

Five Different Perceptions On the Future of Russian Foreign Policy

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The politically active elites, which compete in power struggles in Russia, have different concepts of how Russia's foreign policy should look. These differences comprise the future of foreign policy towards the non-Russian republics of the former USSR and the rest of the world. It is difficult, however, to make a party-by-party analysis of the various foreign policy visions. The political scene is too fragmented, while the differences have much deeper roots than party affiliation: they are based on different political-historical philosophies. It is possible, however, to distinguish the political thinking of five main blocs: liberals, the neo-Communist-nationalist opposition, "centrists," radical democrats and "professional opportunists."

The ideological component of Soviet policy in a bipolar world was clear: the "interests of socialism" played a major role in determining foreign policy; in domestic policy, "state security interests," which in fact meant the preservation of the political power of the Communist *nomenklatura*, overshadowed all other considerations. As one Russian author put it: "At that time, security for us meant the KGB."¹

In the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the re-establishment of the Russian state, different concepts and vocabularies have emerged among the elites that formulate the foreign policy agendas. Two new dimensions are gaining currency.

One is the familiar geopolitical school of foreign relations, in contrast to the Marxist division of the world into socialist, capitalist, progressive and reactionary countries. Geopolitics in Russia now has achieved a respectability it was never able to attain during the Soviet period when it was officially disparaged as the thinking of imperialists and Nazis. Geopolitical analysis now is championed by those who hold themselves out as pragmatists.

The second foreign policy concept is rarely a part of current Western analysis. It rests on what its proponents term a "historical-civilizational" or geostrategic approach that postulates the importance in foreign affairs of civilizations and cultures that have dominated huge land masses for hundreds of years. Current adherents of this analysis, first proposed in the West by Oswald Spengler and Arnold Toynbee, and in Russia by Nikolai Danilevsky and Konstantin Leontiev, believe that the influence of the great civilizations

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is far more important than the more common division of the world into the developed and developing nations, industrial and post-industrial countries.

These concepts have become part of the accepted vocabulary of foreign policy discourse in Russia, along with traditional Marxist and Western positivist political thinking. Their acceptance has reached the point that different groups sometimes give opposite interpretations of the geopolitical reality facing Russia. Acceptance has also achieved a greater impact on policy formulation: Russian military and civil security experts and officials who make foreign policy and military doctrine frequently formulate their goals in geopolitical and geostrategic terms.²

The impetus behind geopolitical analysis in foreign policy gained force in 1992 when the Academy of the Russian General Staff set up the Faculty of National Security for civil government and public officials.³ According to Colonel-General Igor Rodionov, chief of the Academy, the curriculum for students attending the new faculty includes geopolitical and geostrategic studies, as well as courses on economic, ecological and information security. At the same time, the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences created the Center for Geopolitics and General Security headed by Academician Vladimir Pirumov.⁴ According to Pirumov, the time when the Russian military-scientific community thought that "geopolitics is a servant of imperialism" has passed. Today, the newly created Center has gained significant influence through its official coordination of the activities of about 20 institutions and think tanks on contract with the ministries of Defense, Security, and Internal Affairs, as well as the Supreme Soviet and Yeltsin's government.

The subject areas under its wing are as broad as its institutional reach: the Center now coordinates studies on international and national security, defense and military security, economic and ecological security and information security. In addition to this new institutional infrastructure devoted to spreading the geopolitical gospel, some researchers such as Nikolai Kosolapov of the Institute of International Relations and World Economy, have proposed elevating the Russian national interests elucidated by geopolitical analysis to a form of national ideology.⁵ Kosolapov's concept, in contrast to the more usual form of nationalism verging on chauvinism, proposes a nationalist concept based on the experience of the United States, in which the interests of, and allegiance to, the nation-state are seen as superior to ethnic, religious and interest groups. He sees this concept as critical to the formation of a pluralistic and multi-cultural society. The integrating role of national interests is also helpful in formulating national security policy and working out balance-of-power considerations in foreign policy.

