

# Supreme Soviet Investigation of the 1991 Coup

## *The Suppressed Transcripts: Part 2*

### Hearings “Concerning the Role of Repressive Organs in the Putsch of 19-21 August 1991”

#### **Editor’s Introduction**

In this issue of *Demokratizatsiya* appears a second portion of the suppressed transcripts of Russia’s sole public investigation of the August 1991 Soviet coup.

The hearings—the only public probe of the putsch—were held in late 1991 and early 1992 by the Russian Supreme Soviet Commission for Investigating the Causes and Circumstances of the August Putsch, led by Lev Ponomarev, a reformist lawmaker and co-chairman of the Democratic Russia Movement. Translations of the commission’s executive summary, conclusions, and recommendations, as well as excerpts of the 4 February 1992 hearings on the role of the KGB in the coup, appeared in the Fall 1995 issue, along with a glossary of individuals and organizations named in the transcripts.

In the following pages appears the remaining testimony concerning the role of the KGB. Witnesses include KGB First Chief Directorate leader Yevgeny Primakov, who held his post after the Soviet collapse, when the KGB espionage branch was re-named External Intelligence Service (SVR); former USSR KGB Chairman Vadim Bakatin; and Ponomarev Commission experts Vladimir Rebrikov, Gleb P. Yakunin, Boris M. Pugachev, journalist Yevgenia Albats (then with *Moscow News* and presently with *Izvestiya*), Sergei V. Kuleshov, and others.

Testimony on the mass-scale laundering of funds and other financial activity by top Communist Party officials in the waning days of perestroika will be published in the Spring 1996 issue.

The following pages were translated from photocopies of the original draft transcripts typed by Supreme Soviet stenographers. The stenographers used manual typewriters with worn-out ribbons, resulting in text that did not copy well. Parts of the text are illegible. As drafts, the text quality is uneven, as moderators ask witnesses to hurry, or as streams of consciousness result in abandonment of syntax. The translation is tight, often stilted, to preserve accuracy over style. Sections concerning procedural questions that offer no historical insights have been deleted here in the interests of brevity. All editing is indicated in the text. Deleted text is marked by ellipses. Supreme Soviet transcribers’ marks appear in parentheses, while the translator’s and editor’s marks are shown in brackets.

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# Transcript

## Meeting of the Commission for Investigating the Causes and Circumstances of the August Putsch on the Subject: "Concerning the Role of Repressive Organs in the Putsch of 19-21 August 1991."

4 February 1992

[Continued from previous issue of *Demokratizatsiya*]

Chairman: L. A. Ponomarev

### Chairman

Thank you. Please, Yevgeny Maximovich Primakov, Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service.

### Yevgeny M. Primakov

I would like to say first of all that Deputy Prosecutor General of Russia Yevgeny Kuzmich Lisov spoke here, and before him the chairman of the commission which worked on the investigation of the activity of the law enforcement organs in connection with the attempt to conduct the *coup d'etat*, Sergei Vadimovich Stepashin, and they talked about the fact that [the] intelligence [service] did not directly participate in this matter. I would like to emphasize this.

Actually, there is no data showing that intelligence directly participated in this coup.

At the same time, this does not mean that a retrospective look at the activity of intelligence as a whole generates only the positive side of its work. Basically, intelligence did those tasks which were set before it in the defense of the state's interests, and on this segment and in this direction much good was done, much that was positive. But the activity had negative aspects which were connected with ideological intelligence, with the fact that intelligence implemented direct orders of the leadership. And the leadership at this time was, naturally, the leadership of the party. Such things as, for example, the transmittal of money to various parties you already know about. This has no direct relationship to the GKChP [Emergency Committee]. But it was done. Intelligence completed courier functions, complied with orders which it received, and could not [refuse to] implement them. It was never the initiator of these matters.

Now the next question is how we are to effect a series of steps which will allow us to reliably exclude intelligence from a system which could constitute a threat to the constitutional order of Russia in the future. Although, I want to say once again, intelligence never was such a threat during the time of the GKChP.

What must be done for this? For this it is necessary to reorient the activity of intelligence, what it does, and to reliably orient it in such a way as to de-ideologize completely this activity. This is being done. Intelligence

now works on this basis, and we, certainly, didn't invent this slogan, that "there are no constant enemies, and there are no constant friends, but there are constant interests of Russia, and constant interests of the Confederation [sic] of Independent States." These interests are absolutely justified. This is the necessity to set up such conditions under which nobody would be able without our knowing about it to destabilize the system of arms [parity]; this is watching out so that there will be no proliferation of dual-purpose technology; this is the struggle for the economic interests of the state; this is the struggle so that the state would protect, hopefully, its interests in other areas as well; this is objective information. I want to emphasize again that it must be absolutely objective, and should not support any earlier arrived at operational scheme or system, and should not be conjecture, no matter how it was obtained, and it must be reported to the leadership.

Intelligence at the same time effects, certainly, measures directed to furthering the policies of the Russian Federation. These steps need not be done outside the framework of the law, naturally. These measures need not be odious in any way. At the same time, if, let's say, we have to improve our relations now with the United States, then intelligence in its activity must anticipate the necessity of strengthening these relationships, and so on.

If we talk about the control activity of intelligence, then, certainly it must control. But a specific direction of this activity should come to the point [of specifying] what the control is on a daily basis, and it must strictly be done in those formats so it doesn't constitute a danger to the safety of intelligence operations.

Under these conditions, I would like to request that the Russian parliament do the following. First, it is essential to adopt a special law about intelligence, and passing that law should not be delayed. I would like to ask secondly that a special commission be created for intelligence. I think that such a commission should exist separately from other commissions dealing with security or law enforcement organs. And thirdly, I request that on the basis of this law a number of the members of this commission, a group of the members of this commission, as is done in other countries, would take an oath and would sign a paper stating that they would not reveal state secrets and then there would be these bonds, and in this connection that we would be trusted, and that this signature would not be violated, and they would be given access to absolutely all material intelligence has.

That's what I ask you to do. Now here's a question that was given directly to me. I would like to answer immediately, so that there is no doubt about this matter. It was said here that I said somewhere that I worked earlier in the KGB and so on, and I was connected with KGB activities. Secondly, I didn't say this anywhere. And in *Moskovskiy Novosti*, an article was published in which it was said that I was an employee of the KGB since 1957, working in the Near East as a radio correspondent.

I must say that I was not a radio correspondent in the Near East in 1957. I did go to the Near East, but it was not in 1957. It was in 1965, as a correspondent for *Pravda*. I fulfilled many orders which came from my leadership, including, for example, I met . . . during the time of the war in northern Iraq, I met with the leader of the Kurdish movement. And while complying with these tasks I supplied intelligence, supplied the *okhrana* [the guard] with material along KGB channels. But this was all.

But the talk that in 1957, being a radio correspondent, and so on, this has no relation to the truth. That's what I want to say.

**Chairman [Lev Ponomarev]**

Thank you, Yevgeny Maximovich. Are there questions? Please, third microphone.

**G. P. Yakunin**

Distinguished Yevgeny Maximovich. Literally a few days ago, the president talked about the strategic reorientation of all of our foreign policies and he declared that the United States and the Western countries are, literally, allies and friends. In connection with this, naturally, the question arises. Always the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the embassies, as is the common practice of other countries as well, have served as "covers" for intelligence agents. Will the activity of the intelligence service in Western countries now be cut back, and will it be reoriented to countries which are potentially dangerous?

**Primakov**

Distinguished Gleb Yakunin, I want to give one answer to both questions. It will be cut back and reoriented.

**M. G. Astafyev (Moscow)**

Distinguished Yevgeny Maximovich, I have two questions for you. Do you think that the steps toward discharging international tension on the level of intelligence should be mutual? I have in mind mutual cutbacks of intelligence strength.

And, in connection with this question, how can we evaluate the predicted damage from the transmittal by our former KGB leader, Bakatin, of specific material to the American embassy? You know what I am talking about. [The reference is Bakatin's goodwill gesture to the U.S. when he provided the American ambassador with information on where KGB eavesdropping equipment in the embassy was located. —JMW]

**Primakov**

Well, first of all, I want to say that certainly we should work it out so that cutbacks in intelligence and correction of intelligence and reorientation of intelligence should be built on a reciprocal basis. We can't unilaterally effect any cutback in intelligence actions in that case, if we know that some country is working against us with similar forces. The answer is clear here.

Concerning the specific case of Vadim Viktorovich Bakatin, he is here and you can ask him. This is a very difficult question, and must be looked at from many sides.

**Astafyev**

No, I asked for an evaluation of the damage, not about the deed itself.

**Primakov**

We have not assessed the damage, and I think that this is not our function. By the way, foreign intelligence had no part in the directive that monitoring devices should be installed in the American embassy.

**R. M. Akhunov**

Yevgeny Maximovich, during the putsch you had the job, you were named by President Gorbachev, to be on the staff of the Security Council.

