

Why Donbass Votes for Yanukovich: Confronting the Ukrainian Orange Revolution

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Abstract: The 2004 presidential elections in Ukraine attracted the attention of the international community and became known as the Orange Revolution. The Orange Revolution symbolized the birth of civil society in Ukraine and created a feeling of great optimism. However, nearly half of the population voted for Viktor Yanukovich and disapproved of the Orange Revolution. They not only voted for another candidate, but also voted in a totally different manner, making their choice based on different criteria in accordance with a different set of values and orientations. It would be naive to attribute millions of votes for Yanukovich only to falsifications. This article explores the question of why Donbass, Yanukovich's stronghold, almost unanimously voted for him. Donbass is terra incognita for many Ukrainians and the broader international community. A significant number of Ukrainians envision an industrial Donbass based on old stereotypes. This article considers these stereotypes, the history of their development, and their influence on the electoral campaign. It addresses important characteristics such as roots, culture, the concept of the Donbass character, and the mass media's role in shaping public opinion. This article asserts that despite Yanukovich's loss, Donbass business and political elites still have the potential to influence major socio-economic processes in the country and see their future only within Ukraine.

Key words: Donbass, elections, local identity, Orange Revolution, stereotypes, Ukraine

Introduction

The 2004 presidential election in Ukraine attracted the attention of the international community and became known as the Orange Revolution. This extraordinary event in the political life of the post-Soviet world, along with the pre-

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ceding socioeconomic and geopolitical transformations in Ukraine, are reflected in a considerable block of literature, of which we would give special credit to the works of Kuzio (1996, 1997, 2002, 2003, 2005),¹ Karatnycky (2005),² Matsuzato (2001, 2005),³ Niculae and Popescu (2001),⁴ Shulman (1998, 2002),⁵ Stepanenko (2005),⁶ Wilson (1995, 2002, 2005),⁷ Zimmer (2004),⁸ and others. These authors present different aspects of political life and major political events in Ukraine's social, economic, and other contexts. Most of the research until now has focused on the democratic process of the Orange Revolution, while views, and, more important, the reasons why eastern Ukraine consistently votes for its candidate are unknown, at least in the ethno-cultural context of the region. The March 2006 parliamentary election results show that their choice is not accidental, but consistent and well grounded. This article attempts to answer the question concerning the cultural grounds and the role of the media in Donbass's voting pattern.

A quote that comes from the work of Niculae and Popescu, published in 2001, perfectly describes the future of political life in Ukraine:

Presidential elections of 2004 will hardly become a moment of final choice, as the basis of conflict between political elites lies not in competition of political forces but in national self-identification. The elections will only define the direction of its development in short-range or maybe in medium-range outlook. They will display the current psychological situation in society. More over, the elections will legitimate the process of political elite rotation.⁹

There are often comments by well-known politicians, journalists, and ordinary citizens who are not indifferent to the political events that appear on the central TV stations, in the newspaper *Day*, and in other media outlets. These commentators talk about the birth of the Ukrainian political nation and civil society in Ukraine with great optimism. One may get the impression that these commentators and supporters of Viktor Yushchenko do not take into consideration the fact that nearly half of the population voted for Viktor Yanukovich, who served as prime minister from November 2002 to December 2004, and condemned the Orange Revolution. The truth is that almost half of all voters (12,848,087, or 44 percent) not only voted for another candidate, but also voted in a totally different manner, basing their choice on different criteria in accordance with different values and orientations. Thus, it would be too early to talk about the creation of a political nation. It may be only the beginning of such a process. It would be naive to attribute millions of votes for Yanukovich only to falsifications. Falsifications are an object for investigation by the courts and district attorneys.¹⁰ Scholars should admit that in the predominantly Russian-speaking east and in some of the south, Yanukovich was the obvious leader. The majority of his supporters, almost 4.5 million, are concentrated in the Donetska and Luhanska oblasts.

Why did Donbass almost unanimously vote for Yanukovich? Most of the attempts to answer this question stay within the limits of ideas about the zombification of the region's population. The real fundamental preconditions of the Donbass phenomenon have yet to be examined. Donbass is still terra incognita for the majority of Ukrainians. It is not a resort area such as the Carpathians or the Crimea, where people come to rest; it is not Kyiv, where people go to resolve

their administrative issues; and there are no renowned historical or architectural sites such as one can find in Lviv, Lutsk, or Kamenets-Podilski. That is why a significant number of Ukrainians envision Donbass based on their old established stereotypes.¹¹ On the other hand, a significant part of Donbass's population also exist within the limits of stereotypes about the other regions of the country. The people who live in Kyiv and the western part of Ukraine are often surprised when they visit Donbass for the first time because their stereotypes are not commensurate with the reality. This article considers these stereotypes, the history of their development, and their influence on the 2004 electoral campaign.

Donbass: Roots, Culture, and Character

Donbass is a Donetsk coal basin that began developing in the early 1860s. This coal basin occupies a central part of the Donetsk oblast, southern parts of the Luhansk oblast, and western parts of the Rostovskaya oblast, which belongs to the Russian Federation. This area, with its mines, rising waste banks, miners' settlements, workers' settlements, plants and factories, and developed railroad network, is the real Donbass. It is so densely populated that it is difficult to say where exactly one town ends and another begins. This mosaic of cities, settlements, mines, and plants stretches from Donetsk to Luhansk, creating the appearance of a whole region. On the other hand, the Luhansk oblast mostly consists of rural areas devoid of industry. The same is true for the southern part of the Donetsk oblast. It is all countryside with endless fields of sunflowers. Mariupol—a seaport located on the shores of the Azov Sea and a large center of black metallurgy—is the only city in this area. The northern part of the Donetsk oblast consists of industrial cities, villages, agricultural fields, and forests. In rural areas many villagers still speak Ukrainian, especially older people. Thus, the landscape and population of the region are very diverse. Therefore, one of the most significant mistakes is the application of the name Donbass to the entire territory of the two oblasts.

Another stereotype is that Donbass is a uniquely urbanized region. Indeed, the majority of the population live in cities and towns. On the other hand, the living conditions are not much different from those in the countryside and are often lower, depending on environmental conditions. The majority of the population in the cities and towns live in private houses with small backyards and kitchen gardens. In miners' settlements, living conditions are especially poor. Cities lack well-developed architectural planning. The history of cities in the region started from the building of a plant or a mine where the workers were settlers from nearby settlements. Gradually, the construction of multistory apartment complexes began to replace neighborhoods with private housing, and settlements transformed into towns. Such contrasts still exist. That is why it is easy to see a typical rural landscape with sometimes surprisingly poor, private houses just a few hundred yards from downtown Donetsk or Luhansk. Most of the cities are young and do not have metropolitan features. This explains why the people in the most urbanized region have features similar to rural areas as far as living standards and culture are concerned. Interestingly, the popularity of different occult spiritual and magic beliefs inherited from the pagan epoch puts the population of the

region in a leading position even when compared with the western and predominantly agrarian regions of Ukraine, which are popular among ethnographers. Traditional chiropractors and fortune-tellers are popular and many of them are quite young. One can see a poster reading “folk chiropractic” with a phone number right on the balcony of a multistory apartment complex. In other regions of Ukraine, the Russian Orthodox Church made a substantial effort to eradicate rudiments of the pagan culture. In Donbass, this effort was insignificant. Soviet-style atheism limited the influence of Christianity, but it did not influence the population’s pagan consciousness. Nevertheless, the people of Donbass consider themselves to be cosmopolitan and tend to have a certain degree of arrogance in regard to the rest of Ukraine, which, in their view, is just countryside. From this point of view, large Ukrainian cities such as Kyiv, Kharkov, and Odessa are not Ukraine. This line of thinking may cause people to think that the Donbass mentality is both arrogant and irrational.