The political scene in Russia today is too fragmented to make a party-by-party analysis of foreign policy worthwhile. In this article, we choose instead to analyze the five main trends in Russian foreign policy thinking, as

represented by the pro-Western liberal line of Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, by the neo-Communist-nationalist opposition, by the centrist statist (*gosudarstvenniki*), by radical democrats and, finally, by professional political scientists who consider themselves untied to particular party or government interests. In Western political thinking, the first four would correspond, loosely and respectively, to liberalism, national-extremist political philosophy, conservatism and, finally, to a social-democratic political philosophy. The academics do not fit any clear category. Finally, the opportunists from the whole political spectrum are gladly using the most appealing ideas from the opposite political camp. That is why it is worth identifying those political forces which initially advanced their own foreign policy thinking, regardless of how extreme they may be.

Neo-Communists

In some ways, the neo-Communists are much more sincere and straightforward than their predecessors from the CPSU. In February 1993, the newly reborn Russian Communist Party, along with other Communist groups, published a curious document called the "Program of the Union of Communist Parties—Communist Party of the Soviet Union."⁶ In that document, the Communists adopt the current official Russian foreign policy

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terminology that divides the world into the Near Abroad (the non-Russian parts of the former Soviet Union) and the Far Abroad (the rest of the world). The Program presents a Communist analysis of recent history, as well as a political program that extends into the next

century.

In a through-the-looking-glass analysis, the Program presents the fall of communism in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union as a triumph for socialism! In particular, the Program says that the vitality and drive of market capitalism became possible only because the capitalist economy had learned to use socialist state regulation better than the former Soviet rulers.⁷

But the document says that the apparent success of the world capitalist system is only temporary and that soon—within a decade—Communists and their nationalist allies will get another chance. The Program says that a new wave of anti-Western mass movements in the Third World is not far away. According to the document, the future "national liberation" wave in the Third World will be driven by the slogan of "economic independence" from the West; for developed countries, it will mean a reduction in sociopolitical stability and a decrease in the resources to secure it. The document proposes using the unsolved *economic* and *financial* problems of the Third World in

the same manner that the CPSU exploited the anti-colonial drive for *political* independence in Africa and Asia during the 1960s.

In preparation for this development, the Communists drafted a Minimum Program and a Maximum Program. In the non-Russian parts of the former Soviet Union (the Near Abroad), the document proposes an alliance between the Communists and the so-called national bourgeoisie (former *nomenklatura* and home-grown “black market” wheeler-dealers) and opposition to the so-called “comprador” (collaborator) bourgeoisie, which according to Marxist doctrine, has sold out to foreign capital and political interests. The Program names ruling elites in Russia and Georgia as examples of comprador bourgeoisie. In these countries, the highest priority of Communists and their allies is to remove the Yeltsin and Shevardnadze regimes from power (the Program calls these administrations “provisional occupational governments”). It is a different story in Ukraine and Moldova: The Communists say that the national bourgeoisie is in charge in those countries and the policy prescription accordingly is different. In Ukraine and Moldova, the Communists are to form a political bloc with nationalists and social democrats. The Program calls for similar tactics in Kazakhstan, which is classified as a national social democratic regime.

The Minimum Program, which has a two-to three-year time horizon, includes the following points:⁸

- Support for the international legal status of the former Soviet republics, including their membership in the U.N. and other world and regional organizations;
- Support for the united ruble zone and an economic federation within the former Soviet Union;
- Abandonment of the slavishly pro-Western foreign policy in favor of a non-confrontational policy dictated by Russian national interests;
- Restoration of alliances with socialist countries (China, North Korea, Vietnam, Cuba) and the nurturing of friendly relations with east-central European countries and “traditional allies;”⁹
- Ouster of foreign political and economic advisors;
- Restoration of strategic parity with the United States and NATO at a minimal level of nuclear arsenals;
- Reinstitution of a state monopoly on foreign trade and foreign currency and a ban on domestic hard currency circulation;
- Elimination of foreign loans.

