

# Political Integration and Political Parties in Post-Soviet Russian Politics

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Since 1991, many scholars have investigated the emergence of party politics in postcommunist Russia. More often than not those works have focused on the level of the party system in Russia or have concentrated on examining the underlying public attitudes that influence party politics.<sup>1</sup> When parties are dealt with as organizations, it is mostly in descriptive studies of individual parties, rather than systematic attempts to explain party behavior.<sup>2</sup>

One area of particular interest to both academics and political practitioners is the potential role of post-Soviet political parties as integrative organizations in postcommunist politics.<sup>3</sup> Indeed, the integrative function of political parties has long been noted by political scientists in the West.<sup>4</sup> In particular, as David Apter has stated, through their recruitment practices, parties build the “channels of communication . . . between otherwise hostile or non-communicating groups, bringing them into sets of relationships on which the state is built.”<sup>5</sup>

The preponderance of the literature has generally concluded that the parties that populate the political scene in Russia are currently ill-prepared to perform that integrative function. That skepticism is fed by the fact that parties in post-Soviet politics are mostly shifting coalitions of individuals unanchored in postcommunist society.<sup>6</sup> Indeed, pessimists (such as Richard Sakwa) claim that postcommunist Russia is a nonparty system and is not likely to develop real parties. More optimistic scholars (for instance, Thomas Remington and Steven Smith) suggest that parties are developing in Russia growing out of parliament, reminiscent of the initial development of Western cadre (elite) parties. From that perspective, parties may over time evolve into organizations that can perform some of the functions identified by Apter.

In this article, I evaluate whether postcommunist Russian parties are developing into organizations that will be able to promote political integration. To ascertain the extent to which the parties may act as integrative organizations, I

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examine the behavior of the political parties in the last two parliamentary elections (1993 and 1995) in terms of the geographic scope of their candidate recruitment activities and the types of individuals the parties recruit as candidates. I focus on the activities of the “major continuous parties” (those that won at least five seats in both the 1993 and 1995 parliamentary elections).<sup>7</sup> This definition of “major continuous party” includes the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), the Agrarian Party of Russia (APR), the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), Russia’s Choice/Democratic Choice of Russia (VR/DVR), and the Yavlinskii-Boldyrev-Lukin bloc (Yabloko). In particular, I focus on the candidate recruitment choices of those parties in the single-member districts in the regions and republics for both the 12 December 1993 and 17 December 1995 State Duma elections. The analysis of the single member district elections (as opposed to analysis of national list seat elections) provides insight as to how local factors affect the recruitment practices of the national parties and thus assists in assessing the extent to which the parties have penetrated the regions, and the degree to which they may act as the building blocks for future political integration.

### Literature Review

*The debate over the place of party in postcommunist Russian politics.* There has been considerable skepticism about the applicability of Western theory to the post-Soviet political milieu in view of its totalitarian past.<sup>8</sup> There is in Russia a “well developed antipathy to the concept of party after 70 years in which it stood for political monopoly and sometimes repression,” and civil society remains only “weakly developed with few of the autonomous business and labor associations that support parties in other countries.”<sup>9</sup> In addition to cultural and sociostructural reasons, others have pointed to the existence of a strong presidency in Russia as inimical to the development of political parties.<sup>10</sup>

However, the argument that contests the applicability of Western theories of party organization to the Russian case is based on the faulty notion that the only “real party” is the “mass party.” Its time “appears over, and parties in general appear obsolete as vehicles of popular mobilization, regional and national identity, individual development, and, in the Russian context, even as instruments of power.”<sup>11</sup> This conception of “party” ignores the considerable amount of literature that has always held that there are many kinds of “real parties,” not only the mass party.<sup>12</sup> As Lewis notes, it has become apparent that “arguments concerning the decline of the party *per se* were wrong and generally misconceived.”<sup>13</sup> If political scientists are to come to grips with party development in Russia, they must fully ground their work in existing theory before prematurely labeling such theories inapplicable.

