

The Split and Reconfiguration of Ex-Communist Party Factions in the Russian Oblasts

Chelyabinsk, Samara, Ulyanovsk, Tambov, and Tver (1991–95)

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This article presents the argument that Soviet-Russian politics from 1990 to 1995 should be evaluated not as a battle between democrats and Communists (or neocommunist) but as an intra-party split and a realignment of former Soviet party leaders. For this purpose, local politics in Chelyabinsk, Samara, Ulyanovsk, Tambov, and Tver oblasts are analyzed.

One of the most obvious, but never fully considered, facts is that almost all the political leaders in post-Soviet Russia occupied *nomenklatura* posts only a few years before, including former Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar (an editor of the journal *Kommunist*) and former Finance Minister Boris Fyodorov (a senior economist of the Foreign Currency Department of the State Bank). A simple fact would suffice for understanding the historical significance of the intra-nomenklatura struggle: in May 1990, the Russian Congress of People's Deputies, 86 percent of whom were members of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), elected as their chair the future gravedigger of the CPSU—Boris Yeltsin. The extraordinarily emotional and gruesome character of political struggle in postcommunist Russia is barely understandable without considering the logic of internal strife. This aspect of Russian politics has been ignored by Western observers not only because they can be ideologically biased but also because they have directed attention mainly toward Moscow, where relatively young, marginal nomenklatura could successfully take the place of their older counterparts. An analysis of local politics will illuminate the more sober realities of Russian politics.

To perform an inter-regional comparison, let us conceptualize the following four political factions: (1) nomenklatura democrats, (2) non-nomenklatura democrats, (3) left-centrist opposition,¹ and (4) industrialists, agrarians, and specialists (accord-

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ing to the Soviet terminology, *partkhozaktivy* or *khozyaistvenniki*). Theoretically, it is possible to divide democrats into *partdemokraty* and non-party democrats. But, at least at the local level, this demarcation based on ex-party membership is meaningless because we can hardly find any relevant political group composed of non-party members (*bezpartiinye*) in the localities during the Soviet era.

Among these four groups, the most definitive has been the nomenklatura democrats. These people represent the personnel continuity from the former party-state authoritarian regime to the present semiauthoritarian regime based on the “vertical” aspect of executive power. World history has shown that any radical political transformation generates a massive number of weathercocks, but the emergence of Russian nomenklatura democrats during 1990–91 cannot be thus generalized. In central Europe, the brief interregnum between the fall of the Berlin Wall and the elections in the spring of 1990 provided political leaders with few chances to evaluate the situation. Consequently, they ran in the first free elections according to their political convictions and accepted the results they deserved then. In contrast, from 1990 to 1991, Russian leaders enjoyed the full opportunity to sense the new wind, based on such events as the anticommunist electoral victories in central Europe, Yeltsin’s electoral victory as the Russian Parliament’s chair, Ivan Polozkov’s electoral victory over Oleg Lobov as the first secretary of the new Communist Party of Russia in June 1990,² the presidential election in June 1991, and finally, the attempted August coup and its aftermath.

The conversion of the Russian leaders was motivated, as a rule, not by their political conviction but by changes in the party-state relationship: the abolition of the sixth article of the USSR Constitution (which had given the CPSU a monopoly of power); the drastic curtailment of nomenklatura duties at the local level;³ the reorganization of obkom (party organs) departments from the industrial to the functional principle and, consequently, the drastic discharge of party workers; and Yeltsin’s July 1991 ban on “branches of political organizations” within the state and industrial institutions (the so-called *departizatsiya* decree).

The peak of this massive *volte-face* came relatively late. Of the four governors (*glavy administratsii oblastei*) analyzed here, only one, V. P. Solovev (Chelyabinsk), declared himself a democratic communist in early 1990, while two, K. A. Titov (Samara) and V. A. Suslov (Tver), adopted a temporizing attitude even toward the August coup. Not surprisingly, the overwhelming majority of nomenklatura democrats kept their CPSU membership until the party’s dissolution.

A significant portion of nomenklatura democrats are former Komsomol leaders—among the four governors analyzed here, Solovev, Titov, and Suslov belong to this category—and ex-professors of “political economy” or “CPSU history,” such as the presidential representative of Samara oblast, Yu. M. Borodulin, and Tambov city mayor, V. N. Koval. The political implication of this “paradox” barely needs explanation: their prestige significantly declined under the Brezhnev regime despite their official status. They became a target of Gorbachev’s antibureaucratic campaign and, as a result, some of them suffered humiliation in the 1989 (all-Union) and 1990 (republican and local) elections. Last but not least, it was obvious that they, in contrast with the *khozyaistvenniki*, would find no place

in a capitalist Russia and therefore needed to seek “new employment.” Because there is a lack of experts in capitalist economics and Western jurisprudence in Russia, they could adopt radical concepts and become pseudo-monetarists. The pragmatization of government under Brezhnev made it difficult for pure *apparatshiki* (typically, former Komsomol leaders) to fill top-rank posts even at the local level. Ironically, Yeltsin’s cadre policy, mainly motivated by political loyalty, caused the local leaders’ career pattern to revert.

In contrast to national politics, where Yeltsin always hedged his bet on radical reformists and centrists, his choices at the oblast level were unshakable: he bet on nomenklatura democrats. The act of the Moscow radical reformers was expected to be played by the presidential representatives, whose authority, however, had already begun to be curtailed from “commissars” to “coordinators” during the first year of their existence.⁴ For only one of the five oblasts analyzed here (Tambov), Yeltsin appointed a person who did not belong to the political nomenklatura (V.D. Babenko, formerly head doctor of the oblast hospital) as governor.

Yeltsin’s reliance on these morally dubious people (from the point of view of non-nomenklatura democrats) among ex-CPSU leaders not only disillusioned the non-nomenklatura democrats, who had blissfully perceived the summer of 1991 as a democratic revolution, but even pushed a certain portion of them toward the opposition camp. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that Yeltsin’s realistic cadre policy prevented the sort of amateurish government that caused unexpectedly early collapses of the democratic and nationalist governments in several ex-Communist countries. As a matter of fact, in Tambov oblast, the only example of governorship by non-political nomenklatura in this article, governor Babenko, lacked—or at least, was regarded as lacking—sufficient managerial ability and expertise in economics. This was one of the reasons for his resignation in March 1995⁵ and the appointment of a left-centrist, the former first deputy governor O.I. Betin, as his successor.

The genesis of non-nomenklatura democrats, a decisive factor in Russian politics from 1989 to 1991, was affected by the presence of institutions of higher education in the humanities or technology in the region and also by the activity of voluntary associations which emerged at a relatively early stage of perestroika, such as the Memorial organization. Despite their ethical purity, it is difficult to call non-nomenklatura democrats “democrats” without quotation marks because they are characterized by a strong inclination toward dictatorship by a political minority. These people were the most fervent advocates of the presidential appointment system for governors and the most outspoken apologists for the coercive resolution of the October uprising in 1993, when even nomenklatura democrats spoke evasively. Moreover, the weaker non-nomenklatura democrats are in an oblast, the stronger their inclination toward “revolutionary dictatorship.”

This dictatorship-mania seems to be generated not only by their numerical inferiority to any of the three ex-nomenklatura groups (nomenklatura democrats, left-centrists, and *khozyaistvenniki*) but also by their isolation from Russian society. The political ideas shared by non-nomenklatura democrats—such as individualism, fetishism toward freedom, and the tolerance of unemployment and

income disparities—radically contradict the sense of justice of the Russian common folk. The enormous ability to mobilize people, displayed by non-nomenklatura democrats during 1989–91, was ephemeral. The options they were faced with after 1992 (especially after the October uprising) were quite unpleasant: to become a decoration of unbridled executive power, to join the opposition, or to retire from politics entirely.

Russian opposition can be divided into four groups: ultra-nationalists, “democratic alternatives” (such as Grigory Yavlinsky), left-centrists, and left-radicals. Among these, this article focuses on left-centrists since they are the most serious threat to the present government. Moreover, they are—along with nomenklatura democrats—direct successors of the CPSU and therefore destined to be one of the two main *dramatis personae* in postcommunist Russian politics. The conventional wisdom that most activists of the left-centrist opposition—in particular, of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF)—are pensioners is somewhat inaccurate. Most of these pensioners are not average pensioners but, if scrutinized, prove to be the former leaders of the “primary organizations” (branches) of the CPSU. Under socialism, leaders of this level bore the heaviest burden and enjoyed no privileges. If the CPSU branch had, for example, two hundred members, the leader could be a salaried party worker; if one hundred, the leader, as a rule, had to work without pay. They had to take care not only of communists affiliated with their branches, but also of the welfare of their workplace or community in general. If we imagine the daily life of a woman who was, for instance, a director of a rural school, while serving simultaneously as a people’s deputy of the village soviet and a head of the village’s CPSU branch, and besides, having two children to care for, then we can easily understand who the CPSU branch leaders were.

Several years ago, after most of these leaders had retired, they were abruptly confronted with accusations that their lives had been absolutely useless or even harmful to the people and were treated as if they had been Stalin’s sons and daughters. Stunned, these old people found that their accusers were their former bosses in the CPSU. If the ruling class of the present Russia had originated anywhere else other than the CPSU, these pensioners could have consoled themselves that times had changed. What reactions can be expected from these pensioners? Naturally, they are driven to fight to defend their dignity. Moreover, these pensioners are still notables in local communities; they can mobilize votes.

The political composition of left-centrists is multicolored: the KPRF, the Agrarian Party, Yuri Skokov’s Congress of Russian Communities (KRO), some regional movements such as the Great Ural Movement, and the remnants of local soviets. In Chelyabinsk oblast, the Great Ural Movement’s oblast representative “For Rebirth of the Urals” (*Za vozrozhdenie urala: ZVU*) became the core of the left-centrist camp, while in the other four oblasts analyzed here the KPRF organizations have been playing this role. What is more important than the formal factional composition is whether the opposition of the region is incited to oppose only the federal government (refraining from such local issues as whether to have gubernatorial elections), or to fight on “dual fronts” against both the federal gov-

ernment and the region's administration. The ZVU and the Tambov and Samara KPRF organizations belong to the latter, the Ulyanovsk and Tver KPRF organizations to the former.

If nomenklatura democrats and the left-centrist opposition are the two poles in the political spectrum, a significant variable has been the *khozyaistvenniki*. Even excluding Ulyanovsk oblast, where *khozyaistvenniki* have been strongly patronized by the oblast administration, the political activeness of this group reveals a significant geographical diversity. Chelyabinsk *khozyaistvenniki* have a good reason to politicize. This oblast has a large number of military enterprises and such *giganty* as the Magnitogorsk metallurgic conglomerate. Under socialism, these enterprises were di-

rectly subordinated to Moscow, having only weak contacts with the capital leadership. As the now capitalist Moscow has forsaken these enterprises, they have no choice but to lobby through the oblast administration and

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duma. Ironically, the end of a planned economy strengthened the oblast administration's influence on former state enterprises. This is why the “directorial corps” in Chelyabinsk oblast organized the “Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs” (*Soyuz promyshlennikov i predprinimatelei: SPP*) before the oblast дума elections in 1994 and blessed the fragile Solovev administration. In Samara oblast, governor Titov organized entrepreneurs into the “Union for Support of Reforms” immediately after the October uprising⁶ and eventually gained a stable majority of the oblast дума in 1994. Such phenomena cannot be observed in the agricultural Tambov and Tver oblasts. Rather, for these regions, the founding of Our Home Is Russia (*Nash dom rossiya: NDR*) attempted to vitalize centrist industrialists. There are also differences between the *khozyaistvenniki* of these two oblasts. The KPRF “omnipotence” in Tambov oblast has prevented the propagation of the Agrarian Party to ex-kolkhoz leaders and of the “Union of Commodity Producers” (Skokov's industrialist organization) to industrialists of the oblast, both of which, however, have enjoyed a significant success in Tver oblast.

Despite this geographical variety, it is possible to point out a nationwide trend: in 1991, disgusted with Gorbachev's incompetent leadership, a significant portion of *khozyaistvenniki* supported Yeltsin. In 1992, Gaidar's “shock therapy” pushed them toward the opposition. Accelerated privatization changed their mood once again, not only because ownership generally makes people conservative, but also because the dubious procedures of privatization put the new property owners under the yoke of local administrations—of nomenklatura democrats. As always in Russian history, here also the state created the estate.

From this perspective, the summer of 1993—between “shock therapy” and the final spurt of privatization—was a real crisis for Yeltsin. A significant number of *khozyaistvenniki* were sympathetic to the modest program of economic reforms


presented by Lobov.⁷ Non-nomenklatura democrats as a political group nearly evaporated, a certain portion of which shifted to the opposition. Left-centrists regained influence over these groups, and local soviets provided this newly formed united opposition with a political arena to express its view. As was the case with the Moscow and Yekaterinburg city soviets, the more pro-Yeltsin the soviets were in 1991, the more anti-Yeltsin they tended to become in 1993.