Nationalists

While the Communists have been busy thinking big—working out their multi-year global strategy—their nationalist allies have been engaged in the politics of confrontation. *Den*, the rabidly xenophobic and anti-Semitic newspaper

that was the mouthpiece of the “Red-White” opposition, accepted the Communist prescription for a tactical alliance against the “occupational government in Moscow.” The alliance would include nationalists within the former Soviet Union as well as separatists within the Russian Federation. *Den* argued that the concept of a “united and indivisible Russia” should be jettisoned. The newspaper said that “as long as the central government expresses the interests of comprador forces and American capital, the united and indivisible Russia is a pro-American Russia of Yeltsin. It means that on this stage, support must be given to any territory, republic or region that is striving to get away from the power of Moscow.”¹⁰

Accordingly, the nationalist attitude towards the policy both in the Near Abroad and separatist territories within the Russian Federation must be changed. Tactical support must be extended to the separatist leaders like Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudaev or the former Sakhalin governor, Valentin Fedorov: every region of Russia striving for independent develop-

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ment reduces the power base of Yeltsin. For the same reasons the enemies of Yeltsin’s administration must renounce their demand for Russian control over the Black Sea Fleet: “The Black Sea Fleet in Yeltsin’s hands is the auxiliary navy for the U.S. 6th Fleet.”¹¹

In the same way, *Den* said that struggle with the Ukraine for control over the Crimea is unacceptable. Moreover, at the present stage, the anti-Yeltsin opposition must leave the Transcaucasian and Baltic states to their own fate. Instead, the “Red-White” bloc must concentrate its efforts within Russia. The author proposed to use a tactic of Mao Tse-tung, who had realized that there is no point fighting for power amid an “absolutely corruptive, pro-Western capital in the country.” He began to gather his forces in remote provinces and only then made his victorious march to Beijing. Later on, his tactics were successfully used by the Vietnamese Communists in South Vietnam and by the Khmer Rouge in Kampuchea. That is why, *Den* says, neo-Communists and nationalists should support the regionalization of Russia. In a word, *Den* wanted everything that could weaken the present central government. Consequently, *Den* backed the demands of republican and regional leaders within the Russian Federation for distribution of power from Moscow to the ethnic and territorial administrations.

The events of the last months in Russia show that such appeals have made impact on the Russian policy within the Near Abroad. Russian nationalist organizations repeatedly demonstrated their political and material support to Dudaev, to Abkhaz separatists and to regional autonomies.¹²

Irreconcilable Opposition: Common Ground and Differences

The common understanding of geopolitics, the reborn concept of "Eurasianism" and a devotion to the controversial theory of "historical ethnogenesis" advanced by the prominent anthropologist Lev Gumilev made possible the consolidation of neo-Communist and radical nationalist elements to unite in a single anti-Yeltsin opposition.¹³ In March 1992, the creation of the so-called "Red-White" opposition (which the democrats until recently dubbed as the "red-brown" bloc)¹⁴ was announced. By October 1992, the "Red-White" opposition had finished its organizational buildup by establishing the Front for National Salvation (FNS). The FNS, which is an umbrella organization for about forty groups, includes the Russian Communist Party headed by Gennady Zyuganov, Working Moscow led by Viktor Anpilov, the Constitutional Democrats headed by Mikhail Astafev, the Union of Officers led by Lt.-Col. Stanislav Terekhov, the Russian National Republican Party chaired by Nikolai Lysenko as well as monarchist and Cossack organizations. The other famous nationalist amalgamation, the Russian National Council (*Russkii natsionalnii sobor*) co-chaired by former KGB general Alexander Sterligov has not officially joined the FNS, but its second co-chairman and neo-Communist leader, Gennady Zyuganov, is affiliated with the broader alliance, the Coordinating Council of National Patriotic Forces which is also headed by Zyuganov.

