

# Making Sense of Nashi's Political Style

## The Bronze Soldier and the Counter-Orange Community

JUSSI LASSILA

**Abstract:** The Russian youth movement Nashi (“Ours”), established in early 2005, has become one of the best-known realizations of the Kremlin policies to develop after the Orange Revolution in late 2004. It is evident and well-documented that Nashi’s political discourse is based on the Kremlin’s state patriotism and the concept of “sovereign democracy.” The less-discussed aspect of Nashi’s discourse concerns its style—i.e., how the group expresses itself via its ideological position. The article argues that this viewpoint is central for understanding the controversial outcomes of the movement’s public image in the context of post-Orange Russia. It is examined how Nashi’s political discourse is formed in relation to the movement’s ambition to create a cogent “counter-Orange” community. The group’s web reports concerning its most active theme—campaigns centered around the Bronze Soldier episode in 2007–2008—are explored as a primary case study of Nashi’s political discourse added by sociological data concerning youth’s political participation in Russia, as well as views from two Nashi leaders. Drawing on theoretical concepts of Pierre Bourdieu and cultural pragmatics, the article demonstrates that Nashi’s discourse illustrates a difficult and ultimately infelicitous balancing between didactics and stimulation, angling to bring these two dimensions into a convincing wholeness, “a Russian counter-Orange community.”

**Keywords:** Bronze Soldier, Nashi youth movement, Orange Revolution, Pierre Bourdieu, political style

Ukraine’s Orange Revolution of 2004 was probably the most effective color revolution for Russia in terms of political mobilization.<sup>1</sup> These effects have largely appeared as a counter-“revolution,” with visible manifestations of regime authoritarianism and anti-democratic practices, especially during Vladimir Putin’s second term as president.

---

Jussi Lassila is a postdoctoral researcher at the Aleksanteri Institute (Finnish Centre for Russian and Eastern European Studies) at the University of Helsinki. His recent PhD (March 2011) is about the political communication of the Nashi and Idushchie Vmeste youth movements. His current research concerns representations of World War II in the contemporary Russian media, which is a part of the international research project “Memory at War,” 2010–2013. Copyright © 2011 World Affairs Institute

The youth movement *Nashi* (“Ours”), which was established in early 2005, has become one of the best-known realizations of such practices. The movement’s pro-Kremlin position finds a clear resonance with David Lane’s<sup>2</sup> argument of post-Communist, or post-authoritarian, regimes’ strategies to create their own youth and student organizations for political projects.<sup>3</sup> In Ukraine, the role of pro-Orange youth movements was central in creating and maintaining communities that led to the displacement of the old regime.<sup>4</sup> The role of *Nashi* has functioned differently than the youth movements seen in Ukraine, and it is in order to scrutinize the symbolic practices by which *Nashi* produces a supposedly convincing “counter-orange” model. When one places *Nashi* on a continuum of pro-Kremlin youth formations, it appears that their projects—even their entire organization—are relatively ephemeral and ultimately ineffective in the production of a positive self-image. The major concern of this article is how *Nashi*’s political discourse is formed in relation to the movement’s ambition to create a cogent “counter-Orange” community.

In methodological terms, the question at hand regards *Nashi*’s discourse, its ideological content<sup>5</sup> regarding its forms or style, and its reliance on the Kremlin’s state patriotism and the promotion of “sovereign democracy.” The less-discussed question, however, concerns the “how” of *Nashi*’s ideology—that is, how *Nashi* expresses itself through its ideological position. This article argues that this viewpoint is central for understanding the controversial outcomes of the movement’s public image in the context of post-Orange Russia. Moreover, this viewpoint may offer insights into the political communication of pro-Kremlin youth movements in general. *Nashi*’s web reports concerning its most active theme—campaigns centered around the Bronze Soldier episode in 2007-2008—were explored as a case study of the group’s political discourse. From the viewpoint of a contemporary social movement, online writings can be understood as the crystallization of an official voice.<sup>6</sup> To offer a background to the examination of the Bronze Soldier case, *Nashi*’s position in the light of previous literature, sociological data, and views from two *Nashi* leaders are elaborated upon. The key concepts and the theoretical framework of the discourse-analysis approach begin this presentation.

### Key Concepts and Theoretical Framework

In addition to considerable interest from Russian and foreign media, *Nashi* has also evoked notable academic interest. To mention just a few of the earlier studies on *Nashi*, Julie Hemment<sup>7</sup> has examined the group’s projects as realizations of post-Soviet Russian civil society practices; Graeme B. Robertson<sup>8</sup> has evaluated it as an ersatz social movement in relation to Putin’s regime, in terms of regulating civil society practices in Russia. In the same vein, Robert Horvath<sup>9</sup> has approached *Nashi* as a central part of Putin’s “preventive counter-orange” strategies; Doug Buchacek<sup>10</sup> has analyzed its early years from the viewpoint of generational mobilization; and Marlene Laruelle<sup>11</sup> has studied youth patriotism and memory politics in relation to official patriotic policies, with a special focus on *Nashi* as well as the *Molodaya Gvardiya*, the youth section of Russia’s party in power, or “Putin’s party,” *Edinaya Rossiya*. Valerie Sperling<sup>12</sup> has studied *Nashi*’s role in relation to the Kremlin’s patriotic policies; Maya Atwal<sup>13</sup> has approached the group in terms of activist-views in relation to *Nashi*’s official role, and has discussed its conditions of sustainability; Dmitry Andreev<sup>14</sup> has also treated *Nashi*, as well as its predecessor, *Idushchie Vmeste*, in terms of the movements’ complexity in relation to the Kremlin’s official policies;

and Ulrich Schmid<sup>15</sup> has paid attention to Nashi's communicative strategies, evaluating them as a continuation of Soviet-era traditions and Soviet-era conceptual art.

Many of these invaluable contributions to the study of Nashi have largely treated this movement as a (sometimes seemingly passive) realization of elite—that is to say, Kremlin—political projects. Andreev's and Atwal's views are especially relevant, as this article concerns itself with how Nashi communicatively “handles” its position between a reputation as a Kremlin rubber-stamp and the cogent mobilization of largely apolitical youth culture. In this vein, Nashi's discourse is treated here as balancing between didactics and stimulation, angling to bring these two dimensions into a convincing wholeness. The group's designation of didactics can thus be defined as official and conformist, especially the educative relatedness of its activities. This concerns, for example, Nashi's discursive production of state patriotism.<sup>16</sup> Consequently, the youth culture's unresponsiveness to existing political formations in Russia—which evidently concerns Nashi as well—is at least partially recognized by the movement, and this bad reputation is communicatively related to the didactic dimension. It follows that this recognition activates the need for communicative work that could downplay such a reputation. Thus, a demand for stimulating discourse emanates from Nashi's expectations of Russian youth as autonomous and, more precisely, apolitical. In the case of Nashi, the crucial addition to the division between didactic and stimulative dimensions is that the tension between them is not so much a substantive issue; didactics would be exclusively linked to patriotic elements and stimulation to “non-patriotic” ones. On the contrary, the tension particularly lies in Nashi's assumptions about what behaviour produces “correct” patriotism.

Without a theoretical grounding, the division between didactics and stimulation is thin, since these definitions are clearly subjective. A didactic instruction can be very stimulative or, vice versa, a “stimulative” signifier may be felt as a didactic political, or cultural, order. To theorize this division accordingly, this article relies on Pierre Bourdieu's<sup>17</sup> views on cultural production and language-use. According to Bourdieu, all recognizable artifacts of social reality (e.g., the language of political actors) have a particular relation to the aspect of hierarchized cultural production. In terms of artistic contexts, Bourdieu writes: “As liberated as the holders of the different kinds of capital may be from external constraints and demands, they are traversed by the necessity of the fields<sup>19</sup> which encompass them: the need for profit, whether economic or political. It follows that they are at any one time at the site of a struggle between two principles of hierarchization: the heteronomous principle which favors those who dominate the field economically or politically (for example ‘bourgeois art’), and the autonomous principle (for example ‘art for art's sake’).”<sup>18</sup> These two types of hierarchizations can also be referred to as external and internal hierarchizations, which clarifies the principles of the field in acting toward other fields (external hierarchization) and toward its own field (internal hierarchization).<sup>20</sup> Internal hierarchization is the same as the field of restricted cultural production, and external hierarchization is the field of large-scale cultural production.<sup>21</sup>

To apply this framework to Nashi's political discourse, the case becomes about Nashi's agency in the given political situation—which falls between official state policies and the movement's ambition to stimulatively represent the political “didactics” for youth. In this respect, according to Bourdieu's theoretical framing, didactics and stimulation are no longer loose categories that depend on purely subjective judgments. Rather, they orientate to the

different fields of Nashi's sociopolitical reality that stand against one another. It is Nashi's political position that forces the movement to search for a somewhat cogent balance between these incompatible fields of (political) cultural production. Thus, large-scale cultural production can be defined as the group's officially supported cultural production. Youth culture has only a part in this—albeit an important one. This principle is closely linked to the understanding of youth in official policy, including the Soviet legacy, within its paternalistic and instructive aspects.<sup>22</sup> Consequently, the restricted cultural production is Nashi's cultural production, which aims to highlight the notion of youth as distinct from adult-driven youth practices.