Ukrainians started to settle in the northern part of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts—so-called *Slobozhanshina*—in the seventeenth century, and in the western parts of the Donetsk oblast or *Kalmuska Palanka Zaporozhskogo Viyska* (Regiment of the Ukrainian Cossack Military order) in the eighteenth century. In 1778, Crimean Greeks migrated to the Northern Azov territories and established the city of Mariupol and numerous villages. The beginning of the exploitation of the region’s natural resources in the 1860s resulted in a significant influx of Ukrainians and Russians.¹² Collectivization and industrialization during the 1920s and 1930s led to further population growth. Refugees from Ukraine and the neighboring regions in Russia fled their villages in search of a better life and moved to Donbass at that time. They settled mostly in the territories that constitute the real Donbass, i.e., the Donetsk coal basin. A common characteristic of all the migrants was that they built their lives from scratch and relied only on themselves. This characteristic led to the formation of certain features attributed to the population of Donbass: individualism up to social Darwinism, tough styles of behavior, respect for force, high value of labor culture, and a focus on issues of material well-being.

Collectivization resulted in property loss, which led to feelings of anger, while an attempt to build one’s own well-being led to defensiveness. In the words of a local poet: “No one has ever put Donbass down on its knees, and no one ever will.” The absence of any significant state control in the newly occupied territories, until the beginning of the twentieth century, created an atmosphere of legal nihilism. A substantial part of the population, which arrived from a variety of places, are missing features common to traditional communities, features such as religious beliefs, mercy, respect for older people, and so forth.

In many parts of Ukraine, imprisonment carries a stigma and is an embarrassment for an individual. In Donbass, however, it is not taboo and people tend to consider spending time in prison an opportunity to enrich one’s personal experience, especially in one’s youth. Moreover, in Donbass, serving a prison sentence is considered the equivalent of serving in the military. When a man enters the military, his older friends, who have already served in the military, tell him: “Keep the trademark of Donbass,” meaning, “People from Donbass are always first, so

do not let anyone equal to you control you and demonstrate Donbass-type character.” Donetsk and Luhansk are the only oblasts in which, following the tradition, the friends of a man who goes into the military paint on the walls of apartment complexes: “Waiting on so-and-so in 2002” (i.e., “Waiting on Serega in 2003”). The city authorities do not wash the slogans away and they are visible on the walls for many years. One can also see slogans such as “Waiting on Jesus,” but no exact date is specified. This indicates that, unlike the traditional Slavic culture, Protestant denominations exist in the context of Donbass’s traditions. Interestingly, American-style graffiti is nonexistent in Donbass.

Donbass: Local Identity and Political Culture

The diversity of the region’s population has led to the absence of a community consciousness. The stratification of society took place based on people’s affiliation with industries and later with influence from the Soviet state. A specific Donbass identity formed over time.

The principle of compatriotism

is the basis of this identity. Donbass is very inclusive and accommodates everyone who settles there. Donbass offers people certain cultural standards and fast assimilation. This explains why national and cultural communities and clubs are almost nonexistent in Donbass. On the other hand, people born in Donbass, or who spend most of their life there, preserve their collective solidarity and regional identity, i.e., exclusivity.¹³ One of the best examples of this is the presence of a Donbass community in Moscow¹⁴ that exists separately from the Ukrainian community. At the same time, there is not a Kyiv, Poltava, or Dnepropetrovsk community in Moscow. It is difficult to imagine Greeks from Thessalonica or Crete in New York existing separately from the Greek community, or that there would be a Saxon community existing parallel with a German community. Donbass positions itself not only as a separate part of Ukraine, but also as equal to it.

The speaker of the Verkhovna Rada, Volodymyr Lytvyn, stated the main reason for Yanukovich’s defeat in the presidential elections: “He could not become Kyiv’s own man.”¹⁵ Yanukovich failed to become the national leader. Maybe he did not have enough time. He failed to become “Kyiv’s own man” and the elites in Kyiv did not accept him. Yanukovich grew up in the region that shapes a certain psychological type of politician who tends to search for a simple solution to any problem. This type of politician does not compromise. In fact, there are no leaders in Ukraine who grew up in Donbass, except, probably, Oleg Liashko.¹⁶

Donbass has always tried to stand on its own in the Moscow-Kyiv-Donetsk triangle, before and after 1991.¹⁷ After Ukraine declared independence, the balance of power between Moscow, Kyiv, and Donbass did not favor the latter. Kyiv is a

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center of bureaucracy where one must go to settle different issues, resolve problems, and request money from the central budget. The central budget is formed in Kyiv and Donbass contributes more to it than it receives. The people who live Donbass believe this to be the case.¹⁸ They also believe that Kyiv is responsible for the arrears in wages, social transfers, and other payments from the central budget to the region. All of these characteristics help form a negative image of Kyiv. On the other hand, people from Donbass go to Moscow for shopping and higher paying jobs. In contrast to Kyiv, Moscow is a major producer of TV programs, shows, books, and newspapers, i.e., popular culture. Moscow is a good example for Donbass in producing this popular culture. This contributes to the positive image of Moscow in Donbass. Donbass often underlines its independence from Kyiv in its relations with Moscow. Russian newspapers such as *Argumenty i Fakty* and *Komsomolskaya Pravda* are printed with the titles *Argumenty i Fakty in Ukraine* and *Komsomolskaya Pravda in Ukraine*, while in Donbass they are distributed under the titles *Argumenty i Fakty in Donbass* and *Komsomolskaya Pravda in Donbass*. A symbol of Donbass known as the “Palm of Mertsalov,” made at the end of the nineteenth century from a monolithic metal bar, is located in St. Petersburg with replicas set up in Donetsk, Moscow, and Toronto. In the early 1990s, a replica of Tsar Pushka¹⁹ sat in front of the central administration building in Donetsk. The replica, a gift from the mayor of Moscow, is an example of Moscow and Donetsk developing their relations independent of Kyiv.

The language issue is a source of enmity between eastern and western Ukraine. It has been given substantial coverage by the Ukrainian state and media.²⁰ There are two particular aspects of language, or, more specifically, choice of language: its usage in the mass media during the German occupation, and preferences of the population as related to the status of Russian language in Ukraine. Armstrong notes that

. . . in a large number of cities in the Donbass, including Slaviansk, Artemovsk (Bakhmut), Debal'tsevo, and Snezhnoe, the Russians succeeded in establishing a cultural ascendancy without, however, its taking on much political significance. This ascendancy included, in particular, the publication of Russian-language newspapers, which, as a rule, were not allowed in the former Ukrainian Soviet republic.²¹

Views on the status of the Russian language in different regions of Ukraine are presented in table 1.²²

Data presented in the table clearly indicate a preference toward the Russian language in eastern Ukraine. The Kharkivska oblast, as well as several other oblasts, has already declared Russian an official regional language, while in the Donetsk and Luhanska oblasts, Russian is used continuously.