One of the basic principles of pre-war Russian Eurasians was the concept of the "self-standing of Russia." This isolationist concept made an appeal not only within the *irreconcilable opposition* but to the much broader circles of *statists-isolationists*. There are voices of those who propose the creation of a "democratic neo-Eurasian doctrine."¹⁵ Such "neo-Eurasian" doctrine must reject authoritarian parts of the old "Eurasianism" (which were strongly criticized in the West), but take its geopolitical and ecological dimensions.

Indeed, one of the most attractive characteristics of the pre-war Russian Eurasianist theory was the fact it was one of the few, if not the single, Russian political-philosophical teaching that dealt with geopolitics. For a long time, the geopolitical concept was a secret domain of a narrow circle of experts and functionaries working for the International Department of the CPSU, the KGB, the General Staff and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

It was not until 1988-1991 that a group of relatively young Russian academics began to publish papers on geopolitics and relating it to concepts of national interests and balance of power. The first articles appeared in the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs' *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn*, in the magazine of the Institute of International Relations and World Economy *MEiMO*, and in the former CPSU Central Committee journal *Kommunist*, now called *Svobodnaya Mysl*.¹⁶ The most prominent authors included staffers of the International Department of the Central Committee, Valentin Alexandrov and Igor Malashenko and their colleagues from *MEiMO*, Irina Ponomareva,

Konstantin Pleshakov, Mikhail Kozhokhin, Nikita V. Zagladin and Alexander Glivakovsky.

Later on, some of these young geopoliticians joined the platform of irreconcilable opposition. Among them were Zagladin (the son of the International Department veteran Vadim Zagladin) and Glivakovsky. Zagladin, who headed the Center of Strategic Problems of Russia, published an analysis which was very close to the geopolitical vision of the “Eurasians-nationalists.”¹⁷ Even more radical was the analyst from Zagladin’s institute, Glivakovsky, who wrote that the disintegration of the Soviet Union was the result of both the geopolitical miscalculations of tsars and commissars, and the “subversive activity of the West.”¹⁸

Instead of strengthening the Russian Heartlands, which according to this are located in a geographical triangle between St. Petersburg, the Donbass and Novosibirsk, Glivakovsky claims that the Communist governments diverted resources to Central Asia, Kazakhstan, the Baltic states, western Ukraine and western Byelorussia. To this waste must be added the huge expenses for keeping Eastern Europe in the Soviet camp and propping up shaky Third World allies:

In short, it was a purposeful hampering of the economic and social development of the Heartlands territory, where the majority of the Russian people live; it was done in the framework of the quasi-internationalist policy to accelerate the rate of development of the peripheral people. Without such self-destabilization of the geopolitical nucleus of Russia, no strategy of the USA and the West would have worked . . . The Common European Home and the Atlantic West are incompatible. A genuine European Home is a continental Home, in which the main foundations can be only Russia and Germany and to some extent, France.¹⁹

Nikolai Lysenko, the leader of the small proto-fascist National Republican Party, shares the militant anti-Americanism of Glivakovsky. Lysenko, however, argues that military power and territorial expansion cannot be the goal of true Russian nationalists: “The development of world civilization does not leave Russia at liberty to choose. Whether we want it or not, we will be forced with maximal energy to enter into a total struggle with the West and, in the beginning, with the USA, for intellectual and technological leadership in the 21st century.”²⁰

Lysenko continues that the immediate priority is to recapture Ukraine, which cannot be considered as territorial expansion. “By losing Ukraine we are losing one-third of our economic resources, more than one-third of our hi-tech industry and—let’s be candid—the most valuable Slavic genetic potential for our future power.”²¹ On a larger canvas, he says that the “strategic interest of Russia lies as a geopolitical bridge between Europe and the Far East. In Europe, we must come back to our traditional policy of union between two imperators and two nations, Russia and Germany.”²²