Employing a broader conception of the party, the tradition of Duverger, Epstein, and Downs, other scholars have argued that parties are indeed forming in postcommunist Russia and are playing an increasingly important role in shaping postcommunist Russian politics.<sup>14</sup> Although the parties remain in their infancy, Remington and Smith note that “parliamentary parties have been operating

. . . and have already shaped the procedures, structures and policy products of the Duma in basic ways.”<sup>15</sup> They argue that although dominated “by the leaders of the parties in parliament,” they are parties nonetheless, reminiscent of the “cadre” parties that grew out of the parliaments of Europe in the nineteenth century.<sup>16</sup>

Thus the debate over the concept of party in post-Soviet politics appears to be based on very different assumptions regarding the nature of political parties. The more restrictive definition implied by those who espouse the “nonparty” approach to post-Soviet politics would exclude even most Western parties. A more flexible definition would not only allow for systematic analysis, but also facilitate the understanding of post-Soviet politics in comparative perspective.

*Factors affecting party activity.* What factors affect the level of party activity and the types of candidates that parties recruit? Several scholars have noted that in the early days of party formation the degree of urbanization of a region affects partisan behavioral patterns.<sup>17</sup> There are a variety of reasons, but perhaps the most important is that parties emerge out of urban environments, made up in early stages largely of members of the intelligentsia from “upper and middle-class backgrounds.”<sup>18</sup> Over time, the parties must extend their activities to survive, leading to strong pressure to “mobilize” the countryside. This requires that the parties be flexible enough to adapt their programs to local realities and often involves recruiting candidates at the local level who have name recognition, although they may not be ideologically reliable.

Local elites in rural areas often prefer to remain outside the political parties, in part because doing so allows them to build coalitions based on traditional affective ties.<sup>19</sup> Indeed, candidates who already possess political resources such as local name recognition are generally less inclined to affiliate with any of the infant national political parties, because it often produces no tangible benefits for local elites. In sum, political parties that begin in the cities have difficulty penetrating into rural regions.

Scholars examining the first two post-Soviet parliamentary elections have noted that resistance to party penetration was characteristic of both. For Sakwa, the nature of district level competition for the single member district seats affected the behavior of parties. Thus Sakwa notes that in the 1993 single member district elections, the “personal factor was generally more important than programmes” and that all parties sought to recruit local notables.<sup>20</sup> White, et al. noted that the emphasis on local personalities and the lack of partisan penetration were due partly to electoral arithmetic. In districts where a large number of candidates contested an election, the minimum vote required to win declined; this, in turn,

encouraged candidates who could be sure of mobilizing a significant bloc of votes in a district, for example, a factory manager or the head of a large collective farm, to enter the election even if their core support was well under half the electorate. To win in a district, such a candidate could either broaden his or her core vote or encourage a large number of other candidates to come forward, thus splitting the total vote and lowering the number of votes needed for victory. In a single-member district, a candidate who could mobilize anything from an eighth to a quarter of the vote had a chance of victory.<sup>21</sup>

Another factor cited in the current literature on post-Soviet parties that influences where a party is likely to be active is the location of its support. Wyman et al. contend that the major parties in Russia have recognized their social bases and adjusted their political strategies to appeal to those constituencies.<sup>22</sup> Thus, the Liberal Democratic Party's support was heavily concentrated in the manual working class, among workers in state enterprises, in smaller towns, and among the unemployed. The LDPR also appealed to the young, students, and those with less formal education. The CPRF and the Agrarians appealed to the working classes, but gained the most among older people, in particular pensioners and the unemployed. Moreover, both derived much of their popular support from rural areas. Slider, Gimpel'son, and Chugrov observed that "as a rule district level electoral data have shown that rural areas tended to vote against reform and reformers";<sup>23</sup> they concluded that the success of the opposition in the rural regions was due largely to the persistence of the traditional communist nomenklatura.<sup>24</sup> Based on their analysis we would expect anti-reform parties (particularly the CPRF, APR, and LDPR) to focus their political activities in less-populous, rural districts where they had a better chance of winning.

Clem and Craumer, and Sobyenin and Sukhovolskiy noted different levels of support or opposition to reforms in the various regions of the Russian federation.<sup>25</sup> Support for reformists was strong in the northwest, north, West and East Siberia, Urals, and the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg. Anti-reform sentiment was particularly strong in the southern tier of oblasts, stretching from Pskov in the west through the central Chernozem Region and across the Volga.<sup>26</sup> The differences suggest that anti-reform parties would be likely to recruit candidates in regions where anti-reform sentiment was greatest.

### Variables

I employed two primary dependent variables in this study: (a) the level of partisan nomination activity in a region and (b) the type of candidates recruited. *Party nomination activity* is measured both in the aggregate (the number of district candidates nominated by the five major continuous parties, over total number of candidates aggregated to level of region) and for individual parties (the number of district candidates nominated by a particular party, over the total number of candidates running for district election in the regions).