Even time was used to indicate aspirations for autonomy and self-governance. This visible process took place in all the possible dimensions, indeed. In the early 1990s, when Ukraine switched to Kyiv standard time, the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts used Moscow standard time for two more years. Donbass's isolation from Kyiv is growing. At first it was almost invisible, especially in Kyiv or Lviv, and existed mostly in the economic sphere. During the 1990s, Donetsk businessmen

TABLE 1. Views on the Status of the Russian Language in Ukraine, 2004

What should the state policy on Russia be?	Ukraine as a whole	Region of Ukraine (%)				
		West	West-Central	East-Central	East	South
Russian should be banished from the official sphere	15	55	6	4	2	10
Russian should be made the second official language in oblasts where it has majority support	40	30	44	23	47	52
Russian should be made the second official language of the country	40	8	45	69	49	29
Other	1	1	1	1	0	0
Difficult to say	4	6	4	3	1	7

Source. "Ukraina: Pole Mnenij," *Sociologicheskie soobsheniya Fonda "Obshestvennoe mnenie,"* 2004, 1, 42 (cited in Lapkin and Pantin 2005, 8).

changed their positions in the region, while using the Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU), led by Piotr Symonenko, as a convenient curtain. Symonenko was also from Donbass. Donetsk business lived by the principle: "we do not touch you and you do not touch us," maintaining the status quo. It is a well-known fact that in Ukraine political parties are formed to supplement influential business groups, or, if they emerged at the very beginning of independence, they sought partnerships with big business. Based on this, Donetsk business groups isolated the region from outside political influence by fencing off the region from outside businesses. This self-imposed economic and political isolation resulted in cultural isolation. During the 2002 parliamentary elections, pro-presidential parties (that is, pro-Kuchma) such as the Social-Democratic Party of Ukraine (United) recognized that it is difficult to work in Donbass. Even though some of the parties have offices in the region, their activities are always insignificant and invisible. The specific political culture of Donbass has been shaped in these conditions of isolation.²³ The core of this political culture can be expressed in the slogan: "Donbass votes for its own people."

The Ukrainian political elite have overlooked Donbass. Ukrainian politicians have been living with the stereotypes of a Red Donbass that votes for Communists and miners that block railroads and hold protest meetings under the walls of the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament of Ukraine) for too long.

Indeed, Donbass businessmen operated in the Communist Party's shadow. The situation changed at the end of the 1990s. In the second round of the 1999 presidential elections, the Donetsk oblast voted overwhelmingly for Kuchma. This was not the case in the other oblasts in the east and south.²⁴ Kuchma adjusted economic policy to the region accordingly.

While Donbass's newspapers criticized Kuchma before 1999, after 1999 they directed their criticism toward Kyiv in general, attacking the bureaucracy and fiscal policies that are unfavorable to the mining industry's development.

Criticism of Kyiv stopped with the appointment of Yanukovich as prime minister. In 2002, Donetsk business completely moved out of the shadows of the KPU. Candidates from the Party Regions of Ukraine (PR) received the deputy mandates in twenty-one out of twenty-two majoritarian electoral districts.²⁵ The KPU received 29.78 percent of the votes by the party lists. As a consequence, the leader of the KPU, Symonenko, suddenly started speaking Ukrainian, posing as a representative of the interests of all of Ukraine, not only the eastern and southern regions. Donetsk businesses are moving outside of the oblast's limits and starting to expand their economic influence in the Luhansk and Sumy oblasts and in the Crimea. The head of the Supreme Council of Crimea, Boris Deych, has lived in Donbass for a long time.

The economic power of Donbass's business was not commensurate with its weak political presence. Simply put, Donbass's political elites demanded adequate political representation. The Dnepropetrovsk clan, led by Kuchma and his son-in-law, Viktor Pinchuk, took power in 1994. In 2004, the Donetsk clan came to power. The population of Donbass were politically passive. People voted for a candidate endorsed by the director of their plant or mine, i.e., for the KPU or for the director himself. Ordinary people in Donbass believe that the Donetsk clan, along with the Dnepropetrovsk and Kyiv clans, is being confronted by the economically underdeveloped and nationalistic western part of Ukraine. This confrontation is colored with all the Bandera stereotypes inherited from Soviet times. For the people of Donbass, western Ukraine starts right behind Kyiv, or where people speak Ukrainian. Even people who moved from the Kyiv oblast to Donbass after the Chernobyl catastrophe are regarded as westerners. After the Chernihiv and Sumy oblasts gave a majority of their votes to Yushchenko, they were also regarded as pro-Western.

For the people of Donbass, it is normal that the candidate supported by the industrial east always wins. In 1991 it was Leonid Kravchuk, and in 1994 and 1999 it was Kuchma. From their point of view, this made sense because heavy industries are concentrated in the east. The Soviet times taught them that heavy industry constitutes the backbone of the economy and that the consumer goods and service industries are secondary to it. Accordingly, official Soviet propaganda portrayed miners and metal workers as the "guard of labor."

During the presidential campaign, Yanukovich positioned himself as an advocate of the interests of the entire Ukraine. In Donbass, he based his campaign on the idea of the Donbass character. It is convenient to consider the presidential campaign following the publications in the newspaper *Golos Donbassa* (Voice of Don-

bass). In the fall of 2004, hundreds of thousands of copies were distributed on the streets and delivered to mailboxes free of charge. The first five issues contained articles by V. Zablotski, a Donetsk National University professor of philosophy, titled "Donbass Is the Region with Character." Zablotski defined Donbass's character as the following: "Donbass character means courageous obeying of a duty, of an authority of the collective-fraternity, the opinion of which you value and where you are equal to the other and you should do the work." In Zablotski's opinion, the shaping of the Donbass character began with the industrialization of the region. He writes: "The features of our Donbass character and Donetsk patriotism were shaping first of all in connection with emerging and developing heavy industry in southern parts of Russia in the mid 19 century."²⁶ Most of Donbass's population believe this, which leads to the notion that Donbass voluntarily joined Ukraine on March 19, 1918. However, this approach ignores the Cossack period in the region's history during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Indeed, the Donetsk-Krivoroisk Republic, which only existed for several months, and Bolshevik Artem Sergeev, Donbass's founding father, have a special place in Donbass mythology. Lenin disapproved of the establishment of the republic and Donbass's character did not forgive him for it. During the Soviet era, Artem was the most popular name among the male population, while Vladimir was very rare. There were several cities named after the leaders of the Communist Party: Stalino (previously Yuzovka and now Donetsk), Zhdanov (now Mariupol), Voroshilovgrad (now Luhansk), Artemovsk, and others. At the same time, there was no place named after the leader of the world proletariat.

After the dismissal of Stalin's personality cult, cities were gradually renamed or regained their original names. For instance, Stalino was named Donetsk in 1962. Artemovsk never regained its original prerevolutionary name, Bagmut. Moreover, in almost every city the main street was named after Lenin, but in Donetsk the main street is named after Artem. At the very end a street named Illich intersects it.²⁷ This shows that even during the Soviet era, Donbass's character exuded independence.²⁸

Donbass: Mass Media and Public Opinions

The last paragraph in Zablotski's article has the subtitle: "What about tomorrow? Or the Donbass dream." Tomorrow is expressed as: "It is necessary to build our Donetsk (Donbass) dream with mutual efforts."²⁹ In the same issue with a reference to the newspaper *Donetsky Kriazh* (Donetsk Highlands), an unauthored piece states the following: "There is no vacuum in politics. Those who have been trying to suppress and destroy the historical mission of Donbass over the last decades are now trying to fill this emerged political vacuum." Editors of the newspaper do not specify what kind of historical mission for Donbass they have in mind. Maybe this is because it is something commonly known in Donbass? The other materials published in the newspaper make clear who tried to destroy the historical mission.