Glivakovsky and Lysenko belong to the group of technocrats-fundamentalists (*tekhnokraty pochvenniki*), which occupies a special place in the alliance of neo-Communists and nationalists. Although few in number and keeping a low political profile, they belong to an elite of the irreconcilable opposition to the Yeltsin government. Many supporters of this group can be found in the scientific-technical intelligentsia, the military-industrial complex and even among Russian cosmonauts. They harbor a downhearted attitude to the West and militant anti-Americanism. However, they oppose the even more militant group of Eurasians-internationalists, which is grouped around the organ *Elementy* and its editor-in-chief, Alexander Dugin. Dugin, who has established close connections with French, Italian, Spanish and German Right extremists and neo-fascists, recently has organized an “alliance of the people fighting against ‘New World Order’ and mondialism.”²³

At the first meeting of the organization in Moscow there were representatives from Serbian nationalists in Bosnia, Irish Republican Army, Basque ETA, as well as delegations from Iraq and Libya. Remarkably, Dugin has published in his magazine a panegyric to the Nazi SS leader Heinrich Himmler, with the following statement: “Paradoxically, but exactly in this organization [the SS] the utmost intellectual freedom and pluralism prevailed.”²⁴ Ironically enough, the critics of Dugin’s concept of an “all-continental Eurasian Empire” come not from the democratic camp, but from his former allies. In their recent article the technocrat-fundamentalist Sergei Kurginyan and the historian Ksenia Myalo have sharply attacked Dugin and *Elementy*.²⁵ They argued that the All-Continental European Empire “from Dublin to Vladivostok” which Dugin proposed is, in fact, a betrayal of Russian national interests. They also accused Dugin and his comrades of glorifying occult xenophobic mystics of Hitler’s SS and making cult figures out of Himmler, the leader of Romanian fascists Corneliu Codrianu, and the Italian apologist of fascism, Julius Evola.

Statists-Opportunists

The statists-opportunists group (*gosudarstvenniki-opportunisty*) includes several liberal, career-minded politicians in their late 30s and early 40s who belong to the so-called generation of “New Russians.” Some of the most prominent representatives of this group are the political advisor of President Yeltsin, Sergei Stankevich; the secretary of the Constitutional Commission, Oleg Rummyantsev; and the former political director of Ostankino television, Igor Malashenko.

Only a couple of years ago, Stankevich was a rising star in the democratic camp; but in the last year made a tangible drift to the nationalist camp. For example, in his recent article, he wrote on different concepts of Russian foreign policy: “Our policy must be neither Eurocentrism, nor Americocentrism, but Russo-centrism.”²⁶ In the article, Stankevich developed the

concept of several regional civilizations: Western Europe, North America, Southeast Asia, Southern Asia, the Arab World, Turkey and her prospective satellites, and a South African zone. Stankevich said that in such a world model, Russia must preserve its own civilization having pragmatic relations with every would-be zone, but join none of them. This is, in fact, a concept fashionable among pre-World War II Russian emigré Eurasians. They saw Russia as an independent civilization and even had a special term for it: "self-standing" (*samostoyanie*). Indeed, in the last year Stankevich has been remarking that the democrats must capture from the nationalists their slogans, and was thus sharply criticized by one of the democratic ideologists, historian Leonid Batkin.²⁷

The Liberals' Course: Enlightened Post-Imperial Integration

Finally, there is quite interestingly a foreign and national security platform prepared by a group of liberal academics, the so-called "academocrats." A non-governmental group of young businessmen, politicians and academics joined to form the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy (SIOP).²⁸ Among members of the SIOP are the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the U.N. Yuri Vorontsov; the First Deputy Minister of Defense Andrei Kokoshin; new Russian millionaires such as the president of the Association of Joint Ventures Lev Vainberg, the president of the Association of Leaders of Enterprises Mark Masarsky, and the president of the Commerce Union Bank Konstantin Zatulin; Andrei Grachev and Alexander Salmin, formerly officials of the Central Committee and presently with the Gorbachev Foundation; Institute of Europe Deputy Director Sergei Karaganov; the former chief of the KGB Analytical Administration Vladimir Rubanov and the editor-in-chief of *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, Vitaly Tretyakov.

