 1 (November 1997): 19.

56. *Ibid.* See also *Pravda*, 14 March 2002.

57. See Michael E. O'Hanlon, "A Flawed Masterpiece."

58. See Edward L. Morse and James Richard, "The Battle for Energy Dominance," *Foreign Affairs* (March/April 2002).

59. The United States receives 20 percent of its oil imports from Saudi Arabia. See *Euronews*, 27 November 2002.

60. See Raymond Aron, *The Century of Total War* (Beacon Press, Boston, 1966), chapter 11.

61. See Charles Kupchan, *The End of American Era: U.S. Foreign Policy After the Cold War* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2002).

62. The United States and the EU have set a long strategic partnership pursuing compatible interests. As noted, "if this alliance is to fall apart, it will be either because America's interests cease to congruent with Europe's." See "Mr. Bush Goes to Europe," *The Economist*, 9 June 2001, 9. A go-it-alone American policy is considered by most Europeans to be an expression of arrogance, a fact undermined by President Bush's officials who are considered pro-unilateralists.

63. Despite divergences, mainly between Russia-Kazakhstan and the American-led consortium, on the oil and gas pipelines projects proposed or under construction in the Caspian, it should be noted that EU member states are already buying gas directly from Russia. See "Capitalizing on the Caspian's Oil and Gas Boom," *Wall Street Journal*, 28 November 2002, A11. The divergences involve Turkey, which is the beneficiary of one of the biggest energy projects, the U.S.-backed Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. The project puts Georgia and Turkey on a collision course with Russia, while American plans seem not to favor Russian involvement of Russia in the Caspian pipeline politics, a fact that is a clearly political decision since the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline is more costly and bears substantial "environmental and social cost."

64. See Kupchan, *The End of American Era*.

65. Similar anti-war demonstrations took place even in Turkey, one of America's loyal NATO allies. See *Euronews*, 1 December 2002.

66. See John Gaddis, *United States and the End of the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 211.

67. The EU-Russian agreement during the November 2002 meeting concerning free travel of Russians to Kalinigrad concludes one of the most intractable post-Soviet problems. See Natalia Kuznetsova, "Russia: Cutting Deals, Cutting Comments," TOL <russsia.tol.cz>, 12–18 November 2002.

68. In 1996 this need drove many Europeans, particularly the French, to support Russia's membership in the Council of Europe. The argument then, which applies to today's geopolitical circumstances, was that potential isolation of Russia would turn it into a potential threat for European security. The same was expressed by then French foreign minister Herve de Charette, who considered Russian participation in the Council of Europe "as a means to establish communications channels with Moscow." See the Greek daily *Eleftherotypia*, 26 January 1996

69. See William Wallace, "Europe, the Necessary Partner," *Foreign Affairs* (May/June 2001).

70. Ibid.

71. The Final Report of the Seventy-ninth American Assembly defined American military interests through "multilateralizing the use of force, and its human and fiscal costs, through collective security, including UN mechanisms whenever possible." The statement, made a decade ago, implies selective multilateralism and ad hoc support of the UN function. See Allison and Treverton, *Rethinking America's Security*, 447.

72. The importance of trade incompatibilities between the United States and the EU should not be underestimated, as shown by the problems with GATT, and could be magnified by the adoption of unilateral decisions costly for the EU.

73. See Allison and Treverton, *Rethinking America's Security*, 458.

74. Ibid.

75. The suggestion was made in the early 1990s by American scholars who envisaged a world of cooperation among great powers under American leadership. Ibid.; Final Report of the Seventy-ninth American Assembly, 445–61.

76. A useful insight of the French critique on American strategy and "American unwillingness" to support the UN may be found in Ghassan Salame, "New Issues at Stake in War and Peace, Post-Cold War Wars" in *The New International Relations, Theory and Practice*, edited by Marie-Claude Smouts (London: C. Hurst, 2001), 155–70.

77. Some analysts suggest that America uses a form of multilateralism as a cloak to advance strictly national interests. See Mastanduno Michael, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and US Grand Strategy after the Cold War," *International Security* (Spring 1997).

78. See Woodrow Wilson, "A League to Enforce Peace," in *World Politics*, edited by Arend Lipjhart (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1971), 290.

79. The aim was set by the Joint Statement on the Fight Against Terrorism during the Tenth EU-Russia Summit in Brussels on 11 November 2002 and may provide a useful tool in the hands of American policy makers. The EU and Russia stated that they "together are the nucleus of the global coalition against terrorism."