In very general terms, the tension between didactics and stimulation in Nashi's case can be understood as the tension between adult and youth cultural production in the field of politics. More specifically, this tension comes about as friction between those who have power and authority in terms of symbolic capital to establish particular political projects (like the president in Russia) and those who lack authority and legitimacy to implement these projects. In other words, Nashi operates, on the one hand, as a representative of large-scale cultural production (state policies); on the other hand, this task of representation must be carried out in a situation that requires symbolic capital suitable for the rules of restricted cultural production (youth). Consequently, following Bourdieu,<sup>23</sup> it can be assumed that cultural production that relies too heavily either on large-scale or restricted production appears to fail, while Nashi's central task is to unify the demands posed by these fields. The task of the state is the task of the youth, or vice-versa. Nashi's major aim is to diminish the tension between these two.

Bourdieu's framework is fruitfully compatible with those views of cultural pragmatism that aim to transcend the polarization between structure-oriented and agency-oriented approaches.<sup>24</sup> A special case is the modification of the concept of ritual. Jeffrey C. Alexander points out that social performances, whether individual or collective, can be analogized systematically to theatrical ones: "Rituals are episodes of repeated and simplified cultural communication in which the direct partners to a social interaction, and those observing it, share a mutual belief in the descriptive and prescriptive validity of the communication's symbolic contents and accept the authenticity of one another's intentions. It is because of this shared understanding of intention and content, and in the intrinsic validity of the interaction, that rituals have their effect and affect."<sup>25</sup>

Alexander's description is actually a "ritual-like action" when applied to modern societies or ones that can be broadly labeled as nation-states. The difference between rituals and ritual-like actions (the latter is the same as social performance) lies in the fact that in pre-modern societies, the communicative components in various cultures were profoundly ritual;<sup>26</sup> they were fused and not institutionally separated in any sense.<sup>27</sup> In other words, the components of a social performance<sup>28</sup> were blended.<sup>29</sup> Since then, previously combined components of ritualistic communication began to "de-fuse." Along with the emergence of more complex societies and their cultural formations, components of social performances started to institutionalize into separate formations: actors, audiences, representations, and so forth.<sup>30</sup> In Nashi's case, this "institutionalization" (separation) in the post-Soviet space can be seen in terms of the de-fusion between an imagined, politically constructed youth and an autonomous "real" youth. Thus, the most important task for modern or secular rituals is to "re-fuse" these institutionalized, separate components of performance into one coherent, meaningful whole. In Alexander's words:


The goal of secular performances, whether on stage or in society, remains the same as the ambition of sacred ritual. They stand or fall on their ability to produce psychological identification and cultural extension. The aim is to create, via skillful and affecting performance, the emotional connection of audience with actor and text and thereby to create conditions for projecting cultural meaning from performance to audience. To the extent these two conditions have been achieved, one can say that elements of performance have become fused.<sup>31</sup>

It is not difficult to conceptualize Ukraine's Orange Revolution in the context of this quote. In addition to the central role of the youth in Maidan Square in Kyiv—the central locus of the Orange Revolution—that event was able to “re-fuse” separate components of this social performance into a one “orange” community. This can be captured in Andrew Wilson's description of the events in Kyiv in the late 2004: “The mood in the Maidan did not just indicate support for Yushchenko or Tymoshenko personally; it was the articulate anger of a people finding their voice ... students wanted a change in political culture, the poor wanted a change in political culture, and small and medium-sized businesses wanted a change in political culture.”<sup>32</sup> In terms of ritual-like strategy, Yushchenko's camp was able to conduct “an affecting performance, the emotional connection of audience with actor and text and thereby to create conditions for projecting cultural meaning from performance to audience.” As this article will show, Nashi's political discourse includes a similar ambition; the crucial distinction from the situation in Ukraine is that this ambition emanates from a regime-maintaining position.

### **Nashi and the Field of Youth Movements after the Orange Revolution**

In late 2004, in the midst of the Orange Revolution, the first rumors of a new Kremlin-supported youth movement began to circulate.<sup>33</sup> These rumors proved to be correct. In February 2005, the “Antifascist Democratic Youth Movement Nashi” was officially established.<sup>34</sup> Its role as the successor to the group *Idushchie Vmeste* became immediately clear when Vassili Yakemenko, the head of *Idushchie Vmeste*, announced that he would be Nashi's leader. From the viewpoint of political positions, Nashi can be located in the category that Tat'yana Stanovaya<sup>35</sup> calls “loyal to the Kremlin” (Лояльные Кремлю).<sup>36</sup> Besides Nashi (Наши), this category includes the youth movements the Young Guard (Молодая Гвардия), Young Russia (Россия Молодая), and the Moscow-based Locals (the last one is my addition to Stanovaya's category), which operate and act according to the Kremlin policies. Those organizations that work to some extent in accordance with the interests of the Kremlin but whose ideology is openly nationalistic or leftist are in this same category. These include such movements as the Eurasian Union of Youth (Евразийский союз молодежи, ЕСМ) headed by the nationalist theorist of geopolitics Alexander Dugin, and the youth organization of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (Либерально-демократическая партия России, ЛДПР), well-known by its populist-nationalist leader Vladimir Zhirinovskii. Stanovaya (2005) suggests that this category can be divided into “patriots” (ESM and LDPR) and “liberals” (Nashi, *Molodaya Gvardiya*, and *Rossiiia Molodaia*). The category opposite this one also includes patriots (Патриоты) and liberals (Либералы) who can be either leftist (Левые) or rightist (Правые). The leftist opposition includes such movements as For the Motherland (За Родину), which is partly loyal to the Kremlin; the Union of Communist Youth (Союз коммунистической молодежи, СКМ); the Vanguard of the Red Youth (Авангард красной молодежи, АКМ); and the National Bolshevik Party (Национал-большевистская партия, НБП).

The latter is partly liberal (or right), and was one of the best-known Russian youth movements of the mid-2000s.<sup>37</sup> In 2005, liberal opposition groups such as We (Мы), the Democratic Alternative, Yes! (Демократическая альтернатива, ДА!), Time Is Up (Пора), and I Think (Я думаю) worked mostly virtually without concrete actions. The movement Defense (Оборона), instead, worked actively as the main youth organization of the Apple political party (Яблоко), and can be defined as one of the main political opponents of Nashi in its early stages. In sum, Stanovaya argues that the Russian youth movements of the mid 2000s can be defined by two factors: the relations of a movement to the current political authorities (the Kremlin) and a movement's political position on a left-right axis, as Figure 1 shows.<sup>38</sup>



Stanovaya continues that in light of the situation in 2005—which in many ways persists today—the most influential and visible youth movement in Russia was Nashi. According to her, the main reason for the Kremlin's creation of Nashi was to develop a new version of the previous “official” youth movement, *Idushchie Vmeste*, after its excessively radical and marginalizing actions. In addition, the crucial political motivation for the creation of Nashi was the twofold apolitical attitude of contemporary Russian youth from the Kremlin's viewpoint; this included the ongoing apoliticization of youth and its potential

consequences. Stanovaya proposes that for the Kremlin, the apoliticization of youth actually meant unwanted politicization—political activities that were divergent from its interests (in particular, the Kremlin became concerned with preventing “Orange movements” among youth).<sup>39</sup> In this sense, Nashi was meant to function as a certain motivational system within official youth policy—a system in symbiosis with political interests that supported the maintenance of the current political authority. Hence, all those organizations (e.g. communists, Western liberals, and the extreme right) that did not fit into this framework are regarded as “apolitical.” Now, the biggest challenge for Nashi in its task of mobilization are college and university students, who have been very sceptical toward such “ready-made systems of motivation.” Few members of the university community can identify with such constructions, and most of them think that movements like Nashi work only as instruments of political manipulation. This skepticism has led, in turn, to the formation of various local youth movements within Russian institutions of higher education.<sup>40</sup>

Although Stanovaya's framework concisely contextualizes the position of Nashi in relation to other youth movements, her definition leads too easily to viewing Nashi in terms of a “rubber stamp” or a representative of “virtual democracy”—a movement that fakes real democratic practices.<sup>41</sup> This is not a wrong definition, but from the viewpoint of scrutinizing Nashi's own voice and its political discourse in terms of attempting to conduct a cogent re-fusion between didactic and stimulative demands it is not very productive approach. Stanovaya views Nashi as more or less subordinate to the Kremlin's goals. In this respect, she follows that common portrayal of the movement that Maya Atwal<sup>42</sup> calls the discourse of “creeping authoritarianism.” Nashi appears as an attempt by the Russian state to undermine the development of independent political youth movements. While this approach can be relevant in many ways, its major problem is that it presumes the passivity of Nashi activists and the absolute ability of the state to determine the movement's development. Although Stanovaya rightly shows those problems that Nashi inevitably has faced, and faces, in its activities—particularly skepticism from the side of Russian youth—she views the movement as a Kremlin project, which emphasizes the passivity of the movement in relation to the Kremlin's “orders.”

In line with Atwal's concern to evaluate Nashi activists' views, Dmitry Andreev<sup>43</sup> offers valuable insights into the role Nashi in the context of Putin's Russia. According to him, Nashi, as well as *Idushchie Vmeste*, can be described as a pure model of “managed passionarity” (*upravlyaemaya passionarnost'*) in the context of the managed or “sovereign democracy”<sup>44</sup> introduced by Putin's regime.<sup>45</sup> With the term “passionarity,” Andreev<sup>46</sup> refers to the emotions of people whose ambition is to devotedly serve the goals given for, or by, them. Moreover, for such passionate people the main goal is to organize, or reorganize, everyday life around them with the help of a constructed enemy or with negative examples. He argues that although Nashi acts as a pro-Kremlin movement, and is evidently supported to some extent by it, any type of emotional commitment is “prohibited” within the political guidelines of the Kremlin.<sup>47</sup> According to him, while the Kremlin aims to have total freedom in the field of ideology, it follows that for the current political power passionarity like the political stylistics of Nashi is not only unnecessary but also dangerous if it is to distribute its ideas according to its own administrative vertical. Andreev's<sup>48</sup> argumentation leads to such scenarios where Nashi starts to act on its own; the managed passionarity of the Kremlin becomes the pure passionarity of Nashi. In terms of Nashi's challenge in balancing its didactic and stimulative demands, and fusing these two into a

profitable message, Andreev's view is insightful. However, in addition to the examination of Nashi's challenges regarding its didactic demand, it is necessary in order to also shed light on Nashi's major target of stimulation: the potential interest or disinterest of the youth toward the movement.