The type of candidates recruited was measured using a *Political Notability* (POLNOT) score.<sup>27</sup> I constructed a five-point scale that takes into account the occupational background of the candidate.<sup>28</sup> The value 1 was assigned to individuals who were the most "politically notable" or who held a high political office. In other words, the most politically notable were those who already held office and hence had demonstrated a reserve of political capital outside the party's resources. These included presidential aides, presidential representatives, ministers who were not Duma members, legislative assistants, members of oblast or republic legislatures, and executives. However, for 1995, incumbent Duma deputies were excluded from the total of district candidates. The reason is that we are interested in the new candidates recruited to the party's banner, not those who

were politically notable by virtue of having been elected in 1993. For 1993, this left 58 district candidates for the CPRF, 75 for the APR, 60 for the LDPR, 90 for Yabloko, and 115 for the VR/DVR. For 1995 the totals were the following: 131 district candidates for the CPRF in 1995, 141 for the APR, 55 for the LDPR, 109 for the VR/DVR, and 116 for Yabloko.

The value 2 was assigned to local political notables such as representatives in city or county government, collective farm managers, factory managers, and directors of large enterprises. The value 3 was assigned to individuals whose occupations put them within the ranks of intelligentsia, but who did not hold political office, had not appeared on the party's list in 1993, and were not identified as being an officer or member of the party. This category included academics, engineers, journalists, teachers, managers, lawyers, doctors, and entrepreneurs. Although those individuals did not hold positions that clearly demonstrated previous political careers, they occupied positions that made them noteworthy enough to pursue independent political careers if they wished. Included in the fourth category (assigned the value 4) were individuals from occupations that did not generally make them well known, such as workers, farmers, artists, pensioners, students, and the unemployed, and who did not appear on the party's list in 1993. This category included those who did not have the political capital or notoriety that would allow them to pursue an independent political career. The fifth category (assigned the value 5) included candidates who were identified as political activists, or who listed their primary occupations as party functionaries or activists in ancillary organizations (such as trade unions and social and political movements allied with the parties). These individuals were assumed to be most dependent on the party for their political standing.

Taken together this five-point ordinal scale was defined as measuring the degree of independent political notability (POLNOT). Thus, a mean score for all candidates that was closer to 1 would indicate that the party's candidates were largely recruited from the ranks of independent political notables. A mean score closer to 5 would suggest that the party largely recruited from the ranks of those who were most likely to depend on the party's resources. If the expectation that the parties would be moving in the direction of recruiting more political notables in 1995, compared with 1993, holds true, then we would expect that the mean POLNOT scores would be significantly different from the parties' scores in 1993.

In addition to the dependent variables listed above, several independent variables (or the factors that may be associated with higher levels of partisan nomination activity and the types of candidates nominated) were included in this study: *Degree of Urbanization of Region* (URBAN) estimated how urbanized a region is, measured by the percentage of people in the region living in towns of 50,000 or more. According to the literature (particularly Rokkan, and Slider et al.) we would expect that the more urbanized a region, the more active are the reformist parties. "*Political Temperature*" (POLTEMP) of the region where the district is located is a term coined by Sobyenin and Sukhovolskiy to indicate the degree to which the district is supportive of political reform.<sup>29</sup> The measure was calculat-

ed for the period 1991–1993 for all 89 republics and regions of the Russian Federation and is based on the following formula:

$$\text{POLTEMP} = \frac{\text{sum}(100-2P_i)}{4}$$

where  $P_i$  = the percent of voters voting against reform at time  $I$  (such as against President Yeltsin in 1991, against the referendum of 1993, against the constitution in 1993, and for the CPRF, APR, and LDPR in 1993).

The measure represents an average score where +100 represents a region whose voters were completely in support of reform, and –100 a region whose voters completely opposed reform. It is employed to test the expectation that the pro-reform parties (VR/DVR and Yabloko, and in 1995 the pro-government NDR– Nash Dom Rossii/Our Home is Russia) would tend to nominate candidates in districts in areas that historically supported reform, and the opposition (LDPR, APR, and CPRF) would tend to nominate candidates in districts that were located in areas that generally opposed reform.

#### **Unemployment (UNEMP), Poverty (POVERTY), Elderly (ELDER), and Industry (INDUSTRY)**

Among the other factors that supposedly affect the level of individual party activity are ones associated with particular constituencies (such as the elderly) and factors that identify “winners and losers” in the changes that have occurred since 1991 (such as unemployment and poverty).

