

The Centrality of Elites

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In the 1970s, a doctoral student in the economics department at Harvard could not understand a case study in which two aluminum factories with the same assets produced different outputs. “The tools to understand this were completely absent in the economics profession,” he mentioned later. His professor suggested that he might find the answer across the river at the business school, which he did. The main reason for the discrepancy turned out to be the management of the enterprises.

Although it never claimed to be a science, not even a dismal one, the Sovietological profession has suffered from similar shortcomings, such as an inability to predict the imminent collapse of the USSR. Likewise, the debate on the reasons for the successes and failures of the postcommunist transitions at the time also seems to be deficient. As economics has, since the 1970s, learned much from management studies, so too should our profession. Renowned management guru Peter Drucker has noted that psychology is a central ingredient in management studies and in the management of corporations. The personality traits of the managers are routinely taken into account. Sovietology, transitology, and more specifically, political science and diplomacy should consider doing what has been obvious to journalists and other casual observers of the East-Central European transitions and emphasize more the personal background and motivations of the leaders.¹ This could go a long way in explaining those transitions and the performance of their governments. It could provide a framework to explain not only what happened in the last thirteen years but also what might happen when Belarus, Cuba, North Korea, Turkmenistan, and others begin their political and economic transitions.

For example, can any other factor besides quality of leadership and management explain the different performances of the transitions in Estonia and Latvia, perhaps the two most similar countries in the region when their simultaneous transitions began (see table 1)? Could the differences in governance and quality of government in turn explain the difference in economic performance of both Baltic neighbors?

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TABLE 1. Rankings of Quality of Governance in Two Baltic Countries

	Estonia	Latvia	n ^g
Honesty ^c	1	8	17
Institutional performance ^b	4	9	25
Economic freedom ^d	1	4	26
Property rights ^a	1	16	22
Quality of legal drafting ^a	4	14	22
Quality of judiciary ^a	5	21	22
“State capture” (inverted) ^a	6	18	22
FDI per-capita ^b	\$ 1,337	\$ 1,027	—
Human development ^e	6	9	26
Ease of bureaucratic permits ^a	2	13	20
Bureaucratic honesty ^a	1	10	20
Country risk (inverted) ^f	1	6	19

^a*Transition: The First Ten Years* (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2002), 61–63, 106; World Development Report 1997: Private Sector Survey <www.worldbank.org>, questions 12a, 14.

^b*Transition Report 2000* (London: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2000), 21; *Transition Report Update: April 2001* (London: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2001), 22.

^cTransparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2001 <www.transparency.org>.


^dGerald P. O’Driscoll, Jr., Kim R. Holmes, and Melanie Kirkpatrick, *2001 Index of Economic Freedom* (Washington, DC and New York: The Heritage Foundation and Dow Jones and Company, 2001), 18–9.

^eUnited Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 2001* <www.undp.org>, 14.

^fEconomist Intelligence Unit Country Risk Service <www.eiu.org>.

^gNumber of postcommunist countries in each study.

FIGURE 1: Economic Growth in Estonia and Latvia



Whereas the Estonian democrats in 1992 fully committed themselves to breaking with the past, with Soviet institutions, personnel, and economic practices, in Latvia the democrats and the nomenklatura essentially fused into “Latvia’s Way,” the party that has governed the country for most of its post-Soviet period. Are Estonia and Latvia like the paradox of the two aluminum factories, especially since both are perceived to have applied similar macroeconomic policies? Surprise—there really are no tools in the economic profession (nor perhaps in transitology) to explain the paradox, although amateur observers of the Baltic transitions can readily point out the reasons.

The Nomenklatura Phenomenon

The mismanagement of transitions appears to be due not to lack of technical skills, as the IMF seems to assume, but to negative human capital and simple sabotage, as J. Michael Waller, Marshall Goldman, Anders Åslund, and others have insisted from the beginning. The reasons for this behavior, however, are rarely explored. A more elaborate study needs to be conducted on the psychology of the nomenklatura. It seems that a sequel to Michael Voslensky’s classic book *Nomenklatura: The Soviet Ruling Class* is in order, perhaps called *Nomenklatura: A Psychology of Power and Crime*.