Outlines of the Oblasts

As the table shows, the selection of the five oblasts in this article is aimed at a range of regional types (table 1).

The two industrial oblasts focused on here are well known for their governors' procapitalist attitude. In particular, Samara governor Titov became a vice president of the NDR at the national level. Chelyabinsk oblast covers an area of 87,900 square kilometers in the southern Urals and has a population of 3,638,000.⁸ Travelers visiting Chelyabinsk would be surprised at the contrast between this city

TABLE 1. Levels of Consolidation of the Local Pro-Yeltsin Factions and the "Administrative Parties"



- Axis I: The magnitude of the political turmoil the oblast experienced in the spring of 1990.
- Axis II: The attitude of the oblast leadership toward the August coup evaluated by the RSFSR presidential office.
- Axis III: The appointment by Yeltsin of the first governor: in compliance with or in defiance of the opinion of the oblast soviet.
- Axis IV: The relationship between the oblast administration and the oblast soviet in 1993.
- Axis V: The activeness of the local left centrists after the October Incident.

and neighboring Yekaterinburg in terms of sociocultural infrastructure. This sense of unfairness is more pronounced in view of the fact that Chelyabinsk oblast has made contributions to the national economy nearly equal to those made by its giant northern neighbor. The notorious ecological catastrophes of the area exacerbated the poor social conditions of the oblast. These circumstances made oblast politics during 1989–91 extraordinarily fervent.

Whereas Chelyabinsk oblast, whose leading industries are metallurgic and military, has been suffering a serious socioeconomic depression, Samara oblast in the mid-Volga (53,600 square kilometers; population 3,296,000) belongs to the favored few in contemporary Russia. As one of the largest oil-producing oblasts in the country, Samara is a beneficiary of the Yeltsin-Chernomyrdin economic policies, which resulted in the elimination of domestic manufacturing and the wholesale exportation of natural resources.

Writers in nineteenth-century Russia used to contrast “merchant, dynamic Samara” with “aristocratic, conservative Simbirsk.” Almost the same can be said of this transition period, but the expression of this “conservativeness” seems to be more dramatic: Ulyanovsk oblast (37,300 square kilometers; population 1,444,000) has emerged as one of the two “miracles on the Volga,” each of which contrasts with the other. One is the well-known radical transformation of the Nizhny Novgorod oblast under governor V. Ye. Nemtsov, and the other is the “Chinese path” of the Ulyanovsk oblast guided by governor Yu. F. Goryachev.

If Ulyanovsk oblast presents a unique example of Russian left-centrism, what might be called the “North Korea on the Volga,” then Tambov oblast (34,300 square kilometers; population 1,317,500) presents a more usual example, since it belongs to the famous “Red Belt,” that is, strong supporters of the KPRF in the central, black-soil region. What should be emphasized here is that neither illustration of the predominance of the left-centrists is representative for Russian rural politics: a more typical picture can be found in the Tver oblast (84,100 square kilometers; population 1,668,000). Here, without political differentiation among CPSU leaders until the August coup, the leaders were realigned quite bureaucratically: ispolkom (regional government) leaders, pledging loyalty to the winning horse, were incorporated almost intact into the new structure of local administrations, whereas obkom/raykom leaders, dislodged from their position of power, realized that the soviets could be used as their political vehicle. No wonder, therefore, that many agricultural oblasts, where leaders were comparatively less factious until the August coup, became a main battlefield between the “two branches of power” during 1992–93.

The “Administrative Party” and the Left-Centrist Opposition

“Big Bang” in the spring of 1990. The effects of the political turmoil of 1989–90 in oblast politics were pointed out by Joel Moses in his study of the Volgograd oblast.⁹ The most decisive moment in this process was in the spring of 1990, when the elections of the people’s deputies of the RSFSR were held and the “democratically elected” oblast soviets emerged. Given this, the magnitude of the political turmoil the oblast suffered can be measured by two indicators: (1) how many

nomenklatura candidates lost the republican elections, and (2) whether the CPSU faction of oblast-soviet deputies functioned in order to realize Gorbachev's "concurrency" policy, that is, to elect the CPSU obkom first secretary as the oblast soviet chair.

Based on these indicators, it can be concluded that the CPSU leaders of the three agricultural oblasts analyzed here rode out this time of troubles without receiving a serious wound. In Ulyanovsk oblast, there were only two cases of "unexpected" defeats of nomenklatura candidates at the hands of democrats in the republican elections.¹⁰ Before long, moreover, one of these two winners was disillusioned by Yeltsin and eventually participated in the defense of the White House in the autumn of 1993. The Ulyanovsk oblast soviet, 88 percent of whose deputies were Communists,¹¹ elected Goryachev even without an alternative candidate.¹² He became the obkom first secretary several days later.¹³ In Tambov oblast, CPSU leaders had learned lessons from a bitter defeat at the hands of V. V. Davituliiani, the future presidential representative of the oblast, in the capital electoral district for the 1989 election to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies and, this time, preferred to bypass all risks by standing as candidates only in rural electoral districts.¹⁴ As for the Tambov oblast soviet, the obkom first secretary Ye. M. Podolsky could be elected as its chair.¹⁵ In Tver oblast, defeats of some prominent CPSU leaders in the republican elections—one of whom was Suslov—did not affect the normal function of the Communist faction in the oblast soviet,¹⁶ which elected the obkom second secretary M. A. Shestov as its chair.¹⁷ Thus, as illustrated below, only the two urbanized oblasts, Chelyabinsk and Samara, underwent trials more or less similar to those of Volgograd.

From spring of 1990 forward, Russian oblasts did not experience such a magnitude of political realignment until after the August coup, when Yeltsin began to exploit the presidential appointment system for governors in order to split artificially the local ex-CPSU communities and create his own foothold in the oblasts. This does not necessarily mean, however, that the oblasts that suffered the "big bang" effects in 1990 did not cause Yeltsin trouble in finding his supporters, as was the case with Chelyabinsk and Volgograd. In Samara oblast, for instance, "big bang" had effected only the isolation of orthodox-minded obkom leaders, with the political constellation of the oblast as late as the summer of 1991 remaining unsettled. This was the reason behind the unexpected appointment as governor of the Samara city soviet chair K. A. Titov, who was almost unknown to the populace.

In sum, there were two peaks of political realignment of oblast leaders: the spring of 1990 and the period after the August coup. As for the oblasts examined in this article, the first peak fermented only Chelyabinsk politics, leaving Ulyanovsk, Tambov, and Tver politics relatively calm until the second peak. Although Samara politics became clamorous after 1989–90, its situation remained indeterminate until the August coup.

Chelyabinsk Oblast. In Chelyabinsk oblast, the differing reactions to the crises of the party eventually led to the political polarization of party leaders, which cul-

minated in “dual power” in the summer of 1993, or the confrontation between “two governors”: V. P. Solovev (born in 1947) and P. I. Sumin (born in 1946). They both worked as Komsomol gorkom secretaries of Chelyabinsk city in the mid-1970s.¹⁸ In the mid-1980s, Solovev, the then second secretary of the CPSU gorkom of Chelyabinsk city, was sent to the Academy of Social Sciences attached to the Soviet Central Committee, where he met a man from Sverdlovsk who would decisively influence his future: V. V. Ilyushin.¹⁹

Completing this “second higher education” in 1988, Solovev became the first secretary of the Chelyabinsk CPSU gorkom, while Sumin became the first deputy chair of the oblast ispolkom a year before.²⁰ They competed for the first time in the party election for the CPSU obkom second secretary in September 1989. According to the standard career pattern at that time, this duty was a preparatory position for the next oblast ispolkom chair and Sumin won this election.²¹

As mentioned above, Solovev converted to a democratic communist at the beginning of 1990, when the amendment of the sixth article of the USSR Constitution became a public issue.²² This metamorphosis, however, did not produce an immediate effect; he lost the March elections for the RSFSR Congress of People’s Deputies.²³ As for the simultaneously elected Chelyabinsk city soviet, according to Gorbachev’s “concurrence” policy, the gorkom first secretary Solovev could be elected as its chair, although this election was problematic from the point of view of “alternativeness.” Apparently, it was Solovev himself who put forward the rival candidate.²⁴ Thus, it was not easy to clean up his reputation as a party functionary, though the post of capital soviet chair would provide him with important political resources.

The leitmotif of the Chelyabinsk democratic movement—as was common with the national one—was the anti-privilege sentiment. This motive was effective enough to cause frequent resignations of obkom leaders throughout the second half of the 1980s. The final blow was delivered in July 1990 by the Chelyabinsk city soviet chaired by Solovev: an investigatory team organized by the city soviet uncovered a stock of “deficit products” in the obkom canteen.²⁵ Such “corruption” might be laughable for those who witnessed the magnitude of corruption in post-communist Russia, but at that time it enraged the population and provoked an angry wave of secession by party members. An extraordinary plenum of the obkom was convened in August, where many attendees loudly demanded that the obkom first secretary resign. Two members of the obkom bureau actually did resign, declaring their disagreement with the obkom leadership.²⁶

This plenum vividly revealed the myth of a “monolithic party” and the intensifying factional struggle. Precisely as Yeltsin did at the Twenty-Eighth Congress of the CPSU, so Solovev, the very person organizing the attack on the party, was present and expressing his anxiety about the fate of the party. The issue of the obkom newspaper *Chelyabinsk Workers* covering the plenum displayed the apogee of democratization and political naiveté of the times. A political party in any multiparty system would not permit its organ to dedicate an entire issue to its own agonizing scandals. It might be possible only in a “democratized” single-party system.

Shortly after this August plenum, the CPSU gorkom of Chelyabinsk city passed a resolution for self-liquidation.²⁷ Solovev removed the main doorplate of the gorkom from the entrance of the building, which was now to be occupied only by the city soviet and its ispolkom.

These upheavals, however, were contained within Chelyabinsk city. As for the oblast soviet, outspoken democrats gained only 16 of the total 250 seats as a result of the 1990 local elections.²⁸ This soviet elected Sumin as its ispolkom chair and, before long, also as the soviet chair.²⁹ Thus, as the obkom leadership declined, two political structures came to the fore: the centrist oblast soviet headed by Sumin and the procapitalist capital soviet headed by Solovev.

“. . . five deputies of the State Duma from the [Chelyabinsk] oblast . . . sent an open letter to Yeltsin requesting the removal of Solovev as governor.”

Given these circumstances, the August coup was nothing but a “gift from the tsar” for Solovev. His intimate connection with the RSFSR presidential office enabled him to judge the situation and to demonstrate his support for Yeltsin from the first day of the coup,³⁰ whereas Sumin assumed a

neutral attitude. These differing responses did not affect the balance of power at the oblast level. An extraordinary session of the oblast soviet on 28 August elected Sumin by an overwhelming majority (153 to 6) as a candidate for governor,³¹ who had to be appointed by Yeltsin “with the consent of the oblast soviet.”³² Democratic deputies also recommended that Solovev be included in the list of candidates for governor, but he gained no votes. In other words, neither democrats—nor Solovev himself—voted for him.³³ This result did not dispirit Solovev. Gaining support from the Democratic Russia Movement, he organized a private delegation to the Russian president and went to Moscow. Solovev, assisted by Ilyushin, now one of Russia’s most powerful figures as the president’s personal secretary, suggested to Yeltsin that Sumin was “a communist and tacit supporter of the GKChP [the coup plotters].” When the official delegation of the Chelyabinsk oblast soviet arrived in Moscow, Yeltsin had already made up his mind.³⁴ At the end of October, Yeltsin appointed Solovev as governor.³⁵ Solovev immediately removed all the members of Sumin’s ispolkom from their posts and formed his own “team.” By 1994, Solovev’s team (deputy-governors) was composed of three of his former gorkom and Komsomol protégés, two drastically promoted personnel within the oblast ispolkom structure, one former worker of the oblast soviet apparatus, one former rayon soviet chair, and one former associate professor of the Chelyabinsk Polytechnic Institute.³⁶

The oblast soviet furiously protested the appointment of Solovev, but before long grudgingly accepted the Solovev administration, complying with a resolution adopted by the Fifth RSFSR Congress of People’s Deputies in favor of refraining from gubernatorial elections during the “period of radical economic reforms.” Sumin remained only as the oblast soviet chair.

It is puzzling that at this crucial moment Sumin did not resist Yeltsin's decision. Sumin's behavior clearly contrasts with that of Goryachev in Ulyanovsk, who did not lose the chance to organize a mass protest against Yeltsin's "neglect of local opinion" and eventually gained the gubernatorial post. At that time, Sumin enjoyed a certain degree of mass support and trust by the *khozyaistvenniki*.