### **Overview: The Political Participation of Russian Youth**

In March 2005, immediately after the establishment of Nashi, 4 percent of Russians surveyed responded that they were familiar with the group.<sup>49</sup> Interestingly, despite this small number, Nashi was the best-known youth movement. The clearest majority, 66 percent (56

---

***“The unresponsive attitudes toward Nashi, and to youth movements in general, find their strongest explanation in statistical information concerning youth political participation.”***

percent in the 18–24 age range) professed not to know of any youth movements. This unresponsiveness toward youth movements seemed to dominate public attitudes a couple of years later, as well, after Nashi had already received a large amount of attention in the Russian media. A poll conducted by the research center Foundation of Public Opinion (FOM),<sup>50</sup> which studied Russians' views of youth in relation to politics and political activity, also asked “what youth movements do you know or have heard about?” The most

well known was Nashi, but in terms of the percentages, this familiarity with the group was not very convincing. Only 13 percent of Russians reported that “I know or have heard about the movement.”<sup>51</sup> Seventy-five percent of Russians announced that it was “difficult to answer,” or said that “I do not know any youth organizations.” This is interesting, as Nashi's visibility in the Russian media had been overwhelmingly high by the end of 2007. According to the Russian print media database Integrum, 2007 was the most active year in terms of Nashi's media visibility.<sup>52</sup>

In light of this information, there is solid ground to argue that Nashi's relatively low familiarity among the population (including youth) is based on public unresponsiveness rather than simply a lack of information. In other words, people have seen or heard about Nashi, but they do not care about it. Among those who professed to know Nashi, 56 percent said that they did not have any feelings toward the movement.<sup>53</sup> In FOM's poll the highest percentages were recorded in the categories “I do not have any attitudes toward the mentioned movements” and “difficult to answer” (45 percent in total).<sup>54</sup> The most positive attitudes were recorded for the pro-Kremlin movements Molodaya Gvardiya and Nashi—but even then, only 5–6 percent expressed this attitude. Hence, although this information shows that familiarity with Nashi has grown since its establishment, the number of negative and unresponsive attitudes has also grown. The number of those who did not know Nashi—or, in all probability, those who did not care—was overwhelmingly high among the Russian population, including young Russians. In this regard, the rapid growth in familiarity with Nashi during its first year was still not as high as had been expected.<sup>55</sup>

The unresponsive attitudes toward Nashi, and to youth movements in general, find their strongest explanation in statistical information concerning youth political

participation. In the 2005 FOM poll,<sup>56</sup> among all age groups of the population, disinterest in politics was higher than interest in it, but among younger generations (18–35) the disinterest was highest, at 65–67 percent. In addition, among the youngest age-group (18–25), 96 percent declared that “I have not participated in the activities of any political organizations” (among the whole population that figure was 80 percent).<sup>57</sup> (In 2008, 75 percent of the entire population considered that “there are only a few, if there are any at all, young people who are interested in politics.”)<sup>58</sup> Among the age-group 18–35, this figure was 76 percent, although there were more respondents who considered that “there are a lot of politically active young people,” 14 percent, (while among the whole population the figure was 11 percent), and less of who considered that “there is not a politically active youth at all,” 13 percent, (while among the whole population the figure was 22 percent).

In addition to revealing the apolitical nature of Russian youth, these data support the argument that underlines differences in the understanding of the concept of “political” between the population (predominantly among youth) and the political elite.<sup>59</sup> When in 2008<sup>60</sup> a poll asked, “do you think it is necessary or not that young people, not older than 25, participate in politics and the political life of the country,” 69 percent of Russians considered that it was necessary and 65 percent considered that “participation in politics and political life helps young people to attain a high position in society.” Hence, it seems that attitudes toward politics strongly depend on whether it refers to politics as such, or politics in “practice,” that is, existing political structures and organizations. Thus, a highly unresponsive and apolitical attitude becomes apparent in the minimal participation in political organizations (96 percent have not participated in any organizations) but, at the same time, there is a relatively positive attitude toward political participation in terms of attaining a high position in society (65 percent). Apolitical youth is not taboo—on the contrary, it is explicitly pointed out in the State Youth Policy.<sup>61</sup> These data offer relevant background for didactic and stimulative dimensions of Nashi's political discourse. On the one hand, youth must be politicized (stimulated) within official policies, and Nashi along with other pro-state youth formations are clearly in a central role in this official vision. On the other hand, however, a minimal interest toward these youth formations puts effective stimulation to the test. To move from this general context of statistical indicators to the micro-level of Nashi's voice, views by two Nashi leaders follow.

### Views from Two Nashi Leaders

In March 2009, a Nashi leader referred to here by the pseudonym “Oleg” explained me his reasons to join the group:

Oleg: Why did I join? Well, this is difficult and simple question at the same time (laughing)...difficult because...because I don't know why I joined eventually ... it's difficult ... in that time I already had experience in youth political activities and they had affected me extremely negatively ... because ... I had enough, it wasn't interesting.

Jussi: Why?

Oleg: Why...well, you know, each youth organization has a particular adult organization ... the Komsomol had, and still has RSM KPRF, although less than the Komsomol of the KPSS ... the Molodaya Gvardiya has Edinaya Rossiya, and that is always a very ... complex enough

relationship. And, from the viewpoint of progressivity, youth is repeatedly linked to this progress in the country, but adults, on the one hand, somehow systematize and ... intervene, on the other hand ... there is the federal youth leadership, there are adults with their own tasks, but in this region. And there is a kind of dilemma in the administration ... well, the matrix's structure (*matrichnaya struktura*) is not in balance, it's not very ... effective, or correctly speaking, it is non-balanced ... the central operatives are not nice. Well, in sum, I had enough. I joined Nashi ... because I was one of its founders, first in one region, and then in another ... we sat down together ... and decided to do something despite that negative experience. Difficult to say [I joined] perhaps because there were no adults at any time.

Oleg's partially wavering explanation of his reasons for joining the movement reveals an interesting combination of didactic "adult" discourse and autonomous "youth" discourse. The didactic discourse comes about implicitly as his major negative experience in the first paragraph. This negative view is actually explicated at the end of the second paragraph as the most probable reason why he actually joined Nashi. Hence, Oleg identifies himself as "non-adult," that is, supposedly as a representative of youth, representing different practices from those that had caused his highly negative experience. However, the specification that elaborates his negative experience, and hence ground for joining Nashi, interestingly assumes a rather bureaucratic vocabulary, that is, markers of a discourse that could be termed "adult" as distinct from "youth": "there is the federal youth leadership," "dilemma in the administration," or "the matrix's structure is not balanced, it is not effective, correctly speaking, non-balanced." Such wording reveals that Oleg sees youth political activity principally in organizational terms with effective or non-effective results, but leaves open to what this effectiveness or ineffectiveness is attached. Since he is a leader of a pro-Kremlin youth movement, it could be assumed that this bureaucratic vocabulary actually reveals Oleg's understanding of Nashi's role *vis-à-vis* official policies. Interestingly, as distinct from these "negative and ineffective/non-balanced" adult practices, Oleg mentions those youth movements that appear more or less as political opponents, or at least competitors, of Nashi (LDPR, KPRF, Rodina<sup>62</sup>). He also puts the youth section of Molodaia Gvardiya, "Putin's party," Edinaya Rossiya, in this same group as well. Hence, according to Oleg, Nashi is something different from all of these, allowing more space for youth in activities of the all-Russian level without adult "systematization" and "interference." This implies that Nashi represents, or allows its members, that progressivism which is often linked to youth. Indeed, this comes about in Oleg's reply to my additional question as to whether Nashi is purely a youth movement:

Yes, yes, clearly youth [movement] that LDPR, KPRF, Rodina do not have at all at the moment ... well, on the other hand, if we view this question simply. Why simply? Because I saw the possibility to do something real in the movement. And that pleased me. This possibility was not only related to my own region, but it was a possibility to do something on the scale of the country ... to be part of some kind of megaproject ... and most important, I clearly understood that this project allows me personal improvement as well. I saw the educational program ... and I really liked it, it was ... and is interesting.

In short, Oleg sees Nashi as the movement in which he can do something real. This "real" allows activities not only at the regional level, but on the scale of the whole country, by using the term "megaproject"—mentioned in the first lines of the movement's manifesto.<sup>63</sup> For him, Nashi represents a youth movement in which he can be part of "big issues" and undergo personal development, and this option is contrasted against adult practices.

This single sample from a leader of the movement does not allow one to draw overly wide conclusions of Nashi's viewpoint in relation to official policies, but Oleg's views illustrate its aptitude to be something unique along with its official political conformism. Similar views that draw on the movement's uniqueness and individual capabilities, as well as views that are compatible with official policies, can be tracked in "Vadim"'s reasons to join the movement. One of the early leaders of the movement, he was interviewed in May 2008, also using a pseudonym. While Vadim regards my question about reasons of joining the movement very nicely, he specifies:

First, I did not join Nashi. There were few people...people who found the Nashi movement... and I joined this process...when I found out that there is a group of people in Moscow with whom my personal ideas are completely compatible (*sovpadayut na sto protsentov*)...That's why I joined the process.