A few authors have noticed the parallels between the structure and behavior of communist parties in the Russian region and those of criminal organizations in the United States and Palermo. To understand this phenomenon, we should note that of the ten personality disorders recognized by the American Psychiatric Association (APA), the label “psychopath” or “antisocial,” which is normally found in less than 2 percent of a general population, is over-represented among convicted criminals. The APA defines the antisocial personality disorder as

fail[ure] to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behavior . . . such as destroying property, harassing others, stealing or pursuing illegal occupations. Persons with this disorder disregard the wishes, rights or feelings of others. They are frequently deceitful and manipulative in order to gain personal profit or pleasure. . . . They may repeatedly lie, use an alias, con others, or malingering. . . . They may have an arrogant and inflated self-appraisal and may be excessively opinionated, self-assured and cocky [yet] may display a glib, superficial charm and can be quite voluble and verbally facile.²

“Lack of empathy,” “inflated self-appraisal,” and “superficial charm” are traits seen in the Bolshevik ethos as the “vanguard of society;” their use of any means to achieve power, their fondness for *provokatsiya* and pathological lying, their disregard of basic human dignity, and their impassioned and seductive rhetoric on social welfare, equality, and peace.

Considering that early Bolsheviks and their cheka drew both resources and personnel disproportionately from criminal activity, it can be speculated that perhaps a large number of antisocials also found themselves inside the communist parties and their repressive apparatuses. The Bolshevik and chekist modus operandi, their violent philosophies, and their promises of getting rich quickly (through theft of their victims’ property) perhaps encouraged continued recruitment of antisocials through self-selection from the population at large.

It may not be exaggerated to assume that the same individual who finds himself attracted to criminality in a democratic country would in another context be attracted to the NKVD or KGB, and in yet another to the Gestapo. The anecdotal evidence that Benito Mussolini's fascists readily converted themselves to communists immediately after his fall perhaps is indicative of this phenomenon. In East-Central Europe, most if not all of the leaders that adopted the language of violence to justify authoritarian governments and interethnic or intersectorian conflict hail from the former communist parties or their political police structures. They include such figures as Slobodan Milosevic in Yugoslavia; Rakhmon Nabiev, Immomali Rakhmonov, and Safarali Kenjaev in Tajikistan; and Franjo Tudjman in Croatia, among others. Xenophobic leaders also include Vladimir Zhirinovskiy and Alexander Barkashov in Russia, both of whom have been suspected of hailing from the former KGB (see tables 2 and 3). Organized crime has also been widely tied to these structures.³

Of course, not all the members of the communist parties could be suspected of suffering from antisocial personality disorder, though it would not be surprising

TABLE 2. Some "Heroes" of the Transitions

Person	Country	New task	Old job
L. Walesa	POL	President	Electrician
V. Havel	CZS-CZR	President	Playwright
M. Laar	EST	Prime Minister	Historian
L. Meri	EST	President	Cinematographer
J. Manitski	EST	Property Commission	Manager of rock band ^a
V. Landsbergis	LIT	President	Musicologist
V. Vike-Freiberga	LAT	President	Professor ^a
G. Starovoitova	RUS	Party leader	Sociologist
L. Ponomarev	RUS	Party leader	Physicist
J. Basta	CZS-CZR	Lustration commission	Archaeologist
A. Goncz	HUN	President	Writer
J. Gauck	GDR	Lustration commission	Lutheran minister
J. Antall	HUN	Prime Minister	Historian
L. Peterle	SVN	Prime Minister	Environmentalist
V. Adamkus	LIT	President	U.S. public servant ^a
F. Dimitrov	BUL	Prime Minister	Lawyer
I. Kostov	BUL	Prime Minister	Professor
T. Mazowiecki	POL	Prime Minister	Catholic intellectual
S. Grigoryants	RUS	Human rights NGO	Gulag prisoner
B. Djelic	SER	Finance Minister	Consultant ^a
M. Panic	SER	Prime Minister	Businessman ^a
N. Kijusev	MAC	Prime Minister	Economics professor

^aIn exile.

