

Patronage and the Presidential Critique: Budget Policy in the Fifth Russian State Duma

FRANK C. THAMES, JR.

The Presidential Critique and the Puzzle of Russian Presidentialism

According to the presidential critique,¹ several features of presidential systems should have reduced the opportunities for cooperation between the State Duma and Russian President Boris Yeltsin. Because the two branches are elected separately, the presidential system should suffer from “dual democratic legitimacy.”² Because both were freely and fairly elected democratic institutions, both the Duma and the president could claim to speak for the society at large and refrain from cooperative efforts. Unlike parliamentary systems, where disagreements between the legislature and the government can lead to no-confidence votes and often new elections, presidential systems lack such means to recast political institutions to solve an impasse.³

The rigidity created by the fixed electoral terms of the branches could have created difficulties as well.⁴ If elected at different times, the president and the legislature could arise out of different political atmospheres, which may give them divergent ideologies or political attitudes. These differences of opinion can become hardened and fixed until the next electoral cycle. Although Yeltsin is broadly considered a reformist or democratic president, the Duma elected in December 1993 featured significant antireform elements due to the success of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's nationalist Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), and the Agrarian Party. Between them, these factions controlled 36.4 percent of the seats in the Fifth State Duma.

The drawbacks of presidentialism can be particularly difficult in multiparty systems. Presidents often find that the creation of legislative coalitions is more complex due to the larger number of parties, and that the political system is more often polarized.⁵ Because the 1993 Duma elections created a legislature with eleven fac-

Frank C. Thames, Jr. is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Government at the University of Texas at Austin. His published work examines the foundation of Russia's electoral system.

tions and did not feature a presidential majority party, Yeltsin potentially faced great difficulties in creating effective coalitions to pass needed legislation.

Perhaps the most problematic assertion of the presidential critique is that the debilitating interbranch failure to cooperate is a consequence of the differing characteristics of the branches' constituent support. The president is elected nationally; therefore, his or her goals are thought to be "plebiscitarian" in nature.⁶ The president tries to satisfy the desires of the entire nation rather than a limited set of groups. Conversely, legislators usually represent geographically defined districts, which makes their primary goal the appeasing of parochial interests.⁷ This difference institutionalizes conflict by giving the branches opposing incentives, even when they may be ideologically similar. Legislators, beholden to local interests, will often demand policies different from those of a president, even if they belong to the same party. The difference in constituency base makes finding common ground difficult and fuels the conflicts that paralyze decision making. Russia should not be immune from this conundrum, since half—225 members—of the State Duma were elected in single-member district elections. The other half were elected in a nationwide party-list vote.

However, initial evidence suggests that the Russian legislative-executive relationship has not been characterized by intense periods of noncooperation. The main presidential critique indicator for the absence of cooperation, the failure of the democracy itself, did not occur. One could contend that the absence of conflict is simply due to the strength of the Russian presidential system that gives Yeltsin nearly unlimited decree power. However, an analysis of executive decrees gives a more complex picture. On the surface, a review of Yeltsin's decrees initially supports the argument that he avoided cooperation with the legislature to implement his agenda. Of the 1,959 pieces of federal legislation issued between 1994 and 1995, 37 percent were federal laws and 73 percent were normative presidential decrees.⁸ However, significant variance existed in the distribution of laws and decrees in some essential policy areas. In budget policy, for example, the ratio of laws to decrees is significantly higher than average, 60 percent laws and only 40 percent decrees. Furthermore, Yeltsin never implemented a budget unilaterally with an executive decree between 1994 and 1996. Although Yeltsin did use his decree power in the area of budget policy, none of the decrees replaced the federal budget law. Thus, the formation of the federal budget was a cooperative effort between the Duma and the president during this period. Instead of using his significant decree power to outflank the antireformist, multiparty legislature, Yeltsin chose to push his budget through the Duma, and not to undermine its democratic legitimacy.⁹

As stated above, according to the presidential critique, one of the fundamental causes of executive-legislative discord is the inherent incongruity between the plebiscitarian president and the more parochial legislature. But the idea of the plebiscitarian president is based on an analysis that does not include the effects of patron-client networks. Patronage can, as an alternative to strong political parties, provide a framework to structure cooperation even in presidential systems. When patron-client networks form the basis for interest articulation, the president and

the legislators must satisfy their particularistic demands. Extensive patronage creates a set of shared constituents among the legislature and the president. Having two particularistic branches increases the possibility of cooperation, since their bases of support are no longer categorically different. Therefore, in a system where patronage is dominant, there are more incentives for interbranch cooperation.

What then should we expect in policymaking based on this argument? First, federal budget policy should benefit the discrete patronage interests that exist in the Russian context. Second, the legislative coalition to support the presidential policy should be linked not to major social groups, but to important government and economic elites enmeshed in the patronage politics of the day.

Patronage and Russian Duma Factions

Patronage networks linking key elites did not simply appear with the end of the Soviet Union. Patron-client networks proliferated the Soviet political system.¹⁰ The hierarchical nature of the Soviet system forced officials to employ informal networks of clients to advance preferred policy outcomes.¹¹ In the absence of political parties or interest groups, these patronage networks became the dominant forms of elite political organization that linked state, party, and economic groups.

The weakness of the ties between political parties and society is a major cause of the persistence of patronage and personalistic ties. Most parties lack institutions that allow them to penetrate into society; therefore, the majority of parties do not have well-developed bases of popular support. The December 1993 Duma elections demonstrated the organizational weakness of parties. Few political parties maintained the resources to support candidates across the breadth of the country.¹² Often, strong local candidates saw little benefit in maintaining an affiliation with a national political party.¹³ Consequently, 52 percent of the single-member district candidates ran as independents. The success of so many independents—136 won seats—further supports the conclusion that the organizational or monetary benefits of party support were insufficient to induce candidates to join parties. Further showing the regional weakness of parties, only 13.8 percent of deputies in local assemblies claimed a party affiliation as of January 1995.¹⁴ In the 1995 gubernatorial elections, both the CPRF's and Yeltsin's attempts to support gubernatorial candidates with "proto-parties" failed to exert a great impact on the electoral successes of candidates.¹⁵ Because of their inability to attract local candidates and form party organizations to link them to society, political parties tended to be disproportionately centered in Moscow with little regional penetration.