The SIOP group is important because its upscale membership will have an impact on the formulation of Russian foreign policy for a considerable time. First, it reflects the views of a new ruling social class in Russia. Second, it presents a "centrist" line. Although the centrist bloc Civic Union has not presented any foreign policy vision, it is likely that when it does, the centrist approach will be similar to that of the SIOP policy formulations. In fact, in January of 1993 the deputy director of the Institute on the USA and Canada, Sergei Rogov, presented to the Political Council of Civic Union a draft of the foreign policy platform.²⁹ Judging by the summary of the document, it has no radical differences with SIOP's report; this might be explained by the fact that Sergei Rogov is also a member of SIOP.

The SIOP report begins with an appeal to recognize the following fact: Measured by many indicators, present-day Russia is a middle-sized power comparable to Canada, Brazil and Argentina in the Americas; France, Britain and Italy in Europe and India and Indonesia in Asia (this of course ignores the size of Russian territory and its nuclear arsenal). Second, the report

postulates that in the foreseeable future, Russia most likely will be a moderately authoritarian state with an economy of a state-capitalistic type. These characteristics in many instances are predetermined by the nature of the Russian new ruling class, which is heavy with the old and new state *nomenklatura*, academocrats, directors of state enterprises, young businessmen, and KGB, army and Interior Ministry officers.³⁰

For self-motivated reasons, the new ruling class will be resistant to the complete openness of the Russian economy, but for the same reasons it will be interested in close cooperation with the West as a guarantee of its well-being. The report calls such a foreign policy course an "enlightened post-imperial integration."

Two major alternatives to this course might be a violent and rapid restoration of the USSR or self-isolationism. In the first case, which is advocated by the "Red-White"

 opposition, Russia might experience a total external and internal catastrophe. The SIOP paper stresses that the outside world is not interested in restoring Moscow's control over the former Soviet Union. Any effort to do so will be met not only

According to a liberal group of foreign policy pundits, "Russia most likely will be a moderately authoritarian state with an economy of a state-capitalistic type."

with a new global isolation, but also with a full activation of Western deterrence, but on vastly less favorable terms for Russia. The line of confrontation will lie not in the center of Europe, but at the border of the Russian Federation. In the worst case this may lead to the disintegration of Russia and the devaluation of its "nuclear card" because the West can decide to intervene to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Even in the most optimistic outcome, the forced restoration of the USSR can mean a civil war and an international confrontation with a possible return to normal life in 20 to 50 years.

The neo-isolationist course, which is propagated both by radical democrats and some nationalists is also unacceptable. True, it can promise a relatively quick transition to a new type of society in Russia and a favorable attitude from the outside world. Self-isolation for Russia and the refusal to support the Russians living in the Near Abroad will lead to a surge of aggressive nationalism in Russia itself and in the former Soviet republics. This would stimulate mass migration into Russia and conflicts on all of her territory, which eventually will smash any regime.

The SIOP report also analyzes the Western direction of Russian policy, which the mass media has already dubbed as "Atlantist." Reviewing the current trends within the European Community and German unification on the one hand, and the global trends in the U.S. foreign policy on the other, the paper concludes that Russia must choose neither the "Eurocentrist" nor

the “Americo-centrist” lines. “Russian interests are a permanent balancing act between American and European directions,” the report says. Therefore, Russia has long-term interests in the preservation of NATO and partnership with it.

As an imperative for “enlightened post-imperial integration,” the paper set up a decisive rejection of a global presence, Communist neo-messianism, geostrategic ambitions and an oceanic fleet, “at least for the foreseeable future.” The SIOP concept is the most complete and detailed report on future Russian foreign policy goals to date. Although it has many conflicting statements, it gives a general perception about the spirit and mood of the new ruling class in Russia. Importantly, the report contains one principal conceptual agreement with its antagonists, the Eurasian-nationalists. This is the statement that “Russia must return to its traditional continental policy.”