Every issue of *Golos Donbassa* contains a special rubric under the general title "Elections 2004: The Voice of Donbass Decides." There are numerous, brief inter-

views with the ordinary people of Donbass in the rubric. From their answers to the question, “Who would you not vote for under any circumstances?,” it is clear that they would never vote for the opposition leader, Viktor Yushchenko, because he regards Donbass as second-class and its population as servants, villains, and second-class citizens, and so if Yushchenko should become president they would end up in a reservation.³⁰ Zimmer points out that Yanukovich has, for his own purposes, manipulated and exploited Donbass’s complex regional identity.³¹

People who live in Donbass say that they will never vote for Yushchenko by expressing the following opinions on his politics: “Because his policy is one of a gangster. [He] is recruiting youth for his gangster-type settlings,” and “I

“For the people of Donbass, western Ukraine starts right behind Kyiv, or where people speak Ukrainian. Even people who moved from the Kyiv oblast to Donbass after the Chernobyl catastrophe are regarded as westerners.”

do not like his policy, his methods of work, when he organizes all those meetings, demonstrations, and provokes people.”³² Yushchenko has not done anything for Donbass. Respondents expressed a strong intent to vote for Yanukovich because he is “our own, from Donbass.”

Letters published in the *Golos Donbassa* contain more com-

prehensive explanations for Yanukovich’s support. An economist living in Gorlovka said that:

I absolutely support Yanukovich. Why?—Because his base consists of the national bourgeoisie. This national bourgeoisie has grown from the Soviet directors of enterprises and is indivisible from the means of production. The means of production are not portable and can not be stolen and sold abroad. Thus the national bourgeoisie does not have a choice but to invest in the development of the national economy or otherwise the stream of profits will end sooner or later. This constitutes the major difference between the national bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie-tymoshenki,³³ whose business is to pump all the wealth out of the country without giving anything in exchange.³⁴

Mutual allegations were numerous and harsh, indeed.³⁵

Negative attitudes toward the Orange Revolution among Donbass’s population are obvious. Although 58.2 percent of the respondents in the west and 41.9 percent of respondents in central Ukraine regard the Orange Revolution as a conscious struggle of the people to protect their rights, only 23 percent of the respondents in the south and 17.3 percent of the respondents in the east have the same attitude. Not surprisingly, 46.5 percent of the respondents in the south and 54.1 percent of the respondents in the east consider the Orange Revolution a coup d’état, either organized with Western support or prepared by political opposition.³⁶

The mass media in Donbass challenged Yushchenko in a variety of ways.³⁷ For instance, on the eve of the first round of presidential elections an anonymous article titled “Ukrainian Fascism—The Terrible Truth” appeared in the *Golos Don-*

bassa. The article described the activities of OUN-UPA, anti-Soviet guerilla military organizations that opposed the Fascist occupation in western Ukraine, and gave quotes from the memoirs of Polish people who survived the Volyn' tragedy of 1943.³⁸ A small remark at the end of the article informed readers that today nationalist organizations support Yushchenko.

After the first round of the elections on October 31, 2004, when, according to the statistics of the Central Election Committee, Yushchenko was half a percent ahead of Yanukovych, *Golos Donbassa* published an article titled "The Second Round: The East against the West." In this article, Shtil says that:

Voting in the first round confirms the development of the events under the scenario: "candidate of the East against the candidate of the West." Eastern and most of the central regions of Ukraine gave their votes to Yanukovych while western Ukraine voted for Yushchenko. A clear geographic split takes place based on the principle of distance from Russia and United Europe.³⁹

There was a map under the article titled "Ukraine Has Split," which depicted regions painted in two colors, depending on the results of the vote. However, the map did not name the nearby countries because, if it had, readers would have seen that the Chernihiv and Sumy oblasts that border Russia voted for Yushchenko, while the Odessa oblast gave a majority of its votes to Yanukovych, despite the fact that it borders Romania, a member of NATO. The same issue contained the following information:

The majority of those who were marching in the columns under the Orange flags are people who not only have failed to adapt to the surrounding reality, but also aggressively condemn the larger part of Ukrainian citizens who have finally learned to survive in this environment. It is exactly their faces grimaced with anger, that we will be able to see at all levels of the vertical axis of power in case of a victory for Yushchenko. Today they are pawns to the King. Tomorrow can bring them power and money. To be more precise: power over us and our money.⁴⁰

The next issue of the newspaper contained a map of a divided Ukraine with the caption "Who Will Win?" on the front page and an article titled "Where Is Your Character, Donbass?" The unknown author of the front-page article addressed readers with the following question: "You have not expected such a result for the first round, dear reader, have you? . . . The low political literacy of many western Ukrainians played a role. They answered the question, 'why are you giving your vote to Yushchenko?' by saying, 'Well, everyone does.'" According to the author, Yushchenko's significant advantage is due to a high-level of participation—more than 80 percent—in western Ukraine. In the Donetsk oblast, the turnout was around 74 percent. The author appeals to the readers with a call to participate in the second round:

Man of Donbass! Did you forget how Yushchenko called us "lackeys" or "servants" during his visit to Donetsk a year ago?⁴¹ Don't you understand that in the case of his victory he will "tear apart" the independent region? Don't you see how they make us enemies of Ukraine while we maintain its well-being? Will you allow exterminating yourself? No? Then do not sit on the couch hoping that everything will get settled without your voice!⁴²

In the same issue, observers from Donbass share their views on the election campaign in western Ukraine. They say that people took them well, but they got an impression that people in western Ukraine are morally suppressed and the TV sets only receive programs from Poland. They learn from Polish TV programs about the events in Ukraine. Readers of the *Golos Donbassa* believe that “Yushchenko leads a very active presidential campaign in the West and we should do the same here. It will be scary if Yushchenko should come to power. American troops will enter the country and will impose their rules. We must remind people about this on a regular basis,” and, “Yanukovich has already done a lot for Donbass and for the country and he now only needs more consistency.”⁴³ In a November 12, 2005, issue of *Golos Donbassa* readers stated that “But we also need a high level of agitation and more information about him. Yushchenko tries hard to literally shake out votes from the people. [They] go to hospitals, universities, while we do not do anything. And he conceals this, but we should do it openly.”⁴⁴ The people of Donbass are starting to wake up and the Donbass character is becoming active. “The people of Donbass are always first and we can’t lose.” The people become politically active and involved in the confrontation with the rival and his aggressive supporters. The last page of the issue concludes with a lengthy article titled, “Plans of Yushchenko: We Will be Buried in the Nuclear Grave.”⁴⁵

On November 21, 2004, after the announcement of Yanukovich’s second round electoral victory, *Golos Donbassa* posted opinions commonly expressed in Donbass regarding student involvement in the pro-Yushchenko demonstrations in Kyiv: “Of course, there are a lot of fooled youth, but they will decide nothing. The decision depends on us—people of the east of the country, and first of all Donbass. And we are not as politically passive as people use to think. The second round showed what we can do.” As the leader of the Slavic Party, O. Bazilyuk, who is from Donbass, characterized it: “These are youth which in the early 1990s was not attending school yet, and now these youth have been brought up in the spirit of hatred against ‘easterners’ and ‘moskali’⁴⁶.”⁴⁷

Every issue of the *Golos Donbassa* devoted central pages to the presidential elections. Here are some of those news headlines that can serve as a good indicator of the dynamics of the presidential campaign in Donbass:

“Vote with Donbass in Your Heart.”⁴⁸

“October 31 Is the Day of Presidential Elections. Choose the Right to Live for Donbass.”⁴⁹

After the first round: “Donbass Is Winning. Your Voice Is Needed.”⁵⁰

“Shared Destiny. Good Choice. Donbass Will Win.”⁵¹

After the second round: “Congratulations on Your Victory, Donbass [in Russian] Congratulations on Your Victory, Ukraine [in Ukrainian].”⁵²

This does not represent a chronology of the presidential elections, but rather an open conflict with an unknown enemy. At the same time, Donbass shares its victory with Ukraine. The stakes are made on the Donbass character, i.e., the people of Donbass are always first and Donbass and Ukraine are equals. Congratulations on the victory are even made in two different languages.