And when the GKChP fired the entire staff of the Security Council, none of you who held those jobs stepped forward. Nor did you protest. Evaluate, please, if this was constitutional or unconstitutional. At the same time, the youth and Rostropovich hurried here from Paris, and with the population here did the necessary work. If you remember yet how you worked as the Chairman of the Commission on Privileges in the Union parliament, I have the impression that you can not stand up either for the authorities, or for yourself. Are you in agreement with my evaluation?

**Primakov**

Well, first, what you say demonstrates, distinguished deputy, your ill-informed state, and that you have a complete lack of information. On 20 August at 11 o'clock in the morning—I arrived from the south late in the evening of the 19th—but on the 20th, actually at 10:30 in the morning, if you want, Vadim Viktorovich Bakatin and myself—both of us members of the Security Council—signed an announcement against the GKChP, in which we said that we know firmly that the president is healthy, and it said that we consider the transfer of power into the hands of that group of persons to be anti-constitutional. This announcement was broadcast on *Ekho Moskvy* at 12:30 on the 20th. Please pay attention to the facts.

Concerning the second part of your question, concerning privileges which I didn't take for myself. On that level, since I had my privileges withdrawn, well, I hadn't used them anyway.

**D. S. Bubyakhin** (Member, Supreme Soviet)

Distinguished Yevgeny Maximovich, you started your testimony with the words that your authority has no involvement with the August conspiracy. So how do you make your statement agree with the facts, when specialists of foreign intelligence took active parts in developing the plans for the military-party coup in Tbilisi, in Baku, in Riga, and finally, in Vilnius? And foreign intelligence knew, primarily United States intelligence knew about the impending August conspiracy. You probably know that President Bush warned Gorbachev via Bessmertnykh that such a conspiracy was being readied. If your intelligence did not know these facts, then doesn't this raise some doubts that your service might not be on such a high level?

**Primakov**

Distinguished deputy, I want to say to you in this connection that we work on *foreign* matters. This is *foreign* intelligence. If we had been occupied with investigating internal processes inside the Union and had been concentrating our efforts there, then apparently you and your deputies would have full justification in criticizing us and saying that we are not taking care of business. But concerning the warning, this warning was not made by [our] foreign intelligence, but by *American* intelligence.

**Bubyakhin**

America. That's what I'm talking about.

**Primakov**

And that's what I am talking about.

**Bubyakhin**

No, but if . . .

**Chairman**

Thank you. Thank you. The question was asked. An answer was given. Fifth microphone, please.

**V. V. Muksev** (3rd Natl-Terr. District)

Materially, thank you.

**Chairman**

Thank you.

**Primakov**

I emphasize, on a *voluntary* basis.

**A. P. Surkov**

Distinguished Yevgeny Maximovich, as you know, at the beginning of January, speaking in this hall, at that rostrum where you are standing now, Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin appealed to all the countries of the world, to all parties and movements, asking them to help find that which was stolen from the people by the CPSU and hidden somewhere, either in the form of assistance, or in the form of special accounts. As we know now, both through our commission and through the evidence from the investigation which the Russian Prosecutor is conducting, nothing could pass across the border through your [KGB] First Chief Directorate (CD), and everything, certainly, was done with the participation of your service. Well, the idea is that the 1st CD took direct part. Moreover, we have information that in the 1st CD archives there are authentic, as they say, meticulous records down to the last inventory of who took what, how it was transferred, and how much was transferred.

Today it is simply embarrassing to me that we have to ask the entire world to help with this which, in essence, is here in Lubyanka. Why didn't you obey Yeltsin's call and why didn't you make it possible [for us to] seek what we need in these archives?

**Primakov**

I want to say once again that—and here the distinguished Deputy Prosecutor General is sitting—that any requests from the Prosecutor General to look at documents located in the archives—and by the way, our archives are not in Lubyanka, if there are such requests—and I haven't received any—naturally in a legal manner, these requests will be satisfied. But I want to tell you that yes, actually, we carried money to other parties, but we have no such documents attesting to the fact that intelligence participated in laundering money by the party or that in some way intelligence participated, that is, intelligence as an institution, in the commercial activity that the party supported. Individual intelligence workers, particularly Veselovsky, who have published about this . . . in general his announcement was published, they went to the Business Office of the CPSU Central Committee, and were retained in the intelligence service reserve, and I have to say this about that: It was forced by the former KGB leadership. They went there and worked there as workers for the Central Committee Business Office.

Concerning, so to speak, review of all documents, please. There are no questions. Do all this in a legal manner and go ahead, please, look. If the Prosecutor needs to do that, then [access] will be provided.

**Surkov**

Good. We will use this.

**Medvedyev** (Yekaterinburg)

Yevgeny Maximovich, in connection with the fact that the committees of our Supreme Soviet are now working on a draft law about investigative operations, I have two small questions for you. First, do you think that it is proper to attach your service, the foreign intelligence service, to the list of organizations which have the right to conduct investigative operations on the territory of the Russian Federation? In other words, should your service conduct such activity to any extent in relation to our own Russian citizens?

And the second question. Do you think it is possible, ethical, and legal if people's deputies cooperate with your service on a confidential basis?

**Primakov**

I will answer your questions. First, investigative activity can be done by intelligence only in relation to its own employees. And about nobody else. This necessity is brought about by the [nature of our] work. The necessity is brought about by the safety of intelligence. But other than that, I again emphasize, not a single person can be subject to or become the object of this investigative operation.

Concerning your second question: Do you have in mind some sort of agent connections? I think that it is unacceptable to have agent connections with members of parliament.

**Chairman**

Thank you. Yevgeny Maximovich, now I will ask you something. At one time, our commission inquired into the agent activities of your service. We know very well that intelligence operatives were used to discredit leaders of the democratic movements, such as Yeltsin, and to [spread] disinformation in the Western press about the situation in the country and about democratic organizations. You did not submit a written reply to us, but you did say to me that you have no information about these activities. Is this still true?

**Primakov**

Lev Alexandrovich, you need to add that which I said to you about this. I invited you to come and said I would open everything to you, everything we have, and you yourself could look at it.

**Chairman**

That is, you confirm that we actually have no . . .

**Primakov**

I invited you to come. You can come and convince yourself of what we have and what we don't have. Unfortunately, you didn't take me up on it.

**Chairman**

Thank you. Good. That means, then, we are invited still. . . . Thank you very much, Yevgeny Maximovich, there are no more questions. Thank you. We invited Vadim Viktorovich Bakatin. He does not now occupy a government post, but since he headed the service for a long time. . . .

**V. V. Bakatin**

For a short time.

**Chairman**

For a short time. Excuse me. He headed it for a short time. We invited him to express his opinion on the theme of our hearings, and perhaps, answer some questions.

**Bakatin**

Distinguished Chairman, very distinguished deputies! I am truly grateful to you for this invitation which I didn't expect and I truly want to emphasize that I am speaking now at these parliamentary hearings *only for myself and I represent no service*. I express here my own personal opinion.

It was suggested that I think here about the answers to two questions. First, the role of the KGB in preparing for and implementing the *coup d'état*. I have spoken about this many times, that I did not study this matter, but it is absolutely clear that the KGB leadership unquestionably played an important ideological and organizational role here. And then, not only the leadership, but those who remained, each had traces of this role. However, once again I want to say that I do not think it is possible to personalize the evaluation here. That is a matter for the prosecutor and the court. I gave my impressions to the investigator. Furthermore, I thought and think and want to say here, and I have said this many times, that we must limit the responsibility to only the higher leadership of the KGB and not crawl into the depths, because in each microcell one can find one who was for and one who was against and one who was passive and one who was active and this can lead in general to a very difficult situation. That is, the leadership is responsible. And to make a long story short, I attribute this evaluation to the role of the KGB as was expressed here by Stepashin's Commission. One thing that seems to me to possibly be important is to work out one matter which this commission did not address completely. In any event the KGB and the leadership of the KGB are not main figures. They are secondary. This is the first cause for the creation of that situation which made possible the attempt at the anti-constitutional coup.

I would not want to hear further talk on this because, probably, this would demand, possibly, deeper analysis. But I nevertheless think that the mood of contradiction which came up on the single distributed basis of socialist economics, the conflict between the old party and state structures and the centrist employees and the newly-born democratic power which did not take that path of any constructive cooperation, but took the tragic path of breaking down, contradictions, and destruction—this conflict very seriously led us both to the putsch and to this situation in which we find ourselves since the putsch. And the tragic, leadership role here was played by the reactionary policy of orthodox hierarchy of the CPSU leadership, the KGB, the military-industrial complex, and the army, which from the beginning, as everyone knows, refused to compromise and elected a path of procrastina-



tion and forceful opposition to the objectively necessary democratization both of the economy and generally and so on. Everyone knows this. And in summary, after a series of adventuristic attempts, beginning with Vilnius in January, this August culmination, well, this is the result. The KGB is not controlled like an autonomous entity by any super-secret authority other than the CPSU Central Committee, and it has broad capabilities from secret political surveillance to the use of special purpose forces, directly used by the leadership of the CPSU and the KGB for realizing their policies. And as a result of their policies, there was damage to the party and state structures, the international pressure, and the abrupt disintegration of the economy, apparently, already having lost the last chance of directed reform. I am talking, maybe, somewhat more broadly than the specific questions which the commission set before me, but I think that it is impossible not to consider this influence.