The one-year grace period given by the Congress of People's Deputies to the executive branch of power expired at the end of 1992. The Chelyabinsk oblast soviet immediately began to prepare a gubernatorial election, which was conducted in April 1993 and resulted in Sumin's "victory." Solovev denounced this election as illegal and invalid (he did not run in it). The oblast court supported Solovev's challenge, whereas the Russian Supreme Soviet and Constitutional Court recognized the election as effective on the ground that "governor V. P. Solovev was appointed without consent of the oblast soviet" (in other words, against Yeltsin's own decree). In August, the Central Bank froze the Solovev administration's account.³⁷

It was only by the October uprising that Solovev could be saved from this impasse. The uncompromising confrontation between the two branches of power during 1992–93 cast a long shadow over a series of measures adopted by governor Solovev after October, in particular his creation of the extraordinarily weak oblast дума—with only fifteen deputies for this oblast of 3.6 million people—and his indolence in introducing city dumas in the oblast, which even presidential decrees requested.

Despite Solovev's outspoken devotion to reformist ideas, his connection with Ilyushin and Fyodorov, and his unusual ability to pump out subsidies from the center, his leadership has been evoking discontent even on the part of democrats. In April 1994, five deputies of the State Duma from the oblast (three of them belonging to Russia's Choice) sent an open letter to Yeltsin requesting the removal of Solovev as governor on the grounds of numerous cases of corruption, budgetary disorders, and his tendency toward "establishing personal power."³⁸ In response, Sergei Filatov dispatched an investigative commission to Chelyabinsk, which later submitted to Yeltsin a report suggesting Solovev's dismissal, denouncing him for corruption, indolence in local reforms, and so forth.³⁹ Such a report might have been fatal for Solovev if he had not been protected by presidential secretary Ilyushin.

Governor Solovev was disgraced by the results of a monthly poll conducted by the Ural Branch of the Russian Academy of Science from June 1994 to April 1995, where Solovev had to share with Sumin, who had long since stopped being a political factor, first place as the oblast's best known figure. He also ranked at the bottom in response to the question "how well is he working?"⁴⁰ Given the monopoly of the broadcasts by the administration, Solovev's unpopularity was stunning. He did not risk a run for the Federation Council in December 1993.

After the October uprising, Sumin and some of his men found employment in the investment-holding company "Vybor." In preparation for the oblast дума elections, they founded the ZVU in March 1994. Even after the elections, Sumin's faction continued to "build the party." By December 1994, the ZVU had opened

its “gorkom/raykom” organizations in almost all the cities and rayons of the oblast and declared that it had nearly seventy thousand participants.⁴¹ In 1992–93, Governor Solovev repeatedly purged the heads of local administrations whom he regarded as Sumin’s sympathizers. These former mayors, as well as former soviet leaders, became the core of the ZVU.

The ZVU established friendly relations with the “Union of Youth” (the successor organization of the Komsomol), Skokov’s “Union of Commodity Producers,” “Labor Chelyabinsk,” and various “veteran” organizations.⁴² In the elections for the State Duma in December 1995, the ZVU functioned as a regional “united front” composed of five leftist electoral blocks—the KRO, the KPRF, Viktor Anpilov’s bloc, the Agrarian Party, and Alexander Rutskoi’s Derzhava, although it coordinated candidacies only loosely.⁴³ As a result, three of the five seats of the single-member districts of the oblast were won by ZVU candidates, one of whom was Sumin himself.

It is not an ordinary phenomenon that the ZVU aimed at mass party building from the beginning of its existence. In neighboring Sverdlovsk oblast for example, Governor Rossel’s regionalist organization “Transformation of the Urals” remains an electoral (temporary) organization,⁴⁴ although it achieved a remarkable success in the gubernatorial election held in August 1995.

Unlike other oblast left-centrist opposition groups examined in this article, the ZVU has shown its ability to recruit young activists. Moreover, it provides the democrats disillusioned with Yeltsin with a new arena for their activities. An example of this is P. V. Bolshakov, a former correspondent for Radio Liberty and now chief editor of the ZVU newspaper *Rebirth of the Urals*.

Despite these achievements in terms of popular movements and national elections, the ZVU has not been able to influence oblast politics decisively, because it made a tactical mistake at the oblast дума elections in 1994. Unaware of the *khozyaistvenniki*’s “leaning to the right,” the ZVU did not envision any danger in recommending candidates jointly with the aforementioned SPP—a party of the “Red directors.” As a result, the composition of the oblast дума proved to be four deputies recommended only by the ZVU, three deputies recommended only by the SPP, five jointly recommended deputies, and three “independent” deputies.⁴⁵ Before long, most of the five jointly recommended deputies revealed their pro-administration attitude and, moreover, so did two of the three “independent” deputies. Thus, the Solovev administration could obtain a majority in the oblast дума. Furthermore, given the extraordinary small number of deputies, the administration can easily “bribe” them or paralyze the functioning of the дума.

A remarkable example of this situation is the protracted farce of local elections in the oblast. On 22 September 1994, the oblast дума decided to conduct mayoral and local дума elections in the oblast on 12 February 1995.⁴⁶ Governor Solovev resisted this decision on the pretext of the default of the oblast law of local government and other normative provisions. The oblast дума compromised with Solovev to postpone the elections until 28 May 1995⁴⁷ but had adopted all the necessary normative provisions by March. Nevertheless, Solovev prohibited the heads of local administrations of the oblast from conducting local elections

and the majority of the *duma* deputies surrendered. A. S. Salomatkin, one of the ZVU deputies, sued for recognition of the illegality of Solovev's ban on local elections. The Supreme Court supported Salomatkin, but this judgement was ignored by the administration and the majority of the State Duma.⁴⁸ On 28 August 1995, President Yeltsin signed the Federal Law of the Local Government, which had passed the State Duma. It seemed that the local elections in Chelyabinsk oblast became inevitable at long last. The oblast *duma* decided to conduct local elections on 17 December simultaneously with the State Duma elections.⁴⁹ However, as is well known, only three weeks after the promulgation of the Federal Law of Local Government, Yeltsin issued a decree which "recommended" postponing local elections until December 1996.⁵⁰ The majority of the Chelyabinsk oblast *duma* supported this decree. Thus, the complete default of local representative organs in Chelyabinsk oblast continued even throughout 1996.

Samara Oblast. Incipient turmoil in the Samara oblast forced the obkom first secretary Ye. F. Muravev—at the time one of the few surviving Brezhnevite feudal lords—to retire in July 1988.⁵¹ The Central Committee of the CPSU countered the situation by a measure which was still prevalent then but whose injurious consequences were becoming increasingly obvious in other regions: it sent one of the Central Committee cadres, V. G. Afonin, formerly head of that body's Department of Chemical Industry, into the battlefield.⁵² As for Muravev, local people could console themselves: "he might be bad, but he is ours," whereas the new obkom first secretary Afonin did not even make his wife move from Moscow to Samara. Moreover, he proved to be no better than his predecessor in his authoritarian style.⁵³

As with the Chelyabinsk oblast soviet, about 80 percent of the Samara oblast soviet deputies elected in the spring of 1990 were CPSU members,⁵⁴ but Samaritan communists had already lost their political identity and their trust in the obkom leadership. It was obvious that the Communist faction of deputies would not function. Gorbachev's "concurrence" policy could not be pursued in the Samara oblast soviet simply because the obkom plenum itself did not agree with Afonin's candidacy for the soviet chair "for fear of adding to their shame."⁵⁵ As a result, the soviet chairmanship fell into the hands of *partkhozaktivy*, who possessed it until the October uprising: the soviet was chaired by V. A. Tarkhov, a leader of the oil industry, until March 1992 and then until the October uprising by O. N. Anishchik, a financial specialist.⁵⁶

After this humiliation, Afonin retired in September 1990, and this time a local leader, V. S. Romanov, succeeded to the post. Under Romanov's leadership, the Samara obkom became one of the centers of "orthodox Marxists."⁵⁷ Although a sober political force, they were fated to be isolated during the waning months of the USSR. The oblast soviet dominated by *partkhozaktivy* favored Yeltsin during the RSFSR presidential elections and reacted positively even to the *departizatsiya* decree,⁵⁸ while the Samara obkom, unlike the other four obkoms analyzed in this article, strongly resisted it.⁵⁹

Therefore, it was an enigma that this oblast soviet leadership not only tempo-

rized with the August coup but even prepared a resolution supporting the plotters. This might be attributed to political “spinelessness” (*beskhrabetnost*) inherent in *khozyaistvenniki*; or perhaps they were only eager for strong power as a prerequisite for stabilizing the economy, irrespective of whose power it was. Hardly better, if not worse, was the behavior of the Samara city soviet leadership. During the three days of the attempted coup, Chairman K. A. Titov continued to reject calls to make a public speech or to convene an extraordinary session of the city soviet. This was the reason for the protest made by several democratic deputies of the city soviet against the appointment of their chair as governor.⁶⁰

In Chelyabinsk oblast, the “big bang” could not shake the oblast soviet. Therefore, a relevant counterbalance led by a typical nomenklatura democrat, V. P. Solovev, emerged until the August coup. In Samara oblast, the obkom leadership was so easily ostracized that an amorphous democratic movement only entailed a hegemony of opportunistic *khozyaistvenniki* and, thus, could not be forged into an anticommunist core which Yeltsin might have been able to rely upon during the coup. Paradoxically, the Samara oblast soviet, which had overthrown the CPSU obkom leadership earlier than any other oblast, was put on the Yeltsin-Makharadze (deputy prime minister in charge of regional politics) blacklist after the coup. V. A. Tarkhov was deprived of not only his ispolkom chairmanship but also soviet chairmanship, and remedies for this situation occupied a significant portion of the activities of the oblast soviet for the next several months.⁶¹

K. A. Titov (born in 1944) spent six years as a professional Komsomol leader in the 1970s. On this basis, he was given a job in the Kuibyshev Institute of Planned Economy and eventually rose to the position of associate professor, albeit he was only engaged in administrative work in this institute. Being a vice-president of a Soviet-Bulgarian joint company, he was elected to the capital soviet and then as its chair in the spring of 1990.⁶² Behaving as a centrist, Titov was an acceptable chair both to the Communist and the democratic factions in the soviet.

The reason for the appointment of Titov as governor, even though he did not support Yeltsin during the coup, is another enigma in Samaran politics. It is improbable that the RSFSR presidential office could foresee this chairman’s transformation into a convinced capitalist deserving to be vice-president of the NDR. There have been many rumors in Samara about this appointment, including bribery, but only a few things are certain: Titov attended the founding convention of the Democratic Party of Russian Communists (the party of Alexander N. Yakovlev and Eduard A. Shevardnadze) that was held immediately before the coup and thus encountered strong criticism from the Samara obkom.⁶³ In order to apologize for his “passiveness” during the coup, Titov visited Moscow soon thereafter, and the decree ordering his appointment as governor trailed him back to Samara (30 August).⁶⁴

During the four years of his governorship, benefiting from the riches of the oblast, Titov realized a relatively favorable economic situation for the oblast. This economic performance, combined with the isolation of the left-centrist opposition and the moderateness of the *khozyaistvenniki*-dominated oblast soviet, enabled Titov to pursue, unlike Chelyabinsk governor Solovev, a neutral (apolit-

ical) cadre policy. Although it might seem strange at first glance, the vigorously transforming Samara oblast is marked by an unusual continuity of the local elite from the socialist era. As of 1994, five of the eight deputy governors were people who had already occupied leading posts in the CPSU obkom, the Komsomol obkom, or Samara city ispolkom in the 1980s, and only two of the deputy governors were promoted to this level of leadership after Titov's inauguration as governor.⁶⁵ Moreover, nearly two-thirds of the heads of rayon administrations of the oblast used to be the CPSU raykom first secretaries or the rayon ispolkom chairs before 1991.⁶⁶ Thus, the lack of political confrontation made the neutral cadre policy possible, which nipped confrontation in the bud.

This unusual continuity of local cadres from the ancien régime has an institutional background as well. After the realization of Gorbachev's "concurrence" policy in 1990, conflicts between local soviets and ispolkoms ensued, although their magnitude was far smaller

"During the four years of his governorship . . . Titov realized a relatively favorable economic situation for [Samara] oblast."

than those in 1992–93. A reason for these conflicts was that local CPSU first secretaries began to exploit their soviet chair posts to compensate for the waning influence of their party duties. That, in turn, evoked discontent on the part of local ispolkoms that were already moving toward centralization. In 1991, the USSR government initiated the second "concurrence" policy, i.e., the concurrence of the soviet chair and the ispolkom chair duties.