Conclusion

The acute political crisis and the power struggle over early elections make impossible any predictions about the future of Russian foreign policy. The concepts discussed above represent a variety of foreign policy philosophies among politically active forces in Russia. None of these concepts, however, is a monopoly with any of the political groups, which are advancing them publicly. On the contrary, as it happened in practice, mutually antagonistic political forces are picking up elements of philosophy from their opponents. The concept advanced by the SIOP group is only one of the few which considered the new geopolitical situation in Russia while retaining the course of reforms.

Notes

¹ Vladimir Pirumov, «Vozvrashchenie geopolitiki,» *Radikal* No. 42, 1992.

² See, for example, Col.-Gen. Igor Rodionov, «Na lezvie besopasnosti,» *Rossiiskie Vesti*, No. 25, 1992; Lt.-Gen.(Ret.), Boris Tarasov, «Voennaya strategiya Rossii,» *Nash Sovremennik* No. 12, 1992; Vladimir Lukin, «Rossiiskie reformy i Zapad,» *Narodnyi Deputat*, 1992; Sergei Rogov, the chief of the Russian Parliamentarian Center for Strategic Research, «Kakoe mesto my zanimaem v mire,» *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 25 March, 1993. See also, “Foreign Policy Strategy of Russia in Near Abroad,” a round table in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Diplomaticheskii Vestnik*. Nos.21-22, 1992.

³ Igor Rodionov, «Na lezvie besopasnosti,» *Rossiiskie Vesti*, No.25, 1992.

⁴ Vladimir Pirumov, «Vozvrashchenie geopolitiki,» *Radikal* No.42, 1992.

⁵ Nikolai Kosolapov, «Natsionalnaya besopasnost v menyayushchemsya mire,» *MEiMO* No. 10, 1992.

⁶ *Glasnost*, 18 February, 1993; *Pravda*, February 1993.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ Among “traditional allies,” nationalists and neo-Communists usually name Iraq, Syria, Libya and the other former Soviet clients in the Third World.

¹⁰ *Den* No. 48, 1992. The “red-white” opposition published an odious document “National security: On urgent measures for the liquidation of the consequences of the Yeltsin regime,” *Den*, No. 45, 1993.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² On position of “Red-White” opposition in regional conflicts see, for example, Vladimir Eremenko, «Predannyi Kavkaz,» *Literaturnaya Rossiya* Nos. 42-44, 1992; Anatoly Lanshchikov, «Russkie na Kavkaze,» *Literaturnaya Rossiya* No. 51; interview with Torez Kulumbekov, *Literaturnaya Rossiya*, No. 7, 1993.

¹³ On political aspects of Lev Gumilev's philosophy of "ethnogenesis," see Victor Yasmann, "Red Religion: An Ideology of Neo-Messianic Russian Fundamentalism," *Demokratizatsiya*, No. 2, 1993, pp. 20-41; Also: Alexander Yanov, «Uchenie Lva Gumileva,» *Svobodnaya Mysl* (formerly *Kommunist*), No. 17, 1992.

¹⁴ *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 11 March 1992. Although the term "red-brown" was initiated by Leon Trotsky in the 1930s, the pro-Yeltsin mass media used it in political warfare against "neo-Communist-nationalist opposition" until November, 1992. In retaliation, the nationalists dubbed pro-Yeltsin forces as "demo-fascists." But in November, 1992, former Director of Ostankino Yegor Yakovlev organized a meeting between the chiefs of mass media who represented the "irreconcilable opposition" and those of the democratic-liberal camp—their democratic counterparts. (Ostankino Television, 13 November 1992). In addition to Yegor Yakovlev, at the meeting were present the editor-in-chief of *Izvestiya*, Igor Golembiovsky and the chief editors of *Den*, Alexander Prokhanov; *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, Valentin Chikin; and *Pravda*, Gennady Selesnev. Both sides agreed to drop from their newspaper's language the libel of "red-brown" and the calls for violent overthrow of Boris Yeltsin. As the events have shown, the pro-Yeltsin media indeed dropped the "red-brown" libel, while the opposition newspapers have continued their appeals for violence.