TABLE 3. Some "Villains" of the Transitions

Person	Country	New task	Old job
S. Milosevic	YUG	President	Leader in CP
A. Lukashenka	BEL	President	Soviet kolkhoz leader
L. Kravchuk	UKR	President	First sec., CP
L. Kuchma	UKR	President	Enterprise director, CP
P. Lazarenko	UKR	Prime Minister	Leader in KGB
V. Meciar	SLK	Prime Minister	Youth leader, CP
V. Chernomyrdin	RUS	Prime Minister	Soviet minister, CP
V. Zhirinovskiy	RUS	Party leader	Collaborator, KGB
B. Yeltsin	RUS	President	First sec., CP
N. Nazarbaev	KAZ	President	First sec., CP
S. Niyazov	TUR	President	First sec., CP
H. Aliev	AZE	President	Politburo CP
I. Iliescu	RUM	President	Politburo CP
M. Snegur	MOL	President	First sec., CP
P. Lucinschi	MOL	President	Central Committee, CP
I. Karimov	UZB	President	First sec., CP
R. Nabiev	TAJ	President	First sec., CP
I. Rakhmonov	TAJ	President	Soviet kolkhoz leader
V. Gerashchenko	RUS	Central Banker	Central Banker
Ye. Primakov	RUS	Prime Minister	Leader in KGB
V. Cherkessov	RUS	Super-governor	Dissident-hunter, KGB
V. Barannikov	RUS	Minister of Interior	Official in CP
V. Kebich	BEL	Prime Minister	Official in CP
Zh. Videnov	BUL	Prime Minister	Official in CP

Note. CP = Communist Party.

if the figure exceeded the 2 percent found in the general population. Such parties also attracted a range of individuals, from those longing for career advancement (the so-called careerists), to those resisting foreign occupation, to those perhaps genuinely supportive of the overt aims of communist power. Some communist reformers and postcommunist leaders, such as Kiro Gligorov in Macedonia, Mikhail Gorbachev and Vadim Bakatin in the USSR, Stanislaw Shushkevich in Belarus, and Leszek Balcerowicz in Poland, among others, come to mind as constructive leaders. However, they are in a minority, and why they acted differently than the majority of their former comrades defies simple explanation, though perhaps it was because many of them were making their careers outside the party structures (in physics like Shushkevich, or in construction like Bakatin).

What about the group comprising figures such as Alexander Kwasniewski, Gyula Horn, Janez Drnovsek, Ilir Meta, Algirdas Brazauskas, and the other former communists who defeated democratic or semidemocratic governments in the mid-1990s but did not return their countries to authoritarianism? Their "conversion to civility" may have been more the result of their predecessors' dam-

aging the communist structures enough to prevent a return to the past. Their rebirth as social democrats may have been perceived merely as the correct political strategy, which it indeed was. The main factor differentiating this group from those ex-communists who returned to power and reversed constitutionality and economic reform was the actions taken by the prior democratic government. Where democrats had forgotten to dismantle the structures they inherited, a return to authoritarianism and a form of “crony socialism” proved to be less costly and more beneficial for the former communists. Kwasniewski and Brazauskas did not follow the path of Heydar Aliiev in Azerbaijan and of Alexander Lukashenka in Belarus probably because they *could not*.

In any case, that “conversion to civility” may have been relative. Witness the allegations that Brazauskas conspired with Russian elements to cut off the gas supply to his own country right before the 1992 elections to embarrass his contender, President Vytautas Landsbergis, or that Kwasniewski refounded his communist party with KGB funds. Extraconstitutional acts of this magnitude simply are not associated with noncommunist governments and forces.

The lack of emphasis on elite psychology in our field perhaps explains Richard Pipes’s adage that “Sovietology is the only profession where the more one studies, the less one understands.” U.S. president Ronald Reagan’s rookie perception of Soviet elite psychology was more correct in the end than practically anything Sovietology had produced until then. Reagan seemed to vindicate the truism that communist leaders understand and respect those who “get tough” with them and disdain those who attempt appeasement. This personality trait also can be seen in what has been defined as the “psychic masochist,” a person who is “painfully submissive to a ‘stronger’ person, and as painfully brutal and arrogant towards a ‘weaker.’”⁴ Although communism and fascism are often interpreted as opposite ideologies, perhaps they should begin to be interpreted as the same *psychology*.⁵

Transitology’s Red Herrings

Following the transitions more in terms of the professional backgrounds of the actual leaders could also help shed light on two ongoing debates in transitology: the merits of shock therapy versus gradualism, and the merits of presidential versus parliamentary systems. For over a decade now, scholars have argued the *kto vinovat* (who is to blame) of Russia’s perceived failure in economic reform, and the main culprit is generally seen as the “big bang” or shock therapy model of stabilization and liberalization that in theory began in 1992.