This second concurrence is not as well known among Western observers as the first, because it was not widely realized. It was too burdensome to be the local CPSU first secretary, the soviet chair, and the ispolkom chair simultaneously. Samara oblast, however, was an exception where this second concurrence was pursued actively. Moreover, in 1992–93, the former local CPSU first secretaries who remained as only the soviet chairs, seeing little prospect in working in the legislative branch, came back as the chiefs of the executive branch, that is, as heads of local administrations. Thus, as of 1995, nearly half of the heads of rayon administrations of the oblast were the former CPSU raykom first secretaries.⁶⁷

By 1993, Titov's administration had grown to be one of the most stable administrations in Russia. In contrast with Solovev, Titov wished to become an elected governor, but the oblast soviet, seeing that the odds were against its own candidate, was reluctant to have a gubernatorial election. As a result, this issue was shelved in the spring of 1993.⁶⁸ Titov obtained the legitimacy of "governor elected by the people" by his victory in the Federation Council elections in December 1993.

In response to presidential decree No. 1400, Titov "stopped the authority" of the Samara oblast soviet on the pretext that the soviet denounced the decree, although the tone of the denunciation was more circumspect than those of other oblast soviets.⁶⁹

If the split of the ex-CPSU community in Chelyabinsk oblast can be viewed

as vertical, then the split of Samaran ex-communists can be characterized as horizontal. Almost all the former oblast and rayon leaders, if not yet retired, remain in power or have become bourgeoisie, while the former activists of CPSU primary organizations have gathered under the banner of the KPRF. Virtually the only, but significant, exception to this phenomenon is the former CPSU obkom first secretary, Romanov. He is also the sole example in this article of the former CPSU obkom first secretaries in the RSFSR who dared to become the obkom first secretary of the present KPRF. Because of this ethical consistency, Romanov assumes a charismatic aura, which might have contributed to his overwhelming victory in the State Duma elections in 1995.⁷⁰ However, unlike rank-and-file activists of the Samaran KPRF, Romanov is less ardent in his denunciation of the “betrayal” committed by his men. Apparently, Romanov knew then that if he won the 1996 gubernatorial election, he would not be able to create from scratch an army of administrators such as existed then, and that those who “betrayed” him would “betray” Titov as well.

If the ZVU is characterized, as a result of the vertical split of the ex-CPSU community, by its centrist tendencies and inclination toward “united front” tactics, Samaran Communists are more leftist and do not hesitate to be stubborn if their principles are at stake. For instance, they declared outright that the August coup attempt in 1991 was for a just and patriotic cause.⁷¹ Samaran Communists cannot overcome the isolation within oblast elite circles that they have been suffering since 1990, although they could gain popularity, as anywhere else in Russia, among the masses.

The composition of twenty-five deputies of the oblast дума elected in 1994 is as follows: one Communist, two leftists (supported by the Communist-guided electoral bloc), four Agrarians, and the remaining being principally proadministration.⁷² It is necessary to add that the 1994 elections in Samara oblast were marked by stunning examples of corruption and abuse organized by the electoral committees.⁷³ Governor Titov, like Solovev in Chelyabinsk, fired almost all the workers of the former soviet apparatus—in outright violation of presidential decrees—and sent to the newly formed дума apparatus some of his shrewdest cadres. Generally, governors do not spare their human resources to keep representative organs in their pockets.

The October uprising and the oblast дума elections in 1994 practically ousted the independent, left-oriented *khozyaistvenniki* from the oblast politics. Nevertheless, they seem even now to be closer to Titov than to Romanov. An interview with O. N. Anishchik, the last oblast soviet chair, reminded me of Alexander Chayanov, the prominent Russian agronomist before collectivization who, based on his professional expertise, was convinced of the fatality of Stalin’s policy but could not but compromise with it in default of political conviction. This is symbolized by Anishchik’s own self-castigating joke: “the only right solution is to amend the Constitution and make Yeltsin a monarch for life. If a new government emerges, irrespective if it is Chernomyrdin, Zyuganov, or Zhirinovskiy, it will begin to ask bureaucrats how they spent budget money. Then, we will be obliged to execute them by the bunch.”⁷⁴

Ulyanovsk Oblast. Life in Ulyanovsk oblast, the birthplace of Lenin, is colored by artificial tranquility. Prices of food products are about half of those in other oblasts. This is a result of the administration's price regulations based on the semi-autarky of the oblast and on the partial implementation of rationing. In this oblast, kiosks cannot develop due to the administration's coercion, while a network of state commerce persists. The Ulyanovsk administration managed to prevent the spread of the effects of "shock therapy" to the oblast. The amount of industrial production of Ulyanovsk oblast during the first nine months of 1993 was 95.5 percent of that during the same period in 1992. As a local newspaper said, "There is no slump."⁷⁵

Primarily because of cheap food, even the elderly are relatively well dressed and smiling on the streets—a rare scene in post-Gaidar Russia. On the other hand, vodka is about twice as expensive as in other oblasts—this profit margin is added to a fund for administrative price operations. In Ulyanovsk, it is very rare to find beggars and gypsies. Young women wear clothing that appears to have come from the Brezhnev era, in contrast to such large cities as Yekaterinburg or Perm, where streets are full of posters advertising prostitution.

Unlike their counterparts in Moscow and St. Petersburg, the Lenin Museum and the Lenin Memorial Hall, which overlook the Volga, are still working and fighting for the "truth of Lenin." In Ulyanovsk, the oblast дума was not introduced until December 1995. Three of the four leading local newspapers are patronized by the administration (the other is radically democratic). Last but not least, it was in this oblast that this author was interrogated by an intelligence agent for the first time in his life. A colleague, who kindly provided shelter, was blackmailed by the president of the institute where he teaches. Both acts were, in all probability, the design of the oblast administration.

Privatization in this oblast is strictly bridled by the administration. As a result, "the governor's activities are aimed at supporting the privileged status of specially created commercial organizations, whose activities enable the implementation of rationing."⁷⁶ The parliamentary elections in 1993 resulted in a monopoly of all seats of both chambers of the oblast by the administrative party. The candidates of this "party" gained more than four times as many votes as the runner-ups.⁷⁷ Approximately the same thing happened in the State Duma elections in 1995.

One source of this extraordinary strength of the administration is its stable and deliberated cadre policy. Here, the old career pattern has remained almost intact. This is exemplified by the biography of V. A. Sychev, a deputy of the State Duma elected in 1993 from this oblast. Born in 1960, he was educated, after military service, at the Moscow Institute of Youth in the mid-1980s. Starting as the Komsomol gorkom first secretary in a small city in Ulyanovsk oblast, he was promoted to the Komsomol obkom first secretary by 1990. After the dissolution of the Komsomol, he remained the obkom first secretary of its successor organization the "Union of Youth." In 1992, Sychev was appointed as a deputy governor and began to chair the Committee of Youth. Elected to the State Duma, he was affiliated with the Duma Committee on Youth and Family Problems.⁷⁸ Thus, Sychev has been walking along the typical path of a *komsomolets*, as if the dissolution of the CPSU had been just a bad dream.

One of the justifications often made by radical reformists in present-day Russia is that a “Chinese path” was impossible for Russia since its prerequisite, a strong authoritarian party, was already non-existent in the second half of the 1980s. The “miracle” of Ulyanovsk would seem to be a counterpoint to this argument.

The biography of governor Goryachev (born in 1938) appears typical for his generation. When he was three years old, his father died at the front. His mother’s subsequent death orphaned seven children. Yuri Frolovich was brought up by his eldest sister. Working at a veterinary laboratory, he graduated from the Ulyanovsk Agricultural Institute. After serving in the army, he was elected as the Komsomol raykom first secretary in a rayon of Ulyanovsk oblast. By 1965, he was promoted to the Komsomol obkom first secretary. From 1973 to 1987, Goryachev worked as the CPSU raykom first secretary in Ulyanovsk rayon. His fourteen years of governance of this capital-surrounding rayon won him a reputation as a good *khozyaistvennik*, expert in agriculture and rural administration.⁷⁹ Probably, Goryachev learned political pragmatism through his Komsomol experiences, and obtained managerial ability through his party duties in Ulyanovsk rayon. Moreover, during the Ulyanovsk raykom period, he started a “face the people” campaign, which would help him afterwards to present himself as a devoted popular statesman. For example, the raykom leaders, headed by Goryachev, often caravaned to villages, convened village assemblies, listened to residents’ discontents, and decided problems, as far as possible, on the spot. Goryachev continued this practice even after he became governor.⁸⁰

Goryachev boasts that he begins work at six o’clock every morning—not unusual for ex-obkom first secretaries—by reading not newspapers but price information constantly published by the State Statistical Committee.⁸¹ Western observers would be overwhelmed by the numerous decrees and enactments issued by Goryachev, which would seem to reach every corner of the population’s social and economic life. This situation evokes among the population a sense of gratitude to Goryachev. Unlike Titov in Samara and Nemtsov in Nizhny Novgorod, Goryachev cannot show himself well on TV. Such a type of leadership, as well as Goryachev’s peasant-like (*muzhikovataya*) outlook, might not be desirable if he were the governor of an urbanized oblast. However, in Ulyanovsk at least, his behavior seems to be strengthening the “Goryachev cult.”

Ironically, Ulyanovsk oblast, the bastion of conservative reformism in the 1990s, used to be a harbinger of perestroika. This was thanks to G. V. Kolbin, the CPSU obkom first secretary of Ulyanovsk oblast from 1983-86. After his duties in Georgia as Shevardnadze’s deputy, he needed to be an oblast first secretary for some time as a prerequisite for becoming a republican first secretary. By his extravagant behavior, Kolbin opened a curtain for mass politics in this typically rural oblast and left for Kazakhstan, where, as is well known, only ethnic conflict and humiliation were awaiting him.

Ulyanovites would remember the governance of the next first secretary until April 1990 only as an interregnum, but this first secretary made an important decision: he recruited Goryachev from the Ulyanovsk raykom and assigned him to the oblast ispolkom chair. Besides, O. V. Kazarov, Goryachev’s former Komsomol

comrade and an established economist, was elected as the second secretary of the CPSU obkom. If Goryachev was appreciated for his expertise in agriculture, Kazarov was placed primarily in charge of industry. This double-headed leadership continued until after the August coup. During this period, benefiting from the incipient decentralization of the Soviet economy at the time, Goryachev initiated a gradual reconstitution of the oblast's agriculture in favor of its self-reliance. It was the success of this that eventually enabled the administration's present semi-autarkic economic policies.⁸² It is improbable that Goryachev foresaw the regionalization of the Russian economy a few years later, but certainly he, motivated by populist regionalism, was not so allegiant to a centralized economy.

This tendency became more manifest after his inauguration as the obkom first secretary in April 1990, when he promised "to suspend almost completely the construction of new industrial facilities and relocate a fundamental part of capital investment toward social facilities."⁸³ We can hardly find, even among statements made by radically procapitalist leaders at that time, such an outright declaration of a drastic departure from principles of Soviet economic policies. As a criterion to form his team, First Secretary Goryachev emphasized that it is necessary "to change decisively the style and method of work, and to submit our work to the interests of the people. The time of office-based labor is gone."⁸⁴ On the other hand, Goryachev never hid his contempt toward "democratic" reformism. He stated in an interview that "meetings and discussions will increase neither meat nor sugar."⁸⁵ Merciless battles against "shock therapy" consolidated this conservative reformism. Characteristically, the Ulyanovsk administration not only criticized "shock therapy" from the vantage of the people's welfare but also constantly ridiculed the incompetence of the Gaidar team, labeling them "*Ura*-reformists." On the other hand, the Ulyanovsk leadership never related Yeltsin to this insult.

This history of the development of Goryachevite reformism testifies that it is not a simple conservatism clinging onto the Soviet past but is another attempt at adapting the "party" leadership to the epoch of mass politics. In this sense, Goryachevite reformism is not the opposite of but a parallel to radical reformism.

As mentioned above, neglecting the fashion at that time, the Ulyanovsk oblast soviet elected Goryachev without an alternative candidate in April 1990. At the moment of voting, someone threw a question from the floor, "Why only one candidate?" The temporary chair asked the floor, "Who has a proposal about other candidates?" But no one responded.⁸⁶ Two weeks later, according to the then-standard career pattern, the obkom second secretary Kazarov was elected as the oblast ispolkom chair.⁸⁷ Before long, Goryachev was elected also as the obkom first secretary, exhibiting outstanding popularity among Communists in the intra-party "electoral campaign" targeted at this election.⁸⁸

As for the Ulyanovsk city soviet, however, Communist deputies were split, and G. I. Stupnikov, an organizer of a "discussional polit-club" in Ulyanovsk city, was chosen as its chair.⁸⁹ Born in 1927, Stupnikov served at the front during World War II, and then became an engineer. After his retirement in 1988, he participated in a democratic movement. Stupnikov, like Solovev in Chelyabinsk, began to exhibit

his democratic-ness ostentatiously and was appointed the presidential representative of the oblast after the August coup.⁹⁰ In contrast to Chelyabinsk, however, this procapitalist core based on the capital soviet could not grow to pose a serious threat to the solidarity of the ex-nomenklatura community.