There is, however, one major exception: the CPRF. As the heir to the organizational structure of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the *kompartiya* maintains a strong, regional party organization.¹⁶ In addition, the CPRF is more closely linked to core voting groups such as pensioners and those disenchanting with the Yeltsin era reforms. However, the strong social ties of the CPRF are the exception among Russian political parties.

With the weakness of political parties, patronage ties become essential political resources that link the political center with important particularist interests.

One needs to look no further than the presidency to see examples of this phenomenon. Boris Yeltsin, although at times entering strategic alliances with some parties, never affiliated himself with a political party. Furthermore, Yeltsin has never tried to cobble together a ruling coalition of Duma factions or deputy groups to support his government. Instead, Yeltsin based his political influence on personal ties with key political and economic actors. The well-documented political influence of the so-called oligarchs, whose influence stemmed from their immense financial empires, is another example. The large financial industrial groups, for example Boris Berezovsky's LogoVAZ and Vladimir Potanin's Uneximbank, used their control over media organizations, campaign expenditures, and ties to government officials to secure a great deal of influence in the government.¹⁷ The well-known link between then prime minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and his former company, Gazprom, is another example of this phenomenon.¹⁸ Anatoly Chubais, former leader of the State Property Committee and the Russian voucher privatization program, has vast ties with Russia's growing financial sector. The controversial sales of major Russian industrial assets have, according to many, been carried out for the benefit of Chubais's cronies.¹⁹

During this period, the Russian government, in particular the ministerial structure, has been dominated not by outside politicians, but by individuals with significant experience in state or economic structures administered by the state. For example, ministries such as the Ministry of Atomic Energy, the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Production, and the Ministry of Fuel and Energy have consistently been led by persons with experience working or managing these branches of the economy. Some ministers, such as Oleg Davydov, of the Ministry of External Economic Links, and Yefim Basin, of the Ministry of Construction, not only worked in enterprises of their respective spheres but were bureaucrats in those ministries during the Soviet era.²⁰ Thus, Yeltsin has a well-documented tendency to appoint to essential government posts individuals who have previously worked in or managed their area of responsibility. The governmental structure is inhabited by individuals with strong ties, friends, and proteges in both the state and the economy. In such an atmosphere, patronage is able to thrive.

In the end, the importance of personalistic links and the weak social ties of parties had definite effects on the factional structure of the Fifth State Duma. Although it is possible to divide factions and deputy groups along ideological lines, it is also possible to divide them based on the strength and nature of their political support.²¹ In general, there were three types of factions in the Fifth Duma: mass-based, corporatist, and cadre (see table 1).²² Mass-based factions maintain strong, well-organized party structures that link them to social groups. Their political organizations are more closely tied to voters; therefore, mass-based parties are more apt to base their political decision making on the demands of their political base. Often, ideology plays a role in their decision making.

The next major type of faction in the State Duma was the "cadre" faction. Cadre factions are differentiated from mass-based factions primarily based on the comparative weakness of their party structures. These factions typically have a developed, national leadership but are only in the process of creating regional

TABLE 1
Typology of Factions in the Fifth State Duma

Mass-based	Cadre	Corporatist
CPRF	Yabloko LDPR DPR	Russia's Choice Agrarian Party New Regional Policy PRES Women of Russia Russia ^a Stability ^a

^aRussia and Stability did not register as deputy groups until spring 1995.

structures. Certainly these factions may claim a devoted following among voters, but their support is softer, more malleable than among adherents of the mass-based factions. Often, their identity is formed by the personality of their leader. Over time, some cadre factions may develop into mass-based factions by developing firmer bases of support. However, it is also possible that cadre factions will fall apart because of inability to form such links.

The final type of Duma faction was the "corporatist" faction. Unlike the others, these represented very specific, particularistic groups, and those ties—not ones to large sections of voters—define their policy preferences. Often, these factions linked themselves to state structures or economic sectors, a fact often reflected in a high percentage of government officials and economic managers in their Duma delegations. There is a tendency for corporatist factions to contain high percentages of single-member district representatives, who are often more susceptible to patronage influences because of their need to win a local election. Some are deputy groups formed within the Duma, among members who did not participate in the party-list portion of the elections. Ideology may play a role in the decision making of corporatist factions; however, it is secondary to the provision of political and economic goods to their corporatist backers. Certainly, both mass-based and cadre factions have corporatist interests, from which they receive political and economic support. However, the comparatively stronger ties to society of cadre and mass-based factions make decision making solely on the lines of their corporatist allegiances more problematic.

One of the main differences between corporatist factions and others is the higher percentage of economic and government elites among their delegations in the Duma. As the data in table 2 demonstrate, corporatist factions contain a dominant share of deputies who once worked as economic managers or government officials and those who worked in either the agricultural or the industrial sector of the economy. However, these political and economic elites were not evenly distributed among the corporatist factions. Most of the economic managers and agriculturists were, not surprisingly, in the Agrarian Party, PRES, Russia's Choice, and New

TABLE 2
Occupation and Work Background of Deputies by Faction Type

Type of faction	Agricultural background	Industrial background	Government official	Economic manager
Mass-based	3	9	5	6
Cadre	1	7	18	10
Corporatist	50	24	118	55

Sources: Center of Applied Political Research, *INDEM Statistics 2.0* (Moscow: INDEM, 1996) [database]; Panorama, *Federalnoe Sobranie: Spravochnik* (Moscow: Panorama, 1994).

Regional Policy accounted for the majority of the government officials. Nonetheless, the corporatist factions clearly contain the majority of direct representatives of Russia's economic and political structures.

Only one mass-based faction existed in the Fifth Duma: the CPRF. Containing some forty-five deputies, the highly organized and disciplined CPRF was the only faction and political party that could claim a well-developed party structure. Over the course of the Fifth Duma, the faction suffered few ideological splits and lost very few members; however, it failed to form a coalition to implement its legislative agenda, whose main component was more state intervention in the economy.²³ The CPRF is not without its corporate interests. During budget debates, for example, the faction often calls for increased defense expenditures.²⁴ However, its commitment to an ideological position opposite to that of the Yeltsin administration resonates with many of its votes. The faction's strong ties to its base, made up of many that have not prospered during the Yeltsin era, makes its support for government policy more complicated.

