

Ukrainian Higher Education in Transition: Perspectives and Policy Implications

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Study, Study, Study,” the Leninist quotation reads. “The Party Is the Mind of the Nation.” The quotation, a leftover from the Soviet era, sits high atop Building Number One of the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy.¹ But inside the building and others that house the academy, administrators, faculty, and students are working to make sure that the culture of the Soviet era and the education system associated with it remain firmly in the past.

Kyiv-Mohyla is symbolic of the impact of visionary leadership on institutions in Ukraine. Symbolic too of what can happen to an institution with clear ties to the West and a steady stream of western funding for reform initiatives. On the other hand, the story of Mohyla highlights how far Ukrainian education has to go and the challenges facing western policymakers whose support for higher education constitutes a pivotal component of democracy promotion and the building of an open society in Ukraine and other countries in the region (Poland and Russia in particular). Ukraine is the third-largest recipient of American governmental assistance, trailing only Israel and Egypt. By looking at Mohyla, we can begin to understand what is right and what is wrong, or at least problematic, with Ukrainian higher education and what it means for our policymakers.

The academy is at once Ukraine’s oldest and one of its youngest universities.² Mohyla was founded in 1632 by the leading orthodox clergyman of Kyiv, Petro Mohyla, who was convinced that the “survival of orthodoxy” depended on radical and immediate reform of the monastical order. The curriculum was based on the Jesuit model, replacing Old Church Slavonic with Greek and Latin. Mohyla, to the dismay of some of his more conservative orthodox colleagues in Kyiv and elsewhere, sent many of his fellow priests off to Poland for additional training.³ He was successful beyond his wildest imaginings but not in the way he intended or foresaw. Within a generation of Mohyla’s establishment, Kyiv and two-thirds of modern day Ukraine lay in Russian hands, but the Russian Orthodox Church,

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headed by the Patriarch Nikon, took most of its priests from the academy.⁴ Unfortunately, at least for Mohyla, that happy occurrence did not last because by the early nineteenth century, Mohyla's doors were closed forcibly, because of St. Petersburg's suspicions that Polish influence was still too strong in Kyiv and that culturally conscious Ukrainians might destabilize the empire. The doors remained closed from 1819 to 1991, when, like Ukraine itself—that is, less a result of general social movements than of the maneuvering of small groups at the center—the doors reopened and a new academy emerged, an academy dedicated to the aims of its founder: westernization, this time with a secular twist.

The founder of the new academy and nearly a decade later still its president, Vyacheslav Brioukhovetsky, was a leader of Rukh, a coalition of democratically minded Ukrainian nationalists formed in 1989 to oppose Communist and Russian rule. Brioukhovetsky and those around him saw the re-establishment of the once famous academy as their contribution to Ukraine's renaissance.

At the undergraduate level, Mohyla resembles an American liberal arts college with its tripartite division into humanities, social sciences, and natural sciences. Three years after its inception, Mohyla opened the country's first graduate school of social work. One year later, master's degrees were introduced in most of the liberal arts disciplines. There is a law school. And earlier this year an Institute of Civic Education opened to serve as a resource center for democracy studies and to help implement a western assistance grant to train high school teachers in democracy education. Finally, although centered in Kyiv, smaller versions of the main campus function in Mikolaev, in southern Ukraine, and in Ostrog, the latter not far from Lviv to the west. The academy is aided by a nationwide consortium of so-called "feeder" schools, although anyone can apply to the university.

From its reincarnation, the academy was determined to uproot the system of nepotism and corruption that has plagued Ukraine in general and its schools in particular. The cutting edge of this broadside attack is the entrance exam that is graded anonymously at Mohyla. At the beginning, pressure from anxious parents on key administrators forced Brioukhovetsky and others to duplicate examinations in-house, under virtual lock and key, to avoid their theft and reappearance on the city market. Today, Mohyla takes justifiable pride in being recognized as one of the very few educational institutions in Ukraine where admission decisions are based solely on a student's ability, rather than on cash or connections. The situation elsewhere is so serious that the International Renaissance Foundation, a division of Soros, recently launched an experimental admissions examination system at several universities that is similar to Mohyla's: anonymous and objective. The outcome of this necessary and long overdue experiment remains to be seen.