Unlike the Samaran CPSU obkom bureau, the Ulyanovsk obkom first secretary Goryachev did not resist the *departizatsiya* decree and abandoned this party duty in July 1991, retaining only the post of soviet chair.⁹¹ The attitude shared by Goryachev and Kazarov toward the August coup would seem to be, at most, neutral. However, the presence of an embryonic anticommunist core in the oblast induced the RSFSR presidential office to pursue a hard line similar to the Chelyabinsk one. In October, despite the oblast soviet's recommendation of Goryachev for the governorship, Yeltsin appointed a director of an enterprise to that post. This was not a surprise for Goryachev and his men, who had started to organize a popular movement as early as the end of August, when the fact that Ulyanovsk oblast fell onto the Yeltsin-Makharadze blacklist became known. The building where the extraordinary session of the oblast soviet discussed Yeltsin's "neglect of local opinion," was surrounded by masses of protesters with placards displaying such slogans as "Goryachev—all for the people, and the people—for Goryachev," or even "Boris, you are wrong!"⁹² Neither Goryachev nor Kazarov released their offices for the newly appointed "governor," and the latter, unlike Titov and Solovev, lacked a strong will for the governorship. Despite the yearning of local democrats, Yeltsin began to seek a compromise with the majority of local elites. The Russian president visited Ulyanovsk at the beginning of 1992, and eventually appointed Goryachev as governor.⁹³ The last oblast ispolkom chair, Kazarov, devolved his post to Goryachev and became the director of the regional branch of the Savings Bank, remaining only a people's deputy of the Russian Federation. Although Kazarov was deprived of the latter duty with the dissolution of the Congress of People's Deputies in September 1993, he re-emerged as deputy of the State Duma in December 1995.

Governor Goryachev chose one of his protégés, a typical Komsomol-party functionary, as his subsequent soviet chair.⁹⁴ Such a soviet could not act as an oppositional force to Goryachev, and unlike the other four oblast soviets examined in this article, disbanded itself after the October uprising without even deliberating provisions for its successor representative organ.⁹⁵ Ironically, the soviet of the oblast known as a bastion of Russian left-centrism proved to be the most obsequious. As for the oblast KPRF organization, Communists had never forgotten that Goryachev abandoned the duty of obkom first secretary in response to the *departizatsiya* decree and that Goryachev supported decree No. 1400, the coercive settlement of the October uprising, and the Yeltsin Constitution. However, Ulyanovsk Communists are softening their criticism of the administration, recognizing that, given the present course of the federal government, Goryachevite economic policies are the best among unhappy options.⁹⁶ Because of the administration's left-centrism, the votes which might have been gained by Communist candidates flow toward the administrative party. As a result, in this "red" oblast where leftist parties (the KPRF and the Agrarian Party) gained about 30

percent of votes in the proportional electoral district, these parties could not win a seat from any of the one-member electoral districts of both parliamentary chambers in 1993, and of the State Duma in 1995.

The only relevant opposition to the Ulyanovsk administrative party has been a small group of non-nomenklatura democrats who had gathered around Presidential Representative Stupnikov and the newspaper *Simbirsky Kurrier*, which developed from the former gorkom/city-soviet organ. The most striking success gained by this opposition was their victory in a March 1994 lawsuit which judged the electoral provision prepared by the administration for the oblast duma to be illegal.⁹⁷ In defiance of the presidential decrees prescribing the equality of votes—in other words, purely

demographic division of electoral districts—the Ulyanovsk administration persisted on the principle of “one rayon—one electoral district,” while compensating for the supposed inequality between populous and unpopulous districts by introducing, in parallel with

“The only relevant opposition to the Ulyanovsk administrative party has been a small group of non-nomenklatura democrats.”

the rayon-based districts, population-based ones. In other words, the electorate would have been given dual votes.⁹⁸ Nevertheless, local democrats regarded the provision as preferential treatment of rural areas, where Goryachev’s predominance was unchallengeable, and sued for recognition of the provision’s illegality. The judgment was handed down only three days prior to the vote. Goryachev, denouncing the “politician-ness” of local democrats, postponed the elections.⁹⁹

To avenge this humiliation, the administration intensified its attack on Stupnikov, who was not a flawless figure. For example, he engaged in several side businesses, despite the presidential ban on moonlighting by federal servants. Severely criticized by the administration-patronized newspapers,¹⁰⁰ Stupnikov was removed by Yeltsin in December 1994.¹⁰¹ Surprisingly, Yeltsin appointed B. A. Saraev, the former first deputy governor, Goryachev’s right-hand man, as the subsequent presidential representative.¹⁰² This compromise shows that the Russian president, as his entourage’s revolutionary reformism loses momentum, is becoming increasingly dependent on local men of power.

In brief, the Goryachev administration has been a relentless opponent of radical reformism since the latter’s inception, and its criticism of Gaidar’s policies has been almost personal insults. On the other hand, Goryachev supported Yeltsin at decisive political moments—the *departizatsiya* decree No. 1400, and the October uprising. At the cost of this political pragmatism, the Ulyanovsk administration gained a guarantee from Yeltsin of its autonomy in economic policy.

Tambov Oblast. The irony for Yeltsin in respect to the Red Belt oblasts is that, after the August coup, he could not avoid removing the leaders of executive power of these oblasts and thus aided the ex-nomenklatura communities in preserving

their solidarity. In contrast, in central non-black-soil oblasts, Yeltsin could do business with the ispolkom leaders and, as mentioned previously, could split ex-nomenklatura communities from above. The gist of divide-and-rule policies is to profit one at the expense of another. As for the Red Belt, however, by martyring the ex-nomenklatura communities as a whole, Yeltsin allowed the reds to remain red. In this sense, Tambov oblast is not an exception but displays some peculiarities in comparison with other Red Belt oblasts.

Historically, the Tambov gubernia/oblast has been honored for its relatively active cultural life. The oblast has a large number of humanist intelligentsia, a significant portion of whom work at the Tambov Humanities University, formerly the Tambov Pedagogic Institute. As a result, the anticommunist core in Tambov has comprised not only dissidents within the nomenklatura such as V. N. Koval, but also humanist intelligentsia, i.e., non-nomenklatura democrats. For this oblast, the battle between nomenklatura and democrats is to some extent a reality. The relatively abundant human resources available for Tambov democrats allowed them to retain their oblast governance for a comparatively long period of time: from December 1991 to March 1995. In other Red Belt oblasts the leftist forces regained gubernatorial posts as a result of popular elections in 1993. Moreover, the Tambov Left had to wait an additional half year for their complete victory, until A. I. Ryabov, the former oblast ispolkom chair removed by Yeltsin after the August coup, made a comeback at “the first in the oblast history” gubernatorial election in December 1995. In short, the Tambov Left preserved their “cadre potential” and, in comparison with leftist forces in other Red Belt oblasts, suffered more and probably learned more. This history explains the unusual strength and tact of the Tambov Left.

V. N. Koval is the present Tambov city mayor and the most prominent leader in the local democratic camp. Although Koval began his academic life as a specialist of CPSU history, he was attracted more by politics, which was then monopolized by the CPSU. After working as a secretary of the CPSU branch of the Pedagogic Institute, he became the vice-head of the obkom Department for Propaganda and Agitation in 1985. Apparently, his ability and eloquence evoked jealousy among obkom workers. In 1987, he was brought back to the Pedagogic Institute and became dean of the Faculty of History. Next year, he initiated the Memorial movement in Tambov. Frictions with the Institute’s presidency over this movement and personal pressures on Koval only raised his authority and gave additional impetus to the movement. However, these frictions still had an intraparty character, or were only an issue of “ideological guidance” by the obkom, since most of the humanist intelligentsia participating in the Memorial movement were CPSU members and their main slogan was “Support for Perestroika.” Koval faced his former obkom colleagues sitting on the other side of the table.¹⁰³

Another representative figure in the Tambov democratic camp was V. V. Davitulliani, who, in contrast with Koval’s faction, had never been a CPSU member and was, to quote an observer’s word, “a life-long anticommunist.” A specialist in industrial chemistry, he was elected from the oblast as people’s deputy of the USSR in 1989 and soon became well known even in Moscow for his aggressive anticommunist actions.

Despite these attacks on the CPSU, Gorbachev's "concurrence" policy was realized not only in the oblast but also in Tambov city soviet in the spring of 1990. The posts of the oblast and capital ispolkom chairs were also filled by CPSU candidates Ryabov and P. I. Gorbunov, respectively.¹⁰⁴ Although there was no possibility for democrats to change the balance of power in the local representative organs, their fervent mass mobilization responding to such issues as the Lithuanian crisis and the introduction of the Russian presidency did not end in vain. The obkom leaders steadily lost confidence in their own legitimacy as rulers and, as a result, were quite vulnerable to the revolution from above conducted by the newly elected President Yeltsin. As was the case with other oblasts, the *departizatsiya* decree gave a "go-ahead to business" to some obkom leaders, one of whom was the first secretary Ye. M. Podolsky, who moved to a high post in his relative's construction company.¹⁰⁵

As with Chelyabinsk, the Tambov obkom lost its authority, but the oblast soviet was still sticking to its position. Therefore, Yeltsin needed to crush it as well. After the attempted coup, the Tambov oblast soviet leadership, as well as those of Samara and Ulyanovsk, were included on the Yeltsin-Makharadze blacklist. Ryabov was removed from the ispolkom chair on 23 August, and Davituliani was appointed as presidential representative at the earliest stage after the coup on 24 August. After several days, a session of the oblast soviet responded to Yeltsin by electing Ryabov as the soviet chair.¹⁰⁶ Nevertheless, even leftist soviet deputies evaded further conflicts with the president; they feared that such a conflict would lead to the appointment of Davituliani as governor.¹⁰⁷ Democratic deputies, in default of sufficient influence to gain deputies' votes for one or another democratic candidate for governor, looked for a compromise figure. This is why V. D. Babenko, head doctor of the oblast hospital and a declared centrist, was recommended to Yeltsin by the oblast soviet as one of the three candidates for the governorship, although Babenko gained far fewer votes than the other two leftist candidates. For both leftist and democratic deputies, Babenko was chosen as "a horse raced as a rival to the favorite." Leftists feared Davituliani would become governor, democrats feared a pro-Communist would become governor. The delegation sent by Tambov democrats to Moscow persuaded S. P. Filatov to accept this compromise figure.¹⁰⁸

Thus, Babenko was appointed governor in December 1991. In an interview immediately after his appointment, Babenko emphasized the necessity to remedy the polarized political situation of the oblast through "agreement" and "mutual respect." As a matter of fact, he formed a coalition leadership of the oblast administration. As of 1994, three deputy governors were democrats, while five were the former party-soviet cadres.¹⁰⁹ In the capital soviet, a stalemate continued. Neither Koval nor leftist candidates for the mayor could gain a majority of votes. Eventually, Yeltsin bet on Koval, appointing him as mayor in January 1992.¹¹⁰

Shock therapy was especially damaging for agricultural oblasts such as Tambov. Its local Left forces recovered during the summer of 1991 and regained their original power. The confrontation between the Russian presidency and the

Supreme Soviet also affected oblast politics. Nevertheless, the Tambov Left did not rush into decisive hostilities with the Babenko administration, as long as Babenko continued to express his respect toward the existing constitution and “democratically elected” soviets. Unlike the Chelyabinsk and other Red Belt oblast soviets, the Tambov oblast soviet, and its chair Ryabov, did not request a gubernatorial election in the spring of 1993, since Babenko had been recommended for governor by the soviet—albeit as the least desirable candidate—and, therefore, was legitimate. Therefore, it is puzzling that Tambov democrats reacted to presidential decree No. 1400 and the October uprising so fervently and, as a result, hastened their own downfall. Responding to decree No. 1400, Mayor

“Shock therapy was especially damaging for agricultural oblasts such as Tambov.”

Koval declared, “as a statesman, I share and understand President B. N. Yeltsin’s actions, recognize the drama and inevitability of his steps.”¹¹¹ Immediately after the bloodshed in Moscow, Tambov democrats organized a meeting “in support of the president.” Davituliani, Koval,

and other attendees denounced the Supreme Soviet and impatiently demanded the dissolution of local soviets.¹¹² According to presidential decree No. 1617, Governor Babenko recommended the oblast soviet disband itself, but the soviet refused to obey. Babenko, in turn, ordered all levels of the administration to summon soviet deputies individually and “persuade” each to resign as deputy.¹¹³ It is necessary to add that, given the current economic situation of Russia, executive power has various persuasive material levers to influence deputies.