By seeing the establishment of the movement as a process that was compatible with his own ideas and interests—a process that he found—he constructs himself as a leader, distinct from those who joined the movement later and continue to join it now. Or, as he puts it in another part of the interview, "I joined the movement because I had a possibility to be a part of its establishment." In addition, his individual interests are seemingly compatible with official discourse, since Vadim mentions that among Nashi's goals he saw the idea of "maintaining the country's sovereignty" (*sokhranenie suvereniteta strany*) around the "orange events" (*oranzhevye sobytiya*) as principally important. Although Vadim does not contrast his and Nashi's interests with "adult practices" as explicitly as Oleg does, his views on Nashi's uniqueness are clearly contrasted with other pro-Kremlin activities as well:

There was the youth movement *Idushchie Vmeste*, a pro-Putin one...I experienced it, to say honestly, very negatively. I knew it well, but it did not appeal to me. I did not join the party "United Russia" either...it was not interesting.

Although Vadim does not specify why he views *Idushchie Vmeste* negatively, it can be assumed that the issues that *Idushchie Vmeste* propagated were incompatible with his own (*sobstvennye*) ideas. Moreover, by mentioning an "adults' party" (*Edinaya Rossiya*) in this respect, Vadim's view implies that Nashi differs from it. This difference refers in all probability to organizational and practical aspects, rather than ideological ones, as *Edinaya Rossiya* is the key actor in propagating ideas of maintaining Russia's sovereignty, which Vadim regards as most important for Nashi, as well.

Oleg's and Vadim's views illustrate Nashi's ambition to act as a sovereign conductor of official political views. In terms of communicating these views throughout the movement, the question is about Nashi's own commitment in relation to official political guidelines. Nashi appears to be a movement that allows space for personal views in relation to official policies, and this possibility is contrasted with "adult practices." Following Andreev's<sup>64</sup> views of Nashi as passionate movement, this grassroots commitment may also appear contradictory in relation to official political guidelines. To attach these views to the theoretical framework outlined in this article, it can be assumed that Nashi's didactic state-related agenda (large-scale cultural production) in the space of largely prevailing apoliticalness of youth tempts, or even forces, it to use such stimulation (restricted cultural production), which is incompatible with Nashi's state-related position. In this vein, the Bronze Soldier episode presents a revealing example of Nashi's belief to create a supposedly effective ritual in order to tackle this challenge.

### The Bronze Soldier

The relocation of the Soviet-era statue “The Bronze Soldier” from the central Tallinn district Tõnismägi to the Tallinn’s military cemetery by Estonian authorities in late April 2007 offered, from Nashi’s viewpoint, a brilliant platform to demonstrate the importance of, and its emotional commitment to, this event.<sup>65</sup> In terms of expressing particular emotions for political purposes, Mabel Berezin<sup>66</sup> points out that “codifying, managing, mobilizing emotions transforms them into culturally accepted behaviors, situates them in time and space, and depending upon the context, adds a political dimension to the emotion.”

Nashi’s Bronze Soldier conforms perfectly to Berezin’s description. The injustice that official Russia expressed toward the removal appeared to Nashi as a chance to make possible the re-fusion of the domestic concern with “fascism,” and historical and nationally relevant external fascists. That is, a combination of the concern about growing domestic ethnic crimes,<sup>67</sup> Russians’ generally growing engagement with national dignity,<sup>68</sup> and the outrage against the violation of a symbol of the most consensual and important pillar of Russian national identity, “The Great Patriotic War.” In short, the fight against contemporary fascism as a social problem shows its legitimacy through one of the nation’s major historical achievements, namely the “Great Victory” over fascism in 1945. In order to refuse this value with the present on the basis of a commonly shared threat, it follows that contemporary “fascists”—all those who call this victory into the question—aim to tarnish this value, in this case “Estonian fascists.” Despite seemingly weak coherence between these two—the national patriotic policies of the Baltic States and violent attacks against those who do not look like Russians in Russia—Nashi seemingly believed that this would work as a strategy to distinguish itself within the nation’s anger against Estonian history policies. The Bronze Soldier became the most intensive activity of the movement. The archive section of Nashi’s website before the new version of November 2009 included more than 1,300 reports in which Estonia was mentioned, principally in negative terms (these items are still available in the new version, as well). Nashi’s official response, the “ultimatum,” to the statue’s removal began as follows:

**The date for the demolition of the Estonian embassy building in Moscow has been decided**

The federal commissar of the Movement Nashi, Vassili Yakemenko announced the date of the demolition of the Estonian embassy building in Moscow: June 12, 2007. As it was pointed out in the official announcement of the Movement Nashi, “it is necessary to find out possibility to remove the embassy of the fascist Estonia into another, more suitable place according to the law (*imenno v ramkakh zakona*).<sup>69</sup>

Such an account of a social movement, expressed with explicitly official language but whose content is deeply absurd, raises a question of its seriousness. Nashi’s “official announcement” follows the late-Soviet Russian tradition of *styob*—a peculiar form of irony that differed from sarcasm, cynicism, derision, or any of the more familiar genres of absurd humor.<sup>70</sup> Alexei Yurchak continues that *styob* required such a degree of overidentification<sup>71</sup> with the object, person, or idea at which it was directed that it was often impossible to tell whether the *styob* was a form of sincere support, subtle ridicule, or a peculiar mixture of the two. In addition to overidentification with the particular symbol (or object) that is the precise and slightly grotesque reproduction of the authoritative form (e.g. slogan, official speech, or visual image), *styob* involved the

“decontextualization” of that symbol; placing this form in a context that is unintended and unexpected for it.<sup>72</sup>

The headline of this report followed by the announcement of the movement's leader Vassili Yakemenko mimics the *styob*-like overidentification and decontextualization of the object. The Estonian authorities had announced a few days earlier—obviously with official bureaucratic language—that the statue would be demolished/removed from its original location.<sup>73</sup> Nashi then shows its own moral outrage by overidentifying the object.<sup>74</sup> However, the goal of the action for which this official language informs definitely decontextualizes the object: “the date of the demolition of the Estonian embassy building is June 12, 2007.” In terms of political ritual, this date explicitly illustrates Nashi's attempt to attach a particularly patriotic and supposedly unifying element to the Independence Day of Russia, which is celebrated on June 12. This recently established holiday has remained relatively strange to many Russians, and in this vein this date exhibits Nashi's willingness to promote its weak reputation by using it for the given political and symbolic practices.

However, while the use of *styob* could be an effective strategy in terms of mocking a particular political establishment and its practices, in the case of a pro-state movement that promotes official patriotic policies, *styob* seems to be a highly tentative strategy. In terms of protesting, it is evident that Nashi is against the Estonian official interpretation of the Second World War and its consequences (the Soviet-era as an occupation), resulting in a particular historical political practice toward the statue. However, Nashi's response suggests that the movement's commitment to the theme is so intense that the communicative forms used in this protest risk the content of their political message. In this case, it is in order to ask whether Nashi truly believes that it can demolish and remove the embassy building, or if it is sufficient that the audience believe it can accomplish such a goal.

This announcement was related to Nashi's major anti-Estonian rally. The one-week blockade of the Estonian embassy in Moscow in late April and early May 2007 was followed by hundreds of anti-Estonian rallies in different parts of Russia over the course of that year. These rallies illustrate Nashi's obvious willingness to identify itself as a true defender of Russia's national values, especially patriotism and the official narrative of Russia's “great history.” However, from the viewpoint of the tension between didactics and stimulation, this “anti-Estonian intensity” explicitly challenges the balance between Nashi's communicative demands. While the emotional commitment of the rallies was often expressed via *styob*-like elements (explicit stimulation), this pursuit challenges the limits of correctness linked to didactics. This balancing within the attempt to distinguish itself from official instances is present in the “ultimatum” from Nashi's leader Vassili Yakemenko (the sample above is the first paragraph of it). What follows that slightly grotesque decontextualisation of the demolition/removal action is the emotionally loaded request from all (citizens of Russia) to comment on and pay attention to this issue:

Each citizen, no matter his or her position must answer the question: Has he or she done everything so that historical justice has been redressed. We must remember that if this [removal of the embassy] will be done, it will be an unconditional victory over neo-fascism, victory over trampling on memory. This act of political will by particular citizens, the leadership of the country as a whole, shall be the most important step for the further political and moral rebirth of Russia.<sup>75</sup>

While Yakemenko's vision of Nashi seems to be a re-fused community based upon Russia's national dignity, he clearly reserves a vanguard role for Nashi in this potential re-fusion by mentioning "certain citizens" (Nashi) before "the leadership of the country as a whole," and by demonstrating the movement's sacrificing position in relation to the political regime, as the rest of the report reveals:

Collecting signatures for the support of OUR decision to demolish the embassy goes on. More than 100,000 Muscovites and guests of the capital have signed the ultimatum. Hundreds of thousands of Russians in tens of cities of the country—in Nizhny Novgorod, St. Petersburg, Penza, Volgograd, Krasnodar, and in many others—have joined the action.

Today at approximately 4 pm, the commissar of the movement Nashi, Alexander Salikov, tore down the Estonian flag from the embassy building. This was a single initiative by Alexander, the appearance of his civic position and demonstration of his attitudes against the activities of the Estonian authorities. Alexander Salikov and also two of ours, Dmitry Olenin and Aleksei Smirnov, were arrested by the officers of the OMON and carried to the Presnenski militia department (Presnenskoe OVD). Ours were held in the militia department for more than three hours, and after that they were released. Each commissar received a 500-rouble fine due to the violation of administrative law. After three hours, more than 200 activists of the movements Nashi and Young Russia arrived, and after the release of the activists they all went back to demonstrate in the front of the embassy.