The best example of a cadre faction is the LDPR. Coming out of nowhere in December 1993, the LDPR managed to win some sixty-four seats, primarily due to its success in the party-list vote. Rumors suggested that Yeltsin financially backed the LDPR to steal votes from the CPRF. The electoral success of the party was due primarily to the flamboyant Vladimir Zhirinovskiy. At the time of the election and well into 1996, the party maintained very weak regional and party structures.²⁵ In the Duma, the faction distinguished itself for its relatively high discipline and its sometimes enigmatic support for the president.

Yabloko represents another cadre faction. Its weak party base made it heavily reliant on its leadership, in particular Grigory Yavlinsky and Vladimir Lukin to gain its twenty-eight seats.²⁶ Achieving significant urban support, many considered Yabloko to be the party of the intelligentsia. Yabloko was by far the most outspoken, reformist Duma faction, supporting the deepening of free market and democratic reforms. While it is considered a leading reform party, Yabloko consistently refused to back the legislative agenda of Yeltsin. In particular, Yabloko sharply derided the economic proposals of the Yeltsin administration and the ill-fated war in Chechnya.

The Democratic Party of Russia (DPR), containing only fifteen members in January 1994, also falls into the category of a cadre faction. Although it is one of the older political parties, the DPR failed to develop a solid constituency or a party organization. In fall 1994, the faction disintegrated over the question of its relationship to the government as a result of the war in Chechnya. Its former leader, Nikolai Travkin, a member of the Chernomyrdin government, wanted the faction to remain loyal to the government. Others in the faction began to take a more critical approach. The DPR's small size and instability made it a very weak factor in Duma politics.

The Agrarian Party, which totaled fifty-five members, thirty-four from single-member district seats, was the best example of a corporatist faction in the Fifth Duma, since it maintained close contacts with the agricultural elite. The Agrarian Party of Russia developed from the rural deputies' factions in the old Russian Supreme Soviet and regional branches of the CPRF. In 1993, the party formed an alliance with Starodubtsev's Agrarian Union, which represented some 8,000 collective farms, sixty-five large agro-enterprises, and the main (and largest in Russia) trade union of the agro-industrial workers.²⁷ Furthermore, thirty-three of the fifty-five members of the Agrarian faction in the Duma managed collective farms or agro-industries.

In the Duma, the Agrarian Party played an interesting role. On one hand, the faction stood ideologically close to the CPRF, favoring strong state support of the economy and the maintenance of state control over agricultural land. However, its corporate interests', more specifically the agricultural elites', reliance on the state for support forced it to cooperate quite often with the Chernomyrdin government.²⁸ Even as an opposition party, the Agrarian Party obtained key positions within the Chernomyrdin government.²⁹ Further exemplifying the link between the Agrarian Party and the state, the party's list for the 1995 Duma elections contained fifty-five members from the Ministry of Agriculture.³⁰

The Agrarian Party certainly has elements of a mass-based faction. Being the rural cousin of the CPRF, the party preserved much of the rural party structure of the CPRF. Furthermore, the Agrarians have received a good deal of backing from Russia's rural voters. However, what distinguishes the Agrarian Party from the CPRF is the Agrarians' links to the agricultural bureaucracy at both the national and local levels. The party's main goal is the maintenance of the current, inefficient agricultural system that benefits those bureaucrats. The faction's commitment to the agricultural elites' control over the Russian agriculture sector is best demonstrated by its continued opposition to the private ownership of agricultural land.

The largest corporatist faction in January 1994 was Russia's Choice, which controlled seven-six deputies. Russia's Choice benefited from at least nominal backing by President Yeltsin during the December 1993 Duma elections. One of the leaders of Russia's Choice, Yegor Gaidar, served in Yeltsin's government at various times. The faction also featured a significant number of members of government elites, including Anatoly Chubais, Boris Salitykov, Viktor Danilov-Danil'yan, and Yevgeny Sidorov. It is those links to key figures in the Yeltsin government that differentiate Russia's Choice from other reformist factions such as

Yabloko, for example, and make it a corporatist faction. Before December 1994, many considered Russia's Choice a strongly pro-government faction. The faction openly split with government over Chechnya; however, it continued to support the Yeltsin administration's economic policy.³¹ As a result of the split with the government, many deputies left to join other factions and deputy groups.

Another corporatist faction in the Duma was the Women of Russia, which obtained twenty-three seats, mostly from the federal party list. Bureaucrats from the old Soviet trade union structure formed the Women of Russia Party. Their support for the remnants of the Soviet trade union system led the members of Russia's Choice to dub the faction the *zhenodel* or "women's department" of the CPRF.³² Even so, the Women of Russia faction often supported the president and government.

PRES, or the Party of Russian Unity and Accord, which won thirty seats in the new Duma, was the first to be given the appellation the "Party of Power."³³ PRES maintained close ties with the government apparatus at all levels. Not only did the party run a high percentage of government officials in the election—35.7 percent of its single-member district candidates—its faction in the Duma contained thirteen government officials, including two vice ministers and several former members of the presidential apparatus. The faction, at least according to Deputy C. N. Shulgin, reflected "the interests of the organs of local self-rule and the organs of regional administration."³⁴ Apart from the contacts with governmental structures, the party lacked a traditional base and had weak regional organizations. Reflecting its "Party of Power" name, PRES routinely supported the positions of the government.³⁵ However, the war in Chechnya and pre-election maneuvering depleted its membership. By the beginning of 1995, it was down to ten members.

The large pool of independent deputies holding single-member district seats spawned one of the largest, if most unstable, corporatist factions: New Regional Policy. Cobbling together some sixty-seven members, with the aid of the Presidential Administration, the New Regional Policy deputy group sought to represent the interests of Russia's many regions and their economic enterprises.³⁶ The group was closely tied to regional power structures and industries, in particular defense enterprises. Originally labeling itself an anti-reform faction, New Regional Policy moved quickly to the center and often supported the government. Because it did not run as a party in the 1993 elections, the faction had no regional party organizations. Its relative disorganization and instability led to many defections, in particular to the new deputy groups that formed in the spring of 1995: Russia and Stability.