I went to Mohyla on a Fulbright lectureship in 1995, almost by accident, although a revealing one at that. When word of the Fulbright came to me I requested placement at Shevchenko, Ukraine's main university, or "Big Red" as it is affectionately known (for the color of its main building in the heart of Kyiv). "No, no," I was told by the Fulbright program officer in Washington, D.C., "they won't have you—because they are afraid of you. Not of you personally, but of what you teach, history and Russian and Soviet history in particular. The department is not

ready for that." I therefore went to Mohyla, which in 1995 had but a thousand students, scarcely one-twentieth the size of Shevchenko.

I mention that episode not to highlight biographical detail, but to suggest the underlying patterns of Ukrainian higher education. First of all, at Mohyla the doors are open to Western educators. More Fulbright lecturers by far have taught at Mohyla than at any other Ukrainian university⁵—and not only Fulbright professors, but representatives of other American programs, such as the Peace Corps and the Civic Education Project. One reason that western educators are welcomed is that by official policy all students at Mohyla are proficient in English, one of two instructional languages, the other being Ukrainian. All students take classes in English. I taught only in English. The language policy of Mohyla is important because Kyiv, along with substantial portions of eastern and southern Ukraine, is still Russian-speaking, although one hears more Ukrainian on the streets of the capital than was heard five years ago.

Not only are western faculty welcomed, the faculty and students at Mohyla eagerly seek out western opportunities and contacts. And they are encouraged to do so by the administration and their peers, a point I shall return to shortly. Mohyla's undergraduates and graduates go off to other countries. Several of my students, for example, attended the Ukrainian Research Institute at Harvard University for summer school courses in history, government, and literature. Others went off to the Central European University in Budapest, Hungary, for advanced study in international relations. In addition, during the academic year many students intern at foreign companies and banks in Kyiv, thus gaining valuable experience to supplement formal instruction.

Mohyla faculty are regularly awarded Fulbright or IREX grants for research or teaching in the United States. Others journey to Germany or England under the auspices of similar programs. When they return to Mohyla they are celebrated and even lionized at the university, invited to share their ideas and experiences with colleagues and the greater community.

Perhaps nothing is more symbolic of the western orientation and community spirit of Mohyla than the so-called Opening Con. Held on the first day of the academic year, in late August, the incoming freshman class is welcomed not only by the administration but by a special guest speaker, usually an American of Ukrainian descent. Typically the address is followed by a general question and answer period. I attended three "cons," and students were not shy to speak out. The "con" sets the tone for what follows: students are encouraged by example to engage their instructors in the classroom. They have high expectations: a student survey in 1995 revealed that 11 percent hoped to be president of Ukraine someday.

Mohyla's existence throws into sharp relief several aspects of Ukrainian culture and higher education. To begin with the most general, it reflects the proliferation of new schools at all levels and the diversification of higher education. Exact numbers of new schools are hard to come by because new institutions are opening all the time. One estimate offered by a specialist on higher education puts the number private universities and institutes at 150, many of them quite small.⁶ Altogether they comprise 20 percent of the student population. The diversifica-

tion of education reflects the realization of many parents and students that the old curriculum imparts skills and attitudes inherited from a highly centralized economic planning system ill adapted to the new economy and to conditions in the global age.

But diversification also mirrors a critical and often overlooked aspect of Ukraine's transformation during the first postcommunist decade: the emergence of an entrepreneurial mentality, not only in business but also in education. The founders of Mohyla belong to the new middle class, a group of people who have not fallen into poverty as a consequence of Ukraine's headlong rush into capitalism. Admittedly, standard criteria for measuring Ukraine's middle class remain elusive since many people within that layer of society—educators, lawyers, medical personnel, computer programmers—still work for the state. However, evidence of the existence of this class is overwhelming, and not only in terms of consumption patterns (decent clothes, cars, new shops and stores). Everyone knows that Ukraine has two economies: the official one that tells us that virtually everyone is paid miserly amounts if at all, and the unofficial or "shadow" economy, where people do not report incomes or rents and where teachers work second and third jobs and do consulting work on the side.