However, what if Russia’s economic reforms and shock therapy had been managed instead by noncommunist yet competent forces, say, a Russian equivalent of Mart Laar or Ivan Kostov? Would the outcome have been different than that produced by the presidency of Boris Yeltsin (CPSU regional first secretary), the government of Yegor Gaidar (editor of the journal *Kommunist*), and the central bank of Viktor Gerashchenko (Soviet central banker)? If Yevgeny Primakov’s renamed First Directorate of the KGB had not siphoned off the government’s gold and hard currency reserves to Luxembourg in 1990–91, would the ruble have collapsed as dramatically?

As in Russia, the Mexican financial crisis of late 1994 has often been blamed on the “free-market policies” or the “neoliberalism” of President Carlos Salinas. But instead of blaming some economic model, why not simply emphasize Salinas’s background in the dictatorial structures and his family’s history of thievery, or in other words, that “his privatization strategy consisted in giving away state assets to his personal friends, thereby creating sub-optimal market conditions”? Or that “he played with macroeconomic variables such as the exchange rate in order to keep his kleptocratic party in power.”⁶ Although journalists routinely describe events this way, the IMF never does, and usually academics don’t either. In fact, the IMF held up Salinas’s macroeconomic reforms as the “poster child.”

To begin with, scholars should perhaps abandon the tired dichotomy between capitalism and socialism, or between right and left, and concentrate more on the dichotomy between well-managed economic freedom and crony capitalism. The debate about the perceived failure of Russia could take on new meaning if we were to search for answers less in the theoretical underpinnings of shock therapy and more in Gerashchenko’s purposeful mismanagement of the central bank, in Chernomyrdin’s multibillion dollar corruption, and in Gaidar’s reluctance to liberalize trade or allow foreign banking (not to mention in Yeltsin’s personnel policies). The most powerful indicator of good management in the region is whether or not the managers participated in the communist structures of the past.

In principle, there is nothing wrong with shock therapy. To the contrary, it can bring prosperity when properly managed, as was seen in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Estonia. In any case, using labels to classify the different economic models in the region can be problematic and misleading. That is because hardly any of the economic transitions came from the orthodox application of market economics or of any one theoretical model, but from a mixture of orthodox and unorthodox elements, the combination of which depended on the will and criteria of management. An example is Estonia’s unorthodox yet commonsense policy of bankrupting mafia-ridden banks—which contradicted advice from the IMF—or the Czech and Polish policies of capping wages to control wage-push inflation at the beginning of their stabilization periods. Estonia’s fair and efficient privatization, hailed by the World Bank and others as the best in the region, was the work of Jaan Manitski, the former manager of the Swedish rock sensation ABBA, not some “expert” from the former communist structures (they were too busy participating in Russia’s privatization). As is seen in management studies, there is no real cookie-cutter approach to good management and no theories that are always relevant. Some basic principles, good will, common sense, and the character of the manager are more important.

Obviously, theoretical economic models do matter, as evinced by Poland’s slightly superior performance with shock therapy vis-à-vis the gradualism implemented by Hungary’s “cabinet of historians and engineers.” But both nonetheless are broadly considered successful. Russia’s reform (through an impressive stretch of the imagination) was also classified as “shock therapy,” and Ukraine’s as “gradualist,” yet both are considered unsuccessful (the latter more than the former). The question is: What if the theoretical economic model

(between shock therapy and gradualism) ends up mattering less than who actually administers it? If Kwasniewski had hijacked Poland's revolution in 1989 and launched shock therapy, would Poland have witnessed its present miracle or would it instead resemble Romania?

As in economics, what if the political system also mattered less than who fills the top offices? There was a raging debate on whether presidential or parliamentary systems conduced to more functioning government and democracy.⁷ Whereas some have noticed more repression and authoritarian behavior in presidential systems, and at first glance this seems true, notice what happens when we factor in the background of the leaders, as table 4 demonstrates. In the case of East-Central Europe, it appears that the form of government is less relevant than who ends up filling those offices. Except for Levon Ter-Petrossian of Armenia (who used fraud in his 1996 election), and Zviad Gamsakhurdia of Georgia (who was accused of acting eccentrically and undemocratically),⁸ there appears to be a correlation that has little to do with whether a system is presidential or parliamentary. Would things have improved in Moldova if Mircea Snegur's title were "prime minister" instead?