In March 1995, disenchanted deputies from other factions, in particular Russia's Choice and New Regional Policy, formed the faction "Stability." It was founded in the wake of Russia's Choice's refusal to back Yeltsin as a presidential candidate and its opposition to the war in Chechnya. Rumors suggested that the group was formed by key members of the Presidential Administration—Andrei Loginov, Georgy Satarov, and Alexander Livshits—to give unstinting support to Yeltsin and his cabinet. A similar new deputy group, formed primarily from PRES and New Regional Policy defectors, was "Russia." Russia maintained significant ties to both regional and federal power structures and remained loyal to Yeltsin and the Chernomyrdin government throughout 1995.

TABLE 3
Distribution of Seats by Faction Type, January 1994

Faction or deputy group	%	Total seats	Single member district seats	Party list seats
Mass-based	10	45	13	32
Cadre	23.6	106	13	93
Corporatist	55.8	251	151	100
Unaffiliated deputies	10.6	48	48	0
Total		450	225	225

Source: Center of Applied Political Research, *INDEM Statistics 2.0* (Moscow: INDEM, 1996) [database].

The majority of Duma deputies belonged to corporatist factions. As demonstrated in table 3, 55.8 percent of the seats were occupied by deputies affiliated with corporatist factions. Instead of a Duma filled with strong parties with ties to demanding social groups, Yeltsin was faced with a Duma dominated by special interests, representing regional and federal power structures and important economic sectors. It is these corporatist factions, with their ties to economic and government elites, that are most closely linked with the patronage elements of the Russian polity. The corporatist factions should thus be the most consistent supporters of Yeltsin's budget policy.

Russian Federal Budget Laws, 1994–96

What kind of budgets did the corporatist-dominated Duma and President Yeltsin create during this period? Much to the chagrin of many Russian legislators, the overarching goal of Yeltsin's budget policy during this period was to reduce inflation. Beginning with the 1995 federal budget, Yeltsin began a policy of tightly reining in expenditures and reducing the money supply to fight inflation.³⁷ High inflation in 1992 and 1993 seriously injured the population and undermined attempts to secure much-needed Western investment. However, Yeltsin's emphasis on a tighter budget did not mean that he failed to use budget policy to support essential interests. In fact, Yeltsin helped to create a budget policy benefiting three major groups: the defense sector, the agricultural sector, and regional elites.

Spending on the military (see table 4), much of which is directed toward the military-industrial complex, has stayed relatively stable at around 20 percent of total expenditures. In fact, in all three years, succumbing to Duma pressure, the Chernomyrdin government agreed to amendments to increase defense spending by 3.5 trillion rubles in 1994,³⁸ 2.5 trillion rubles in 1995,³⁹ and 3.5 trillion rubles in 1996.⁴⁰ In the push for increased military spending in the Duma, several corporatist factions, such as New Regional Policy, Russia, and Stability were essential players. As a rule, however, most factions, including Yabloko, sought increased defense expenditures.

TABLE 4
Percentage of Actual Expenditure by Policy Area, 1994–1996

Policy Area	1994	1995	1996
Industry	17	15	14
Agriculture	6	4	4
Defense	21	21	19
State debt	9	8	13
Regional	14	16	17
State administration	19	19	19
Social-cultural	7	11	10
Other	7	6	5

Sources: Article 1, *Federalny Zakon R.F.*, "O *Federalnom budzhete na 1994 g.*"; Article 17, *Federalny Zakon R.F.*, "O *Federalnom budzhete na 1995 g.*"; Article 16, *Federalny Zakon R.F.*, "O *Federalnom budzhete na 1996 g.*"

Whether the amounts were sufficient to meet Russia's defense needs is open to question. Critics point out that Russian defense spending has plummeted from 8.7 percent of GDP in 1991, to 3.5 percent in 1996. The level of defense spending rarely seems to satisfy the defense bureaucrats. In 1994, the minister of defense stated that for "normal" functioning of the armed forces, defense spending should take up 12 percent of GDP, or 77 percent of all federal income.⁴¹ While certainly the defense sector receives fewer resources than during the heyday of the Soviet Union, the military-industrial complex and the armed forces have consistently received one-fifth of the dwindling federal resources, which makes them more privileged than other sectors that have seen their financing reduced to almost nothing.

Although overall spending has decreased, agricultural spending has also remained relatively steady at 4 percent of all spending. The Yeltsin government has often given in to agricultural demands, stemming primarily from the Agrarian Party in the Duma. In 1994, the government agreed to increase agricultural spending by 6.7 trillion rubles.⁴² In 1995, to obtain agrarian support, the government agreed to maintain a special tax on enterprises, which netted 5 trillion rubles for agriculture, and increased spending by 9.4 trillion rubles.⁴³ In an unprecedented move six days before the 1996 budget draft arrived in the Duma, the government and the Agricultural Union signed a cooperation agreement in which the government acceded to the union's demands to set agricultural spending at 13.1 trillion rubles and to allow the union to distribute up to one-third of the funds.⁴⁴ Although the government and Duma scrapped the special tax to benefit agriculture in 1996, the Agrarian Party succeeded in increasing agricultural spending by another 4 trillion rubles.⁴⁵

To gain regional support, Yeltsin has followed several different lines of attack. First, in tax policy Yeltsin has maintained the system of "asymmetrical federalism." Since 1993, funds to regions have been based on a percentage of revenues collected within the region. For example, according to the 1994 federal budget,

subjects of the federation kept 25 percent of value added taxes (VAT), 50 percent of alcohol excise taxes, and 100 percent of the excise taxes on oil, gas, coal, light automobiles, and imported goods collected on their territory.⁴⁶ Some regions—Tatarstan, for example—have received privileged positions by which they are allowed to retain a greater portion of these taxes.⁴⁷ According to a former member of the Russian Auditing Chamber, the Duma's budget watchdog, Tatarstan routinely is allowed to keep 75 percent of the republic's VAT receipts.⁴⁸