If the lines of pro-reform versus anti-reform political cleavage run along the lines of winners versus losers, then anti-reform parties should tend to nominate candidates in districts where unemployment (measured as average unemployment rates per region for 1993–95) and poverty are high (average percent of population in region living below minimum living income 1993–95), where there is a higher proportion of elderly citizens (sixty-five and older), and in regions that were relatively more dependent on heavy industrial production (measured by percentage of regional product produced by ferrous metals and machine building industries).<sup>30</sup>

#### **Analysis and Conclusions**

Table 1 summarizes the results of the 1993 and 1995 State Duma elections. The most striking results for the major continuous parties are the success of the CPRF and the precipitous declines of the APR, the Women of Russia, and the VR/DVR (although the latter has been supplanted by the NDR as the principal pro-government party), as well as the virtual disappearance of PRES and the DPR. Yabloko and the LDPR generally held their own. In the single-mandate district elections, the CPRF increased its share of district seats from 10 in 1993 to 58 in 1995; Yabloko also fared well, doubling its district seats from 7 to 14, and the APR registered an increase as well. On the other hand, the LDPR lost 4 of the 5 district seats it held, and the VR/DVR lost 14 district seats (the NDR picked up 14 seats).

**TABLE 1. Votes and Seats Won by Parties, 1993 and 1995 State Duma Elections**

Parties and Electoral Associations	1993				1995			
	% of list vote	% of list seats	# of district seats	Total seats	% of list vote	% of list seats	# of district seats	Total seats
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR–Extreme nationalist)	22.92	59	5	64	11.40	50	1	51
Russia's Choice/Democratic Choice of Russia-United Democrats (VD/DVR–Democratic reformist/pro-government)	15.51	40	24	64	3.94	0	9	9
Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF–Communist opposition)	12.40	32	10	42	22.73	99	58	157
Women of Russia (ZhR)	8.13	21	2	23	4.70	0	3	3
Agrarian Party of Russia (APR–Left-wing opposition)	7.99	21	16	37	3.85	0	20	20
Yabloko (Yavlinsky-Boldyrev-Lukin Bloc-Democratic reformist opposition)	7.86	20	7	27	7.02	31	14	35
Party of Russian Unity and Accord (PRES)	6.73	18	4	22	.36	0	1	1
Democratic Party of Russia (DPR)	5.52	14	0	14	—	—	—	—
Our Home is Russia (NDR–pro-government)	—	—	—	—	10.33	45	14	59
Power to the People Bloc	—	—	—	—	1.64	0	9	9
Congress of Russian Communities (KRO)	—	—	—	—	4.39	0	5	5
Other parties	—	0	23	23	—	0	14	14
Independents	—	0	134	134	—	0	77	77

Source: Maximov's *Parliamentary Companion to the 1995 Russian Parliamentary Results* (London: Maximov Publications, 1995).

Turning to figures 1 and 2, which illustrate the level of partisan nomination activity in the aggregate for the 1993 and 1995 elections, it is apparent that in 1993 the level of party nomination activity was relatively low, with few regions having more than 30 percent of candidates affiliated with the five major parties and geographically concentrated (highest levels were reported in European Russia and south-central Siberia). However, by 1995 (figure 2) the level of party nomination activity had increased dramatically, with over 30 percent of candidates being nominated by one of the five major parties reported in the majority of regions (65.17 percent, or 58 of 89 in 1995, compared with 27.27 percent or 24 out of 88 in 1993).<sup>31</sup>

These results might suggest that the parties have made considerable progress in drawing candidates to their banners and hence are evolving into integrative organizations. However, a difference of means test, which compared the mean scores for the variable POLNOT for 1993 and 1995 for each of the major parties, revealed a trend toward recruiting candidates who are of more elite status (table 2). This was especially true for the CPRF, which had been considered the most organized and disciplined political party in 1993 and which made the greatest gains in the 1995 Duma election. The candidates recruited by the CPRF in 1995 were significantly more "politically notable" than those recruited in 1993 (2.08 and 2.41, respectively). In comparison, the candidates recruited by the APR in 1995 were slightly more "politically activist" than in 1993 (2.21 and 2.09 respectively), but the difference was not statistically significant. For the LDPR, the trend