In one word one can say that while today nothing remains which was, there is serious potential for a social explosion. The situation today has become significantly more dangerous than it was in August. Besides the two traditional spheres of security, that is external, geopolitical as everyone knows, and the internal, suddenly there appeared an absolutely new and absolutely unanticipated third sphere of security, the inter-Confederation [Commonwealth]. This is apparent. Until today, for some unknown reason, nobody has spoken to this matter, but this is one of the new spheres which it is necessary to approach seriously because besides the declarations today, where, in passing, some matters of security are recognized, there is a total lack here of legal and organizational mechanisms, and we observe dangerous improvisations of nationalists and patriots against a background of growing aggressiveness. And in Russia itself, one must say, that speculating on the difficulties, speculating on the economy in disarray, there is actually beginning to appear a neo-Bolshevism which has recovered from its initial fear and which bears with itself a national chauvinistic false patriotism.

They are unconstructive; they do not propose anything constructive; they await their hour; and for them today, the worse it is, the better. And if we recognize this, that there is a second question which I was asked to answer, about understanding of the place, functions, and structure of the federal organs of security, guaranteeing the impossibility of their participation in conducting a conspiracy against the legal authorities. This second question at this moment goes somewhat to another level, and this is not as important because on the first level there is still some conduct of security policies and the conduct of acting and active legislation which, we can say directly, if we speak of the legal vacuum, that after the breakdown, the disintegration of the Union today, largely has only grown because actually, if the main guarantee today is the non-participation of the special services, then the matter is easily solved. We can use the "method" of the Eastern European or Baltic states, that is, totally disband these services and create new ones, free from Communist ideology of *Chekist* security organs. But I personally think that such a path is unacceptable in principle. This is the same Bolshevism with a different face, a repetition of what has gone before, and which has no promise, and in general the question is broader and deeper than in the sense only of the former KGB. I am absolutely convinced that it is necessary to struggle against the ideology of Bolshevism and *Chekism*. Therefore, it is necessary to carefully attend to the rights of each individual because if our type of socialism which we built—perhaps without repression,

probably would have been impossible to build—but it is absolutely impossible to create a civilized, free, democratic society without any discriminatory measures against anyone at all, all the more for ideological reasons.

Nevertheless, providing an answer to this second question there are several general considerations about the situation in the country. Nevertheless, answering the second question, I would propose the known scheme which was not used in the years of perestroika, and I say directly that I simply don't understand why they are slow to accomplish this in the post-perestroika time.

First. This should be begun so that we would not have these constant questions and could work a general concept of security, determining new priorities. What priorities? If we have done with American imperialism, then what? Thus specifically the state organs should task the special services, and the special services should not determine their own priorities, since this concept of security has to be based on the attainment of international and internal economic and political stability, territorial integrity, and the independence of Russia not through the route of deterrence, as it was before, and the accumulation of mountains of arms, and not by the path of force and repression, but exclusively on the basis of trust, and once trust, that means openness of democratic powers of various forms of control. Such a concept, a new concept (this is readily apparent) can call itself only an actually strong power, a strong state. It cannot allow itself the luxury of weakness, and it will be strutting, so to speak, and will create the illusion of some sort of strength, but this is only an illusion. Certainly, time is needed for this to happen, because the concept has to be looked at and realistically reflect the necessary and possible start of the building both of a system of security and a legal basis for security, coming from political appropriateness, by which we are now often being led, and which is by the law and only by the law. As I already said, this is my personal opinion, and nobody else's, and I am not representing anyone else here. We have a legal vacuum which just now has grown.

The second thing we have to do. I ask you to understand that this is no new discovery, I am only stating my opinion, as I was asked to do, and so I am stating it. You can take it or leave it, implement it or not. That is the right of those who have such rights.

Second, we should sign a pact concerning collective security for the countries of the Confederation [sic]. Even when I had the honor to head these organs, the draft was sufficiently worked out by competent organs at the level of academics, and at the deputy level, and by those participating here. This draft of the pact did come out, and apparently everyone knows that it exists. Why hasn't it been signed? I know that Comrade Stepashin knows that the draft exists, and that it is a competent, very good draft, but it is not signed. And it seems to me that today there is nothing more important for the people ( I don't want to say for the nation), specifically for the people than strengthening the Confederation and the pact was directed toward that. This is a matter for the politicians, and they also have a matter then for these very professionals to create a coordinated mechanism for the work of special services. There was an attempt to create such a coordinated mechanism. Now they [coordinated mechanisms] do not exist and, surely, we can't delay this. We must create a unified information system with strictly developed procedures for mutual exchange of information and dependence on the

competence of the participants. This also is a matter for the professionals, and it is very easy to do. And, probably, we should sign an inter-governmental agreement about legal assistance, which as far as I know, we don't have either.

The third proposal. Develop and adopt a package—I think it's important that it be a package, because we must not once again go along the route of the past mistakes of the old Union parliament, when there are adopted, let's say, the basis for cooperation and not a legal right, and so on, and we mustn't adopt something in individual droplets, but must develop and adopt them in a package, and the preparation for this is sufficient—a legal basis worked out in detail for the activity of the special services. I want to emphasize that it must be worked out in detail because the law of declarations, the law of declarations of the known May law about state security, which we all quite easily criticize, is unacceptable in a democratic society, and there will remain an unacceptable outburst of instructions from the authorities of such a democratic state as they interfere with human rights. When I was the KGB Chairman for three months, I gathered the English, Italian, French, and American laws about matters connected with the conduct of special measures, and each of them is about as thick as your finger, where strictly, exactly, clearly are regulated all the activities and matters of control and all the rest. Only in August, 1991 did we add to the criminal-trial standard that this is authorized. By the way, Russia did not accept this Union legislation, and these are the Union bases which do not exist today. That is, in fact, all this is illegal, and nobody can give any guarantees.

What sort of laws do I think this package should contain? About state secrets, about commercial secrets, laws regulating protection and intercept of information, about what we are talking about, the work of all the special services—intelligence, counterintelligence, and we have a whole series of special services, laws regulating investigation operations, about KGB files, about private investigation, which, like mushrooms after the rain, are increasing, not having any legal basis, and you don't find this dangerous for some reason. Probably it's important to have a law about state crimes which is vitally important to simply and accurately today assign responsibility for inciting international disagreements, chauvinism, and nationalism.

Fourth. Viktor Pavlovich Barannikov [Minister of Security] already talked about this. I support him completely. Organize comprehensive but responsible parliamentary control based on the law over the work of special services without any interference with their operational work.

Fifth. I personally think, excuse me, I *know* this will not be supported by everyone. I do not think that structural restructuring of the special services today determines the security of the citizens, of society, and of democracy. This does not determine security. On the contrary, partial restructuring itself creates the danger, since it disseminates the personnel and teaches them inaction and irresponsibility and leads to the loss of professionals—and I am not referring to myself here. This must be stopped. And if, finally, we have created two ministries of security and internal affairs, intelligence, special communications, border troops, and bodyguards for very important people, then now it's time to stop this permanent reorganization and leave them alone and allow them to start working, adapting to the new, the completely new situation in which the special services have not worked. I think that we cannot compare when they were controlled by the Politburo and worked in a

completely different party-state system. They are appearing and are beginning to work in a democratic system and are only starting out to work, and they need help in general, help, by the way, primarily legislative, and we will begin to suspect them of some intrigues first of all. I am thoroughly convinced, knowing those personnel which are now in the leadership, that deepening the disintegration and decentralization is not the answer to the question which Gleb Pavlovich asked, in that you may see some guarantee of security from the participation of the unified *mostra* [monster?] in such an operation which they tried to pull off in August.

Deepening this disintegration and decentralization, the leaders of these services, and I am thinking other services such as military intelligence and customs probably should immediately create a tax-financial inspectorate with the rights of inquiry. They will be able to work out the necessary system of various coordinated mechanisms. And then we can be more comfortable in our relations with our security services, and they will correspond more to that ideology of a legal democratic state which the Supreme Soviet of Russia intends to build. Excuse me. Thank you for your attention.

**Chairman**

Do the deputies have questions? Please, second microphone.

**Nikulin** (Member of the Supreme Soviet)

Vadim Viktorovich, I have several short questions. Much has been printed in the press about the fact that on the eve of the known incidents in the Baltics, you assured the commanders of the OMON [MVD Special Designation Unit] in the Baltics, not independent states, that they are required to comply with the Constitution of the USSR and act in accordance with the laws of the USSR. And later, after all these events, you, apparently, betrayed them, and as a result, their fate now is quite deplorable. This is the first question. And the second question.

**Bakatin**

I don't want there to be a second question. I came here to a specific hearing about a specific matter. Moreover, I will not comment on the presentations of various media which often give diametrically opposing evaluations.