Key to obtaining regional support has been the manipulation of the Fund for the Financial Support of the Regions (FFSR). Between 1994 and 1997, the percentage of regional support from the FFSR has increased from 5.8 percent to 83.3 percent of regional spending.⁴⁹ A region's share of the FFSR is determined by a complex algorithm that attempts to equalize regional differences based on the regions' per capita income and level of expenditures.⁵⁰ In both 1994 and 1995, this algorithm was calculated based on regional budget spending in 1993. This led to numerous complaints that those regions that have suffered the most in the post-1991 economic crisis were discriminated against. Bowing to regional pressure in the Duma, the government changed the base year to 1991, when regional spending was considered more balanced.⁵¹ Again faced with regional demands for more resources, Yeltsin steadily increased the size of the FFSR. In 1994, the government agreed to a Duma amendment that increased the fund by 2.5 trillion rubles.⁵² In 1995, the government agreed to the Duma's demand to base FFSR on the percentage of both the VAT and the tax on profit, which increased the overall size of the fund.⁵³ Because of these compromises, the amount allocated to regions has increased from 14 percent in 1994 of all federal spending to 17 percent in 1996.

Although theoretically based on need, most of Russia's eighty-nine regions receive resources from the FFSR: in 1994, 65 regions; in 1995, 78; in 1996, 75.⁵⁴ One critic of this system notes that 72 percent of the population lives in regions that receive aid, including oil-rich regions such as Khanti-Mainskiy and Yamalo-Nenets.⁵⁵ That the fund is rather generous in its distribution of budget resources garners it wide political support among the regions. The FFSR is also one of the few sources of "live rubles" or cash.⁵⁶ The money can be used by regional governments to cover any expenditure.

Yeltsin's Budget Coalition

Did Yeltsin's budget—geared toward defense, agriculture, and regional spending—play well in the Duma? In Table 5 I show the vote for the budget by type of faction. As expected, the corporatist factions contributed the most to Yeltsin's budget coalitions. For all three budgets, corporatist factions provided more than 67 percent of the "for" votes. Thus, those interests in the Duma most closely tied to particularist interests in the state and the economy were the largest single segment of Yeltsin's budget coalition. Yeltsin's budget policy proved capable of attracting enough votes to pass without his having to rely solely on decrees or extraconstitutional measures.

A statistical examination of the voting behavior of individual deputies using logistic regression analysis further supports this contention. The dependent vari-

TABLE 5
Final Budget Votes by Type of Faction, 1994–1996

Type of Faction	1994		1995		1996	
	For	Against	For	Against	For	Against
Mass-based	41	2	0	35	0	43
Cadre	18	66	62	24	49	19
Corporatist	183	7	206	9	180	2

Source: Center of Applied Political Research, *INDEM Statistics 2.0* (Moscow: INDEM, 1996) [database].

ables are an individual deputy's vote in the final budget vote for each year.⁵⁷ The logistic regressions include only those deputies who actually voted.⁵⁸ Because some abstained, the number voting on each law never equals 450.

A deputy's faction type—cadre, corporatist or mass-based—is measured with a dummy variable. It is expected that membership in a corporatist faction will be positively correlated with voting for the budget in all years. The expectations for membership in other faction types are more complex. Because of the stronger social links of both cadre and mass-based factions, membership in either faction should not have a positive affect on voting on the budget. It is possible that in given budget years these factions maybe be included in a budget coalition. However, that is the exception rather than the rule.

To test the influence of ideology on deputy voting behavior, each deputy was given an ideological score based on the results of factor analyses.⁵⁹ A positive relationship between ideology and voting for the budget indicates that there is a correlation between an antireform ideology and support for the budget. It is a bit difficult to determine what relationship ideology will have on voting. On one hand, Yeltsin is considered a reformist president. However, Yabloko, the most reformist faction, was stridently antipresidential. To complicate matters, the most antireformist faction, the CPRF, also vehemently opposed almost all presidential policies. Furthermore, among the corporatist factions themselves, there are various centrist factions, such as New Regional Policy, Russia, and Stability. The reformist Russia's Choice and the antireformist Agrarian Party are also considered corporatist parties. Thus, it is difficult to determine precisely what relationship ideology will have to Duma voting behavior.

Table 6 presents the results of the three logistic regression tests run on the final votes for the 1994, 1995, and 1996 budgets. As expected, deputies from corporatist factions were major supporters of Yeltsin's budgets. Not only is the corporatist faction variable significant and positively correlated with voting for the budget in all years, but the statistical results show that this variable made the greatest impact on a deputy's decision. Membership in a corporatist faction increased the likelihood of an individual deputy voting for the budget by 96.3 percent, 97 percent, and 99.6 percent in 1994, 1995, and 1996, respectively. The logistic regres-

sion results show that even when controlling for ideology, membership in a corporatist faction was the major cause for supporting a Yeltsin budget. Thus, Yeltsin's tight monetary policy, which gave support to defense, agriculture, and key regions, found a solid core of support within the Duma, reflecting the underlying patronage system that dominates the Russian political system. Deputies from cadre factions were not inclined to support the budget, although the finding is not statistically significant. Yabloko never voted for a Yeltsin budget (see table 7). Considering Yabloko's fervent dislike for Yeltsin's budget policy, which in its opinion failed to fund much-needed structural economic reform, the Yabloko position and the statistical results are not particularly surprising.⁶⁰ The results, to an extent, obscure the underlying mystery of at least one of the cadre factions: the LDPR.