¹⁵ Andrei Ryabov, «Integrativnaya ideologiya i modernizatsia sovremennoi Rossii,» *Svobodnaya Mysl*, No. 15, 1992; Alexander Rubtsov, «Byt russkimi! No—segodnya,» *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* 29 December 1992.

¹⁶ Elgiz Pozdnyakov, «Natsionalnye, grupповые i klassovye interesy,» *MEiMO* No. 5, 1988; Irina Ponomareva, «Geopoliticheskie faktory vneshnei politiki,» *MEiMO* No.1, 1990; Igor Malashenko, «Rossiya v serdchevine zemli,» *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn*, No. 6, 1990; Valentin Alexandrov, «Vneshnyaya politika—algoritim perekhoda,» *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn* No. 6, 1990; Igor Malashenko, «SSSR i SSHA posle totalitarisma i 'kholodnoi voiny',» *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn*, No. 5, 1991; Konstantin Pleshakov, «Nashi interesy v perekhodny period,» *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn*, No. 10, 1991; Aleksei Bogaturov, Mikhail Kozhokhin, Konstantin Pleshakov «Natsionalnye interesy v Rossiiskoi politike» *Svobodnaya Mysl*, No. 5, 1992.; Vasily Veselov, Dmitry Evstafev, Pyotr Skorospelov, «Rossiya v epokhu srazhayushchikhsya tsarstv,» *Nash Sovremennik*, No. 12, 1992.

¹⁷ *Pravda*, February 1993.

¹⁸ Alexander Glivakovskiy, «Natsionalnaya bezopasnost Rossii i geopolitika,» *Kentavr* (formely *Voprosy Istorii KPSS*), Nos. 11-12, 1991, pp. 48-52; See also, «Imperia zla razvalilas—chto dalshe?,» *Moskva*, Nos. 1-4, 1992;

¹⁹ Alexander Glivakovskiy, «Natsionalnaya bezopasnost Rossii i geopolitika,» *Kentavr* Nos. 11-12, 1991, pp. 48-52.

²⁰ Nikolai Lysenko «Nasha tsel—sozdanie velikoi imperii,» *Nash Sovremennik* No. 9, 1992.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² *Ibid.*

²³ *Pravda*, 4 March, 1993; *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 6 March 1993; *Den* No. 13, 1993.

²⁴ *Elementy* No.1, 1993, p. 54.

²⁵ Sergei Kurginyan, *Den*, No. 1, 1993; Yury Bulychev and Vera Afonina «Ocherednoe lzheverie,» *Russky Vestnik* No. 2, 1993; Ksenia Myalo, «Est li dlya russkikh mesto v Evrazii,» *Literaturnaya Rossiya* No. 32; Apollon Kuzmin, «Rossiya i okultnoimgle ili zachem 'evrasiitsy' maskiruyutsya pog russkikh patriotov,» *Molodaya Gvardia*, No. 2, 1993.; Yury Vlasov, «Zhnetsy buri,» *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, May 22, 1993.

²⁶ *Rossiiskie Vesti*, No. 40, 1992; *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, No. 6, 1993.

²⁷ *Literaturnaya Gazeta* No. 11 and No. 17, 1992.

²⁸ *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 19 August 1992, and 10 December 1992. For details and composition of the SIOP, see Susan Crow, "Competing Blueprints for Russian Foreign Policy," *RFE/RL Research Report*, No. 50, 1992, pp. 45-50.

²⁹ Report of RFE/RL Russian Service from Moscow, 21 January 1993.

³⁰ Academician Tatyana Zaslavskaya, who advanced her model of social composition of Soviet society, defined the "postcommunist" ruling class in the same terms as the SIOP report. See Tatyana Zaslavskaya, «Vverkh po eslatoru, idushchemu vniz,» *Znanie-sila*, Nos. 5-7, 1992.