**Chairman**

Excuse me, maybe I can ask something in this matter. This is correct.

**Bakatin**

I am prepared to answer questions on the theme of the hearing. I think that we can get together another time on the theme of my personal or not personal promises to anybody.

**Nikulin**

Then tell us, please, since you were the Chairman of the KGB after the August events, why did you do such a poor job in replacing those of the established generals and directorate chiefs who had served out full terms—and I was able to visit several directorates—and practically nothing was done to replace these very reactionary, conservative generals with a younger generation of officers of progressive orientation?

**Bakatin**

That is a subjective evaluation. I look at it differently. I went to each one individually and worked with each one. You consider them reactionary. I would be more careful in my evaluations. I wouldn't find it necessary to judge them so sweepingly.

**Mikhail Molostvov** (Committee on Human Rights)

I want to address you as a private citizen. And I would say, as someone whom I respect as an honest person. But this question concerns reality, the reality of the various of our special services, that activity which we fear. Remember there was that noted—the press is reminding us of it now—“bathing” of our now, then, our future president. I remember how you with reluctance then went to the rostrum as the minister from whom the [USSR] Congress [of People's Deputies] demanded an explanation. Now all the more you may not answer me, because you, actually, are a private citizen. But I would like to know, was this a personal special case or was this in connection with political games within our country? And this history with “the Yeltsin bath?” Was this a personal deal or a political game? A dangerous political game.

**Bakatin**

I will not answer that question.

**Molostvov**

Thank you.

**Chairman**

Fourth microphone.

**Unidentified speaker [possibly M. G. Astafayev]**

My first question will be to the Chairman. Don't think that I had in view the previous question. This has nothing to do with that. I didn't hear, let's say, that in the practice of American [oversight committee] meetings it is allowed not to answer some question. That's my question to you.

And now, Vadim Viktorovich, to you. You have the right again to refuse to answer, but I repeat my question concerning the known transmittal of material to the American embassy. I considered your interview in *Izvestiya*. It was said somewhat indirectly that this was done at least after consultation with President Gorbachev and President Yeltsin. Could you answer, was this your initiative or was your agreement solicited? Or whose initiative was it?

**Bakatin**

It was my initiative and I asked them to agree to it.

**Chairman**

Thank you. Concerning answers. It happens that we are not now conducting an investigation, and Vadim Viktorovich was invited as a private citizen, and not as an object of the investigation of a man whose activity we are investigating. Now we have Gleb Yakunin, please, a member of our commission. Gleb Pavlovich, aren't you ready? Excuse me, I didn't warn you earlier. The next person is People's Deputy Rebrikov. Please, Vladimir Rebrikov, a member of our commission.

**V. Rebrikov** (RSFSR People's Deputy)

Good day, distinguished deputies and distinguished participants. I joined this commission to check the segment connected with reorganization, or the possible reorganization of the organs of power for control. Therefore, I would like to interpret a little that information which I received during the period of the commission's work, and with those structures about which we managed to associate, and which helped my work. And now I will present to you my conclusions and recommendations concerning the possible reorganization or the danger of possible reorganizations, which today are taking place in the system of the law-enforcement structures, including both the KGB and the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs].

In my view, today we have a society held prisoner by three ideas. The idea of administrative management of the state. The idea of managing capital. And the idea of a socially just state, which all rule the majority of our population. But we have never achieved the idea of legality and rights. One may say from three items which we managed to look at while checking the oblasts and those activities which were done by responsible people during the putsch period. They bent all systems of construction of our state mechanism, as this same information showed, to a self-organization, to a self-fulfillment not on the basis of legal norms, but on the basis of personal interaction, personnel coordination, and workers of these structures. Personal, subjective influences and the assignment and movement of the leaders of all ranks predominated. The party slogan which was adopted 70-plus years ago that "personnel decide everything" lives until this time and acts quite efficiently.

Today there is practically no opposition and control in the parliament, and moreover in the public to what is going on in the organization of state structures, since they [presumably both parliament and the public] lack the structures of public organizations which can resist [the changes] and inform the public about these processes.

I want to say that this is true of the MVD and the KGB. The struggle for the sphere of influence between the KGB and MVD was waged throughout the period of the existence of the so-called Soviet structure. You all know examples of this. I would like to talk a little about what took place in the period when Andropov and Shchelokov stood in opposing positions.

We had one alma mater. That is the CPSU and its ideology. But these monsters which grew and actually went out of control began to dictate their own conditions. And this very struggle took Shchelokov to the alternative about which you know and Andropov to the post which he later occupied.

But I am interested in the continuation of this line, and how it operates today. The idea of this struggle is that the KGB structure tried to use every means to gain supremacy over the organs of the MVD, its employees, and its agents. As you know, there was movement of several thousand KGB employees and a large transfer of personnel into the MVD system, about which now, by the way, Barannikov spoke. There was massive repression connected with the bringing about of criminal cases. This in general let happen, so to speak the discharge which was done by Fedorchuk.

Under Fedorchuk, you know, a specific group of MVD employees was formed. That's what I want to say, that Demidov took an active part in this work. I will name names, not covering up the essence, and if anyone has any further questions, you can see me and I will try to clarify them. For example, among those surrounding Dunaev alone there were discovered about, I don't

remember exactly, four or five KGB agents who were introduced during this period. You can check this out with Dunaev.

Now such an appearance, as we say, has been stopped. But I think that there is more work necessary. And I will further name for you a series of names which in meetings with me, per information, and so on, stand in one chain and whose actions in personnel assignment, use, and making some decisions were somehow controlled, and we will say, agreed with one another. These are Barannikov, Demidov, Yelin, Silaev, Yegorov, Petrov, Skokov, Lobov, Polenichko, Aslakhanov, Ilyushin, Stepankov, Dunaev, and Vazhagov.

I will not disclose all the mechanisms of cooperation, but they do exist. I can tell interested people about them.

The question was raised here that a law is needed to regulate the investigation operations activity of these subunits. Therefore, I want to get the information to you, as a result of these counteractions, the necessity to take up the optimum alternative. Right now in the Supreme Soviet a URZ law is being discussed, which, as in the old "good" times, all the practical activities of the operational subunits depend on the permission of the authorities' instructions and regulations. And this alternative was proposed by the employees of the practical services who would call the civilian society somehow to control that process, that is, an alternative of codification of this activity where there would be norms for direct action and not norms for ordering the leadership. This was upset by a group of workers of the MVD system who said that they fulfill the social order. But who asked? This is no specific answer?

I want to say that those alternatives about which we are speaking now, of the putsch, yes, in my opinion, the breakdown of this putsch, was the action of those professionals and subunits which were supposed to be the executors of it, and probably, it was their inaction and their civil feeling which did not allow them to fulfill these criminal laws, but it was in no way the action of those politicians and leaders which stood above us. This is one thing. You can analyze this from the materials you have.

The result of that group of persons whose names I named to some extent is connected among themselves. I think, as with the case of Filshin and the cutoff of credit to the Russian government, when it wants to stand on its own two feet. I have data about the stoppage of 500 million and of one billion dollars, the disruption of possible contacts between Russia and [Miami?] in the delivery of sugar to please Cuba and our interests and the displacement to a secondary role or the replacement of such people as Grebennikov, Dunaev, Komissarov, and Ivankov, about which you already heard. These are specific acts.

Further, today's situation with these people allows them to control almost the same institutions of state power as the Procuracy, the MVD, the KGB, and State Arbitration—that is, all four institutions which practically are responsible for compliance with the law.

In this situation, I want to ask you, do we need some laws and who will develop them, and who can control them in this situation? Today practically nobody. To the extent that parliament has freed itself from the control over personnel assignment and hiring, therefore, today's situation is very fraught [with danger].

I do not want to hold your attention any longer, I only want to say that in my opinion, in this situation, it is essential to do the following:

- Establish control by parliament on the hiring and firing of important positions;
- [Consider] the possibility of removal and redistribution of the functions of these repressive organs to the extent that the less they are unified, the more alternatives [we have] for controlling them and the more alternatives [we have] for making their merging impossible and [hindering] their ability for self-development.

And here I would like to say that even the state should in the person of our parliament and the state cooperate in the creation within these structures of the organs of public control, by which I envision trade unions and various types of officers' meetings. This process is ongoing, and is meeting with fierce resistance from the leadership of all ranks, including from our distinguished Comrade Barannikov, who reassured us about all this at the time of his selection, when he was named, but whose actions are quite diametrically opposite. I saw this from his answers.

Therefore, I consider it essential that such institutions of public assurance, the possible rebirth of these structures, must be stimulated and created.

Further, I would like to talk about increasing the openness in assigning and removing responsible persons. It is essential to disclose their income at the time they accept the job, and exclude any possibility that they would participate in any commercial operations, because this increases the citizens' trust in that job and that person and allows us in at least some degree to bring public figures to the state structures which in the eyes of the public have totally discredited themselves.