The demonstration around the Estonian embassy has continued for five days around the clock. At the moment more than 250 activists from the movements Nashi, Young Russia, and Locals are attending the demonstration in the Malyi Kislovskiy Lane.<sup>76</sup>

The grotesque, *styob*-like headline of Yakemenko's ultimatum is strengthened by this description of Nashi's persistence in collecting signatures for the ultimatum. The description follows Nashi's common practice—evidenced by its numerous web-page reports on various themes—to blur its name ("ours") with the playing of the Russian possessive pronoun; the task of "Ours" is our (Russia's) task. In the second paragraph, the description of the arrest of the activists clearly draws its social and political value from the practice and discourse of the field of restricted cultural production—that is, a culture of practices that stand against official conformism. The civic position (*grazhdanskaya pozitsiya*) that Nashi generally represents according to the framework of the large-scale cultural production (respect toward law and order) is now contrasted with the self-denial of an activist. In other words, a true civic position is contrasted to formal laws. Nashi's willingness to report on this incident in detail in terms of its civic position explicitly shows how Nashi potentially risks its own status as a pro-government and conformist movement. However in the following excerpt, the movement wants to remind the reader about this legal and conformist side of its activities:

#### **Unknown people threw stones at the Estonian embassy building**

Last night an unknown person threw stones at the Estonian embassy building. As a result the glass of one window was damaged and two windows were cracked. According to participants, the stones were thrown by few people from the neighboring house.

After seeing the hooligans, our commissars with activists from Young Russia and the Locals tried to catch them. However, the provocateurs could not be caught. The movement Nashi officially announces that our activists have nothing to do with this incident. We are not announcing the first time that we act according to the law exclusively.<sup>77</sup>

This report is strikingly different from the purposefulness of explaining the moral obligation to break laws in the name of protesting the violation of sacred national values (tearing down the Estonian flag on the territory of the embassy). In all probability, the reporting of a stereotypical act of hooliganism (throwing stones)—no matter by whom—offers Nashi an opportunity to compensate its relatively unrestrained, and presumably stimulative, nationalistic sentiments by making a reminder of its engagement on the official side of society. It follows that in this episode Nashi's highly emphasized symbolism seemingly causes effects that risk its own position as a movement loyal to the Kremlin and official policies. In addition, Nashi risks its position as a serious movement, as “the ultimatum of the demolition/removal of the Estonian embassy building according to the law” illustrates. The intention to keep this ultimatum alive is realized through *styob*-like activities, for example, by erecting stands for posters in various areas onto which local people can write or draw their anti-Estonian comments. These stands were guarded by Nashi “commissars” wearing World War II-era Red Army uniforms.<sup>78</sup> In probably the clearest example of full parody, Nashi urged local people in the town of Kovrov to ask whether they were infected by “the horrible virus called eSStonian fascism,” and then cordially announced that “the majority of Kovrovians were not infected, and did not need anti-fascist vaccination.”<sup>79</sup>

The first big challenge for Nashi's persistent interest in the Bronze Soldier theme was to redeem the explicitly emotion-laden ultimatum to demolish/remove the Estonian embassy building from its current location. At the deadline of the ultimatum, Russia's Independence Day on June 12, 2007, Nashi made public the following report:

Let it stand. So far...

More than a month ago the statue of the Soviet soldier-liberator was removed in Tallinn. A part of Estonian society—only a part—stood against this by active protests. Defenders of the statue were killed and thrown into jail, but still fascist Estonian authorities managed to receive victory. The statue was destroyed and the grave of the fallen buried under the monument defamed.

During protests around the Estonian embassy, we suggested to demolish the Estonian embassy building and to remove it to a distant district of Moscow in order that it will not disfigure the historical outlook of the capital. We approached authorities of all levels. We asked thousands of people. However, it seems only few people in the society are ready to forcefully defend the memory of the fallen as well as stand against reinterpretations of the Second World War. And, in order to avoid even deeper division in the society, it was decided not to start the demolition on the date that was announced.

Fascist authorities in Estonia decided to remove the statue—and they removed it. In Moscow, however, the fascist embassy still stands; so far. As a symbol of not-readiness, many people agree that the memory of the fallen is sacred. As a warning of our indecision and inconsistency in many things concerning our country and the great pages of its history, due to the 1990s,

that will disturb us in the future, as well, when we defend our Motherland not only in big things, but in small things, too. And it necessarily becomes the guarantee of defeats in the future, not only of our conscience but of our memory, as well.

Let it stand. So far.<sup>80</sup>

Despite the serious international consequences of this episode, not only between Russia and Estonia but also between Russia and the European Union,<sup>81</sup> nothing as absurd as demolishing and removing the Estonian embassy was likely to happen. Especially in terms of the original ultimatum, in which the issue was not only about the demolition and removal of the embassy in metaphorical terms, but principally the demolition/removal of the embassy building. Furthermore, although the European Union largely condemned Russia's official reaction,<sup>82</sup> during the peak of the episode one can find critique toward Nashi from instances of Russia's official voices, as well. On May 7, 2007, the Russian analytical pro-governmental journal *Ekspert* explicitly criticized Russia's "unsystematic," "pathetic," and "ineffective" response to Estonia's defamation of "our sacred values" and attempts "to demolish the Yalta world order by turning Russia the liberator into Russia the aggressor." "Hooligan activities by the representatives of Nashi" were mentioned as a concrete example of this failed response.<sup>83</sup> That is no wonder since no matter what Nashi's ultimate goals in its ultimatum were, the fact that the embassy remained where it was (an outcome that was more than predictable) meant Nashi suffered a symbolic loss.<sup>84</sup> Consequently, this loss must be redeemed somehow. This redemption was done by showing Nashi's self-denial and persistence in setting a goal of organizing hundreds of rallies. Although this goal was not achieved, Nashi's failure was projected onto others by using a blatantly Soviet sounding account, according to which only a part of the Estonian society<sup>85</sup> actively protested the removal, and then by accusing all of Russian society. Thus, Nashi first wanted to highlight its intention to defy the "conformist integration" of society by bravely protesting against the defamation of society's memory. However, the actual symbolic loss (the failure of the ultimatum) is redeemed by pointing out that Nashi did not conduct this ultimatum because it did not want society to become even more fragmented. In the last paragraph Nashi moves back to showing the experienced injustice and "imbalance" by repeating the bluster of the headline but also reminding Nashi's consciousness of potential, subsequent violations of Russia's values. Now Nashi clearly speaks from its "independently constructed didactic position" that presumably allows warning society regarding its passivity, as a legacy of the 1990s, in terms of the witnessed and potentially forthcoming defamations of "our Motherland."

The important aspect in this redemption of symbolic loss, as well as in later anti-Estonian rallies and reports, is the use of innocent victims. According to Randall Collins,<sup>86</sup> these victims must not only be innocent, but must also be emblems of the movement's dedication or be quickly converted into such emblematic material. This is vividly present in the beginning of the sample above, in which Nashi blatantly inflates the consequences for the part of Estonia that defended the statue by arguing in the past tense passive that "the defenders of the statue were killed and thrown into jail." The latter statement is more or less true despite its propagandistic tone. The Estonian authorities did arrest hundreds of people during "the Bronze night,"<sup>87</sup> but only one confirmed human loss took place, the death of a Russian-speaking Estonian student, Dmitry Ganin.<sup>88</sup> Ganin's death received wide publicity in the Russian media, but Nashi was the vanguard in terms of his martyrdom. By

September 2009, 150 reports could be found on Nashi's website using the search word "Ganin." In many of these reports—following the ritual-like strategy—Dmitry Ganin was explicitly re-fused with victims of the Great Patriotic War. The following report from the city of Tula, published on the first anniversary of Ganin's death, is an example of this:

**Tula: Commemoration Day of Dmitry Ganin**

Today commissars of the movement Nashi gathered on Victory Square to lay flowers at the statue for the fallen in the wars. Exactly a year ago, Dmitry Ganin was killed in Tallinn when he was defending the honor of Russia and the memory of the heroes who fought in the Great Patriotic War. Youth gathered on the square to take part in the mourning event dedicated to the anniversary of his death.

We have not forgotten the events in Estonia. We continue to collect signatures for the "Bronze book" against the "black lists." We won't surrender but, on the contrary, will become more confident day by day of our justness. History cannot be rewritten. The Bronze Soldier, despite standing no more in Tõnismägi Square, will always remind of the country that beat fascism.<sup>89</sup>

Ganin's death brilliantly illustrates the importance that innocent victims have for many social movements, and how these victims become martyrs.<sup>90</sup> This occurs because the victims are taken to represent the moral power of the movement. They symbolize the feeling that the movement will ultimately win out.<sup>91</sup> For Nashi, actively protesting for Mark Siryk,<sup>92</sup> one of Nashi's Estonian–Russian activists, who was arrested and charged in the Bronze Night riot, illustrated this power of being right. However, Ganin intensifies this feeling because for Nashi, he proved the justness of its cause by his death, and thus he functions as an ideal martyr. In this regard, the important dimension in Ganin's martyrdom is its link to Nashi's platform of emotional commitment and ritual-like re-fusion. From Nashi's viewpoint Ganin's death can be naturally re-fused with the sacred memory of the fallen of "The Great Patriotic War" and the honor of the country, as well as the Russian youth. One also sees a change in Nashi's persistence on this theme after the failed ultimatum for the removal of embassy—and Nashi's reorganization. Now Nashi collects signatures for a special "Bronze book" that is somewhat the counterpart for Estonia's black lists for Nashi activists travelling to the Schengen area.<sup>93</sup>