In 1994, LDPR members voted against the budget. The LDPR, mercurial as ever, complained that the budget did not sufficiently protect Russia's borders from infiltrating foreign thieves or stop the degradation of the economy and society.⁶¹ Zhirinovskiy stated that the LDPR would vote for the budget only if Yeltsin removed Deputy Premier Anatoly Chubais and three other government officials.⁶² In both 1995 and 1996, the LDPR became essential supporters of the Yeltsin budget. According to one Duma deputy, it is the general opinion that the LDPR was simply bought.⁶³ One deputy chair of the Duma's Budget Committee stated that Yeltsin and the government often give lucrative government contracts to businesses that are closely linked to Zhirinovskiy in exchange for the LDPR's support in the Duma.⁶⁴

Perhaps one of the most surprising findings is that membership in a mass-based faction, the CPRF, was positively correlated with voting for the budget in 1994. This seeming incongruity is due to the specific political events that surrounded the 1994 budget vote. The 1994 budget process did not begin until March 1994, and the budget was not adopted until June.⁶⁵ The CPRF decided that not to vote for the budget in June would actually serve the interests of the president, allowing government to act without a budget for the rest of year, with no input from the Duma. Deputy I. V. Bratsishev of the CPRF stated, "It is necessary to accept the budget, since it is better with a budget than without a budget."⁶⁶ In 1995 and 1996, however, the CPRF voted against the Yeltsin budgets. In particular, the Communists criticized the lack of social spending and the failure of the Yeltsin administration to index wages and pensions.

The ideological results are quite interesting. Although not statistically significant, the variable was negatively correlated with voting for the budget in 1994. This gives us the indication that more liberal elements were likely to vote for the budget. However, in 1995 and 1996, voting was positively and significantly correlated with antireformist ideology. A deputy at the median level on the ideology score was 94.7 percent more likely to vote for the budget in 1995. However, in 1996 the same deputy was only 79.9 percent more likely to vote for the budget. Thus, the impact of ideology on deputies' voting behavior was inconsistent over time, vacillating between no influence and a strong influence. Ideology can affect deputy voting behavior; however, its power is not consistent over time during the Fifth Duma.

TABLE 6
Logistic Regression Results DV= Deputies Vote on Final Budget, 1994-1996

Independent variable	1994 budget			1995 budget			1996 budget		
	B	SE B	Exp B	B	SE B	Exp B	B	SE B	Exp B
Cadre faction	-2.3791**	-0.5123	0.0926	0.2385	-0.4034	1.2693	-0.2127	-0.5726	0.8084
Corporatist faction	1.7694**	-0.599	5.8676	2.822**	-0.4863	16.8131	4.2128**	-0.9271	67.5346
Mass-based faction	1.7750*	-0.8656	5.7835	-10.4423	-16.818	0.0000	-12.4721	-25.0155	0.0000
Ideology	-0.2537	-0.2171	0.7759	.7029**	-0.1659	2.0196	1.0951**	-0.2416	2.9896
Constant	1.4906**	-0.4608		.6579*	-0.3121		1.2942**	-0.4839	
Percent predicted correctly	88.52			89.06			95.3		
- 2 LL	384.78			405.98			338.23		
N	0.44			0.46			0.68		
	357			384			319		

Note: B = unstandardized regression coefficient, and SE B = its standard error; Exp B = exponent of B; LL = log likelihood.
*p < .05; ** p < .01.

TABLE 7
Results by Faction of Final Budget Vote, 1994–1996

Duma faction	1994		1995		1996	
	For	Against	For	Against	For	Against
Reform factions						
Russia's Choice	45	3	48	2	39	0
Yabloko	1	16	0	17	0	19
Centrist factions						
PRES	22	0	21	1	8	0
Women of Russia	20	0	20	0	19	0
New Regional Policy	51	4	44	5	27	1
Democratic Party of Russia	13	1	6	6	5	0
Russia Stability	—	—	24	1	25	0
—	—	—	—	—	19	0
Antireform factions						
Agrarian Party	45	1	49	0	43	1
KPRF	41	2	0	35	0	43
LDRP	4	44	56	1	44	0
Independents	33	7	31	17	19	7
Total	275	82	299	85	248	71

Source: Center of Applied Political Research, *INDEM Statistics 2.0* (Moscow: INDEM, 1996) [database].

Note: Empty cells indicate faction or deputy group not in existence at time of vote.

The fact that voting for the budget in 1995 and 1996 correlates with an antireformist ideology is due in part to the absence of Yabloko, the most reformist faction, and the presence of two major antireform factions, the LDPR and the Agrarian Party, in the budget coalition. Yeltsin's success in obtaining such an antireformist coalition suggests that his "reformist" moniker, though certainly more prevalent then than now, was questionable. Furthermore, although not particularly surprising, this result underlines the potentially antimarket character of many of the deputies who represent the interests of the Russian economic and political establishment.

The logistic regression results confirm that corporatist factions, those tied closely to the economic and governmental power structures to which patronage networks were most uniquely tied, were the most consistent supporters of Yeltsin's budget policy during the time of the Fifth State Duma. Even when controlling for ideology, membership in a corporatist faction is clearly the most powerful force in determining support for the Yeltsin budgets. Thus, Yeltsin's budget policy, which privileged certain regional and economic interests, found support even in an antireformist legislature in a system that should have been hampered by presidential-legislative deadlock.

Conclusion

What does it matter that Boris Yeltsin buys his budget? That question can be answered in several different and important ways. First, the description of the Russian presidency as “superpresidential” is called into question. Yeltsin did not simply use his executive decree authority to force a budget on the weak Duma. Instead, he bargained with corporatist interests to create a budget that benefited them. Yeltsin was a strong president; his strength, however, was not due simply to the formal powers given to him by law. Instead, he used the budget process to build a coalition of supporters that reduced the need for legislation by presidential decree.

Perhaps most important, Yeltsin’s use of a distributional coalition to pass budgets suggests that patron-client networks can alter the incentives of a president. In the patronage-dominated Russian polity, a president must be able to deal with such demands in order to rule. Yeltsin’s budget coalition included the representatives of important interests desiring state resources. By agreeing to a budget that supports their interests, Yeltsin turned away from the assumed plebiscitarian bias of his office toward particularism—a particularism shared by a section of the Duma sufficiently large to create cooperative budget policy.

What does this result suggest about the presidential critique? My findings show that in societies dominated by patron-client networks, the negative effects theorized by the critique can be mitigated. The application of the critique in a country without a strong party system illustrated weaknesses in its explanatory power. The question then becomes whether my conclusions can be replicated in other countries featuring party systems with similar levels of patronage.