The emerging social structure is visible in Kyiv, Odessa, Lviv, and Kharkiv, Ukraine's largest cities, where new private schools abound. And it extends beyond those centers. How much beyond became clear to me in March 2000 when I traveled to Zaporizhzhia, an industrial center southeast of Kyiv and home in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries of the venerable Cossack redoubt, or Sich. While there I visited a private economics institute where I was asked to address the entire student body, some two hundred in all. I offered to speak in Ukrainian but was told that would not be necessary as everyone in the room understood English. For the next hour I answered questions from students and faculty. Following the session I was given the obligatory tour by the rector. The building was immaculate, among the cleanest I had seen in Ukraine. Several of the classrooms had computers, and there was a large computer learning lab. All of this was the result, I was told, of donations from rich local businessmen. The parking lot leading to my van was filled with cars, including a couple of Mercedes and Audis. The main street in Zaporizhzhia hummed with expensive looking cars and well-dressed people, a sight that partly belied the image of a social catastrophe attributable to Ukraine's so-called "lost" decade of economic development. The institute was one place to sense the growth and potential of Ukraine's middle class. It, as well as other institutions, including Mohyla in Kyiv, suggests that the popular belief that Ukraine is a nation divided into two classes, and two classes only—a tiny group of rich New Ukrainians sitting on top of an impoverished mass—is simplistic if not wrong.⁷

The decision to establish Mohyla as a progressive institution of learning highlights an emerging social reality in Ukraine. Unfortunately, it also highlights the persistence of another cultural trait, this one having to do with deeply embedded classroom traditions. Put simply, Mohyla's existence brings into clear focus the entrenched system of knowledge transmission that prevails across the university

community (and indeed in the schools in general). Reflecting the dominant pedagogical ethos under communism—passive, deferential, above all nonquestioning for fear of being wrong—students sit dutifully and respond in rote fashion to questions posed from on high. The system is top-down, “fact” centered, with the teacher or professor in charge.

Passivity is reinforced by another characteristic of university education: the enormous amount of so-called seat time. Students sit in class from thirty to forty hours a week, with little opportunity for independent study. Combined with the fact that many students now pay some tuition, which in turn entails part-time work, such a system is truly onerous. Finally, all too often examinations are oral, which

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may not mean anything in itself, except that the examination questions are so “factual” that they require pre-exam tutoring, a process open to abuse and bribery. By contrast, essay exams inspire fear and anxiety, because in theory at least they require some analysis or reflection, a process alien to students at all levels. Even at Mohyla essay exams are more

the exception than the rule, as my students regularly reminded me.

The continuity of educational practices, sometimes reaching into the best schools, such as Mohyla, is not my main point here. Rather it is that perhaps the greatest single impediment to reform and change in Ukrainian education—as great in my opinion as the absence of resources—is the conviction of many educators nearly a decade into independence that the *system* is fundamentally sound. From its inception, Kyiv-Mohyla was testimony to the belief of its founders that the system was fundamentally unsound. The conviction of Brioukhovetsky and his associates that change should not be limited to the margins (i.e., a redesigned history major or added courses in sociology) is not shared in other quarters. And even at Mohyla not everything changes overnight. But for many teachers and administrators at other institutions that is precisely what reform means: change along the margins, not the essentials. At first glance this argument has seductive appeal. After all, as Ukrainian high school principals—most of them from a mathematical/technical background—will attest. Ukrainian schoolchildren still outdo their American counterparts in math and science. Fourth grade Ukrainian schoolchildren—and this is confirmed by a World Bank study—do eighth grade American math.⁸

What they will not tell you—because many do not know—is that the same World Bank study revealed that Ukraine was at the bottom of the list when it came to measurements of critical thinking and the ability to solve real life problems with no apparent or easy answer. According to the International Renaissance Foundation in Kyiv, which drew on the World Bank report for its own study of

the schools, the problem of critical thinking and interactive learning is fundamental to the transformation of Ukrainian education. "At the moment," the report notes, "the Ukrainian economy is in great need of innovative and creative people who are capable of working in complex and non-standard conditions. The education system . . . still functions as it did in the past, when initiative and innovation were not only not encouraged, but on the contrary were sometimes severely punished."⁹