Therefore, I want to say since there are personal relationships among these people, that along party lines there are some possibilities for them to recommend to one another here and there, so it is essential in this case, probably, to legalize an institution of bail, so that such assignments, and a number of other cases, are known concretely, such as who stands for whom and who is coming from whom, because belated hearings like ours and, so to speak, bust investigations are after the fact, and play no prophylactic role.

I also want to talk about the fact that today I stopped only indirectly on the idea of administrative management of the government of power. The idea of the adherents to social justice, and this is our whole society, and the idea of management of capital, the capital society, this is related, I think, to the Moscow government, with all those persons who support it.

Today the trade union of police workers and the block of parties to which belong Gdlyan, Chernichenko, Rumyantsev, and the other five parties are working on gathering and checking out information and also anti-societal activity of these adherents of idea management via capital, and not via the law. We are gathering this information now and verifying it. I want to say that if we do not take measures to establish control and also to introduce these public structures in these organizations, in my opinion, two alternatives await Yeltsin. One of the alternatives is the Gorbachev alternative, when they betrayed him to please a new leader who would reflect their interests. Russia—the Union alternative, that is disintegrating. And the second alternative, that is that Yeltsin become the father of all the peoples of the remnants of Russia, and in Russia the regime would be reduced to Chile or something similar.

Thank you for your attention.



**Chairman**

Thank you. Please, Father Gleb Yakunin. No questions are needed, and now we will listen to the commission members and commission experts. The following speaker will be Boris Mikhailovich Pugachev, a commission expert.

**G.P. Yakunin**

Distinguished deputies, honored guests! I will try to be brief, because everyone is already tired and it is hard to comprehend, all the more so such important and interesting material. The repressive organs of the KGB and the church—this is a painful theme, and actually we were forced to let some stuff slip through, and that which I discovered, I who was a dissident for 30 years, so to speak, in the framework of the church organization, is staggering. On the words of the classics of Marxism and Leninism, we spoke about the fact that in the world, the growth of socialism, the establishment of Communism, religion would die, and the negative pronouncements about the fact that Marx said that it was the opiate of the people and Lenin said that it is a spiritual vodka, all of this was in the area of theory.

Even at the 11th Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Worker's Party (RSDWP), the precursor of the Communist party, in its program there were five points. To establish without limit freedom among all freedoms which the Bolsheviks in the case of the fall of the tsarist regime and their accession to power promised. These were freedom of conscience—above all freedom of conscience—of speech, of the press, of meetings, to strike, and of unions. What beautiful words! Since 1917, when the Cheka was created, the all-out struggle with religion was started. Now you know the basic moments of this struggle, the confiscation of church valuables, the mass closing of churches, the struggle with collectivization, the mass destruction of religion, particularly in rural areas. By the beginning of the war [probably World War II], the churches and religion had practically ceased to exist, and only for show for foreigners were some churches in Moscow and Piter [St. Petersburg] and in oblast and republic centers [allowed to remain open].

In 1943, the Russian Orthodox Church began to be reestablished, but under the very strict control of Beria himself. The most terrible thing was that besides the external persecution, recruitment began. We discovered a very interesting document. I won't read the whole thing here, because Poloshin published it in *Izvestiya*. This is an excerpt from the report, not disclosing the name of an employee of the Cheka, an authorized assistant, from the main custody, archive 1, opus 5. There it is said directly how it is necessary to recruit the clergy. The clergy is to be used for these purposes, particularly those who occupy the important service positions in church life, and this is specifically for the struggle against religion, such as the church hierarchy, the metropolitans, and so on, forcing them under the threat of severe responsibility to give out among the clergy these or those instructions which might be useful to us. For example, banning the forbidden agitation about decrees which were directed against religion, closing monasteries, and so on. That is, resistance of the new power to destroy religion. This led to the fact that the agent recruited was supposed to be a slave of the Cheka forever, fearing to disclose the conspiracy of his activity. Recruitment is done and should be done of informants and threats of prison or concentration camp for insignificant reasons, for speculation, for violations of the laws or

instructions of the powers and so on. Unfortunately, I must confirm that at the dawn of this work, this activity of the Cheka was quite successful.

How, discovering these archival materials, do we evaluate the leadership of the Fifth Directorate? By the way, I already raised the question here to Deputy Prosecutor Lisov about the activity of Filipp Denisovich Bobkov. By the way, under his personal leadership for literally decades this monstrous service was created, with agent activity in church organizations. What were the aims of this activity? In the first place, to solidify the agents' positions. I must say that we as confessors and as Orthodox were interested in the situation in the Russian church, but I must say directly that there was not a single confession [which was not infiltrated], so I don't think that the Russian church is an exception. There were many recruited agents among the Muslims, the Baptists, and even among the Catholics. It seemed that even such a powerful organization which had resisted pressure and had a great deal of experience with the state in the Baltics also was recruited. And among the Buddhists—well, we are only human, and our commission was not able to deal with this matter. Therefore I am talking basically about the Russian Orthodox church. Strengthening the agents' positions, moving KGB agents into leadership positions. You know the famous slogan “personnel decide everything,” and the KGB leadership worked on this and tried to move personnel.

There is a lot of material. For example, agent Pavel, who was sent to Irkutsk, was moved into a leadership position in the Russian Orthodox church. After six years, by the way, he became a metropolitan. He was a young man, and this was an unprecedented case, only thanks to the influence of these organs he was able to break through. Further, at the level of strengthening agents' positions, in 1980 information, agent Grigorenko, one of the bishops, was moved in the line of the Russian church to a leadership position. And there are many, many such examples.

The KGB used church delegations, including some of its own personnel under the guise of [delegation] members. For example, in the makeup of a delegation were included—this is information from 1976—KGB agents Ognev, Sergeev, and others, including an operational worker of the active reserve under appropriate cover as an employee of the patriarchate. Sent along on a trip to the People's Republic of Bulgaria with Patriarch Pimen, as part of the group, was an employee of the KGB Leningrad Directorate, Comrade Khripunov. And so on.

Unfortunately, the Directorate of External Church Relations (UVTsS), the International Department of the Moscow Patriarchate was actually turned into a total cover for the activities of KGB agents and their activity abroad. They used church agents for rechecking the reliability of other agents; that is, they spied on one another. In March, 1984, the information “in connection with the signal about the possible change in attitude of agent Nesterovich, through our operational capabilities and the capabilities of friends from [Bulgaria], he was sent back to the USSR. Participating in these measures were agents Prokhorov, Vadim, and Kuznetsov. Work on this signal continues.”

Control over church organization and church meetings was done also within the Soviet Union. For example, in 1980, the special “Staff-88” was developed, which worked on surveillance for assuring the celebration of the 1000th anniversary of the conversion of Russia. There was a special plan, “Raskolniki-88,” and this was a struggle against church dissidents. Written

in 1988, KGB agent Nikitin was sent to Zagorsk with the intent of operating on object "Missionary." Object "Missionary" is Alexander Men, and object of observation. By the way, this touches this theme here. Without an end, every year we see in almost every month there are traces of operational work of the KGB about the endless observation and tactical operations around the deceased Father Alexander Men. We see that the KGB not only helped to expose crime, but actually opposed in all ways so that the MVD organs would not investigate this monstrous crime.

KGB organs used the church, and church agents for gathering operational information. This was primarily in the West, but also inside the country. For example, there is an interesting note which we could not put our hands on this instant, signed by the KGB in which orienting note number 48Ts was issued, dated 28 July 1970, about the KGB organs' use of the Russian Orthodox church in counterintelligence measures within the country and abroad. This is the use, as they say, of a respected organization to serve the intelligence organization. The use of agents in the church medium for observation and surveillance of the church opposition was also widely used.

And, finally, the formation of a positive public opinion about the policies of the Soviet Union with the use of church agents of the KGB. For example, in accordance with the plan for active measures against the deployment of IRBMs [U.S. intermediate-range ballistic missiles] in Europe, which [plan] was worked out in accordance with an instruction of the CPSU Central Committee about this matter and confirmed by the leadership of the KGB on 28 August 1981, and also within the framework of a joint plan between the service of the APGU of the KGB about exerting positive influence toward the Soviet Union on the clerical circles of the West, through the leading agents of the KGB organs Abbat, Antonov, Kuznetsov, Nesterovich and others via religious channels we will accomplish a complex of actions for acting on the public and political circles of the countries of Western Europe. The agent capabilities of the Russian Orthodox church and its friends toward the Pope also provided information that the excessive "growth" of the Uniate question could mean only damage to the relations between the Vatican and the Russian Orthodox church.

Or take for example, October, 1983. At the invitation of the "Friendship Denmark" society, a delegation of the Russian Orthodox church which included agents Abbat and Grigory went to Denmark. The agents were assigned the task of vindicating the peace-loving foreign policy of the Soviet government, and to expose the inspiration of Western propaganda about the state of religion and the believers in the USSR and so on and so on.

And, finally, to provide politically positive influence on the foreign delegations who visited our country. There is also material about this.