**TABLE 2. Mean Political Notability Scores for Major Continuous Parties, 1993 and 1995, for Nonincumbent District Candidates**

Party	1993 Mean (SD) <i>n</i>	1995 Mean (SD) <i>n</i>	Difference of Means 1993 & 1995 <i>t</i> score
CPRF	3.36 (.89) <i>n</i> = 58	2.64 (1.28) <i>n</i> = 131 <sup>a</sup>	3.89 (.00)*
APR	2.36 (.98) <i>n</i> = 75	2.21 (1.09) <i>n</i> = 141 <sup>a</sup>	.98 (.33)
LDPR	3.45 (1.17) <i>n</i> = 60	3.42 (1.55) <i>n</i> = 55 <sup>a</sup>	.12 (.90)
Yabloko	2.48 (1.05) <i>n</i> = 90	2.61 (1.24) <i>n</i> = 116 <sup>a</sup>	-.82 (.41)
VR/DVR	2.31 (1.18) <i>n</i> = 115	2.74 (1.20) <i>n</i> = 109 <sup>a</sup>	-2.76 (.01)*

<sup>a</sup>Includes only candidates who were not incumbent State Duma deputies.

\*Two-tailed significance at  $p \leq .01$ .



FIGURE 1. Party Nomination Activity by Region, 1993





FIGURE 2. Party Nomination Activity by Region, 1995



was in the opposite direction from that of the CPRF. The LDPR candidates recruited in 1995 were more of the political activist ilk than in 1993, but again the difference was not statistically significant.

The development of the CPRF is indicative of the trend toward recruitment of elite candidates, which appears to support Rokkan's theory regarding the development of political parties. However the recruitment of more elite candidates in the districts *did not explain the success of the CPRF in 1995*. Indeed, as I noted elsewhere, less-notable candidates were just as likely to win as were notable candidates for the CPRF. What may account for the CPRF's success is the strength of the Communist parties' organization in smaller cities and rural areas, in contrast to their relatively weak position in big cities such as Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Ekaterinaburg.

The movement toward recruitment of political elites, who may or may not be wedded to the party by ideological or programmatic concerns, has resulted in the development of a cleavage within the CPRF, pitting the party leadership at the center against the rank and file in the regions. Indeed, as Remington and Smith noted, after the 1993 election district deputies tended to have more extreme views than party-list deputies and tended to be more cohesive in their voting patterns than the party-list deputies.<sup>32</sup> These divisions are not limited to the CPRF and characterize the other major parties as well. The emergence of such internal cleavages makes it very difficult for parties to act as links between center and periphery and perform the integrative function that characterized the development of so many Western parties.

In table 3, I show the correlation between the parties' nomination behavior and environmental factors for the 1995 parliamentary election. In addition to urbanization, "political temperature," unemployment, poverty, elderly population, and industry, the level of party activity in the 1993 election for the individual regions is included. The latter was included to ascertain the extent to which previous activity in a region in 1993 predicted activity in 1995. If there is a correlation between these variables and partisan activity in 1995, it suggests that parties have identified their respective constituencies and gravitate toward regions that are likely to provide political support.<sup>33</sup>

Table 3 illustrates a matrix of simple bivariate correlation coefficients.<sup>34</sup> The results indicate that the constituency factors (ELDERLY, POLTEMP, POVERTY, INDUSTRY and URBAN) generally did not go very far in explaining the nomination activity of the major parties. The result is contrary to some of the existing literature, which suggested that the parties have recognized and established links with their respective constituencies. Thus, for the CPRF, although the signs of coefficients are generally in the direction predicted by some of the existing literature, none of the relationships is statistically significant. For instance, the first coefficient stands at .16, indicating a positive but weak relationship between percent of the population over sixty-five and CPRF political activity. The evidence does not support the argument that there is a relationship between elderly constituencies and CPRF political activity.<sup>35</sup> None of the other relationships for the CPRF are significant, either. Interestingly, neither is the relationship between

**TABLE 3. Correlation Coefficients, Party Nomination Activity, 1995**

Party	ELDERLY	POLTEMP	POVERTY	INDUSTRY	URBAN	CPRF 93	APR 93	LDPR 93	YAB 93	RC 93
CPRF	.16 (.14)	-.17 (.13)	.05 (.71)	.06 (.59)	.04 (.69)	.19 (.08)				
APR	.16 (.14)	-.13 (.22)	-.00 (.99)	-.01 (.94)	-.01 (.94)		.13 (.24)			
LDPR	.13 (.22)	.12 (.28)	-.01 (.89)	-.08 (.46)	.11 (.31)			.19 (.08)		
YAB	.27 (.01)**	.086 (.44)	-.06 (.61)	.13 (.24)	.18 (.10)				.24 (.03)*	
NDR	.10 (.34)	-.23 (.03)*	.17 (.16)	.09 (.40)	.05 (.62)					-.04 (.70)

\* $p \leq .05$ .\*\* $p \leq .01$ .