One important question for Russian politics, and for our understanding of the effects of presidential systems, is whether the executive-legislative relationship described here is stable. It does not appear likely that the Russian party system, which produced so many corporatist Duma factions, is invariable. As Russian parties spend more resources to build stronger and more far-reaching political organizations, the number and strength of mass-based factions should increase. With their stronger ties to different and conflicting social groups, future Russian presidents may not find a pliable, corporatist Duma. Thus, the development of stronger political parties that are better able to focus and communicate societal demands to the central political institutions may signal the further consolidation of Russian democracy in one area, but it may also create instability in another area, namely executive-legislative relations. What we may see in Russia, therefore, is a rather odd paradox. Although it may be considered more democratic because of the strength of political parties and the weakness of archaic, antidemocratic patronage networks, the Russian political system may reveal more discontent, as it deals with increased executive-legislative tensions. It is at that point that the presidential critique may have its final say.

NOTES

1. The “presidential critique” is based primarily on analyses of Latin American presidential systems. The critique argues that in presidential systems, the absence of mechanisms to break deadlocks between the president and legislature have led to stalemates that prevent

democratic consolidation. Conversley, parliamentary systems that feature no-confidence votes, for example, are less likely to suffer similar breakdowns. Juan Linz, "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?" in Juan Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., *The Failure of Presidential Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 6. For further reading, see Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Scott Mainwaring, "Presidentialism, Multipartyism, and Democracy: The Difficult Combination," *Comparative Political Studies* 26 (1993): 198–228; Matthew Shugart and John Carey, *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach, "Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarianism v. Presidentialism," *World Politics* 46 (1996): 1–22; and Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Soberg Shugart, eds., *Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

2. Linz, "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy," 6.

3. Technically, the Russian system is semi-presidential, because the Duma can vote no confidence in the government. However, the president can simply ignore the results. Even if the Duma votes no confidence again within three months, the president chooses to dissolve either the government or the Duma. Thus, the Russian presidential system more closely resembles a purely presidential system.

4. Linz, "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy," 6.

5. Mainwaring, "Presidentialism, Multipartyism, and Democracy."

6. Linz, "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy," 29.

7. *Ibid.*, 30.

8. *Rossiiskaya Federatsiya, Sobranie zakonatel'stva Rossiiskaya Federatsiya* 1–52 (Moscow: Administratsia Prezidenta, 1994); *Rossiiskaya Federatsiya, Sobranie zakonatel'stva Rossiiskaya Federatsiya* 1–52 (Moscow: Administratsia Prezidenta, 1995); and *Rossiiskaya Federatsiya, Sobranie zakonatel'stva Rossiiskaya Federatsiya* 1–52 (Moscow: Administratsia Prezidenta, 1996).

9. A similar point is made in Thomas Remington, Steven Smith, and Moshe Haspel, "Decrees, Laws, and Inter-Branch Relations in the Russian Federation," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 14 (1998): 287.

10. See John P. Willerton, *Patronage and Politics in the USSR*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) and T.H. Rigby and Bohdan Harasymiw, eds., *Leadership Selection and Patron-Client Relations in the U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983).

11. Willerton, *Patronage and Politics in the USSR*, 5.

12. Laura Bellin and Robert Ortung with Ralph S. Clem and Peter R. Craumer, *The Russian Parliamentary Elections of 1995: The Battle for the Duma* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 43–46.

13. Robert Moser, "Sverdlovsk: Mixed Results in a Hotbed of Regional Autonomy," in Timothy J. Colton and Jerry F. Hough, eds., *Growing Pains: Russian Democracy and the Election of 1993* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1998), 422.

14. Darrell Slider, "Elections to Russia's Regional Assemblies," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 12 (1996): 261.

15. Steven Solnick, "Gubernatorial Elections in Russia, 1996-1997," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 14 (1998): 64.

16. Bellin and Ortung with Clem and Craumer, *The Russian Parliamentary Elections of 1995*, 43–46.

17. Juliet Johnson, "Russia's Emerging Financial-Industrial Groups," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 13 (1997): 348.

18. Previously, *Gazprom* was the Soviet Ministry of Gas Industry (*Mingazprom*). When *Gazprom* was created, Chernomyrdin was its minister.

19. *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* (Moscow), 13 September 1997.

20. Pavel Gazukin and Vladimir Pribylovsky, *Pravitel'stvo Rossiiskoi Federatsii* (Moscow: Panorama, 1996), 57.

21. Factions are those parties in the Duma that passed the 5 percent barrier and received seats from the party-list vote. Deputy groups are organizations of deputies formed in the Duma after the elections. To form a deputy group, thirty-five members need to register as members. Both factions and deputy groups maintain certain rights within the Duma itself. They receive a vote in the internal decision-making body of the Duma, the Soviet of the Duma, the right to nominate candidates for leadership positions, support from the Duma apparatus, and greater access to speak in floor debates.

22. Only those factions that were officially registered at the time of budget votes will be analyzed.

23. *Moscow Times*, 14 January 1994.

24. *Federal'noe Sobranie-parlament R.F., Gosudarstvennaya Duma: Stenogramma zasedanii. Vesennaya sessiya 4, 6–27 April 1994* (Moscow: Izvestiya, 1995), 404.

25. *Moscow Times*, 22 April 1994.

26. S.A. Mndoyants and A.M. Salmin, *Parlamentarizm v Rossii*, (Moscow: Fond razvitiya parlamentarizma v rossii, 1996), 23.

27. Bellin and Ortung with Clem and Craumer, *The Russian Parliamentary Elections of 1995*, 46–47; Mndoyants and Salmin, *Parlamentarizm v Rossii*, 21.

28. Mndoyants and Salmin, *Parlamentarizm v Rossii*, 21.

29. The deputy premier of the Russian government, Alexander Zaveruykha, who entered the government in February 1993, was elected to the Duma in 1993 on the Agrarian Party list. On 27 October 1994, Agrarian Party and Duma member Alexander Nazurchuk was named minister of agriculture and food production in the Yeltsin government.