TABLE 4. First Postcommunist Leaders

Eventually considered "authoritarian" or excessive violators of laws or human rights; backgrounds in Communist system		
Leaders in mostly presidential system	Yeltsin Iliescu Karimov Niyazov Akaev Ter-Petrossian Gamsakhurdia	Nabiev Kravchuk Milosevic Snegur Tudjman Nazarbaev Berisha
Leaders in mostly parliamentary system	Meciar Kebich	
Not considered authoritarian or excessive violators of laws; not from Communist system		
Leaders in mostly presidential system	Havel ('89-'92) Izetbegovic Elchibey	
Leaders in mostly parliamentary system	Klaus Laar Antall Landsbergis Mazowiecki	Dimitrov Peterle Kljusev Godmanis

A theory of elites and of management may not explain why democracy comes to a country or not, but it could shed more light on why a postcommunist country has a successful democratic or market transition or not. Theories of path dependence, civic culture, institutional design, bureaucratic politics paradigm, geography, and so on, can go far in telling us why Uzbekistan's frail civil society has maintained Karimov in power rather than a figure such as Abdurahim Polat. But they cannot explain why Azerbaijan returned to dictatorship. That reason can be found specifically in the democratic leader Abulfaz Elchibey's refusal to call for new parliamentary elections, dissolve the secret police, and shatter the old command economy and its networks, the way Havel and Laar did. In other words, Elchibey's poor management eventually destroyed him, despite his good intentions.

Poor management can explain why Estonia and Latvia performed dissimilarly, despite applying roughly the same macroeconomic reforms. The same good will and naïveté (poor management) displayed by genuine Latvian democrats such as Dainis Ivars when inviting the nomenklatura to participate in senior government posts in 1991–92 also afflicted the Rumanian poets who overthrew Nicolae Ceausescu in 1989, only to witness the hijacking of their revolution by Ceausescu's cronies. Elite decisions can even explain the sully of the Czech miracle. The corruption and eventual poor performance of the Czech economic reform has been blamed on the lack of regulation and "insider dealing" in the way state assets were privatized. Some authors have pinned the blame specifically on Minister of Industry and Trade Vladimír Dlouhy—perhaps coincidentally, the one former communist that Klaus allowed in a senior post in his government.⁹ Although the voucher system has structural flaws, there is no reason why that system, if well managed, could not have proven workable, as Manitski (the rocker) demonstrated later in Estonia. As in Greek mythology, the personal flaws of the heroes in transitology have serious repercussions that no "political science fiction"¹⁰ theories can explain.

Lessons for the Future

When facing the next postcommunist transition, the Western governments and transitologists should learn from management studies and look at the background of the managers. If Cuba or North Korea produces a "hijacked transition" and an Ion Iliescu-type government, it will very likely make a difference if the pressure is kept on (by local democrats as well as by the West) until they produce a Walesa, a Havel, or a Dimitrov.

Why is this important? For one, billions of dollars could be saved. Countries ruled by new democratic elites simply did not produce multibillion dollar fortunes for their political leaders the way Viktor Chernomyrdin's government did in Russia, Heydar Aliiev's does in Azerbaijan, or Leonid Kravchuk's did in Ukraine. Second, the West would not be blamed consistently for the shortcomings of the transitions. In the region, democratic forces are not associated with anti-Western rhetoric or paranoid accusations. That was largely the domain of former communists.

Third, lives could be saved. As mentioned earlier, virtually all the violence in the region was provoked by individuals and structures associated with the previ-

ous regime. The theory that “ancient hatreds” explains the violence has been disputed by numerous scholars, who maintain that perhaps communist structures and personnel needed a new way to repress and divide their opponents.

With some exceptions (i.e., Russia), the West should consider simply allowing regimes to go bankrupt when one of their almost inevitable financial crises occurs. Western governments should also be more active in working with the democratic forces in countries suffering from a hijacked transition, to ease Iliescu- or Kravchuk-type regimes out of office. Western intelligence agencies should also assist in locating government funds looted at the end of a communist regime and condition aid on recovering such funds, thereby strengthening the hand of the democratic forces to act and to overcome entrenched special interests. This would be a far cry from Strobe Talbott’s policy during the Clinton administration of compulsively assisting the former communists while ignoring simple requests from genuine democrats such as Galina Starovoitova.¹¹

Some positive signals in this direction are already emerging, such as NATO’s and the EU’s unusually direct advice to the Slovak electorate on its chances at membership if Vladimír Mečiar were to be elected to power once again. The IMF also recently took its first baby steps toward monitoring and punishing corruption in its client governments—something real bankers have been doing routinely for centuries with their corporate borrowers.