CPRF nomination activity in 1995 and that in 1993 ( $r = .19$  and  $p = .08$ ). In other words, regions in which the CPRF was active in 1993 were not necessarily the ones where it was active in 1995.

In turning to the other parties, the only significant relationships are those between YAB and ELDERLY, YAB and YAB93, and NDR and POLTEMP. Two of these relationships are contrary to what was anticipated by the literature: Yabloko tended to be more active in regions that had significant numbers of elderly citizens ( $p = .001$ ) and the NDR tended to be more active in regions opposed to reform ( $r = -.23$  and  $p = .03$ ). The former result is quite interesting given that it was Yavlinskii, speaking at the *Tsentralnyi Dom Literatorov* on 23 November 1995, who claimed that it was the CPRF, not Yabloko, that appealed to the elderly.<sup>36</sup> The latter result is also interesting in that the ostensibly pro-reform government party was more active in regions that tended to be identified by Sobyenin and Sukhovolskii as opposed to reform. In sum, the evidence does not support the contention that parties' nomination activities were affected by the existence of regional constituencies or by the characteristics of the regions.

Although the evidence from the past two legislative elections does not seem to support the notion that parties are developing into organizations capable of performing the integrative function, it is far too early to conclude that that will never happen. Indeed, as many comparativists know, it is not unusual that parties fraught with regional/center division survive and thrive (witness the development of the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan or the Irish parties under the condition of the STV [single transferable vote] electoral system). However, what is particularly problematic for postcommunist Russian party politics is that, unlike Japan or Ireland, the environment of perpetual crisis and the dearth of organizational resources make it difficult to create organizations that link center and periphery, elite and masses.

The development of parties in the West followed the pattern of elite parties evolving into integrative organizations. It is quite possible for this to occur in post-Soviet Russia as well. Some evidence also indicates that the parties in parliament (other than the CPRF) are establishing links with grass-roots political organizations. For instance, in a very interesting study of local St. Petersburg politics, Alan Holiman noted that local political organizations have established organizational links with Yabloko, providing city politicians with access to a Duma faction and Yabloko with the local organizational apparatus it lacks.<sup>37</sup> These developments have thus far been limited to isolated cases. Further analysis must first be conducted to ascertain the staying power and integrative potential of the postcommunist Russian parties.

#### NOTES

1. Alexander Dallin, ed., *Political Parties in Russia* (Berkeley: International and Areas Studies, University of California at Berkeley, 1993); M. Steven Fish, "The Advent of Multipartyism in Russia, 1993–95," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 11 (1995): 340–83; Peter Lentini, ed., *Elections and Political Order in Russia* (Budapest: Central European Press, 1995); Ian McAllister and Stephen White, "Democracy, Political Parties and Party-Formations in

Postcommunist Russia,” *Party Politics* 1 (1995): 49–72; Stephen White, Matthew Wyman, and Olga Kryshantovskaya, “Parties and Politics in Post-Communist Russia,” *Communist and Postcommunist Studies* 25 (1995): 185–202.

2. See Richard Sakwa, “The Development of the Russian Party System: Did the Elections Change Anything?” in *Elections and the Political Order in Russia*, 169–201; Richard Sakwa, “The Russian Elections of December 1993,” *Europe-Asia Studies* 47 (1995): 195–227; Laura Belin and Robert Ortung, *The Russian Parliamentary Elections of 1995: The Battle for the Duma*. (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1997); Michael McFaul, *The Troubled Birth of Russian Democracy: Parties, Personalities, and Programs* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1993); Michael McFaul, “The Troubled Birth of Russian Democracy: Parties Personalities, and Programs,” *Canadian-American Slavic Studies* 30 (1996): 362–79.