**Conclusion**

Nashi's political discourse can be approached in terms of challenges that arise when a state-conformist and regime-maintaining social movement tries to conduct a "ritual-like strategy à l'Orange" in the context of post-Orange Russia. That is, the creation of a community that was able to accomplish its ultimate goal: changing the regime. Hence, for Nashi, the central challenge is how to transform the political glory of an oppositional force into a political glory of existing political conformism around official policies. In this vein, Nashi's discourse can be defined as an attempt for a distinctive conformism. This article has examined the question with the help of Bourdieu's fields of cultural production, which suggest that the felicity of a particular style used by a habitus depends on the habitus' position in a particular field. In this respect, a relevant Russian counterpart for Nashi is one of its major opponents, the National Bolshevik Party (see Stanovaya's classification above), during Nashi's early years. The National Bolshevik Party (NBP) has appeared as one of

the most scandalous, controversial, but also aesthetically well-known youth movements in post-Soviet Russia. The National Bolsheviks have largely received their reputation—not least by the creativity of their leader, writer Eduard Limonov—through various theatrical performances and actions, and this is partially due to the fact that there is no ideological or “substantive” catechism that would explain the political guidelines of the NBP.<sup>94</sup> In terms of political style, this means that the NBP’s sovereign position in the oppositional field, that is the field of restricted cultural production, allows almost any kind of combination for the sake of symbolic capital. Whereas NBP activity appears in the periphery in relation to the conformist center, it can be assumed that the accumulation of the NBP’s symbolic capital can be strengthened by its illegitimacy in the field of large-scale cultural production. As Sokolov<sup>95</sup> continues, “politics for the NBP is principally a form of creative self-expression that allows simultaneous and effective use, for instance, of Nazi-officer Ernst Röhm or Che Guevara in terms of maintaining old, and mobilizing new supporters.” In short, the whole political style and image of the NBP can be seen as an emphatic mockery of its enemies and exaggeration of goals by “overidentifying” and “decontextualizing” them. Although such *styob*-like strategy risks the reputation of the movement as well, the NBP’s position guarantees its success for the movement. While there is an explicit link to the Kremlin policies in Nashi’s political position—totally unlike the NBP—it seems that it is Nashi’s didactic position that is “water” for the potential “fire” of youth culture resonating political aesthetization (stimulation).

The Bronze Soldier is an illuminating case of these challenges in Nashi’s political discourse. Regarding the growing patriotic and nationalistic sentiments in Russia’s public opinion during the last ten years,<sup>96</sup> along with the large-scale apoliticalness of youth, it becomes partially understandable why Nashi uses so much energy for promoting patriotism. There is a clear patriotic potential in the population, among youth in particular, and this potential must be utilized. For Nashi, however, as a conductor of official policies, the main problem is how this potential could be utilized within the creation a cogent public image for the movement. This article has argued that this challenge can be conceptualized as a tension between state-didactics and youth culture stimulation that Nashi attempts to re-fuse. Oleg and Vadim’s views on Nashi in terms of “true youth movements”—that is, youth movements in which activities are not disturbed by adult practices in the implementation of official policies—support this attempt.

Nashi’s supposedly profitable communicative strategy to re-fuse these de-fused social powers is an adaptation of *styob*. In the light of effects to the public image of the pro-Kremlin youth movements, it seems that style is seen ultimately independent in relation to political contents. That is, *styob* appears purely as an expressive tool, a form of “political technology,” on the basis of models that have been used in totally different political positions (the Orange side in Ukraine, or NBP’s carnivalistic fascism in Russia). Regarding the potential effects that *styob*-like strategies have caused for the public image of pro-Kremlin groups, and partially for the conditions of their sustainability, there seems to be a lack of self-reflection in their political communication. The *styob* of Nashi’s predecessor, Idushchie Vmeste, within its book campaign against few famous Russian writers in the name of freedom of expression and for the sake of “correct moral values” led to consequences that were opposite to those desired and intended. They included disassociation by the Kremlin and the growing popularity of the accused writers.<sup>97</sup> Consequently, Nashi’s outrage toward the demolition/removal of the Bronze

Soldier was converted into an absurd ultimatum for the demolition of the Estonian embassy, as well as for creating new emblems of Russian patriotism and nationalism, celebrating the martyrs linked to the event, and later suggesting various officials rename streets for these martyrs.<sup>98</sup> It is obvious that Nashi's *styob*-like activities around the Bronze Soldier were not valued arguments against the political elite's decision to reorganize Nashi in early 2008. Or, these activities were one of the central reasons for the reorganization, since Nashi's bad image had become, in part and from an international perspective, Russia's bad image.<sup>99</sup> In practice, this reorganization meant the shutdown of the majority of Nashi's regional sections.<sup>100</sup> Recently, Nashi's active sub-organization Stal', which has become the somewhat active or even follower of Nashi, was responsible for the scandalous installation of "impaled enemies of Russia" in the annual pro-Kremlin youth summer camp in 2010.<sup>101</sup>

Nashi's political discourse can be seen as a failed ritual-like strategy in its goal to create a convincing youth movement on the basis of emerged Russian patriotism. On the one hand, the most stimulative aspect of this discourse—an adaptation of *styob*—can be interpreted as Nashi's sense to carry out distinctive but politically correct youth patriotism, since its use might redeem its appropriateness as a youth culture practice from the viewpoint of adults. On the other hand, since these strategies appear as politically incorrect, seemingly associated with unrestrained nationalism, it is worth suggesting that pro-Kremlin youth movements truly struggle with cogent expressions for their political ideologies. This opens a broader question of the limits of appropriateness in Russia's civil society, not in the sense of opposing the official policies, but of promoting pro-state ideas in particular.

## NOTES

1. Marlene Laruelle, *Youth, Patriotism and Memory in Russia*. Seminar paper held at the Aleksanteri Institute in Helsinki, November 10, 2009 (used by author's permission); Andreas Umland, "Ponimanie Oranzhevoy revolyucii: demokratizatsiya Ukrainy v zerkale Rossii," Polit.ru, December 30, 2009, available at <http://www.polit.ru/institutes/2009/12/30/orange.html> (accessed September 9, 2010); Andreas Umland, "Oranzhevaya revolyutsiya," russkoe antizapadnichestvo i revoliutsiya rossiiskogo politicheskogo rezhima poslednykh let, Polit.ru, January 14, 2010, available at <http://www.polit.ru/institutes/2010/01/14/umland.html> (accessed September 9, 2010); and Robert Horvath, "Putin's 'Preventive Counter-Revolution': Post-Soviet Authoritarianism and the Spectre of Velvet Revolution." *Europe-Asia Studies* 63, no. 1 (January 2011): 1–25.

2. David Lane, "'Coloured Revolution' as a Political Phenomenon," *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 25, no. 2 (2009): 113–135, 132.

3. See also Horvath, "Putin's 'Preventive Counter-Revolution'."

4. Andrew Wilson, *Ukraine's Orange revolution* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005); Maksym Zhrebek, "In search of a theoretical approach to the analysis of the 'Colour revolutions': Transition studies and discourse theory." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 42 (2009): 199–216.

5. For more about this tradition of the so-called Critical Discourse Analysis, see, for example, Norman Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992); Lilie Chouliaraki & Norman Fairclough, *Discourse in Late Modernity: Rethinking Critical Discourse Analysis*. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999).

6. Here I follow Brian McNair's view of political communication, who defines it as all of those elements of communication that might be said to constitute a political image or identity. See Brian McNair, *An Introduction to Political Communication* (New York, NY: Routledge, 1995), 4.

7. Julie Hemment, *Youth voluntarism and the restructuring of social assistance in Russia*, paper presented to the Kennan Institute workshop, International Development Assistance in Post-Soviet Space (Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars, Washington DC, May 2007, used by author's permission); Julie Hemment, "Soviet-Style Neoliberalism?: Nashi, Youth Voluntarism, and the Restructuring Social Welfare in Russia." *Problems of Post-Communism* 56, no.6 (November/December 2009): 36-50.

8. Graeme B. Robertson, "Managing Society: Protest, Civil Society, and Regime in Putin's Russia." *Slavic Review* 68, no. 3 (2009): 528-547.

9. Horvath, "Putin's 'Preventive Counter-Revolution'."

10. Doug Buchacek, *Nasha Pravda, Nashe Delo: The Mobilization of the Nashi Generation in Contemporary Russia* (M.A. thesis, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 2006).

11. Marlene Laruelle, *Youth, Patriotism and Memory in Russia*.

12. Valerie Sperling, "Making the Public Patriotic: Militarism and Anti-Militarism in Russia." Marlene Laruelle, ed., *Russian Nationalism and National Reassertion of Russia* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2009): 218-271.

13. Maya Atwal, "Evaluating Nashi's Sustainability: Autonomy, Agency and Activism," *Europe-Asia Studies* 61, no. 5 (July 2009): 743-758.

14. Dmitry Andreev, *Fenomen molodezhnoy "upravlyaemoy passionarnosti" i vozmozhnye scenariy ego perspektiv. Molodezh i politika*. (Moskva: Biblioteka liberalnogo chteniia 17. Moskovskoe byuro fonda Fridrikha Naumanna, 2006): 49-61.

15. Ulrich Schmid, "Nashi – Die Putin-Jugend. Sowjettradition und politische Konzeptkunst." *Osteuropa* 5 (2006): 5-18.

16. See, for instance, Sperling, "Making the Public Patriotic."

17. Pierre Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power* (Cambridge, England: Polity Press, 1991); *The Field of Cultural Production* (Polity Press, 1993); and *The Rules of Art* (Stanford University Press, 1996).