The direct rewards for these inexorable measures adopted by the Tambov “administrative-democratic party” were its fiasco in the parliamentary elections in December and a monopoly by Communist and other leftist candidates on all seats in both oblast parliamentary chambers. Moreover, the new constitution was not approved in Tambov oblast. Symbolically, two Federation Council seats from this oblast were gained by Ryabov and Gorbunov, both of whom were removed from their posts as ispolkom chairs (oblast and capital, respectively) after the August coup, and governor Babenko and Presidential Representative Davituliani both were defeated.¹¹⁴ At this moment, their political lives practically ended. The elections for the oblast and capital dumas held in the next spring were something akin to a bacchanalia for the leftist opposition. It even seems that leftist candidates had forgotten how to coordinate candidacies or wrongly thought that the traditional double-round electoral system was still effective. Naturally, votes for the leftist candidates were diffused but they still gained more votes than democratic candidates did.¹¹⁵

It was inevitable that Babenko would support Yeltsin’s actions, as long as he was an appointed governor. But no doubt he could have behaved more evasively. Why did Tambov democrats dare to anger the Left opposition and awaken the

sleeping lion? A plausible explanation is that the bloodshed in Moscow evoked panic even among governors, reminding them of the days immediately after the August coup when the only way to remain in power was to show their loyalty to the president. Titov in Samara, for the time being, gained from his bet, since he won the parliamentary election. Babenko lost it. He did not understand that the Russia of 1993 was not the Russia of 1991 and that Tambov is not Samara.

The new oblast дума elected Ryabov, the former oblast soviet chair and a Federation Council deputy, as its chair; nineteen of twenty-eight deputies voted for him.¹¹⁶ The oblast дума fell into confrontation with the administration over the issue of the Oblast Charter, since the дума project for it prescribed strict control over executive power by the дума. In January 1995, the oblast дума resolved to conduct a gubernatorial election at long last.¹¹⁷ This decision was motivated by Babenko's managerial incompetence and a series of scandals concerning Babenko and one of his democratic deputies. This time, Babenko did not have the possibility to play at Bonapartism, since Davituliani had resigned as presidential representative in February 1994.¹¹⁸ Babenko resigned from the governorship in March 1995.¹¹⁹ According to normal bureaucratic procedure, Babenko's rightful successor might have been his first deputy, Betin. Moreover, Betin was recruited from the former party soviet structure and even used to be a Central Committee member of the Communist Party of Russia (Polozkov's party). He was an acceptable candidate to the oblast дума and Communists. Democrats wished to see Koval as the next governor. Betin lobbied the Russian presidency through Chernomyrdin, while Koval did so through Filatov.¹²⁰ Although Betin won, this victory did not give the Left unlimited joy.

Apparently, Betin promised Chernomyrdin something during his lobbying. In May 1995, Betin opened the regional branch of the NDR in Tambov and became the leader of this Chernomyrdin organization. At this moment, he chose to compete for the governorship in December of the same year with Ryabov, the candidate supported by Communists. The defeat of A. L. Strakhov in Sverdlovsk oblast testified that the NDR cannot win against the left-centrist opposition (Rossel), despite spending several times more money than the opposition and mobilizing whole administrative machines for the electoral campaign. The defeat of Betin added to this hypothesis; even by putting up such a leftist candidate as Betin, the NDR cannot win.

Simultaneously with the gubernatorial election, local deputies of all levels (villages/towns and rayons) were elected in Tambov oblast and representative organs named "soviets" were re-established in all the administrative-territorial units. Newly elected governor Ryabov, as he promised during his electoral campaign, stated his intention to conduct elections for mayors and heads of rayon administrations of the oblast in the spring of 1996.

In Tambov city, the political situation developed in relative favor of the democrats. Shrewd as ever, Koval envisioned a crisis of his own legitimacy in the results of the parliamentary elections of 1993, and announced a mayoral election simultaneously with the city дума elections the next March. Although Koval gained the most votes among the mayoral candidates, the election would be valid only if more

than 35 percent of the electorate of Tambov city voted. This condition was not fulfilled. Koval, through electoral committees, manipulated to underscore the number of the electorate and thus “validate” the election. The relationship between Koval and the Communist-dominated city дума has been tense over such issues as the City Charter, budget control, and hoisting the Soviet flag over the дума building to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the victory over Germany.¹²¹

What should be emphasized here is that Koval, in contrast to Babenko, created his own apparatus and “party” during the four years since his term began in 1992. After inauguration, he reshuffled deputy mayors (formerly city ispolkom members) and, as much as possible, rank-and-file servants, while preserving experienced department heads in order to guarantee continuity of managerial work. With the passing of time, young rank-and-file servants accumulated experience and became deserving department heads.¹²² He also opened the Department of Youth, which plays a role similar to the former Komsomol gorkom, that is, not only taking care of youth but also actively recruiting youth for the administration.¹²³

Moreover, Koval developed the idea of “territorial-social self-government” (*territorialno-obshchestvennoe samoupravlenie*: TOS) and introduced these micro-institutions not as “social” (voluntary) organizations but as obligatory (territorially comprehensive) ones. Tambov city was divided into seventeen small districts based on TOSs (building committees, street committees, and so forth). This structure serves not only the welfare of the population but also, again, to recruit administrative servants.¹²⁴ It is well known that, under socialism, party committees of enterprises used to take care of the TOSs of the micro-district where the enterprise was located. In 1991–93 this system was ruined. Ironically, after the October uprising, that is, after the re-establishment of a monolithic administrative system, various attempts at rebuilding these urban communities began to be made, in most cases under the guidance of local administrations. Among these attempts made in various regions of Russia, the experiment in Tambov city is at the forefront. Tambov citizens should be grateful to Mayor Koval, for this indisputable leader of local democrats is not so foolish as to dream of introducing a Western-style civil society into Russia. Rather, he initiated a practice which reminds one of the traditional “socialist” system, a peculiarly Russian combination of care of the population, community building, and cadre recruitment. Communists in Tambov easily understood the political nuance of Koval’s organizational policies, but they must admit the realism contained in these policies.

Tver Oblast. Local politics in Tver oblast can be regarded as typically rural, in which the ex-CPSU community was divided artificially, bureaucratically, and “from above.” For local leaders of this oblast, both the August coup and the October uprising came like a bolt out of the blue. Given this, the institutional relationship between the two branches of power often plays a more important role than the so-called Left-Right axis. The strong gravity toward centrist compromises in Tver politics would make observers feel that there has been a strange symbiosis between the administrative party and the left-centrist opposition. This is partly because of the cultural influence of the Russian Orthodox church in the

oblast and partly due to the glorious memories of the Tver zemstvo, both of which induce the opposition to be patriotic rather than leftist.

In the spring of 1990, Gorbachev's "concurrence" policy was realized not only in the oblast but also in the capital soviet.¹²⁵ The anticommunist core in the oblast soviet was composed of only twenty-three deputies and, in most cases, raised only distributive issues; for instance, whether to finance the formation of market infrastructure in the region. The renaming of Kalinin back to Tver was supported by both the democratic and the Communist factions. In contrast to the Tambov oblast soviet, the Communist faction of the Tver oblast soviet did not resist the referendum for the introduction of the Russian presidency.¹²⁶

The democratic movement in Tver, unlike its Tambov counterpart, almost skipped its embryonic and heroic stage of the Memorial movement. The Tver democratic movement became fervent only in 1990, after the emergence of the Democratic Platform faction in the CPSU. Oblast leaders of this faction, V. I. Bragin (the future head of Ostankino) and V. I. Belov (the future presidential representative of the oblast), as a natural result of their motives, paid more attention to Moscow than to mobilizing the masses of their own oblast for democratic causes. This situation calmed oblast politics until the attempted August coup. Therefore, if the decline of the Tambov obkom authority was a homicide by democrats, its Tver variant was a natural death. Not only ispolkom leaders but even soviet leaders gave no sign of resistance to the departizatsiya, and quietly abandoned their party duties.¹²⁷ On the other hand, in contrast to Samara oblast, the second "concurrence" was hardly pursued in this oblast; soviet leaders stuck to the principles of a parliamentary republic and regarded the hypertrophy of executive power as dangerous. As a result, the former obkom and raykom/gorkom leaders continued to occupy positions of soviet leadership and were led into tacit tension with administrative leaders, that is, with their own former subordinates. This unpleasant relationship was symbolized by the confrontation between leaders representing two branches of power; Shestov (born in 1933) the oblast soviet chair, and Suslov (born in 1939) the governor.¹²⁸

Suslov is the only example in this article of the automatic appointment of the serving oblast ispolkom chair as governor. In this sense, he was more legitimate than Solovev, Titov, and Babenko. Yet as was the case with many other oblasts that were blessed by Yeltsin with this moderate choice, the legitimacy of the governors of this category also became contentious because, before long, local leaders recognized the simple fact that governors were not the successors of the former oblast ispolkom chairs but of the former obkom first secretaries. Considering Suslov's inadequate managerial ability and his lack of eloquence and charisma, it is highly dubious that the Tver obkom leaders regarded him as a candidate for the future obkom first secretary when they "put" (*postavili*) him into the post of oblast ispolkom chair in 1987.¹²⁹

Nevertheless, the oblast soviet leadership preserved its restrained attitude toward both the Suslov administration and the Russian president. During the severe debate over the new constitution in 1993, the oblast soviet leadership repeatedly expressed their opposition to adopting any variant of the constitution as long as the two proj-

ects by the Supreme Soviet and the president had not been “merged” into a single project, although the oblast soviet did not hide its sympathy toward the Supreme Soviet project.¹³⁰ Albeit denouncing presidential decree No. 1400, the oblast soviet requested only the simultaneous re-election of the president and the Supreme Soviet. Unlike the Chelyabinsk oblast soviet, the oblast soviet leadership did not support Rutskoi’s “presidency.”¹³¹ After the October uprising, they did not resist Yeltsin’s decrees, and after deliberating several provisions for the successor representative organ and its election, they disbanded.¹³² Due to this self-restraint by the soviet leadership, the Legislative Assembly of Tver Oblast (the oblast дума), in contrast to the Chelyabinsk, Samara, and Ulyanovsk dumas, emerged as the legal and legitimate successor of the oblast soviet.

The Tver administrative party has also revealed a specific centrism. In default of a strong tie with the RSFSR presidential office, it could not behave decisively against the August coup. Preparing a text expressing support for the Russian president as late as 21 August, the administration leadership feigned that they had prepared it the day before.¹³³ As for cadre policy, Suslov is close to the pragmatist Titov but not to the politicized Solovev. As of 1994, three of the seven deputy governors were the former city/rayon leaders, two had been recruited from enterprises, one was a former professor of the Agricultural Institute. The other one was the head of apparatus of the administration (*upravliayushchii delami*), S. V. Skachkov, an old-timer serving since the 1980s and a true expert in cadre matters.¹³⁴

The oblast soviet convened a conference against presidential decree No. 1400 and invited not only soviet deputies of various levels but also administrative leaders, lest the dual power in Moscow should spread to the oblast. Some administrative leaders attended the conference for fear of enraging local notables, while others absented themselves to exhibit loyalty toward Yeltsin. Governor Suslov neither agreed to attend nor rejected the conference, but was only absent “due to illness.”¹³⁵ In contrast to Solovev and to Titov, Governor Suslov tolerated the newly formed oblast дума re-employing the former workers of the oblast soviet apparatus. As a result, the Tver oblast дума was able to become relatively independent from the administration. In addition, Suslov did not strongly attack the former oblast soviet newspaper, the *Tver Herald*, thus allowing it to preserve its fervently patriotic, anti-Yeltsin and anti-American position.

It was during the parliamentary elections in 1993 and the oblast дума elections in 1994 that the Tver administrative party, under the tactful guidance of Head of Apparatus Skachkov, acted decisively to marginalize the influence of the former soviet leaders. As for the parliamentary elections, the two seats of the single-member districts of the lower chamber and one seat of the upper chamber in this oblast were practically pre-occupied by Communist candidates and by Governor Suslov, respectively. The other seat of the upper chamber became a harsh battlefield between V. N. Rastorguev, an ecologist and professor at Tver University, supported by the “administrative-democratic party,” and A. V. Kozlov, the former chair of the Staritsa rayon soviet, supported by Communists and Agrarians. Rastorguev won this election by a hair.¹³⁶ In contrast with Chelyabinsk and Tambov, the remnants of the Tver oblast soviet leadership could not gain any seats

in the oblast дума elections. For instance, the former oblast soviet chair Shestov was defeated even by a head of a town administration. Due to this lack of continuity with the former legislators, the oblast administration can easily control the дума.¹³⁷ This situation is affected also by the tactics adopted by the Tver KPRF organization which, unlike its Tambov counterpart, accentuates economic issues rather than political ones, such as local government, and tries to focus the anger of the population on the federal government rather than create strong confrontations at the local level.