Some notable exceptions are the works of Remington and Smith, and Sobyenin who specifically analyze the behavior of political parties. However, the emphases of these works are less on electoral behavior and more on the behavior of parties in parliament. Thomas F. Remington and Steven S. Smith, “The Development of Parliamentary Parties in Russia,” *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 20 (1995): 457–89; Alexander Sobyenin, “Political Cleavages among the Russian Deputies,” in *Parliaments in Transition: The New Legislative Politics in the Former USSR and Eastern Europe*, ed. Thomas F. Remington (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994).

3. McAllister and White, “Democracy, Political Parties and Party-Formations”; Richard Sakwa, “Parties and the Multiparty System in Russia,” *RFE/RL Research Report* 2. 28 (1993): 7–15; Alexei M. Salmin, M. Bubnin, P. I. Kapelyushnikov, and M. Yu. Urnov, *Partiinaya sistema v Rossii v 1989–1993* (Moscow: Nachala, 1994); John Ishiyama, “Red Phoenix? The Communist Party in Post-Soviet Russian Politics,” *Party Politics* 2 (1996): 147–75; John Ishiyama, “The Russian Proto-Parties and the National Republics,” *Communist and Postcommunist Studies* 29 (1996); John Ishiyama, “Red vs. Expert: Candidate Recruitment and Communist Party Adaptation in Post-Soviet Politics,” *Party Politics* 4 (1998): 297–318.

4. Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 405.

5. David E. Apter, *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 188.

6. Geoffrey Evans and Stephen Whitefield, “Identifying the Bases of Party Competition in Eastern Europe,” *British Journal of Political Science* 23 (1993): 521–48. White et al., “Parties and Politics in Post-Communist Russia”; McAllister and White, “Democracy, Political Parties and Party-Formations”; Salmin et al., *Partiinaya sistema v Rossii v 1989–1993*; Sakwa, “Parties and the Multiparty System in Russia.”

7. To some, Russia is a nonparty state, and hence no real parties exist there. However, this approach ignores the rich literature on political parties that suggests that a wide variety of parties can exist regardless of the degree of organization. Paul G. Lewis, “Introduction and Theoretical Overview,” in *Party Structure and Organization in East Central Europe*, ed. Paul G. Lewis (Cheltenham: Edward Elger, 1996), 1–19; Peter Mair, “Party Organizations: From Civil Society to the State” in *How Parties Organize: Change and Adaptation in Party Organizations in Western Democracies*, ed. Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair (London: Sage, 1994), 2; Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair “Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: the Emergence of the Cartel Party” *Party Politics* 1 (1995): 5–28.

The conception of party that I employ here is based on the “electoral image” of the party. Epstein defines the political party as “any group of individuals, however loosely organized, whose avowed purpose is winning elections” (Leon Epstein, *Political Parties in Western Democracies* [New York: Praeger, 1967], 1). Similarly, Downs defines the political party as “a team seeking to control the governing apparatus by gaining office in a duly constituted election” (Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* [New York: Harper

and Row, 1957], 25). Janda defines the political party as “a set of organizations that pursue a goal of placing their avowed representatives in government positions” (Kenneth Janda, *Political Parties: A Cross-National Survey* [New York: Free Press, 1980], 5). Thus any group, no matter how organized, qualifies as a political party if it seeks to run candidates for election. To be sure there are either definitions of “party” that are more restrictive, but defining a party only in terms of organization ignores the wide variety of different organizational forms parties can take. In sum, there is no “normal” model for a political party. Some can be high organized and internally disciplined (such as the Dutch Party of Labor), and others not much more than a collection of different factions (such as the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party prior to 1992) no matter how organized (or unorganized). The major continuous parties in Russia qualify as parties in the eyes of the vast (but largely uncited) theoretical literature on political parties (Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, eds., *Political Parties and Political Development* [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966]).

8. Sakwa (note 2 above), “The Development of the Russian Party System,” 190.

9. White et al. (note 1 above), “Parties and Politics in Postcommunist Russia,” 199–200.

10. For an excellent discussion of why presidentialism was preferred in Russia and the newly independent states, see Gerald M. Easter, “Preference for Presidentialism: Postcommunist Regime Change and the NIS,” *World Politics* 49 (1997): 184–211. For a discussion of other institutional explanations for party development, see Robert G. Moser, “The Impact of the Electoral System on Postcommunist Party Development: The Case of the 1993 Russian Parliamentary Elections,” *Electoral Studies* 14 (1995): 377–98.

11. Sakwa, “The Development of the Russian Party System,” 190.

12. Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties* (London: Methuen, 1964). See also Epstein, *Political Parties in Western Democracies*; Katz and Mair, “Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy”; Lewis, *Party Structure and Organization in East Central Europe* (note 7 above).