18. Bourdieu, *The Rules of Art*, 216.

19. To radically condense Bourdieu's theory, it could be called a continuous theoretization of social fields. The most general field division is the division and mutual relation between economic and cultural fields (for more, see Pierre Bourdieu, *Distinction: The Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste* (Boston, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1984).

20. Bourdieu, *The Rules of Art*, 216-217.

21. Bourdieu, *The Field of Cultural Production; Language and Symbolic Power*; For more about the application of Bourdieu's fields of cultural production in post-Soviet Russia, see, for example, Alexei Yurchak, "Privatize your name: Symbolic work in a post-Soviet linguistic market." *Journal of Sociolinguistics* 4/3, 2000, pp. 406-434; Serguei Oushakine, "The Quantity of Style – Imaginary Consumption in the New Russia." *Theory, Culture & Society* 17, no. 5 (2000): 97-120.

22. See, for example, *Strategiya gosudarstvennoy molodezhnoy politiki s kommentariyami* (Gusev, B.B. & Lopukhin, A.M. (eds). Moskva: Izdatel'stvo gosudarstvennogo social'nogo universiteta, 2007), available at <http://www.mon.gov.ru/press/news/3318,print/> (accessed October 27, 2010); Gosudarstvennaya programma "Patrioticheskaya vospitanie grazhdan Rossiiskoi Federatsii na 2006-2010 gody" (2005), available at [http://www.ed.gov.ru/young\\_people/gragd\\_patr\\_vospit/gosprog\\_patriot/](http://www.ed.gov.ru/young_people/gragd_patr_vospit/gosprog_patriot/) (accessed April 15, 2010).

23. Bourdieu, *The Field of Cultural Production*.

24. Jeffrey C. Alexander, "Cultural pragmatics: social performance between ritual and strategy," in Jeffrey C. Alexander, Bernhard Giesen, Jason L. Mast, eds., *Social Performance: Symbolic Action, Cultural Pragmatics, and Ritual* (Cambridge University Press, 2006): 29-30.

25. Alexander, "Cultural pragmatics," 29.

26. Following Victor Turner's views, Alexander (29) uses the birth of the ancient Greek drama as the initial dividing line between ritual and ritual-like strategy. See Victor Turner, *Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors: Symbolic Action in Human Society* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1974).

27. Alexander, "Cultural pragmatics," 38-40.

28. Alexander classifies these components into actors, audiences, representations, means of sym-

bolic production, social powers, and mis en scenes, 38-40.

29. Alexander, "Cultural pragmatics," 38-40.

30. Alexander, "Cultural pragmatics," 42-51.31 Alexander, "Cultural pragmatics," 54-55.

32. Andrew Wilson, *Ukraine's Orange Revolution* (quoted via Zherebkin "In search of a theoretical approach"), 199, 202.

33. Mikhail Shevchuk and Dmitry Kamyshev, "Obyknovennyi "Nashizm," *Kommersant*, February 21, 2005.

34. Viktor Savel'ev, *Goryachaya Molodezh Rossii* (Moscow: OOO Kvanta, 2006): 86; Ekaterina Savina, Yulia Taratuta & Mikhail Shevchuk, "Kratkii kurs istorii dvizheniya 'Nashi'," *Kommersant*, January 29, 2008.

35. Tat'yana Stanovaya, "Molodezhnye organizacii v sovremennoy Rossii," Politkom.ru, 2005, available at <http://www.politcom.ru/320.html>, (accessed October 27, 2010).

36. The Russian script is used here in order to facilitate identification in categories below.

37. Mikhail Sokolov, "Nacional-Bolshevistskaya partiya: ideologicheskaya evolyuciya i politicheskii stil," in Aleksandr Verhovskiy, ed., *Russkii nacionalizm: Ideologiya i nastroyenie*, (Moscow: SOVA, 2006): 139-164.

38. Stanovaya, 2005.

39. See Umland, "Oranzhevaya revolyutsiya."

40. Stanovaya, 2005.

41. See Andrew Wilson, *Virtual Politics. Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005); Graeme B. Robertson, "Managing Society," 2009.

42. Maya Atwal, "Evaluating Nashi's Sustainability," 744.

43. Dmitry Andreev, "Fenomen molodezhnoy "upravlyaemoy passionarnosti."

44. This concept was said to be the invention of Vladislav Surkov, one of the Kremlin's key ideologists, and the "ideological" founder of Nashi. In short, "sovereign democracy" aims to be a highly selective constellation of various ideological traits, picking up the best forms from the West, and then connecting them to the most valuable Russian traditions and practices. In this regard, "sovereign" refers to Russia's absolute autonomy to define its own democratic path. For more discussion of sovereign democracy by its ideologists and representatives, see *Pro suverennoiu demokratiu*. Poliakov, L.V. (ed) (Moscow: Evropa, 2007).

45. Andreev, 52.

46. Andreev, 50.

47. Andreev, 58.

48. Andreev, 59-61.

49. "'NASHI' v gorode: Rossiyane o molodezhnykh organizatsiyakh," VCIOM, March 30, 2005), available at [http://wciom.ru/arkhiv/tematicheskiiarkhiv/item/single/1156.html?no\\_cache=1](http://wciom.ru/arkhiv/tematicheskiiarkhiv/item/single/1156.html?no_cache=1) (accessed October 27, 2010).

50. FOM (2008), *Molodezh v politike*, available at <http://bd.fom.ru/report/map/dominant/dom0820/d082024/printable/> (accessed October 27, 2010).

51. FOM 2008; According to a poll by the Levada centre conducted in November 2007, this figure was clearly higher (26 percent) among those who professed to know political youth movements. Nashi was the best known youth movement. Interestingly, Idushchie Vmeste was fifth (8 percent) in this poll, ahead of many other more active youth movements. However, 66 percent responded that they had not heard of any youth movements (Levada Center, January 21, 2008, *Patriotizm i dvizheniya "Nashi,"* available at <http://www.levada.ru/press/2008012101.html>, accessed August 3, 2010). There are no major changes in the latest poll concerning Nashi (Levada Center, 2011: *Nashi – samoe izvestnoe politicheskoe dvizheniya v Rossii*, available at <http://www.levada.ru/press/2011021002.html>, accessed 17.2.2011).

52. Virve Leskinen, *Reprezentaciya molodezhnogo dvizheniya "Nashi" v tekstakh "Rossiiskoy gazety" v 2005-2008 gg.* (Master thesis, University of Jyväskylä, 2009).

53. *Patriotizm i dvizheniya "NASHI,"* Levada Center, January 21, 2008, available at <http://www.levada.ru/press/2008012101.html> (accessed October 27, 2010).

54. FOM (2007), "Nashi" i drugie molodezhnye dvizheniya, available at <http://bd.fom.ru/report/map/d071516> (accessed October 27, 2010).

55. According to data obtained by VCIOM in 2005, the familiarity of Nashi grew 5 percent in three months (in March 2005, 4 percent, and in June 2005, 9 percent). In the light of these dynamics, the director of VCIOM, Valery Fedorov (VCIOM 2005), assumed that “the day when a youth movement can seriously challenge older comrades is not far off.”

56. FOM (2005), *Politicheskii potencial i politicheskaya aktivnost' molodezhi*, available at <http://bd.fom.ru/report/map/dd052222> (accessed October 27, 2010).

57. FOM (2005).

58. FOM (2008).

59. For more, see Elena Omel'chenko, “Molodezh dlya politikov vs. molodezh dlya sebya? Razmyshleniya o cennostyakh n fobiakh rossiiskoy molodezhi,” *Molodezh i politika* (Moskovskoe byuro fonda Fridrikha Naumanna. Moscow: Biblioteka liberalnogo chteniia 17, 2006).

60. FOM (2008).

61. *Strategiya gosudarstvennoy molodezhnoy politiki*, 17; For more about Russia's youth policy and national identity politics, see Douglas W. Blum, “Russian Youth Policy: Shaping the Nation's State Future,” *SAIS Review* XXVI, no. 2 (Summer-Fall 2006): 95-108.

62. These are all political parties that are represented in the Russian Duma and have youth sections.

63. Manifest, available at <http://nashi.su/manifest> (accessed October 27, 2010).

64. Dmitry Andreev, “Fenomen molodezhnoy ‘upravlyaemoi passionarnosti’.”

65. The Bronze Soldier is the informal name of this highly controversial Soviet World War II war memorial in Tallinn. Originally the statue was named “Monument to the Liberators of Tallinn” which was unveiled on September 22, 1947, three years after the Red Army reached Tallinn on September 22, 1944 during the Second World War. Its original location, a small park on Tõnismägi in central Tallinn (during the Soviet years the place was called Liberators' Square), consisted of a burial site of thirteen Red Army soldiers' which were reburied there in April 1945. For more, see “Bronze Soldier of Tallin,” available at [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bronze\\_Soldier\\_of\\_Tallinn](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bronze_Soldier_of_Tallinn) (accessed May 27, 2011).

66. Mabel Berezin, “Secure states: toward a political sociology of emotions,” in Jack Barbalet, ed., *Emotions and Sociology*, (London: Basil Blackwell, 2002): 3-52, 35. For more about emotions and ritual in the context of Fascist Italy, see Mabel Berezin, “Emotions and Political Identity: Mobilizing Affection for the Polity,” in Jeff Goodwin et. al, eds., *Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2001): 83-98.

67. Galina Kozhevnikova, “Radikal'nyi nacionalizm i protivodeistvie emu,” in Aleksandr Verhovsky, ed., *Russkiy nacionalizm: Ideologiya i nastroyenie* (Moscow: SOVA, 2006): 87.