Real and Imagined Separatism: Manipulations of the Public's Opinion

On November 27, 2004, many cities in Donbass held meetings in support of Yanukovych. Organizers of the meetings assured participants that the “brown-orange” plague⁵³ was moving toward Donbass. Calls for autonomy for Donbass and the other eastern and southern regions enthused the majority of the population: “We will survive without them, but they won’t.”⁵⁴ However, the Donbass’s people enthusiasm, based on the region’s self-sufficiency, declined after police in the Sumska and Poltavaska oblasts stopped and turned back Donetsk trucks sent to buy potatoes (a staple in Ukraine).⁵⁵ This indicates that Ukraine already exists as a form of federacy. These so-called “potato wars” are not new. In 1996, the Donetsk business community forced the governor of the oblast, Viktor Sherban, out of the region. Shortly thereafter, Kuchma made him the governor of the Sumska oblast. Sherban, offended by the act of his compatriots and former business partners, instructed the Sumska oblast’s traffic police not to let trucks with Donetsk plates to enter the Sumska oblast. As a result, Donbass had to import potatoes from the Belgorod oblast in Russia until the administrations of the respective oblasts resolved the situation.

In an attempt to regulate inflated prices on certain products, oblast governors create numerous administrative obstacles for importing goods from other oblasts, which helps local markets avoid competition.

In this context, the notorious convention held in Severodonetsk on November 26, 2004, in which some deputies and governors from the pro-Yanukovych east and south called for autonomy, should be seen as an attempt to legally verify an already existing way of doing things and to distribute powers rather than trying to secede. Some deputies and governors used separatist rhetoric to prevent Yushchenko and his supporters from taking power in Kyiv. Complex agreements signed in the Verkhovna Rada on December 8, 2004, indicate that the compromise has been achieved and regional administrators and businessmen will have control over their regions after the reform of local self-governance that began in 2005 is completed.

Donbass’s leaders clearly understand that they are more influential in Ukraine than in Russia. Moreover, Donbass’s mining industry receives subsidies from Kyiv. For some parts of Ukraine, it is more economically rational to import coal from Poland and Russia than to buy it from Donbass, but the government continues to subsidize some ineffective mines to avoid social problems. Hypothetically, if Donbass united with Russia, a number of Donbass’s mines would be closed and its metal plants would face rough competition from their powerful Russian counterparts. In these circumstances, owners of the metal industry and Yanukovych’s supporters would not have the protection and support of the government they enjoy now.

Lapkin and Pantin characterize the situation in Donbass in the following way:

The eastern *macroregion* (primarily the Donbass), a kind of Soviet industrial enclave inside independent Ukraine, has proved to be the least prepared for life under liberal market conditions. Although it surpasses all other regions in terms of resources, infrastructure, and capital assets, it cannot manage without paternalistic

attention from the center. The systemic incompatibility between the Soviet industrial complex and the new state's economic policy and economic priorities has predetermined the region's economic, social, political, and ethnocultural troubles. A major contradiction in sociopolitical attitudes prevails here: profound dissatisfaction with the current situation (expressed in steady support for the "implacable left wing"), combined with intense engagement in national politics as the main source of political opposition to the course of building a nation-state.⁵⁶

Separatist rhetoric aside, it appears that Donbass's business and political elites see their future only within Ukraine.⁵⁷ While Yanukovich promised to make Russian Ukraine's second official language during the 2004 presidential elections,⁵⁸ vice speaker of the PR in the Parliament, Yevhen Kushnariov, asserted that there should be only one state language—Ukrainian—and the other languages should be given minority languages status, as prescribed by the European Charter on Languages.⁵⁹ Kushnariov also suggested introducing a special Ukrainian language test for all government employees, as well as a 20 percent pay cut for those who fail the test and a 30 percent pay increase for those who pass the test and demonstrate proficiency in Ukrainian. Interestingly, the grandson of Donetsk governor Blizniuk attends a school that uses Ukrainian as the language of instruction, despite the fact that there are very few Ukrainian schools in the region. At the same time, Blizniuk, who resigned from the governor's position in early 2005, favors autonomy for Donbass and making Russian the second state language. Yanukovich, whose son is now an MP, addresses the Verkhovna Rada in Ukrainian, even during the crisis of July 2006.

The dismissal of the second round election results and the authorization of another vote frustrated the majority of Donbass's population, but it did not take long for them to mobilize. Donbass's character has overcome the failure.⁶⁰ The copying of different forms of propaganda and collective action broadly used by the organizers of the Orange Revolution, including the distribution of blue stripes that symbolized support for Yanukovich, political leaflets, organizing meetings, appearances in public, and speeches from an open, concert-type stage indicated the population was politically mobilized. The anti-Yushchenko atmosphere was supported by gossip and threats about the consequences for the region of having Yushchenko as president. Donbass's people previously voted for their candidate because "he is our own" or "because the director said so," now their choice was more conscious and explained by the logic of confrontation: "who will take over: them or us?"

After the Constitutional Court rejected the results of the second round of the 2004 presidential elections and scheduled the revote for December 26, 2004, Yushchenko commented that because the Orange Revolution had removed political censorship and people of the eastern and southern regions of the country received access to objective and unbiased information through the free press, they would change their opinion about him.⁶¹ This statement demonstrates how uninformed Yushchenko and his advisors were about the situation in the pro-Yanukovich regions. Apparently, they were inclined to believe that the votes against Yushchenko were mostly the result of the massive propaganda of the

media, controlled by Kuchma and Yanukovych. In reality, the deep cultural divide between the east and west of Ukraine predetermined the people's choice. The change of emphasis on the central TV channels after November 21 did not have a significant influence on the people's beliefs because they were certain that the traitors, and first of all Kyiv bureaucrats, fooled their candidate. On the eve of the December 26 revote, local newspapers called on people "not to trust the 'orange' channels," even though there was no need for such calls, because the people of the region do not trust the news on UT-1, Inter, Channel 5, 1+1, and others in the same way that the "orange" electorate does not trust the news from the pro-Yanukovych TRK Ukraine. Identifying a candidate as "our" or "stranger" seems to work. The Donbass mentality's inability to process information is exacerbated by the region's isolation. Yanukovych received essentially the same number of votes in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts during the revote as he did during the first and second rounds—93 and 91 percent, respectively. Data for voter turnout in the 1999 and 2004 presidential elections are presented in table 2.⁶²

According to the data presented in table 2, voter turnout in the 1999 and 2004 presidential elections increased between the first and second round. In the second round of the controversial 2004 election, voter turnout in Donetsk was 96.7 percent. This unusually high-level of participation, which exceeds the national average and level of participation in the western city of Lviv, may be partially attributed to Yanukovych's powerful propaganda machine. According to Ukraine's Central Election Commission (CEC), 67.13 percent of registered voters participated in the 2004 election. On April 10, 2006, the CEC announced the final results (which can be seen on the Commission's Web site). Out of forty-five parties, only five passed the required 3 percent electoral threshold. Comparing the results with early polls, it was unexpected that President Yushchenko's party, Our Ukraine, received less than 14 percent of the national vote, much less than the PR, and the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc (BYuT). The KPU received less than 4 percent of the vote and twenty-one places in the Parliament, as opposed to their

TABLE 2. Turnout in the 1999 and 2004 Presidential Elections

Year	Turnout (%)		
	Lviv	Donetsk	National average
1999			
First round	78.9	66.1	70.2
Second round	85.7	77.5	73.8
2004			
First round	80.8	78.1	74.9
Second round	83.5	96.7	80.9

Source. Central Election Commission of Ukraine, <http://www.cvk.gov.ua/vnd2006> (accessed June 6, 2006).