I call this the perception gap, the gap between what is perceived to be real and what in fact is real. The perception gap is serious because it exists in many quarters, some of them quite surprising. During semifinalist interviews for the Junior Faculty Exchange Program (JFDP) that I administered in Ukraine for two years (1998–2000), we interviewed some fifty semifinalists (out of 150 applicants) during three days and asked them to assess the general state of Ukrainian education. Eighty percent said that fundamentally it was sound. Only a minority spoke of the need to restructure the basic curriculum to underscore active learning or to give students meaningful opportunities to, say, evaluate economic or social problems or literary texts. Given the relatively young age of the respondents and their openness to new experience, as evidenced by their participation in JFDP, one can understand the depth of the resistance to reform that has characterized Ukrainian educators since 1991. If these young professors were blind to the need for far-reaching reform, what does this mean for the general education community?

Reflecting decades of isolation and insulation from the West, the perception gap overlaps with deep-seated cultural and psychological attitudes (national pride, resentment of precipitous westernization). It is therefore difficult to change. It surfaces in the negative reactions of many university rectors and department chairs to faculty who apply for overseas grants, a reaction that goes well beyond mere envy (although undoubtedly that is there as well in some instances) to the belief that the winners are simply on an all-expense-paid vacation. It also surfaces in the form of applicants—both for the JFDP and the Fulbright programs—not telling their department chairs of their intentions until they have received the grant. It surfaces most seriously in the form of deep depression and frustration on returning to the home campus after a year or semester abroad and being abandoned by colleagues. Finally, it is one reason why these programs should be strengthened and broadened: to narrow and eventually overcome the perception gap.

At Mohyla the impact of Western assistance has been greatest in economics, in which the Eurasia Foundation now underwrites a two-year master's program that includes heavily subsidized student stipends and western faculty, mostly from the United States. Graduates often assume top-paying positions in western businesses and local banks or continue their education at the doctoral level at elite European and American universities. The program has expanded threefold since its inception in 1996, and understandably, the ratio of applicants to acceptances is high, at least five to one.

What is necessary first and foremost for the success of any education or humanitarian assistance program is sustainability. At Mohyla, it is easy to see why assistance has taken hold. Reform lasted because it was there to begin with, in

the stated mission of the university and the philosophy of its founding president. Reform will outlast Brioukhovetsky because it is bigger than any single individual or group of individuals. Western assistance to Mohyla works because it facilitates local actors. And even modest investments pay off because they are applied to existing structures.

On the other hand, sustainability is a challenge even in best case scenarios in that region of the world. Kyiv-Mohyla is not a rich institution, although compared to most Ukrainian universities, it is more financially secure. Brioukhovetsky spends a lot of time on the road, usually in the United States, in search of donations. There is a modest endowment. Students pay tuition, recently \$2,000 a year, but actually many pay little or nothing, as tuition is discounted through work-study programs. The multimillion dollar Eurasian grant has produced an outstanding program with outstanding results. But what happens when the grant ends? Newly successful entrepreneurs and businessmen may fund start-up ventures at existing schools of business, as they have in some cases, but it is difficult to see domestic resources beyond that point.

A timely example of the importance—and the problems—of sustainability is civic education. Civic education is the new “buzzword” at the Ministry of Education and for a good reason. As Pavlo Polyansky, in charge of secondary school education, explained to me in a recent interview, civic education could instill a civic patriotism that would bridge the deep regional and ethnic divides that characterize modern-day Ukraine.¹⁰ Properly applied, civic education could begin to fill the spiritual vacuum brought on by the collapse of communism, a collapse that, however much welcomed by millions of Ukrainians, left millions without the cradle-to-grave welfare system associated with Soviet socialism. The depth of this spiritual vacuum, this crisis of faith, as Polyansky put it during the interview, was evident in 1999 when Petro Symonenko, leader of the Ukrainian Communist Party and speaker of the Verkhovna Rada (the parliament), finished second to Leonid Kuchma in the vote for the presidency. Polyansky and others see civic education as a long-term antidote to nostalgia, to the deeply ingrained search for simple answers to complex questions, and to a barely concealed preference for authoritarian solutions to the myriad problems facing Ukraine.