Partially reflecting these Communist tactics, the gravity toward centrist compromises reappeared among the new oblast-duma deputies, while this дума revealed an outright adversarial position towards the Yeltsin-Chernomyrdin policies. It adopted the anti-Yeltsin *Tver Herald* as its newspaper after a protracted, heated debate.¹³⁸ Toward the anniversary of the October uprising, this дума, eight of whose thirty-one deputies are serving heads of local administrations or administrative workers, adopted a resolution denouncing Yeltsin's acts the year before as "contradicting the then-existing constitution."¹³⁹ The дума expressed "discontent" with the results of voucher-based privatization in the oblast¹⁴⁰ and protested against the Chechen War. Unsatisfied with mere protest, a radically democratic deputy and an ultra-leftist (Anpilovite) deputy, both with a bitterly antagonistic history, jointly made a motion demanding the oblast extricate itself from the Agreement on Civil Peace and Accord of 1994.¹⁴¹ Thus, the Tver oblast дума has been sensitive to nationwide political trends since 1994, while preserving a pragmatic relationship with the Suslov administration.

Satisfied with the relatively calm political situation of the oblast, governor Suslov proposed, as late as November 1995, to conduct a gubernatorial election in the oblast simultaneously with the Дума elections in December. As expected, Communists could not counter this sudden proposal and refrained from putting up their own candidate for governor. Unexpectedly, however, the administrative party of the oblast was split over this election. V. I. Platov, head of the Bezhetsk city/rayon administration, who is radically democratic and the leader of a zemstvo movement, ran for the governorship. Ironically, Communists, who had contributed to the unpopularity of Suslov by criticizing, though modestly, his incompetence throughout the last three years, almost supported Suslov only in order to prevent the emergence of the Platov administration. The victory of Platov opened a new page of Tver politics.

Conclusions

The CPSU was a national, popular party. Both its strength and weakness had deep roots in Russian society. In contrast to some countries of Eastern Europe, in the USSR even the potential counter-elite could not exist outside the nomenklatura. The study of post-communist politics in Russia should start from this indisputable fact. The administrative party (or nomenklatura democrats) and the left-centrist opposition inherited the two faces of this Janus, the CPSU, and have become the two main actors in Russian *realpolitik*.

We should not categorize the defeat of Chernomyrdin's NDR in the State

Duma elections in December 1995. We should not underestimate the potential of this “administrative-democratic party” to mobilize state machines, including the electoral committees, and to spend state budgets for its own electoral campaign. An irony of this party, however, is that Yeltsin organized it by gathering the local leaders who are skillful at riding on winning horses. On the other side of the same ledger, those leaders could not stick to their position when the situation became unfavorable. In this sense, the fate of the NDR in the December elections had already been decided in August of the same year, when the NDR candidate for Sverdlovsk governor, Strakhov, was defeated by Rossel. Before the State Duma elections, Samara governor Titov, despite being a vice president of the NDR at the national level, did almost nothing for this party and its candidates. The then Tambov governor Betin, despite being the founder of the regional branch of the NDR, declared himself an independent candidate in his electoral campaign for governor and was repaid by defeat.

Analyses in this article revealed that there is no positive relationship between an affinity for a market economy by regional administrations and the continuity of their personnel (cadres) from the socialist era. Rather, orthodox communists often revealed an unusual ability to metamorphose into fervent capitalists. The continuity of regional cadres from the past was affected by the pattern of the splitting of its ex-CPSU community—by the concrete political events in the region. On the other hand, the political situations of regions have been strongly affected by the distribution of “cadre potential” (human resources) among various political forces, in particular, between the administrative party and the left-centrist opposition. Transition to capitalism cannot be a purpose in itself in Russian local politics. Rather, at least for the administrative party, economic policies are no more than a means to mobilize and preserve the local “cadre potential” to its side. Thus, despite Yeltsin’s highly politicized, anti-meritocratic cadre policies, local politics in Russia have preserved, to a significant extent, their pragmatic character.

From this vantage, it is useful to note the continuity of criteria of this meritocracy. Such people as Rossel, Sumin, and Ryabov would have become obkom first secretaries if the ancien régime had continued to exist for a few more years. Under popular elections for governors, these people have emerged victorious. The opposite can be said of such people as Strakhov, Solovev, Babenko, and Suslov. These gentlemen could and can be governors only under the presidential appointment system. What is a democracy which stakes itself on those who cannot survive competitive pluralism? Can such a democracy be viable? The only remarkable exception in this article is Goryachev, Ulyanovsk’s governor. He became the obkom first secretary under socialism, could be appointed by Yeltsin as governor, and will probably win as governor even under popular elections. Therefore, it was not by chance that the Russian presidential office began to seek a model for capitalist transition not in Chelyabinsk but in Ulyanovsk. Thus, the ghost of the “Chinese path” avenged itself upon Yeltsin in the end.

Another finding of this article is that Russian political society is highly institutionalized. It has strict rules, and violations eventually evoke aversion among both the elite and the masses. That is why Yeltsin could not consolidate either a

“presidential republic” or an appointment system for governors, although both of these have numerous precedents in world history. Because of this high level of institutionalization, the transition theory, a prerequisite for which is abundant freedom in institutional design, can hardly be applied to Russian politics. This is in contrast with developing countries, whose political societies are relatively un-institutionalized, or with central Europe, where the previous rules of the game had merely been sustained by coercion and were thus illegitimate. It seems to be easier to build Russian democracy (here, democracy without quotation marks) on the existing rules of the game than on their ruins. Moreover, it is difficult not to notice that the “administrative-democratic party” wishes to protract the “transition period” as long as possible because, exploiting this concept, it can dismiss not only the previous/present rules of the game but also the rules of Western-style democracy.

The following figure illustrates the levels of consolidation of the local pro-Yeltsin factions or the local “administrative parties.” This figure testifies that the appointments of the first governors by Yeltsin after the August coup played a decisive role in the configuration of local ex-CPSU factions and, accordingly, in the formation of Yeltsin’s political bases within the oblasts. In Ulyanovsk oblast, since Yeltsin compromised with the majority of local elites and appointed Goryachev as governor, there has not been any serious destabilizing element, while the opposite is true of Chelyabinsk oblast, where Governor Solovev creates crisis after crisis. Samaran politics twice experienced “unexpected developments.” First, the *khozyaistvenniki* (men of merit), in ousting the obkom leadership from the oblast soviet, did not support Yeltsin during the coup. Second, Governor Titov, who enjoyed neither legitimacy nor support among the local elite immediately after his inauguration, has quite tactfully succeeded in drawing the local ex-nomenklatura into a firm procapitalist camp. Yeltsin’s bet on “centrist” Babenko temporarily ameliorated the political situation of Tambov oblast, but the October incident eventually deprived Babenko of playing at Bonapartism. Although the appointment of the serving oblast ispolkom chair Suslov as governor was the most moderate choice by Yeltsin, the hypertrophy of executive power during 1992-93 endangered Suslov’s legitimacy and intensified oppositional actions of the oblast soviet. However, the administration’s containment policy against the former soviet leaders toward the 1993 parliamentary and the 1994 oblast-duma elections succeeded in weakening (or, at least, pragmatizing) the local left-centrist camp. As a whole, the significance of the presidential appointment for governors in oblast politics explains why Yeltsin would never surrender this political lever as long as he holds the presidential office.

Finally, this article revealed that the strength and character of the regional left-centrist opposition have also been affected by the pattern of split within the region’s ex-CPSU community. If the CPSU leaders preserved their solidarity and moved *en masse* toward the opposition camp, as with the Red Belt oblasts, the opposition would prove to be extraordinarily strong. Even after they regained gubernatorial posts, they continue to preserve their anti-Yeltsin character. The opposite example is Ulyanovsk oblast, where the local ex-nomenklatura com-

munity was almost wholly incorporated into the administration, which has been attentively evading conflicts with Yeltsin. In this case, the human resources and votes which might have been gained by the KPRF have been absorbed by the administrative party. If the regional ex-CPSU community was split “vertically,” the opposition would become relatively centrist and enjoy support not only among the masses but also among the regional elite, as with the ZVU in Chelyabinsk oblast. If the split was “horizontal,” the opposition would become more populist and leftist, and tend to seek its support primarily among the masses, as is evidenced by the Samarans Communists. As for Tver oblast, although the split was “vertical,” specifics of an agricultural oblast have not given its ostracized obkom/raykom and soviet leaders any significant chance to make a comeback. Ironically, it is in such agricultural and conservative oblasts as Tver that the administrative party, a stalwart of Russian capitalism, enjoys more or less stable governance. In brief, the more the former nomenklatura cadres are proselytized into the regional democratic camp, the stronger the democratic camp becomes. This fact epitomizes the tragedy of the Russian democratic movement, if such a movement ever existed at all.

NOTES

1. There are cases in which Western literature on Soviet politics uses this word for “democratic alternatives” such as Yabloko and the Democratic Party of Russia, but I employ this word to represent political forces which can be situated on the political spectrum between the Congress of Russian Communities (KRO) and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF).

2. The shock delivered to reform-minded local party leaders by the “founding convention” of the Communist Party of Russia, especially the electoral victory as its first secretary by Ivan Polozkov, who had been defeated only a month before by Yeltsin as a candidate for the RSFSR Supreme Soviet chair and was boasting to have spent his “whole life in party apparat,” is exemplified by the newspaper article “Shag vpered, dva shaga nazad,” *Vechernyi Chelyabinsk (VCh)*, 28 June 1990.

3. Personal lists (*lichnye dela*) of local CPSU leaders, preserved in local ex-party archives, testify that from 1989-90, most local soviet duties were excluded from the nomenklatura (“tables of duties”) and, consequently, the confirmation by CPSU organs of their appointments and removals became unnecessary. In addition, from 1990-91 many leaders’ duties in social organizations such as the Komsomol and managerial duties such as those of the kolkhoz chairmen were excluded from the nomenklatura.

4. Interview: V. V. Mashkov (Presidential Representative of Sverdlovsk oblast—all of the duties noted in this article, if not indicated, are the duties at the moment when the person was interviewed), 8 June 1995, Yekaterinburg.

5. See the “appeal” adopted by the Tambov oblast дума to President B.N. Yeltsin on 16 January 1995: Tambovskaya oblastnaya дума, *Informatsionnyi byulleten* 7 (February 1995): 50-51.

6. *Rossiiskii vestnik* (Moscow, 1995), 385.

7. Interview: O. I. Anishchik (the former Samara oblast soviet chair and the former member of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation), 19 June 1995, Samara.

8. The populations and areas of the five oblasts mentioned here are quoted from the following literature: A. Glubotsky, A. Mukhin, and N. Tyukov, *Organy vlasti subektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii (obzory. biografii. telefony)*, (Moscow, 1995). Below, this literature will be abbreviated as *OVS*.

9. J. C. Moses, “Saratov and Volgograd, 1990-1992: A Tale of Two Russian

Provinces,” in *Local Power and Post-Soviet Politics*, ed. by T. H. Friedgut and J. W. Hahn (M.E. Sharpe: Armonk-London, 1994), 96-137.

10. *Ulyanovskaya pravda (UP)*, 21 March 1990.

11. *UP*, 14 June 1990.

12. *UP*, 4 April 1990.

13. *UP*, 8 April 1990.

14. D. G. Seltser, “Razvitie politicheskoi situatsii v Tambovskoi oblasti: 1990- 1995-gg.” forthcoming in *Regiony Rossii: khroniki i rukovoditeli* (Tsentralnoe chernozeme) ed. by Kimitaka Matsuzato, *et al.*

15. *Tambovskaya pravda (TP)*, 29 March 1990.

16. *OVS*, 313; Interview: A. V. Kozlov (the former Staritsa rayon soviet chair and the former member of the “small soviet” of the Tver oblast soviet), 9 April 1994, Staritsa city, Tver oblast.

17. *Kalininskaya pravda (KP)*, 30 March 1990.

18. Interview, P. I. Sumin (the former Chelyabinsk oblast soviet chair), 3 October 1994, Chelyabinsk.

19. Interview: N. M. Ryazanov (the former ispolkom chair of Korkino city, Chelyabinsk oblast), 24 March 1995, Chelyabinsk.

20. Interview: P. I. Sumin, 3 October 1994; Ye. A. Karabatova, “Rukovoditeli Chelyabinskoi oblasti: 1985-1995” forthcoming in *Regiony Rossii: khroniki i rukovoditeli* (Ural) ed. by Kimitaka Matsuzato *et al.*

21. Interview, N. M. Ryazanov, 24 March 1995.

22. *VCh*, 1 March 1990.