20 percent in the 2002 elections. The March 26, 2006, parliamentary election results are presented in table 3.⁶³

During the beginning of Yushchenko's presidency, no major changes in the leadership in the east and south were made, especially on the mid- and lower-levels. The appointment of Vadym Chuprun, Ukraine's former ambassador to Turkmenistan and a Donbass native, to governor of the Donetsk oblast indicates a possible agreement between Yushchenko and the Donetsk oligarchs. Chuprun's relative neutrality is good for the balance of power between the center and Donbass's business clan. As the Orange Revolution's leaders were busy struggling for positions in the new government and influence on the president, they did not think about the future, even though they clearly understood that Donbass's oligarchs would be influential in the March 2006 parliamentary elections. They did not develop a plan that would allow them to gain more support in the east. The elections helped the PR preserve and further strengthen its position in the region.

Only the Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU) and the BYuT have an active presence in Donbass. Respect for Donbass featured prominently in these parties' political slogans. "Love Donbass! Believe in Ukraine!" was intended to show respect to the people of Donbass, positioning the region as equal to the country. Nevertheless, this strategy, based on the specifics of the regional mentality, did not help, as Yushchenko's Our Ukraine received only 1.41 percent of the votes in the Donetsk oblast and 2.04 percent in the Luhansk oblast.

The SPU and the BYuT, who portrayed themselves as opponents of the business clans and supporters of the region's working class, were unsuccessful as well. Most of the electorate voted for the PR, demonstrating that the regional agenda dominates class issues. People did not vote for the Left or the Right per se, but for people they knew and trusted, leaders who fit into their cultural and mental profile and visionary frameworks. Dramatic elections in 2004 and 2006 have only strengthened Donbass's regional identity and initiated a minor refurbishing of the old stereotypes of the "other" Ukraine. Now, in place of the "other," a hostile entity or force is occupied not only by western Ukraine, but first of all by the Orange Kyiv that contin-

TABLE 3. Results of the March 26, 2006, Parliamentary Elections

Place	Party/Bloc of parties	% of votes received	Total votes received	No. of seats
1	Party of Regions	32.14	8,148,745	189
2	Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko	22.29	5,652,876	129
3	Bloc of Our Ukraine	13.95	3,539,140	81
4	Socialist Party of Ukraine	5.69	1,444,224	33
5	Communist Party of Ukraine	3.66	929,591	21

Source. Central Election Commission of Ukraine, <http://www.cvk.gov.ua/vnd2006/> (accessed June 2006).

ues to live at the expense of the regions, damages relations with Russia, and is preparing to sell Ukraine to NATO. The people of Donbass, as well as people in the east and south, consider the removal of NATO troops from the Crimean peninsula a victory.

One of the essential features of the 2006 parliamentary elections, at least according to the media, is the image that they were the “most democratic elections,” “first truly democratic elections in Ukraine,” “unique,” and “first honest and transparent elections in the history of Ukraine.” These types of slogans were numerous.⁶⁴

Parties were unable to achieve an agreement necessary to form a coalitional government, fighting for the seats in ministries and parliamentary commissions, creating a weak coalition right before the deadline. Starting on June 27, 2006, deputies/members of the PR successfully blocked the Parliament’s work for ten days, demonstrating Donbass character. They promised to block it for a month to cause another political crisis, and achieve new parliamentary elections. They do not like that their leader could be fooled again by the current leadership. Yanukovich, who uses terms such as “Donbass nation” in his rhetoric, told delegates from the PR in a meeting that “The road to unification of Ukraine is open. Revolutions and demonstrations are over.”⁶⁵ The situation changed again on July 17, 2006, when there was an announcement about the creation of a parliamentary majority. This group consisted of the PR, the SPU, which supported Yushchenko during the 2004 presidential elections, and the KPU, which remained neutral during the 2004 presidential elections. The three parties formed a coalition and nominated Yanukovich for prime minister.⁶⁶ An Anti-Crisis coalition was formed and Yushchenko nominated Yanukovich to become the prime minister. A total of 271 MPs voted for Yanukovich. With political tensions still rising, and the BYuT threatening to withdraw its members from Verkhovna Rada, the Rada says that it can appoint Yanukovich without Yushchenko’s approval.

Conclusion

After Yushchenko’s victory announcement, most of the Donbass people thought that the victory had been stolen from them and tended to group around their leader. Even though there were no significant demonstrations against the final results of the elections, this does not mean that the PR had quit. In 2005, Yanukovich had an opportunity to criticize the Cabinet of Ministers—appointed by Yushchenko and led by Tymoshenko and then Yekhanurov (from September 2005)—and remind them, among other things, about the promised compensation for people’s deposits to Sberbank,⁶⁷ which were devalued during the reforms.

Of the twenty-nine million people who voted on December 26, four-and-a-half million in just the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts voted for Yanukovich. Of the twenty-five million voters who took part in the 2006 parliamentary elections, more than eight million voted for the PR (see the Appendix for detailed statistics). The results of the election clearly indicate that the political culture of Donbass’s population did not change and that the Donbass electorate strongly supports the PR. The PR alone received 186 of the 450 seats in the Parliament. Yanukovich did not have central resources in these elections. Thirty-two percent

of the electorate voted for the PR, which cannot be ignored. This created an opportunity for forming a coalition around the PR. This coalition created a government and Cabinet of Ministers with Yanukovich as prime minister. A package of amendments adopted on December 8, 2004, significantly enhanced the prime minister's power. In any case, Donbass has become a political force. Donbass has been isolated from the rest of Ukraine for a long time and now it will require substantial and consistent efforts to integrate the population of this Ukrainian Ruhr into national politics and civil society.

NOTES

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2. Adrian Karatnycky, "Ukraine's Orange Revolution," *Foreign Affairs* 84, no. 2 (March–April 2005): 35–42.

3. Kimitaka Matsuzato, "All Kuchma's Men: The Reshuffling of Ukrainian Governors and the Presidential Election of 1999," *Post-Soviet Geography and Economics* 42, no. 6 (2001): 416–39; "From Communist Boss Politics to Post-Communist Caciquismo—The Meso-Elite and Meso-Governments in Post-Communist Countries," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 34, no. 2 (2001): 175–201; "Semipresidentialism in Ukraine Institutional Centrist in Rampant Clan Politics," *Demokratizatsiya* 13, no. 1 (Winter 2005): 45–59.

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6. Victor Stepanenko and Sergei Sorokopud, "The Construction of National Identity: A Case Study of the Ukraine" in *Ethnicity and Nationalism in Russia, the CIS and the Baltic States*, ed. Christopher Williams and Thanasis Sfikas, 184–210 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999); Victor Stepanenko, "How Ukrainians View Their Orange Revolution: Public Opinion and the National Peculiarities of Citizenry Political Activities," *Demokratizatsiya* 13, no. 4 (Fall 2005): 595–617.