Only time will tell whether Polyansky and others in the ministry are correct in their assessment of the potential of civic education for instilling a new value system in Ukraine’s young people. But one thing is clear: backed by a massive European and American assistance program, they are putting their chips on the table. A multimillion dollar civic education project to nurture civic culture and respect for the rule of law is under way. The project targets all levels of education, but the primary recipients will be the secondary schools. Civics modules will be integrated into existing subjects. Training workshops for both teacher trainers and teachers in appropriate teaching methods and lesson contents will be held across Ukraine. Resource centers to distribute materials from the project will increasingly function as centers for civic education to ensure continuation of the program after the two-year project ends. Locations of these information points will be identified together with participating Ukrainian teachers, trainers, and cur-

riculum specialists; they could be in libraries at pedagogical institutes, offices of existing NGOs, university libraries, and teacher training facilities and schools. Most important, the fundamental goal of this ambitious project will be to ensure continuation of civic education after 2002 through the creation of a permanent Ukrainian nongovernmental organization composed of networks of teachers and trainers who will carry on across the country.¹¹

The civic education project is a metaphor for how education assistance of whatever kind or nature should be arranged. One of the key ingredients of the project is that it is multiply funded: both the EU, acting through CIVITAS International, with administrative direction coming from the Institut voor Publiek en Politiek in the Netherlands, and the

U.S. government, acting through the Mershon Center at Ohio State, are on board. Diversification is important and is in itself a factor of sustainability. The idea of splitting costs between Europe and America should contribute to the project's ultimate chances of success by making it more feasible politically.

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Equally significant is the target of assistance. For maximum results, regardless of the project or ultimate objective, funding should go through local actors with a proven record of organization and leadership. That is certainly the case here. In the Lviv region the central implementing agency will be DOBA, an association of history and social science teachers under the direction of Polina Verbitska, herself a veteran history teacher. Verbitska has received training in civic education in workshops across Ukraine, Western Europe, and the United States. Her energy, commitment, and organizational skill—she is the founder of DOBA—make this a promising prospect. With the exception of the final objective, the creation of an NGO, which in my opinion is the most problematic, the project is not trying to establish new structures so much as to enhance the meaning/power/scope of bottom-up initiatives already in place both in Kyiv and Lviv. If we ignore this point—if, in other words, our assistance efforts entail significant start up ventures, especially under the seductive rubric of democratization—we will not promote sustainable change. Paradoxically, we may even make matters worse, however unintentionally, by driving up the cost of education reform or democracy promotion, making it too expensive for Ukraine, still a poor nation for the most part. Because the minute the donor pulls out, the clearer it becomes that, to use the proverbial phrase, “the emperor has no clothes,” and things threaten to unravel.

Having said all this, we are still left with an overarching question: How much of a difference will it make? No doubt some. After all, civic education is especially meaningful because it is in line with the keystone of our foreign policy

toward Ukraine, which is to promote an open society in a country whose stability is vital to the stability of the region as a whole. But a caveat is in order in my opinion: Even if criteria of sustainability are met with the new civic education project (as I believe it is), in the end much will depend on where the assistance is targeted to achieve maximum effect and viability. Let me be clear: The battle for the future of Ukrainian education is being fought and will be won or lost in the main pedagogical universities. This is where a new generation of teachers is being trained, teachers who will fan out across this vast land to classrooms in the 20,000 plus schools, three-quarters of which are in the villages. The so-called “peds” are state schools under the direct control of the Ministry of Education.

Like so much else in Ukraine, it is easy at first glance to get somewhat discouraged about the “peds.” Protected by local bureaucracies and staffed by teachers whose knowledge and instincts are framed by the Soviet era, many are unchanged almost ten years later. But there are exceptions, important ones at that. One is the Kirovograd Pedagogical University where the administration resembles that of Kyiv-Mohyla: bright, progressive, open to ideas and in contact with the West. Kirovograd has formed an institutional partnership with Montclair State University in New Jersey, with representatives of both universities regularly consulting and traveling back and forth.