30. Bellin and Ortung with Clem and Craumer, *The Russian Parliamentary Elections of 1995*, 47.

31. Yu. G. Korgunyuk and S. E. Zaslavsky, *Rossiiskaya mnogopartiinost*, (Moscow: INDEM, 1996), 183.

32. Korgunyuk and Zaslavsky, *Rossiiskaya mnogopartiinost*, 184.

33. Mndoyants and Salmin, *Parlamentarizm v Rossii*, 22.

34. *Federal'noe Sobranie-parlament R.F., Gosudarstvennaya Duma: Stenogramma zasedanii. Ocennaya sessiya 12, 15–23 December 1994*, (Moscow: Izvestiya, 1995), 260.

35. Korgunyuk and Zaslavsky, *Rossiiskaya mnogopartiinost*, 184.

36. Mndoyants and Salmin, *Parlamentarizm v Rossii*, 20.

37. V. Mau, S. Sinel'nikov-Murilev, and G. Trofimov, "Finansirovannaya politika 94-96," *Voprosi ekonomiki* 5 (May 1996): 6.

38. *Federal'noe Sobranie-parlament R.F., Gosudarstvennaya Duma: Stenogramma zasedanii. Ocennaya sessiya 6, 8–24 June 1994*, (Moscow: Izvestiya, 1995), 260.

39. *Federal'noe Sobranie-parlament R.F., Gosudarstvennaya Duma 12, 15–23 December 1994*, 226.

40. *Federal'noe Sobranie-parlament R.F., Gosudarstvennaya Duma: Stenogramma zasedanii. Ocennaya sessiya 23, 22 November–22 December 1995*, (Moscow: Izvestiya, 1996), 360.

41. *Federal'noe Sobranie-parlament R.F., Gosudarstvennaya Duma: Stenogramma zasedanii. Ocennaya sessiya 11, 25 November–14 December 1994*, (Moscow: Izvestiya, 1995), 113.

42. *Federal'noe Sobranie-parlament R.F., Gosudarstvennaya Duma: Stenogramma zasedanii. Vesennaya sessiya 5, 11–27 May 1994*, (Moscow: Izvestiya, 1995), 44-45.

43. *Federal'noe Sobranie-parlament R.F., Gosudarstvennaya Duma 12*, 212.

44. *Segodnya* (Moscow), 22 August 1995.

45. *Federal'noe Sobranie-parlament R.F., Gosudarstvennaya Duma 23*, 361.

46. M. V. Romanovsky, *Byudzhetnaya sistema Rossiiskoi Federatsii: Uchebnik*, (Moscow: Yurait, 1999), 133.

47. A. G. Shishkine and M. A. Zakharov, "Byudzhetniye problemy v federativnom gosudarstve: poiska resheniya," *Finansy* 4 (1997): 8–9.
48. Alexander Lysenko, head of the Finance Department of the LDPR, interview by author, 23 May 1999, Moscow, R.F.
49. T. Yu. Gor'kova, M. I. Kropov, I. V. Podporina, and G. M. Shapovalov, *Novye imperativy v byudzhetnoi politike: uroki rossiiskoi byudzhetnoi reformy*, (St. Petersburg: Sankt-Peterburgskiy universitet ekonomiki i finansov, 1995), 167; A. D. Ayushieva and A. M. Tret'yakovoi, *Problemy finansov regiona v ysliviyakh stanovleniya rynochnykh otnoshenii*, (Irkutsk: Irkutskaya gosudarstvennaya ekonomicheskaya akademiya, 1997), 84.
50. Yu. N. Gladky and A. N. Chistopaev, *Osnovy regional'noi politiki*, (St. Petersburg: Mikhailov, V.A., 1998), 422.
51. V.G. Panskov, "Byudzhet-96: tseli, zadachi, prioritety," *Finansy* 1 (1996), 6.
52. *Federal'noe Sobranie-parlament R.F., Gosudarstvennaya Duma* 6, 34.
53. *Federal'noe Sobranie-parlament R.F., Gosudarstvennaya Duma* 12, 208.
54. See: Article 14, *Federalny Zakon "O Federalnom budzhete na 1994 g."*; Article 14, *Federalny Zakon "O Federalnom budzhete na 1995 g."*; Article 14, *Federalny Zakon "O Federalnom budzhete na 1996 g."*
55. Gladky and Chistopaev, *Osnovy regional'noi politiki*, 422.
56. A. Lyako, "Ekonomicheskii krisiz i ego posledstviya dlya byudzhetnoi sistemy rossiiskikh regionov," *Voprosi ekonomiki* 3 (March 1999): 30.
57. Logistic regression is the proper test to run here because the dependent variable, for or against on the final budget vote, is dichotomous.
58. Nonvoting is a common phenomenon in the legislature. Interviews with Duma deputies indicate that although some deputies express their dissatisfaction by not voting on legislation, this is not the only reason for the practice. Therefore, all who did not participate in the vote were dropped from the logistic regression equations as it would be impossible to determine the precise reason for the nonparticipation of any particular deputy.
59. Using factor analysis, for both 1994 and 1995, the final votes on all laws, votes to override presidential vetoes, and no-confidence votes were analyzed to produce a regression score that represents where each deputy would be placed on an antireform to reform scale.
60. According to Mikhail Zadornov of Yabloko, "Nobody will argue about the necessity of strict financial limitations, but there has to be a strengthening by concrete measures for a structural policy, for the further development of reforms, for the creation of those points of economic growth, which are capable to lead the economy from crisis. . . the dynamic of the development of the economy, the structural reform practically did not receive reflection in it [the budget]." *Federal'noe Sobranie-parlament R.F., Gosudarstvennaya Duma* 4, 375.
61. *Federal'noe Sobranie-parlament R.F., Gosudarstvennaya Duma* 4, 413.
62. *Ibid.*, 422–23.
63. Oksana Beklemishcheva, deputy of the State Duma of the Russian Federation, interview by author, 23 June 1999, Moscow, R.F.
64. Vladimir Gitin, deputy of the State Duma of the Russian Federation, interview by author, 23 June 1999, Moscow, R.F.
65. The Duma did not meet for the first time until January 1994.
66. *Federal'noe Sobranie-parlament R.F., Gosudarstvennaya Duma* 5, 62.