In this vein, the West should also encourage lustration, or the easing of the communist nomenklatura from positions in critical governmental and state structures during a transition, to weaken the criminal networks and give the democratic forces a chance to consolidate. It seems that the de facto lustration of Estonia worked better than the more controversial de jure Czech lustration. Spain, by the way, shares this with the successful East European transitions. Prime Minister Felipe González, on his victory in 1982, fired from the government forty thousand holdovers of the Franco nomenklatura and replaced them with members of his party and other formerly unaligned elements. He not only reinvented Spain, but he effectively decapitated the extraconstitutional structures that could have sabotaged his transition. González ruled for fourteen years, but, as in the Czech Republic and Estonia, the renamed party of the nomenklatura never returned to power in Spain.¹² The United States also practiced a rarely noticed form of lustration. The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution prohibits Confederate collaborators from participating in government and other areas of public life. Germany carried out its denazification and Japan its (more limited) cleansing after World War II. Could this be one of the reasons why all these countries are considered successful democracies and economies?

Conclusion

A recent major study of corporate America, which looked at the most dramatic turnarounds among *Fortune* 500 companies in the past four decades, concluded that a change of management was the critical first step in the turnaround of troubled industries. The study found that personnel change occurred before a new cor-

porate strategy was even discussed.¹³ The greatest turnarounds in East-Central Europe were no different.

NOTES

1. Excellent academic work on Russian elites has been done by Virginie Colloudoun. See, for example, her "Elite Groups in Russia," *Demokratizatsiya* 6, no. 3 (1998): 535–49.
2. American Psychiatric Association, *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders*, 4th ed. (Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Association, 1994), 646–47.
3. See for example, J. Michael Waller, "Organized Crime and the Russian State," *Demokratizatsiya* 2, no. 3 (1994): 364–83; and Louise Shelley, "Organized Crime and Corruption in Ukraine: Impediments to the Development of a Free-Market Economy," *Demokratizatsiya* 6, no. 4 (1998): 648–63.
4. Edmund Bergler, *The Superego* (New York: Grune and Stratton, 1952), 57.
5. Adolf Hitler shed light on this when he once famously remarked that converted communists make excellent Nazis, whereas social democrats are "hopeless."
6. One exception is Peter Rutland's paper "Tequila-Vodka: What Can We Learn from the Mexico-Russia Comparison," presented at the Annual Conference of the American Political Science Association, Boston, August 2002.
7. See for example, Donald L. Horowitz, "Comparing Democratic Systems"; Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Centrality of Political Culture"; and Juan J. Linz, "The Virtues of Parliamentarism," all in *Journal of Democracy* 1, no. 4 (1990): 73–91; and Juan J. Linz, "The Perils of Presidentialism," *Journal of Democracy* 1, no. 1 (1990): 51–69.
8. Interestingly, however, Ter-Petrosian's father was a leading Bolshevik who was the founder of the communist parties of Lebanon and Syria. Gamsakhurdia spent years in Soviet mental institutions, which may have contributed to his eccentric personality.
9. See, for example, Petr Vancura, "Czech Republic," in *Nations in Transit 2001: Civil Society, Democracy and Markets in East-Central Europe and the Newly Independent States*, ed. Adrian Karatnycky, Alexander Motyl, and Amanda Schnetzer (Washington, D.C.: Freedom House, 2001), 167.
10. The term is from MIT's political scientist Stephen Van Evera.
11. See Fredo Arias-King, "Is It Power or Principle? A Footnote on the Talbott Doctrine," *Demokratizatsiya* 8, no. 2 (2000): 260–69.
12. It is necessary here to note that, unlike in several other postcommunist countries, in the Czech Republic the Social Democratic Party has its origins in and leadership mostly from the former dissidents, and from some liberal communists who participated in the Prague Spring and were later purged after 1968. The renamed party of the nomenklatura is the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia. In Estonia, likewise, some dissidents and liberal communists formed the centrist and leftist parties that have governed alternatively with Laar's party, Isamaa (later Isamaaliit). The renamed party of the nomenklatura, unlike in Lithuania, did not prosper politically in Estonia. One lesson for future Cuban and North Korean democrats: Form a true social-democratic party from among the dissident ranks to frustrate the nomenklatura's attempt to monopolize the left.
13. Jim Collins, "Level 5 Leadership: The Triumph of Humility and Fierce Resolve," *Harvard Business Review*, January 2001, 71.