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8. Kerstin Zimmer, "Ukraine: The Donetsk Factor," *Transitions Online*, December 21, 2004; "The Captured Region. Actors and Institutions in the Ukrainian Donbass," in *Making Regions in Post-Socialist Europe: The Impact of History, Economic Structure and Institutions*. Volume I: *Case Studies from Poland, Hungary, Romania and Ukraine*, ed. M. Tatur, 231–348 (Opladen: Leske and Budrich, 2004); Kerstin Zimmer, *Donetsk in Kyiv and*

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9. F. Niculae and O. Popescu, "Disputes between Ukrainian Political Elites on the Eve of Presidential Elections in 2004," in *Ukraine: A Country Torn Apart between Europe and Russia*, ed. F. Niculae and O. Popescu, 212 (Bucuresti: Politeia-SNSPA, 2004).

10. *Golos Donbassa*, "Observers Have Recorded Obvious Violations of the Electoral Process in Western Ukraine," November 2004, 6.

11. See, for example, I. Grabovska, "Modern Ukrainians as Reflected in Light of Theirs and Others' Stereotypes," *Suchasnist* [Modernity] 9 (2004): 138–47; G. Schöpflin, "The Political Traditions of Eastern Europe," *Daedalus* 119, no. 1 (2002): 55–90; R. Szporluk, "Why Ukrainians Are Ukrainians," *Transit*, 23 http://www.iwm.at/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=271&Itemid=449 (accessed March 2006) (trans. into Ukrainian in *Suchasnist* 4, 2003); S. Grabovski, "Ukrainians: Independent Nation or Dwellers of a Cultural Ghetto?" *Suchasnist* 7–8 (2004): 86–100.

12. H. Kuromiya, *Freedom and Terror in the Donbass. A Ukrainian-Russian Borderland 1870s–1990s* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

13. I. Losev, "Ukrainians—Inner Diaspora?" *Suchasnist* 7–8 (2004): 101–3.

14. Interestingly, Josef Kobzon—one of the most influential members of the Donbass's community in Moscow—is a persona nongrata in the USA. He was an active supporter of Yanukovich.

15. V. Litvin, "If Someone Was Violating the Law by Abusing His Public Authority, One Must Face the Trial," *Dzerkalo Tyzhnia* [Weekly Mirror], January 2005.

16. *Ibid.*

17. See S. Shulman, "Competing versus Complementary Identities: Ukrainian-Russian Relations and the Loyalties of Russians in Ukraine," *Nationalities Papers* 26, no. 4 (1998): 615–32; S. Shulman, "The Internal-External Nexus in the Formation of Ukrainian National Identity: The Case for Slavic Integration," in *Dilemmas of State-Led Nation Building in Ukraine*, ed. T. Kuzio and P. D'Anieri, 103–30 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002).

18. It is a fact that Donbass gets more from the central budget than it contributes if one takes into account the subsidies and tax breaks the numerous free economic zones concentrated in the region receive. At the same time, masterminds of Yanukovich's presidential campaign tried to persuade people that Donbass is a major contributor to the central budget.

19. The original Tsar Pushka—a giant canon—was made in Moscow in the sixteenth century as a symbol of Russia's military superiority.

20. See, for instance, J. Armstrong, "Nationalism and the East Ukrainian Social Science," in *Ukrainian Nationalism*, ed. J. Armstrong, 62–110 (Englewood, CO: Ukrainian Academic Press, 1990); Y. Hrytsak, "Dvadtsat' Dvi Ukrainy," [Twenty Two Ukraines] *Krytyka* 4 (2002): 18–32; M. Riabchuk, "Ukraine: One State, Two Countries?" *Transit* 23 (2002) http://www.iwm.at/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=269&Item=447 (accessed March 5, 2005) (trans. into Ukrainian in *Suchasnist* 4, 2003).

21. Armstrong, "East Ukrainian," 207.

22. "Ukraina: Pole Mnenij," Sociologicheskie soobsheniya Fonda "Obshestvennoe mnenie," 2004, 142 (as cited in Lapkin and Pantin, 2005, 8).

23. See S. Birch, *Elections and Democratization in Ukraine* (London: Macmillan, 2000); P. Craumer, and J. Clem, "Ukraine's Emerging Electoral Geography: A Regional Analysis of the 1998 Parliamentary Elections," *Post-Soviet Geography and Economics* 40, no. 1 (1999): 1–26; O. Sushko, "The 2002 Parliamentary Elections as an Indicator of the Sociopolitical Development of Ukraine," *Demokratizatsiya* 10, no. 4 (Fall 2002): 568–76; C. Wanner, "Crafting Identity, Marking Time: An Anthropological Perspective on Nation Building in Ukraine," in *Dilemmas of State-Led Nation Building in Ukraine*, ed. T. Kuzio and P. D'Anieri (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002).

24. S. Birch, "The Presidential Elections in Ukraine, October 1999," *Electoral Studies* 21, no. 2 (2002): 339–45.

25. See S. Whitmore, *State-Building in Ukraine: The Ukrainian Parliament, 1990–2003*

(London: Routledge Corzon, 2004).

26. V. Zablotski, "Donbass Is the Region with Character," *Golos Donbassa* [Voice of Donbass], October 2004.

27. Patronymic of Vladimir Ilich Ulyanov Lenin. Patronymics are normally used as a way of addressing good fellows or older people rather than national leaders.

28. See V. Kravchenko, "Fighting the Shadow: The Soviet Past in the Historical Memory of Contemporary Ukrainian Society," *Ab Imperio: Studies of New Imperial History and Nationalism in the Post-Soviet Space* 2 (2004): 329–68.

29. V. Zablotski, "Donbass Is the Region with Character," *Golos Donbassa*, October 2004.

30. See, for example, V. Zorina, "No One Put Donbass down on Its Knees, and No One Ever Will!" *Vestnik NKMZ* (November 2004): 2–4.

31. K. Zimmer, "The Captured Region. Actors and Institutions in the Ukrainian Donbass," in *Making Regions in Post-Socialist Europe: The Impact of History, Economic Structure and Institutions. Case Studies from Poland, Hungary, Romania and Ukraine*, ed. M. Tatur, 231–348 (Opladen: Leske and Budrich, 2004).

32. "Elections 2004: The Voice of Donbass Decides," *Golos Donbassa*, October 29, 2004.

33. Referring to Yulia Tymoshenko, Yushchenko's key ally and one of the leaders of the Orange Revolution. Yushchenko appointed her prime minister in 2005, but later dismissed her.

34. "Elections 2004: The Voice of Donbass Decides," *Golos Donbassa*, November, 26 2004.

35. See, for example, I. Baboshin, "Students Are Zombified by Victor Yanukovich," *Bez Tsenzury* [Without Censorship], October 2004; B. Bahteev, "Silent Numbers," *Suchasnist* 12 (2004): 155–57; A. Dorofeev, "'New Political Nation' or the Crowd of Reptiles," *Vestnik NKMZ* 1091 (December 2004): 3; A. Kolesnikov, *Pervy Ukrainski: Zapiski s Perekovoi* [First Ukrainian: Notes from the Frontline] (Moskva: Vagrius, 2005); T. Steshenko, "Saakashvili and Yushchenko—Political Twin-brothers," *Golos Donbassa*, November 2004, 6.

36. For details, see V. Stepanenko, "How Ukrainians View Their Orange Revolution: Public Opinion and the National Peculiarities of Citizenry Political Activities," *Demokratizatsiya* 13, no. 4 (Fall 2005): 595–617.