Here's a problem which has come up for us. Many accuse us because we publish this and even our deeply respected Vadim Viktorovich Bakatin at the beginning of this process said that we should not expose agents, because this would cause a great deal of damage to morale. Sitting in front of us is a very large legal and moral problem. We, as they say, are beating our breasts, and saying, "I am a democrat," and we think that actually the agents should be agents as in any normal state. And the 5th CD [Chief Directorate] and the KGB should occupy themselves with agent activity. This is natural, as the MVD works in the area not only of espionage, but in organized crime and the drug war and so on. This is natural. But here there is a problem because of what the 5th CD, Directorate Z, was. This was an anti-

constitutional organization which systematically destroyed almost 15-16 departments.

In every direction—science, culture, art, sports, and finally religion. We see that monstrous pressure, the monstrous disintegration from this organization. I see it as a matter of principle, that we can not hide this monstrous past from the people's deputies and from our people. This is particularly true when it comes to religion. I think that even in democratic countries, let's take the USA or Great Britain, a confessor is not supposed and the state doesn't have the right to recruit, because the confessors have a relationship to, as they say, the sacred self, to the institution of confession, to the secrets of the confessional, and he may not break the seal of confession.

I am convinced that these agents, many of them, were coerced, and they were forced to do so. And it is true that many of them are sincere people, and we are not now demanding any punishment for them or public scorn. We only demand penance and absolution. Because our church can not recover and the people now have such a pull and belief in religion, in all religions, in Islam and in Christianity. The state cannot, I think, recruit confessors. That is, as they say, a great sin.

They should recruit on completely new principled beginnings, and a law should be developed, actually, about investigative work. And we must get away from the old cadre of informers. Let new, solemn operational forces seek the cooperation on a new basis in principle. And the state, I think should actually adopt in the new law about investigative work a provision that confessors may not be recruited, that it would be forbidden to recruit clergy of any sort. By the way, we have many troubles from these leaks.

We saw the personnel, maybe, on television. Suddenly our contemporary KGB leadership got very nervous, and did not allow it, and did not allow us to dig into the roots of this monstrous control over society. I think that these archives will be given and should be given to the Russian archives. And our sacred duty is to fight to the end so that. . . . This is a natural process. It takes place in other democratic countries which are moving ahead. Like in Germany. And in the end [archives] were opened there, and [they found that] in the Evangelical church there were 3,000, as they say, informers, *stukachi*. Nevertheless, the believers all the same go and pray. But the church is being cleansed. I think that this process should take place here also. All these archives, and the ideal, as in the former GDR, is that each citizen has the right to obtain his own dossier and look at everything that is written about him.

Thank you for your attention.

### **Chairman**

Thank you. Boris Mikhailovich Pugachev, an expert on our commission, a doctor of philosophy. The next speaker will be Alexander Nikolayevich Kichikhin, another expert on the commission.

### **B. M. Pugachev**

Distinguished parliament members, committee members! Our Commission was manned with qualified jurists, state security workers, and civil servants. There were a total of ten experts. We carefully studied the following mass of documents. We studied the correspondence of the KGB Secretariat for the 1980s. We carefully studied the account of Directorate Z,

the former Fifth Chief Directorate. We studied all of the correspondence between the president and the KGB leadership. There was a great deal of interesting material here for the last two years. We selectively looked at the KGB archives for the earlier period. In parallel with this, we looked at the archives of the CPSU Central Committee which had been closed previously and we were able to become acquainted with the inventory of the party archives of the president, but we were not allowed access to them. Therefore, out of all those here present except for the state security workers, our commission has more information about the specific state of affairs in this authority.

What did we find out? First, we found out that the plans for forcible removal of democratic forces from the political areas were initiated in our country starting in the Autumn of 1990. There was direct correspondence on this matter directly between Gorbachev and the KGB leadership, specifically with Kryuchkov. The latter was an act-type letter, which suggested a plan for introducing an emergency situation throughout the country. This letter, large in scope, which later served in developing Kryuchkov's actions, was sent to Kryuchkov<sup>1</sup> on 7 February 1991, and is entitled "About the Political Situation in the Country." The letter still exists. Gorbachev was acquainted with it. It is located in the archives of the KGB Secretariat.

I would like to emphasize that such letters unquestionably had a provocative character, were sent by Kryuchkov<sup>2</sup> to Gorbachev several times in connection with the situation in Lithuania, and particularly with the events in Lithuania. Here Gorbachev was provoked to all these actions. In connection with the March events in Moscow, when military equipment was deployed onto the streets of Moscow, we found no documents indicating Gorbachev's evaluation or his political attitude to all these documents, which bore a clearly provocation character and anti-constitutional character. Our conclusion is that here the political responsibility is borne by the president of the USSR, Gorbachev, directly for the preparation of the coup d'etat and the prerequisites for the coup d'etat.

In part it was the work of the Fifth Chief Directorate. Yevgeny Maximovich invited [us] to come to him and to acquaint ourselves with the documents. We did acquaint ourselves, Yevgeny Maximovich, with your documents. Included in them, we found a letter addressed to Vorotnikov, the former chief of Directorate Z signed by the Deputy Chief of the Fifth CD, Zhizhin. This letter was dated 21 March 1990. It contains extended criticism of our foreign intelligence abroad, and contains a collection of information relating to Deputies of the USSR and Deputies of Russia. In several cases, these were Gorbachev's closest friends. We found the first document of this paper, showing that Gorbachev was acquainted with this document. After our commission had done its work, this document was destroyed. This was the first document after the work, Distinguished Comrade Bakatin, [after] our work the document was destroyed. But we demanded and obtained a copy,

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1. This might be a transcriber's error. The sense of the paragraph would indicate that the letter was sent by Kryuchkov (*Kryuchkovym*), but the transcriber heard to Kryuchkov (*Kryuchkovu*.) As important as this information is to the sense of the speech, it is an extremely easy error for an inattentive or inexperienced transcriber to make. his might be a transcriber's error.

2. In this case the transcriber did hear *Kryuchkovym*.

and the deputies were acquainted with it. Therefore this work was done quite broadly.

Since 1953, we found, Yevgeny Maximovich, all the data about the transmittal of money via the first CD, through intelligence to the leaders of Communist parties. So as not to get anybody excited, [we found] just one small example about executing a resolution of the CPSU Central Committee Presidium dated 12 March 1953, concerning the transmittal of \$1,200,000 to the Chief of the French Communist Party, Jacques Duclos. There were also many such letters and such documents in your documents, and it would be possible to give a handbook made up of them to the parliament, since there are no state secrets contained in them.

Further. Concerning the assurance from our respected present Ministry, Comrade Bakatin, that the KGB and the present Ministry of Security will conduct operational work. I am acquainted, professionally, with the operational work of the *militsiya* and the KGB. I am educated as a jurist, and I have good practical experience in legal work in investigative organs, and I can confirm that in those forms and about those objects which the KGB did work until very recently, this work was anti-constitutional. We came to that conclusion. In 1991 and in 1990, KGB organs gathered information about Democratic Russia, the Moscow Tribune, the Democratic Union, the Democratic Radical Party, the Socialist Party, the April Writers' Union, the United Workers' Front, independent trade unions, and Pamyat. There was quite active agent work within Pamyat.

Concerning strike committees and other mass organizations and citizens, this work had no political expediency nor any [meaning for] state security. This was simply work of political investigation, against which, apparently, the parliament is speaking out. This is known to our distinguished minister.

We established that until very recently the KGB had been carrying on quite broad intercept of mail, registering correspondence, monitoring telephone conversations, and covert searches of citizens' apartments and placing monitoring devices there, equally both in relation to political parties opposed in attitude to the CPSU. In several cases in these central acts, the president of the USSR, Gorbachev, was informed of them by the state security organs.

We established that in 1990-1991 the KGB organs conducted a mass gathering of computer-based information concerning the Moscow intelligentsia. I will name you just some names about whom the KGB organs gathered information—Bella Akhmadullina, Okudzhava, Yefremov, Rybakov, Alla Pugacheva, Pristavkin, Dudintsev, Moiseyev, Tarkovsky, Khazanov, Messerer, Mikhailov-Konchalovsky, Tolstaya, Kaputikyan—I am reading these deliberately, so that we can have in mind the scale on which these activities were done, and how it carried a local character—Yuriy Afanasiev, Yankovsky, Kasparov, Konratiev, Grekovna, Petrushevskaya, Kardin, Strelin, Yegor Kim, Koryakin, Likhachev, Panfilov, Starovoitova, Borodin, Deichman, Grigorovich, Volkov, German, Rozov, Yefofeiev, Aitmatov, Mironov, Spivakov, Gavrilov, Svetlanov, Glazunov, Averdintsev, Didkov, Chuprin, Rasputin, Vasiliev, Zhvanetsky, Zadornov, Abdulov, Kolyagin, Shchekochikhin, and many, many others.

In our view, all this activity was in no way connected with protecting state security, and it had a subversive character in relation to the stability of the state and the security of the state. Moreover, it was also anti-

constitutional in character, to which I would direct the attention of the ministers of security present here.