13. Lewis, *Party Structure and Organization in East Central Europe*, 3.

14. Herbert Kitschelt, “The Formation of Party Systems in East Central Europe,” *Politics and Society* 20 (1992): 7–50.

15. Remington and Smith, “The Development of Parliamentary Parties in Russia,” 457.

16. *Ibid.*, 483.

17. Stein Rokkan, *Citizens, Elections, Parties* (New York: David McKay Company, 1970), 190–96; Huntington, *Political Order*, 428–32.

18. Huntington, *Political Order*, 440.

19. Rokkan, *Citizens, Elections, Parties*, 254–55.

20. Sakwa, “The Russian Elections of December 1993,” 220.

21. Stephen White, Richard Rose, and Ian McAllister, *How Russia Votes* (Chatham N.J.: Chatham House, 1997), 203. See also Moser, “The Impact of the Electoral System on Postcommunist Party Development,” and Ralph S. Clem and Peter R. Craumer, “The Geography of the Russian 1995 Parliamentary Election: Continuity, Change and Correlates,” *Post-Soviet Geography* 36 (1995): 587–616.

22. Matthew Wyman, Stephen White, Bill Miller, and Paul Heywood, “Public Opinion, Parties and Voters in the December 1993 Russian Elections,” *Europe Asia Studies* 47 (1995): 591–614.

23. Darrel Slider, Vladimir Gimpel’son, and Sergei Chugrov, “Political Tendencies in Russia’s Regions: Evidence from the 1993 Parliamentary Elections,” *Slavic Review* 53 (1994): 718.

24. *Ibid.*, 719.

25. Clem and Craumer, “The Geography of the Russian 1995 Parliamentary Election”; Alexander Sobyenin and V. G. Sukhovolskiy, *Demokratiya, Ogranichennaya Falsifikatsiyami: Vybory I referendumy v Rossii v 1991–1993* (Moscow: Planning Group for Human Rights, 1995).

26. Robert W. Orttung and Scott Parrish, "Duma Votes Reflect North-South Divide," *Transition* 2.4 (1996): 12–14.
27. Ishiyama, "The Russian Proto-parties and the National Republics"; Ishiyama, "Red vs. Expert."
28. All candidate data were taken from *Rossiskaya gazeta* or *Vybory Deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumi 1995* (Moscow: Central Electoral Commission of the Russian Federation, 1996). Occupation, age, party nomination and membership were reported.
29. Sobyenin and Sukhovolskiy, *Demokratiya, Ogranichennaya Falsifikatsiyami*, 121–22.
30. Data on unemployment, poverty, and industry were taken from *Rossiiskii Statisticheskii Ezhegodnik, 1996* (Moscow: Goskomstat, 1996). Data on elderly population were derived from the *Demograficheskii Ezhegodnik Rossii, 1996* (Moscow: Goskomstat, 1996).
31. Chechnya was not included for the 1993 calculation.
32. Remington and Smith, "The Development of Parliamentary Parties in Russia."
33. The exception is the NDR, which did not exist in 1993. As a surrogate, I use the Russia's Choice nomination activity by region in 1993. Presumably areas in which the "party of power" in 1993 was active are the areas where the party of power in 1995 (the NDR) should be active.
34. The bivariate procedure was employed to avoid likely collinearity problems, particularly involving political temperature and other regional characteristics.
35. This in particular seems to run counter to the tendency to emphasize the importance of the elderly portion of the population in explaining postcommunist success. Thus, Wyman, White, Miller, and Heywood contend, the principal political cleavage in postcommunist Russia is based on "winners and losers." The communists in Russia represent a segment of the population that has lost out in the transition to a market economy and whose "politically formative years were at a time when communism as a system still appeared to have a future." Wyman et al., "Public Opinion, Parties and Voters in the December 1993 Russian Elections," 600. This view is also held by the popular Western press and many prominent politicians. See Peter Ford, "Nostalgia for Soviet Era Sways Older Russians," *Christian Science Monitor*, 1 December 1995, 5.
36. Laura Belin, "Are the Communists Poised for 'Victory'?" *Transition* 1.22 (1995): 25–28.
37. W. Alan Holiman, "Consolidating Democracy in St. Petersburg, 1990–1995: How Firm a Foundation?" Ph.D. dissertation, University of Kansas, 1997.