Another, slightly less promising example lies to the north of Kyiv in Nizhyn, a city of 150,000 where I traveled prior to my final departure from Ukraine. The Nizhyn Pedagogical University is named after its most famous graduate, Nikolai Gogol, the great Russian writer Ukrainians love to claim as their own, who spent his university days there in the 1820s. Five thousand regular students and several thousand part-time students attend the university. Most of my time at the university was spent with the history faculty because my host was a thirty-year-old assistant professor named Laryssa Mitsik, whom I met earlier at a civic education conference in Kyiv to launch the EU–American project. The two hours with the history faculty were revealing. All were under thirty. They peppered me with questions about western textbooks and teaching strategies. The eventual presence of the rector in the meeting did not deter them in the least from expressing their opinions on the curriculum and the need for professional development. After the meeting and a tour of the Gogol Museum, Laryssa told me that many students are not getting jobs and that life in the provincial city was, in her word, “tough.”

Tough but not impossible, she confessed. During our walks and talks I realized that Laryssa, who is about to become chair of the History Department—a major departure from Soviet patterns where virtually all organizations, from the Communist Party on down were safely in the hands of senior officials—is a shining example of the possibilities and pitfalls of the younger generation. She makes \$40 a month. She longs for the larger city but adores her students and loves to teach. She has been to the United States and brought back a ton of history texts and teaching guides. She is an optimist in a setting few westerners could fathom, let alone accept. She recognizes the basic issue: that reform, real reform, must aim at the pedagogical universities where the next generation of teachers is being trained. She scoffs at the conventional wisdom of many in her country and not a

few in the West that further democratic reform must wait until the economy lifts off and a larger middle class is formed and empowered. “No,” she argues. We cannot wait because today, “economic and political reform go hand in hand.” She noted that the young people of Ukraine are dramatically and decisively different from their elders—a point I can readily attest to from my three years in the classroom at Mohyla. She pointed out that many Ukrainian youngsters have spent considerable time in the United States, including high school students from Nizhyn and other provincial cities, and returned home with radically altered points of view and set of expectations. When I interjected that at best the number of high school students was a few thousand, she reminded me that nobody had undergone that exposure a decade ago and that these young people came from across the country, including smaller towns and villages. In other words, where I saw the glass half empty, she saw the glass half, if not three-quarters, full. She reminded me that the amount of money given to Ukraine for the high school exchange program, a congressionally funded effort under the umbrella Freedom Support Act, now exceeds the amount given to Russia. She also reminded me that the new minister of education, Vasyl Kremen, has not only called for a new pedagogy based on active learning and democratization, but has surrounded himself with young assistants such as Pavlo Polyansky who are anxious to implement that vision.

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Laryssa’s story—one that could be multiplied a thousandfold across Ukraine—brings me to my final point. A survey of higher education indicates that, like Ukraine itself, the record since 1991 is decidedly mixed. There are real successes: Mohyla; opportunities for faculty and student travel abroad and for meaningful contact with representatives of other cultures; the emergence of a promising private sector reflecting a spirit of experimentation and innovation; and a civic education program that could entail major curricular and pedagogical changes. There are also significant failures or shortcomings: pervasive corruption; perceptions that one can, in the proverbial phrase, have one’s cake and eat it too when it comes to reform; and the general shortage of resources from up-to-date textbooks to adequate salaries to everyday necessities (heat, electricity) in far too many instances.

Then there is the issue of western assistance, more precisely of its overall structure and purpose. From my perspective, the greatest challenge confronting western donors and foundations is to find some way to channel money to the pedagogical institutes and universities. Without question, the greatest impact of external assistance has come in the classroom, in the form of personal example. Direct exposure to interactive learning, discussion techniques, and essay exams, as the

example of Mohyla attests, pays enormous dividends. But only so much can come from a few hundred western teachers spread across Ukraine, the combined result of Fulbright, the Peace Corps, and the civic education project. Even the reverse process of bringing Ukrainian young people to the States for time in the classroom gets us only so far.