We established that until now, we don't know how it is working, but there is operating a broad intelligence network of informers in the Moscow Academic Art Theater, the State Academic Bolshoi Theater, the Writer's Union, the Cinematographer's Union, the Humanitarian Institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the State Concert Association, Fedorov's Optical Microsurgery, and many, many others which I simply will not name here.

We already talked about the work within the framework of the church, and we have published just a small part of these documents, of the tremendous amount of documents that the parliamentary commission possesses.

What conclusions did we come to? First, we concluded that that which I am naming, all these directed activities of the KGB were direct precursors of the putsch and created an atmosphere of an illegal, repressive, totalitarian state, which in our view we still are today.

Second. Parliamentary control was totally absent, as was reliable presidential control over the organs of the KGB and security. They were never self-initiated. We think that even today they are self-initiated. There is neither presidential control, and from these meetings which we had, moreover there is, as we see, no parliamentary control.

We came to the conclusion that Gorbachev, as the president of the USSR, knew about the volume of the basic anti-constitutional activity of the security organs and he bears the direct political responsibility for all this activity.

We conclude, and we support that which our representatives of the Ministry of Security [said here], about the necessity for a legislative basis for your activity. There is none now. But I assure you, as an expert, in response to the questions posed here, that it is possible that monitoring of telephone conversations and surveillance [continues]. On the basis of those instructions from the authority which is now operating in the Ministry of Security, such activity can continue.

Moreover, we did not establish what the departments of Directorate Z [are doing], what [its] activity is, and what [is the] character of the agents and their preservation and their present direction. This was not the function of our work.

Well, and [here is] the answer to the number of complaints that were heard in the testimonies of our distinguished ministers of security. First. The figure of 3,900,000 is not a reliable figure. In the archives of the KGB are totals of arrests broken down by month, by year, for each year up to the present time, [and they include] those in jails and camps, in Stalin's time and in Lenin's. There was a very large -scale repression in Lenin's time. This is a special historical theme. Lenin spoke out as an initiator of this repressive, essentially fascist system of the organization of power, but this is a political and philosophical matter. But we found all this here.

And this one system, I emphasize, continues to act even now, and so the number of casualties and repression, I can confirm, does not correspond to that data which is really found in the archives. Look carefully at these totals, and do not trust your assistants on this account.

Second. I think that the confirmation heard here that it is impossible to restore the files about the workers, paid and voluntary informers, the so-

called KGB agents simply does not correspond to the truth. Yes, case files were destroyed and they are still being destroyed, but there is an inviolable file of all agents and so with the intent of cleansing parliament, or some sort of new elections, cleansing parliament, morally cleansing parliament, and not legally, so that each person would have [his own case file] at his disposal, the parliamentary commissions and state security could easily restore the true face of each deputy, and the true face of each political personage, whether it be Primakov, Gorbachev, or other persons, along with each period of their path of life.

And finally, we have to see what is going on now, that political instability, and that the president of Russia is conducting a bloodless coup, a possible overturning of the very brown-red or fascist coup. The security organs, we concluded, when they worked in Lubyanka, their personnel were disinformed, they were knocked unconscious, and they were deprived of any sort of strategy for activity today. The ministries poured out, dumped out an enormous apparatus, 40,000 people in Moscow alone are their basic numbers sitting idle, which is simply unacceptable that they should be on the government payroll. I think that our parliamentary hearings should include the following result, that President Yeltsin in the face of the load and the political situation can not completely take these organs under control. I think that it would be a very productive idea to create a special joint parliamentary-presidential commission, which would work out a strategy for the activity of the security organs, and which would look at the personnel of the security organs and would see to it that society would be free of danger from the security organs and the punitive apparatus toward democratic organs of power as remains, as long as the structure of these organs now, and their functions, aims, and legal basis have not been reestablished.

That's all. Thank you.

### **Chairman**

Thank you. I think that Kichikhin is not here. Please, Yevgenia Albats. You are ready now. This is an expert from our commission.

### **Ye. Albats**

Distinguished Chairman, distinguished audience. I want to say the following. This is the third commission which is working on investigation of the activities and crimes of the KGB in relation to its own people. And already the results of these three commissions show how we have remained in the hands of this terrible organization.

Unfortunately, I must tell you that the attitude toward the KGB, the powers' attitude toward the KGB is a litmus paper, which influences the reality of the democratic intentions of the powers. This attitude, this litmus paper completely showed the level of democratic leanings of the previous power, which declared perestroika and which ended in the August coup, unfortunately, from my point of view, all that is taking place around the KGB, beginning from September, all this ceaseless shuffling and changing of chairs, shows the attitude of the new power to the KGB. Meanwhile, I think that the power has not figured out completely just how dangerous this organization is. All the time we place the cart before the horse. Today, structural changes in the KGB are needed, and there we need it to be divided into various structures, so the committee will not be a terrible monster.



It is not realistic to do this now. Also impossible is a long discussion about how and what to do in reality, and the most important thing is to conclude how the country today doesn't have a concept of what it wants to prevent, and that is the main thing, that it has financial capabilities. The KGB, everything that is connected with intelligence and counterintelligence and so on, are extremely expensive structures, and first of all we need to determine what budget must be set up for the KGB.

Actually, it is necessary to determine what budget will be assigned to the KGB. I am very afraid, that this very potential will show up on board in the committee and in that apparatus which the committee has, with that equipment which it had, will end up being the people who in their ideology are used to working on political investigation. This is a very dangerous thing.

Second. This is totally principled. The whole fear of today's situation around the KGB is that it constituted a threat to each of us, because the KGB works under conditions without legal limits. This lack of legal limits has always existed, and it was in part redoubled by the adoption in the spring of last year of the law governing the KGB. And this situation still exists now. Unfortunately, the Russian parliament continues its debates concerning the law about its authority, when it was temporarily turned into the BSB [sic], and then temporarily the Ministry of Security, but nowhere in these laws which they are about to enact, nowhere is there any talk that first of all it is essential to adopt laws which would defend the individual from the tyranny of the secret service. In any country of the world without exception the secret service violated the laws, and it always is the enemy of the individual. But in civilized countries of the world there is a system of defense against the secret service. This is first of all a law about the inviolability of private life, which in America is called the [Freedom of Information Act]. This law about the right for information is an absolutely principled law which is in contrast to the law of information in [this] country, because in a case where the country has a law about information, as there is in civilized countries of the world, either the KGB would give material, or Yevgeny Pavlovich Primakov would not allow it, and whether or not the deputies need access to the material, the KGB should clarify why this or that material is not given out. But the right to the information is a basic right of a free society.

Third is a law about investigative operational activity. It must absolutely be closely regulated, concerning who, when, and under what circumstances the existence of deep development in relation to this or that of our citizens may be done, and in accordance with which law this might be done. I think that we don't have time for developing these laws, and we have to enact them unconditionally, but it is essential now, from my point of view, to have presidential decrees to put these standards in place concerning the inviolability of private life, and about the right to information and about investigative operation activity.

If this is not done, then we have behind our backs an organization which has a great deal of experience in conspiratorial work, an organization which is inclined to be led against many state figures, public figures, and journalists, that there is no sphere of activity into which the KGB wouldn't insert its people, and behind this leading they would pull us, and they are pulling us now, and they will continue to pull us. Thank you.

**A. G. Latyshev** (commission expert)

Distinguished Chairman, distinguished deputies, we were put on the staff of the commission to work basically on the sources of our law-enforcement organs. The period of the 1920s and 1930s could be called the punitive organs, and I want to stop only on the historical documents, on which, and with which we are working. On 21 January, distinguished Comrade Volkogonov said that he was shaken by these documents which he saw in the Central Party Archives. He promised that after some time an eight volume set [of them] would be published, but I think that these documents should be published immediately, and they should be published even as photocopies. These are the documents about how Lenin organized the burning of Baku wholly and completely, and how the taking of hostages was organized during the advance on Yudenich's army, and they were sent ahead of the advancing units, and they were shot in the back, and several hundred were killed, and how they burst behind their backs into the trenches of the enemy.

Such features, such as in the summer of 1918, long before the attempt on Lenin's life and before the declaration of the Red Terror, in each rural district (*volost*) no fewer than 100 peasants were hung, and in this way any opposition was completely paralyzed. That's what happened. This is considered a unit of preservation, and there is collection about who will first publish these units of preservation, and the people believe that they are gathered in Manezh Square with the portraits, with the transport, and it is impossible to treat the people like fools. The deputies have to demand the publication of all these documents, these political documents. The commission works under very difficult conditions. Last Monday I went to the KGB archives and was admitted to them, but when I arrived Tuesday morning, the warrant officer on duty said he had an order not to allow me in. We have not been admitted for three days, and then Lev Alexandrovich [Ponomarev] came here, and went to the highest court. After the 14th, if I remember correctly, after the 14th they will not allow anyone in.

The problem isn't with us at the end of the day. Other specialists can be found. But apparently, from the side of society, from the side of the Supreme Soviet there has to be a constant commission which will test that routine resistance, which people suffer today when trying to shed some light on what our past was, and not only on the past, but on our present as well.