68. Boris Dubin, “Zapad, granica, osobyi put': simbolika “drugogo” v politicheskoy mifologii Rossii,” *Neprikosnovennyi zapas* 3, no. 17 (2001), available at <http://magazines.russ.ru/nz/2001/3/dub.html> (accessed October 25, 2010); Boris Dubin, “Krovovaya” voyna i “velikaya” pobeda,” *Otechestvennye zapiski* 5, no. 20 (2004), available at [http://magazines.russ.ru/oz/2004/5/2004\\_5\\_5.html](http://magazines.russ.ru/oz/2004/5/2004_5_5.html) (accessed October 25, 2010); Lev Gudkov, “Russkii neotradicionalizm i soprotivlenie peremenam,” *Otechestvennye zapiski* 3, no. 4 (2004), available at [http://magazines.russ.ru/oz/2002/3/2002\\_03\\_09.html](http://magazines.russ.ru/oz/2002/3/2002_03_09.html) (accessed October 25, 2010); and Lev Gudkov and Boris Dubin, “Est' li perspektiva u russkogo natsionalizma?,” in *Russkiy nacionalizm: ideologiya i nastroyenie*.

69. *Opredelena data demontazha zdaniya Estonskogo posol'stva v Moskve*, May 1, 2007, available at <http://nashi.su/news/17098> (accessed October 27, 2010); *Oficial'noe zayavlenie Dvizhenie “NASHI” po povodu istecheniya sroka ultimatum Estonskomu pravitel'stvu*, May 1, 2007, available at <http://nashi.su/news/17063> (accessed October 27, 2010).

70. Alexei Yurchak, *Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation* (Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2006), 249-250; Alexei Yurchak, “Necro-Utopia. The Politics of Indistinction and the Aesthetics of the Non-Soviet,” *Current Anthropology* 49, no. 2 (April 2008).

71. Yurchak, *Everything Was Forever*, 249-250. According to Ian Parker, the concept of overidentification is drawn from the realm of psychoanalysis but was forged by cultural activists in the Neue Slowenische Kunst into a weapon against Tito Stalinism and contemporary neo-liberalism. Overidentification works because it draws attention to the way the overt message in art, ideology,

and day-dreaming is supplemented by an obscene element, the hidden reverse of the message that contains the illicit charge of enjoyment. Slavoi Zhizhek in particular has applied the concept of overidentification in his works. See Ian Parker, *Overidentification*. Explanation of the term at the site of the Lancaster University Management School (2005), available at <http://www.lums.lancs.ac.uk/events/owt/6455/> (accessed October 27, 2010).

72.. Yurchak, *Everything Was Forever*, 249-250.

73. These terms clearly illustrate the struggle over meanings and their interpretations between the official Estonian and Russian sides during, and after, the episode. The Estonian side systematically emphasized the verb “to carry” (viima), largely used in the passive. For example, it is pointed out in the Estonian version of the Bronze Soldier case in Wikipedia that: Praegu on skulptuur Kaitseväge kalmistul, kuhu see viidi Sõjahaudade komisjoni ettepanekul) (See Pronkssõdur, available at <http://et.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pronkss%C3%B5dur>, [accessed March 2, 2010]). The Russian side, instead, interpreted this as a violent action, not only in symbolic, but concrete terms as well. This is because the use of the term “demolition” is intrinsically seen as the preceding stage of removal. In other words, the statue must be first demolished, only then can it be removed. For example, the Russian version of the Bronze Soldier used exclusively the term demontazh (See *Bronzovyi soldat*, available at [http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Бронзовый\\_солдат](http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Бронзовый_солдат), [accessed March 2, 2010]).

74. *Oficial'noe zayavlenie Dvizhenie "NASHI."*

75. *Opredelena data demontazha.*

76. *Opredelena data demontazha.*

77. *Neizvestnye zabrosali kamnyami zdanie estonskogo posol'stva* (published May 3, 2007, 06:46), available at <http://nashi.su/news/17142> (accessed October 27, 2010).

78. *Vladimir: Lyudi gotovy k piketirovaniyu*, May 1, 2007, available at <http://nashi.su/news/17143> (accessed October 27, 2010).

79. *Kovrov: Spasatel'nyi—ukol eSStonskogo fashizma*, May 28, 2007, available at <http://nashi.su/news/18436> (accessed March 2, 2010).

80. *Pust' stoit. Poka...*, June 12, 2007, available at <http://nashi.su/news/19015> (accessed October 27, 2010).

81. Hiski Haukkala, “Poliittisen ja institutionaalisen solidaarisuuden rooli Viron ja Venäjän välisessä patsaskiistassa. Näkökulma: Pronssisoturin pitkä varjo – muistin politiikkaa ja kansallista uhoa” (Marko Lehti, Matti Jutila, Markku Jokisipilä, Jussi Lassila, Hiski Haukkala), *Kosmopolis: The Finnish Review of Peace and Conflict Research* 3 (2007):78-86), 59-86; and “The role of political and solidarity in the statue- debate between Estonia and Russia. A viewpoint: The long shadow of the Bronze Soldier – Memory politics and national bluster,” *Kosmopolis: The Finnish Review of Peace and Conflict Research*, 59-86.

82. Haukkala, 2007.

83. “Novaya Yalta” (*Ekspert*, May 7, 2007).

84. Interestingly, despite “the official voice of the Kremlin,” the newspaper Rossiiskaya Gazeta (hereafter RG), wrote intensively about the Bronze Soldier from a highly patriotic point of view during the peak of the episode (119 articles in which the word “Estonia” was mentioned between April 15 and June 15, 2007), but referred to Nashi's activities only twice. The first was an article about Nashi's ultimatum and “patriotic persistence” (“Nashi” fakty na ikh argument,” May 3, 2007 and the second was an article about Nashi's demonstration for the release of its activist Mark Siryk “Nash Mark – Akciya,” May 5, 2007. There were no mentions after the deadline of the ultimatum. Thus, although RG's rare mentions of Nashi show its clear support, the small number of overall mentions suggests that Nashi did not have a special role in the general patriotic response that this episode launched.

85. This view implies that Estonia would be still part of Russia without mentioning Estonia's demographic division between Estonian and Russian-speaking people, and without specifying who was actually for and against the removal of the Bronze Soldier in Estonia.

86. Randall Collins, “Social Movements and the Focus of Emotional Attention,” in *Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements*, 27-44, 33.

87. Bronze Night, available at [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bronze\\_Night](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bronze_Night) (accessed May 15, 2011).

88. Dmitri Ganin, available at [http://fi.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dmitri\\_Ganin](http://fi.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dmitri_Ganin) (accessed March 2, 2010); see also Bronze night.

89. *Tula: Den' pamiati Dmitriya Ganina*, April 26, 2008, available at <http://nashi.su/news/24286> (accessed March 3, 2010).

90. Randall Collins, "Social Movements," 32-33.

91. *Ibid.*, 33.

92. In the latest version of Nashi's website, one could find eighteen reports about the case of Mark Siryk.

93. *Molodezh: sub'ekt ili ob'ekt, vot v chem vopros*, January 31, 2008, available at <http://www.nashi.su/news/23216> (accessed October 27, 2010).

94. Mikhail Sokolov, "Nacional-Bolshevistskaya partiya," 147.

95. *Ibid.*

96. Boris Dubin 2001, "Zapad, granica, osobyi put"; Boris Dubin 2004, "Krovovaya" voyna i "velikaya" pobeda"; Lev Gudkov 2002, "Russkii neotradicionalizm i soprotivlenie peremenam"; and Lev Gudkov and Boris Dubin 2006, "Est' li perspektiva u russkogo natsionalizma?"

97. "Idushchie Vmeste" zashli slishkom daleko..., Radiomaiak.ru, available at <http://old.radiomayak.ru/archive/text?stream=society&item=1361> (accessed August 11, 2009); and "Pisateli i Minkul'tury kritikuyut aktsiyu "Idushchikh vmeste" po obmenu "vrednye" knigi na "poleznye," Newsru.com, January 21, 2002, available at <http://www.newsru.com/russia/21Jan2002/knigi.html> (accessed March 2, 2010).

98. *Uvekovechim pamiat' o geroe*, June 6, 2007, available at <http://www.nashi.su/news/18719> (accessed March 3, 2010).

99. "Nashi" stali chuzhimi," *Kommersant*, January 29, 2008, available at <http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=846635> (accessed October 27, 2010).

100. "Nashi" stali chuzhimi," *Kommersant*, January 29, 2008; "Nashisty" ukhodyat tikho," Fontanka.ru, January 28, 2008, available at <http://www.fontanka.ru/2008/01/28/053/print.html> (accessed October 27, 2010).

101. The issue is about Stal's installation "The Enemies of the Nation" (Vragi naroda), an alley framed by impaled portraits of "anti-Russian" politicians and officials. As a result, Western companies sponsoring the 2010-camp, including Daimler AG and Tupperware, announced that they would not sponsor the camp if similar incidents occurred in the future. In addition, the presidential commission for the development of civil society urged Yakemenko—acting as the head of federal youth affairs since 2008—to explain this incident regarding the theme of the camp in 2010: "Youth issues instead of global ideological missions, such as the fight against Orange Revolution." Yakemenko relativized the issue of "youth issues" by pointing out that "for many young people, the falsification of the memory of the Great Patriotic War is a problem." See "Zapadnye kompanii otkrestilis'ot foruma "Seliger," Grani.Ru, September 14, 2010, available at <http://www.grani.ru/Politics/Russia/m.181675.html>, (accessed 27.10.2010); "29-ia stat'ia Konstitucii ne narushena (published 28.7.2010, 23:40), available at <http://nashi.su/news/32520> (accessed October 27, 2010).