23. *OVS*, 328.

24. *Chelyabinskii rabochii (ChR)*, 5 April 1990.

25. *ChR*, 10 August 1990.

26. *Ibid.*

27. Karabatova, “Rukovoditeli . . .”

28. Interview: R. M. Podvigina (deputy of the Chelyabinsk oblast дума), 23 March 1995, Chelyabinsk.

29. Interview, P. I. Sumin, 3 October 1990; Karabatova, “Rukovoditeli . . .”

30. *OVS*, 328.

31. *Narodnaya дума—Gazeta Chelyabinskogo oblastnogo soveta narodnykh deputatov* (ND), 4-11 September 1991.

32. “Ukaz prezidenta RSFSR o nekotorykh voprosakh deyatelnosti organov ispolnitelnoi vlasti v RSFSR,” *Vedomosti sezda narodnykh deputatov RSFSR verkhovnogo soveta RSFSR*, 22 August 1991, No.34, st.1146.

33. Interview: N. M. Ryazanov, 24 March 1995.

34. *Ibid.*

35. ND, 30 October-5 November 1991.

36. *OVS*, p. 330; Karabatova, “Rukovoditeli. . .”; Interview, N. M. Ryazanov, 15 December 1995.

37. ND, 20 January 1993; *OVS*, 329; Interview: R. M. Podvigina, 23 March 1995.

38. *ChR*, 8 April 1994.

39. “O rezultatakh proverki effektivnosti ispolzovaniya organami ispolnitelnoi vlasti Chelyabinskoi oblasti sredstv gosudarstvennogo byudzheta, vydelennykh dlya okazaniya pomoshchi naseleniyu, prinadlezhayushchemu k zone radioaktivnogo zagryazneniya.”

40. *ChR*, 27 April 1995.

41. “Vystuplenie Sumina P. I. na oblastnoi konferentsii dvizheniya ‘Za vozrozhdeniya Urala’” in *Materialy III konferentsii obshchestvenno politicheskogo Dvizheniya ‘Za vozrozhdenie Urala’ sostoiavsheisya 24 dekabrya 1994 goda* (Chelyabinsk, 1994), 1.

42. *Materialy III konferentsii* p. 13; Interview, Z. N. Grosu (press secretary of the Chelyabinsk oblast дума), 17 March 1995, Chelyabinsk.

43. *Vozrozhdeniie Urala* Nos. 8, 9,10,11, and 12 (1995).

44. Moreover, despite the authority of Ye. Ye. Rossel, the “Transformation of the Urals” could gain only three of twenty-eight seats of the Sverdlovsk oblast дума as a result of the 1994 elections (*Oblastnaya gazeta—Yekaterinburgskie vedomosti*, 15 April 1994).

45. *Khronika*, 28 April 1994; *ChR*, 17 May 1994, 24 May 1994, 8 June 1994, 9 June 1994 et al.

46. *Sbornik zakonov i normativnykh pravovykh aktov Chelyabinskoi oblasti (SZNPA)* 3 (August-September, 1994): 197-98.

47. *SZNPA* 5 (December, 1994): 8.

48. Interview: R. M. Podvigina, 23 March 1995; Interview: A. S. Salomatkin (deputy of the Chelyabinsk oblast дума), 20 December 1995, Chelyabinsk.

49. *SZNPA* 10 (September, 1995):12-13.

50. *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 23 September 1995.

51. A. V. Kraevoi, “Ru kovoditeli Samarskoi oblasti: 1985-95” forthcoming in *Regiony Rossii: khroniki i rukovoditeli* (Srednee povolozh’e) ed. by Kimitaka Matsuzato, et al.

52. Ibid.

53. Interview: P. S. Kabytov (vice-president of the Samara State University), 13 June 1995, Samara; Interview: N. G. Doskovskii (professor of the Samara Polytechnic Institute, a city-district leader of the KPRF), 21 June 1995, Samara.

54. *Volzhskaya kommuna (VK)*, 1 May 1990.

55. Interview: O. N. Anishchik, 19 June 1995; Interview: A. N. Ivanov (deputy of the Samara oblast дума and former Samara city soviet chair), 19 June 1995, Samara.

56. *VK*, 13 April 1990; Kraevoi, “Rukovoditeli. . .”

57. The position of the Samara obkom was reported by the *VK*, in particular, in its issues from July to August 1991.

58. See the oblast soviet newspaper *Samarskie izvestiya (SI)* from June to July 1991. In regard to the attitude of the soviet toward the *departizatsiya* decree, see its July 24 and 25 issues.

59. *VK*, 24 July and 16 August 1991.

60. “Zayavlenie deputatov Samarskogo gorodskogo soveta narodnykh deputatov,” *SI*, 3 September 1991.

61. Interview: O. N. Anishchik, 19 June 1995.

62. *OVS*, 294-95.

63. *VK*, 16 August 1991; *SI*, 28 August 1991.

64. *SI*, 6 September 1991.

65. *OVS*, 295-96; Kraevoi, “Rukovoditeli. . .”

66. Interview: V. A. Kuznetsov (head of the analytical department of the Samara oblast administration), 13 December 1995, Samara.

67. Ibid.

68. *VK*, 10 February 1993.

69. *VK*, 24 September 1993 and 28 September 1993.

70. V. S. Romanov gained 50.3 percent of the vote in the electoral district that mainly covers Novokuibyshevsk city (*Samarskaya gazeta [SG]*, 26 December 1995).

71. This is affected also by the fact that Samara is the hometown of General A. M. Makashov, one of Yeltsin’s rivals in the 1991 presidential election and an outright supporter of the GKChP. Makashov, supported by the KPRF, ran for the 1995 Duma election in the electoral district that covers “laborers’ districts” of Samara city and won, gaining 33.4 percent of the vote (*SG*, 26 December 1995).

72. Interview: V. S. Grom (deputy of the Samara oblast дума), 15 June 1995, Samara.

73. The abuses organized or aided by the electoral committees were especially rampant during the campaigns before the second vote on 5 June 1994. This second vote was held in twelve of the total twenty five oblast-duma electoral districts of the oblast, where the first votes were invalidated due to their low voting percentages (less than 25 percent). A collection of electors’ witnesses presented by the KPRF candidates to the oblast court

reveals an amazing picture: in some electoral districts, on the pretext of raising voting percentages, “at-home voting” was conducted by the electoral committees throughout the whole week prior to the vote, although it was an outright violation of the electoral provision of the Samara oblast. In some cases, members of the electoral committees visited each apartment and, concealing their status, distributed “gifts” (packages of food) among residents. At the same time, they made the residents sign a list, explaining that it was necessary for the accountability of these “gifts.” Afterward, these lists proved to be the electorate lists. On June 5, polling station workers showed these signatures to the electors who had received the “gifts” and told them: “you have already voted.” If an elector, nevertheless, insisted on voting, the electoral committees “permitted” him to vote, but without “doubly” signing on the electorate list.

74. Interview: O. N. Anishchik, 19 June 1995.

75. *UP*, 26 October 1993.

76. A. Magomedov, “Politicheskie elity rossiiskoi provintsii,” *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya*, No.4 (1994), 77-78.

77. *UP*, 16 December 1993.

78. *Skify*, 30 December 1994.

79. *OVS*, 326; *UP*, 4 December 1993; *Skify*, 30 December 1994.

80. *UP*, 26 October 1993.

81. *UP*, 4 December 1993.

82. *UP*, 26 October 1993.

83. *UP*, 10 April 1990.

84. *UP*, 14 April 1990.

85. *UP*, 22 September 1990.

86. *UP*, 4 April 1990.

87. *UP*, 21 April 1990.

88. *UP*, 8 April 1990.

89. *UP*, 6 April 1990.

90. *UP*, 25 October 1991.

91. *UP*, 24 July 1991.

92. The last was an echo to hardline Yeltsin critic Yegor Ligachev’s infamous and clumsy “Boris, ty ne prav” accusation on national television in 1989. *NG*, 30 October 1991.

93. *UP*, 10 January 1992.

94. *UP*, 2 March 1992.

95. *UP*, 23 October 1993.

96. Interview: A. L. Kruglikov (the first secretary of the KPRF obkom of Ulyanovsk oblast), 13 July 1995, Ulyanovsk.

97. *Simbirskii kurer (SK)*, 29 March 1994.

98. *SK*, 29 January 1994.

99. *SK*, 26 March 1994.

100. For instance, see: *Simbirskie gubernskie vedomosti*, 8 October 1994.

101. *UP*, 27 December 1994.

102. *UP*, 26 January 1995.

103. Interview: M. F. Kosykh (the first secretary of the KPRF obkom of Tambov oblast), 19 July 1995, Tambov; Interview: D. G. Seltser (senior lecturer of the Tambov Humanist University), 7 December 1995, Tambov.

104. *TP*, 29 March 1990; Seltser, “Razvitie. . .”

105. Seltser, “Razvitie. . .”

106. *TP*, 3 September 1991; Seltser, “Razvitie. . .”

107. Interview: M. F. Kosykh, 19 July 1995.

108. Interview: V. A. Pogonina (analyst-adviser of Tambov mayor), 17 July 1995, Tambov; Seltser, “Razvitie. . .”

109. *OVS*, 311-12; Interview: Ye. G. Goloshumov (head of the press service of the Tam-

bov oblast administration), 17 July 1995, Tambov; Interview: R. P. Volostnykh (deputy-head of the organizational department of the Tambov oblast administration), 21 July 1995.

110. Seltser, "Razvitie. . ."

111. *Tambovskaya zhizn (TZh)*, 25 September 1993.

112. *TZh*, 7 October 1993.

113. *TZh*, 26 October 1993.

114. *TZh*, 15 December 1993.

115. *TZh*, 4, 5, 15, 16, 18, 19 March 1994, et al.

116. *TZh*, 20 and 23 April 1994.

117. *TZh*, 26 January 1995.

118. *TZh*, 8 February 1994.

119. Seltser, "Razvitie. . ."

120. Interview: V. A. Pogonina, 17 July 1995.

121. Interview: V. A. Pogonina, 17 July 1995; Interview: A. K. Klimenko (the first secretary of the KPRF gorkom of Tambov city), 19 July 1995, Tambov; Interview: Yu. N. Starchikov (Tambov city дума chair), 6 December 1995, Tambov.

122. Interview: D. G. Seltser, 7 December 1995.

123. Interview: Yu. N. Starchikov, 6 December 1995.

124. Interview: I. P. Mamontov (vice-head of the Oktyabrsky city-district administration, Tambov city), 18 July 1995, Tambov; Interview: B.V. Konchakov (acting head of the Leninsky city-district administration, Tambov city) and G. V. Meshkova (specialist of the department of local government of the same administration), 18 December 1995, Tambov; Interview: Yu. N. Starchikov, 6 December 1995.

125. *KP*, 30 March 1990 and 17 May 1990.

126. Telephone interview: A. V. Kozlov, 14 January 1996.

127. *Ibid*; *Tverskie vedmosti (TV)*, 2 August 1991.

128. Interview: A. V. Kozlov, 9 April 1994; Interview: B. F. Selvonenko (head of Torzhok city administration, the former member of the "small soviet" of the Tver oblast soviet), 16 April 1994, Torzhok city, Tver oblast.

129. Interview: Yu. M. Boshnyak (the former member of the "small soviet" of the Tver oblast soviet), 12 April 1994, Tver.

130. *TV*, 17-23 September 1993.

131. *TV*, 1-7 October 1993.

132. *TV*, 8 December 1993 and 18-24 March 1994.

133. Interview: A. V. Kozlov, 9 April 1994.

134. *OVS*, 314-15; Telephone interview, A. V. Kozlov, 14 January 1996.

135. *TV*, 1-7 October 1993.

136. *TV*, 17-23 December 1993.

137. Interview: S. V. Skachkov (head of apparatus of the Tver oblast administration), 7 April 1994, Tver. Tver oblast-duma deputies are composed of twelve Communists and Agrarians, one RKR member, one patriotic bourgeois (in sum, fourteen oppositional deputies), and eight administrative workers including six heads of city, rayon, and town administrations, two radical democrats, three moderate democrats (in sum, thirteen pro-administration deputies). The other four deputies are "middle." See: *ThV*, 18-24 March 1994 and 1-7 April 1994; *Tverskaya zhizn*, 23 March 1994.

138. *TV*, 27 V-2 June 1994, 3-9 June 1994, 10-16 June 1994, 29 July-4 August 1994.

139. *TV*, 23-29 September 1994.

140. *TV*, 30 September-6 October 1994.

141. Interview: Yu. P. Tretyakov (secretary of a deputy of the Tambov oblast дума), 6 March 1995, Tver.