I think that now these documents must be published. There are no state secrets in them, since in the 1980's somewhere in Italy a film was made, for example, about the trip of Lenin from Switzerland to Russia. A special commission was created about steps against this film. It was signed at the level of the deputy chairman of the KGB, the Chief of the General Department of the CPSU Central Committee. They organized a commission, so that God forbid there would be no documents on the theme of Lenin and German money. But there are such documents. We are beginning to publish part of them. There is some sort of impossibility to actually tell people the truth, this would constitute a large threat. Therefore, it seems to me, that in any other way, the commission should continue its work even after February 14th. Thank you.

**Chairman**

Sergei Vladimirovich Kuleshov, a commission expert, a doctor of historical sciences. He will be the last speaker.

### S. V. Kuleshov

Distinguished colleagues, it turns out that the talk about the sources of those problems which we are looking at today has been placed at the end of our meeting. As a historian, I would like to talk about that which further acquaintance with the KGB archives shows completely, that in the face of the repressive-punitive organs we had a limited element of that system which grew in our country immediately after the Bolshevik coup. One of the main impressive, so to speak, doctrinal elements of this system was the idea of revolutionary force, which began to act on the life of the specially created organs. These organs of revolutionary inquisition have passed into the history under the name of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission. Placed at the service of the Party and the state, they actually turned into a punitive sword. Felix Dzerzhinsky himself, the godfather of the system of political investigation and political terror, simply expressed the entire philosophy of the lawlessness of his organization. The Cheka, he said, must protect the revolution and vanquish the enemy, even if in doing this its sword falls accidentally on the heads of the innocent.

One must say that actually, this sword actually clearly and methodically falls on the heads of the enemies of the totalitarian system, on the heads of the enemies of the Bolshevik regime. Actually the repressive organs were the punitive department of the party's Central Committee. All the most important designations from the very beginning of the existence of these organs and right up to the present time were made only through the higher party instances.

One must talk about the fact that in April, 1918 this same Dzerzhinsky made a very important discovery. He writes that the very existence of Soviet power possibly depends on the totality of the intensity and timeliness of the steps taken by the Cheka. That is, he confirms that this power is founded and is based on repressive methods. Proving that this was actually so is found in the archives and the data from that same 1918 in a letter to Lenin from one of the functionaries from the Voronezh *guberniya*. "Communists," he writes, "are not in a high position. They are completely dependent on the Cheka, in their medium succeeds the revolutionary feeling and in a sea of blood shooting and the death penalty have been visited on Russia."

One must say that the revolutionary doctrine of Bolshevism as such was in general carried in the framework of the question about the methods and means of reaching a goal. The Jesuit principle that the ends justify the means was used even as the basis of the famous historical document, Sergei Nechaev's *Catechism of the Revolution*, which Lenin called the giant of the revolution. In that catechism it is said, "pleasing to a revolutionary is everything which facilitates the success of the revolution." And on this level the instructive documents of the repressive organs are readily apparent. In particular, in one instructional document, also from 1918, a Cheka worker said directly, "We must always remember the features of the Jesuits, which were not sung on the whole square of our work, but were the strange friends, about which everyone knew and was able to act." But in a situation about the obligations of those working in political investigation there was the following situation. We have to make matters such that we can use all methods which can be useful. And all these methods actively were used, particularly in the area of political opponents.

In the archives of the KGB there is a great deal of echeloning, branching dossiers on all the actually opposition parties from the moment of

birth of these parties, from the moment of collapse of parties, and from the moment of the appearance of new political parties and movements.

One must say that concerning these opposition groups very diversified methods were used, right up to creation of window-dressing Central Committees of these parties. The documents speak of this. Prior to massive introduction of political provocateurs. With the blessing of the leaders of the party, and in particular Lenin, there was developed wide-scale destruction of political opponents. First of all, there were massive operations for political genocide against the Socialist-Revolutionary and the Menshevik parties, through introduction of agents in the worker and peasant movements.

One must say that into the sphere of political investigation fell not only political but also various public organizations. This was at the end of 1921, when the policy of transfer from civil war to civil peace was declared, and the chief of the secret department of the Cheka, Samsonov, writes a long note to his leaders, in which he talks about the fact that scientific-technical, cultural, hunting, garden and other societies which were set up must appear with secret information from the Cheka organs. Moreover, he stresses the use of the special circular of the Bolshevik Central Committee about the fact that in all chief directorates and authorities special organizations or bureaus of cooperation with the Cheka were created.

One must say that it is completely symptomatic, and this is also seen from my acquaintance with the archives, that the repressive organs were used from the very beginning not only against the political opposition, but for all appearances of deviant thinking in the ranks of the Bolshevik party itself. Informing was cultivated, forced in it, as was surveillance of one against another. Part of the duties of party members was the obligation to inform the repressive organs of all appearances of free thought. For example, in 1921, out of 449 informers of the Petrograd Cheka, 227 were responsible party workers, and 179 were rank-and-file Communists. There were party purges not only at the end of the 1920s, not only during the period of Stalin's repression, but even in Lenin's period, and they determined the character of state crimes and they threw the corresponding instances under special control. Thus, for instance, at a Presidium meeting of the Cheka on 13 October 1921, a resolution was adopted that all individuals excluded from the party are to be held under special account by the organs of the Cheka. Thus, in 1921 (there is a special file in the archives of the KGB) there was already conducted agent working of a member of the Central Committee, one of the leaders of the workers' opposition, Shlyapnikov.

I want to say that we said today that the changeover to post-totalitarian, to a new democratic society demands the liquidation of all structures which were built by the totalitarian system.

One of the main conditions of our movement to a legal democratic state is to make repressive organs out of the organs of the dangerous structures, which must protect state interests and the legal security of the citizen of the Russian Federation. Thank you for your attention.

### **Chairman**

Thanks to all participants who have patiently sat until the end. I want to formulate the main, from my point of view, conclusion of our hearings. I will not repeat all the words which were said about the coup of 19-21 August, or about in what situation we are found now. We are now in a situation, as was

correctly stated, in a situation of legal infinity. And this is the main task which now stands before us as before the members of parliament.

I want to remind you that we agreed with Viktor Pavlovich [Barannikov] about the fact that in the course of a week we will create a technical service which under the control of parliament and under the control of the committees of the Supreme Soviet in a week will be ready to start fulfilling the tasks about which we talked today, that is, to control and answer questions of who will be monitored and where. If we are not successful in this task, then we will suffer damage.

And also I want to say the following. We have prepared a draft document about the hearings. I think that we will not confirm it now, but in the near future the commission will confirm this document and present it to the press.

I want to acquaint you with some points, and they, apparently, include that which was said here, and can be considered a result of our hearings.

Organize with the participation of leading republic and foreign specialists exacting investigation of the activity of the USSR Cheka-KGB for the entire period of its existence, which will bring about the publication of the first 'White Paper' in the country's history.

And considering some fragments, this does not mean that I have come to a conclusion.

A task of very rapid ridding of society from the repressive institutions of force is on the agenda in the matter of the covert agents of the former KGB. Noting that not overstating the difficulty of the problem and at the same time the impermissibility on leaving in responsible positions, including in the deputy corps, people who were secretly cooperating with the repressive organs, it is essential to study this question with the aim of developing an appropriate law about disclosure, and about which we must request the committees to legislate, and to the rights of man and the security of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation.

And the final fragment is, "adopt a law allowing citizens access to their own dossiers in the former KGB." That, certainly, is not everything. And in the near future we will publish this document.

Someone has passed a question to me. Will there be a press conference about the results of the hearings? I think that we will have such a press conference, but somewhat later. You can obtain information in our secretariat, telephone number 205-5622. Please, the third microphone. You have a question?

### **Zadonsky**

As I understand it, we heard here repeatedly that at some point some part of the archives were destroyed, and another part was destroyed later. And I even, if I am not mistaken, heard that destruction of the archives still continues now.

It seems to me that it is a very important matter which should be expressed in a resolution that the parliamentary commission must announce, that all the responsible persons who are now working and under whose

supervision these archives are located, that they bear personal responsibility from this very moment for the impermissibility of destroying our past. This should ring out.

**Chairman**

You are completely correct, and we will include that in our report.

**Zadonsky**

And one other thing, about the conduct [of the hearings]. I did not hear that it was announced. Our hearings today are official and each responsible person testifying here bears complete responsibility for the presentation of false or incomplete information and for introducing confusion into the hearings, right up to immediate dismissal from his post. This was not done, but it should have been done at the beginning of these hearings.

**Chairman**

You are quite correct.

**(From the hall)**

I think that this should have been done at the beginning of the hearings.

**Chairman**

Yes, I understand. I think that all the responsible people who testified before us understand the full measure of their responsibility and that's how they approached us. Thanks, everyone, for participating in our hearings.

*[Hearing is adjourned.]*

*[Editor's note: The Spring 1996 issue of DEMOKRATIZATSIYA will contain the text of the 10 February 1992 Ponomarev Commission hearings "Concerning the Financial Dealings of the CPSU."]*