The civic education project is moving in the right direction because it focuses on pedagogy. But western donors must assist and encourage pedagogical universities such as Kirovograd and Nizhyn to tilt the system forward decisively. The actual targeting and identification of promising places must come from Ukrainian educators thoroughly versed in local conditions and with local contacts. From the western perspective, the key point would be a shift from insistence on democratization as the overall policy objective, where means are the servant of ends, to one of strengthening reform by focusing on key individuals who can bring about change. The fundamental point would be to strengthen and reinforce a movement toward a more open society. The program would support people who are willing and ready to change, with the assumption that if a critical mass can be mustered the outcome will be democratic.

My point about process over results as a defining element of our assistance policy brings us full circle to Laryssa again. She is, in my opinion, a symbol of a much broader story that has been running for most of the past decade. The simple fact is that Ukrainians under thirty—and certainly those under twenty—react differently to the new conditions around them. They are as different from their bewildered elders, including their older siblings, as day and night. For the most part they accept and in some cases, such as clothes and lifestyles, frolic in the changes that have swept over Eastern Europe since the end of the Soviet Union. They are not afraid of authority. They talk to foreigners about anything and everything. Many expect to go to the West someday. Above all, they display a resiliency, a kind of toughness, as did Laryssa, that springs from living through constant change virtually all of their lives. From this vantage point, then, the main story in Ukraine is that change is coming, inevitably.

The real question is what kind of change and what kind of future. The alarming fact is that this generation views with increasing frustration the slow turnover of elites and leaders within virtually all institutions. Will young people grow so impatient with the stubborn continuity of elites across the culture as to precipitate social unrest in the near future? So far Ukraine is quiet, although one could imagine a return to the student movements that shook the country in 1990–91 and helped to bring about the demise of the Soviet Union.

I believe that the moment for underwriting meaningful education assistance programs and initiatives in Ukraine is more propitious than at any time since the founding of the new nation and new state in 1991. With people in the Ministry of Education such as Pavlo Polyanky; the energy of young teachers such as Laryssa; the example and impact of Kyiv-Mohyla; and the infusion of civic education in the secondary schools, there is cautious hope that modest investments, properly applied, would yield auspicious results. For the younger generation the future will weigh more heavily than the past. We should be on their side if our demo-

cratic beliefs and principles are to have meaning in Ukraine and the rest of Eastern Europe.

NOTES

1. Henceforth referred to simply as Kyiv-Mohyla or Mohyla.
2. Two histories of the academy for this period are Alexander Sydorenko, *The Kievan Academy in the Seventeenth Century* (Ottawa: University of Ottawa, 1977) and Frank B. Kortschmaryk, *The Kievan Academy and Its Role in the Organization of Russia at the Turn of the Seventeenth Century* (New York: Shevchenko Scientific Society, 1976).
3. For a good account of this story, see Paul Robert Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine* (University of Washington Press: Seattle, 1996), 189 ff.
4. *Ibid.*, 190.
5. Fortunately, American Fulbright scholars are now more evenly distributed around Ukraine. Last year, for example, Fulbright lecturers were in Dnepropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Ternopil (2), Kirovograd, Lviv, and Chernivtsi, as well as Kyiv, a much more equitable distribution of resources.
6. Interview with Alexander Demyanchuk, professor of political science at Mohyla who also served on a special committee within the Ministry of Education to propose reforms of higher education. Approximately 16 percent of Mohyla's budget comes from the state, with the rest from tuition, grants, and donor support.
7. For a brief but instructive analysis of the emergence of a Russian middle class today, see Harley Balzer, "Russia's Middle Class," in CERES Newsletter 7, no. 3, Georgetown University, November 2000.
8. The World Bank study is contained in the *World Development Report 1996* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
9. *Ibid.*, 49.
10. Interview conducted in Polyansky's office in the Ministry of Education, June 2000.
11. Material for this section comes from the brochure announcing the project, entitled "Education for Democracy in Ukraine," and from interviews with likely participants in the project, conducted in June at a civics education conference in Kyiv.