37. See, for example, T. Steshenko, "Saakashvili and Yushchenko—Political Twin-brothers," *Golos Donbassa*, November 2004, 6; V. Tanskiy, "Moment of Truth: There Was a Coup d'état in Ukraine, Not a Democratic Revolution," *Kramatorskaya Pravda*, December 16, 2004, 1; *Kramatorskaya Pravda*, "Ukraine Is Threatened with Pro-American Neo-Fascist Dictatorship," December 16, 2004, 3.

38. "Ukrainian Fascism—The Terrible Truth," *Golos Donbassa*, October 29, 2004.

39. "The Second Round: The East against the West," *Golos Donbassa*, November 2004.

40. Inform-agency, "Partaktiv," *Golos Donbassa*, November 2004.

41. This word is taken out of context for political reasons. Here is the objective description of the events. Yushchenko intended to organize an Our Ukraine meeting in Donetsk. For this reason he had rented one of the largest concert halls in the city—Palace Yunost. When the buses with the attendees of the meeting started to arrive, they found that there were about five hundred drunken students of vocational schools, notorious for their discipline problems. These students were let into the hall to provoke a mass fight and disorder. Yushchenko flew to Donetsk. At the airport, thousands of students and merchants from the flea markets and farmers markets, many of whom were forced to come by the members of the local mafia, met him with hostility. These students and small merchants held anti-Yushchenko posters. There were also numerous posters and billboards placed around the city with the content that can be interpreted as "Yushchenko needs Donbass, but Donbass does not need Yushchenko." On some posters Yushchenko was depicted a la Fuhrer. On the others his head was drilled with a sledgehammer by a miner. Those who put it into action were called lackeys by Yushchenko. The governor of the oblast, Blizniuk, is suspected to be the organizer of this action. Apparently, Blizniuk was acting under directions

from Yanukovich.

42. "Where Is Your Character Donbass?" *Golos Donbassa*, November 12, 2004.
43. See I. Preobrazhenskiy, "Doctrine of Yanukovich," *Golos Donbassa*, October 2004, 3.
44. "Where Is Your Character Donbass?" *Golos Donbassa*, November 12, 2004.
45. *Ibid.*
46. Offensive identity-word for Russians.
47. "Opinions," *Golos Donbassa*, November 26, 2004.
48. "Vote with Donbass in Heart," *Golos Donbassa*, October 8, 2004.
49. "October 31 Is the Day of Presidential Elections. Choose the Right to Live for Donbass," *Golos Donbassa*, October 29, 2004.
50. "Donbass Is Winning. Your Voice Is Needed," *Golos Donbassa*, November 5, 2004.
51. "Shared Destiny. Good Choice. Donbass Will Win," *Golos Donbassa*, November 12, 2004.
52. "Congratulations on Your Victory! [in Russian] Congratulations on Your Victory! [in Ukrainian]" *Golos Donbassa*, November 26, 2004.
53. Alluding to the "brown plague," i.e., German fascism, and the orange color that symbolized support for Yushchenko. The "brown-orange plague" expression was intended to inflict fear of Yushchenko. Using TV and newspapers, the government-controlled mass media painted Yushchenko as a Fascist, as part of an antidemocratic campaign that was fraudulent.
54. "We will survive without them, but they won't," i.e., "We will survive without underdeveloped Western and Central pro-Yushchenko regions, but they will not be able to survive without us."
55. See M. Riabchuk, *Dvi Ukrainy: Real'ni Mezhi, Virtual'ny Viiny* [Two Ukraines: Real Frontiers, Virtual Wars] (Kyiv: Krytyka, 2003).
56. V. Lapkin and V. Pantin, "Assimilation of Democratic Institutions and Values by the Ukrainian and Russian Masses," *Russian Social Science Review* 47, no. 3 (2006): 10–11.
57. See Zhurzhenko, "The Myth of Two Ukraines," *Transit* 23 (2002) http://www.iwm.at/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=273&Itemid=451 (accessed March 2006) (translated into Ukrainian in *Suchasnist* 4, 2003).
58. Newsru, "Yanukovich Promised to Give Russian Language Status of the Second Official Language in the Country," December 18, 2004, <http://www.newsru.com/arch/world/18dec2004/yan.html> (accessed July 22, 2006).
59. Newsru, "Party of Regions Can Leave Its Intent to Make Russian the Second Official Language," July 22, 2006, <http://www.newsru.com/arch/world/22jul2006/yanuk.html> (accessed July 22, 2006).
60. See, for instance, M. Afanasiev, "Whoever Wins, Metal Workers Lose," *Ukrudprom*, December 12, 2004, <http://ukrudprom.com/analytics/anght221104.html> (accessed July 22, 2006); G. Skudar, "We Are on the Pathway to Success, and We Must Not Leave It" *Kramatorskaya Pravda*, December 16, 2004, 2–4.
61. See A. Shehovtsov, "'Donetsk' Are Coming," *Narodnaya Volia*, [People's Will] August 14, 2004, 1; A. Shehovtsov, "Compatriots, Day without Laws," *Narodnaya Volia* December 20, 2004, 2; A. Shehovtsov, "Compatriots, You Are Not Right," *Narodnaya Volia*, December 20, 2004, 1.
62. Central Election Commission of Ukraine, retrieved from <http://www.cvk.gov.ua/vnd2006> (accessed June 5, 2006).
63. Central Election Commission of Ukraine, <http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp/2004/wp0011> (accessed July 12, 2005).
64. V. Tarasov, "Vybory 'Po-kharkovski': Mezhdometija i Epitety Pridumajte Sami" [Elections Kharkov-style: Epithets Are up to Your Imagination], (May 2006). Retrieved from <http://www.maidan.org.ua/static/mai/1143839500.html> (accessed May 30, 2006).
65. Newsru, "Party of Regions Demands from Yushchenko to Introduce Candidacy of Yanukovich for Premiership," July 8, 2006, <http://www.newsru.com/arch/worl/08Jul2006/pobeda.html> (accessed July 8, 2006).

66. Ibid.

67. Sberbank was the only bank in the Soviet Union that dealt with individual savings accounts. The bank never went bankrupt but at the same time owes a large amount of money to its clients. The deposits made in Soviet currency lost their value due to inflation in the early 1990s. Debt repayment is still an important political issue, and is often used for political purposes.

APPENDIX
Results of the March 26, 2006, Parliamentary Elections
(Includes All Political Parties)

Parties and blocs (parties and blocs with at least 1% of the votes nationwide)	Votes	%	Seats
Party of Regions (Partiya Regioniv)	8,148,745	32.14	186
Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko (Blok Yuliy Tymoshenko) All-Ukrainian United Fatherland (Vseukrayins'ke Obyednannya Bat'kivshchyna) Ukrainian Social Democratic Party (Ukrayins'ka Sotsial-Demokratychna Partiya)	5,652,876	22.29	129
Bloc Our Ukraine (Blok Nasha Ukrayina) People's Union Our Ukraine (Narodnyi Soyuz Nasha Ukrayina) Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs of Ukraine (Partiya Promislovtziv i Pidpryjemstv Ukrayiny) People's Movement of Ukraine (Narodniy Rukh Ukrayiny) Christian Democratic Union (Khristiyans'ko- Demokratichnyj Soyuz) Ukrainian Republican Party Assembly (Ukrayins'ka Respublikanska Partiya Sobor) Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (Kongress Ukrayins'kykh Natsionalistiv)	3,539,140	13.95	81
Socialist Party of Ukraine (Sotsialistychna Partiya Ukrayiny)	1,444,224	5.69	33
Communist Party of Ukraine (Komunistychna Partiya Ukrayiny)	929,591	3.66	21
People's Opposition Bloc of Natalia Vitrenko (Blok Natalii Vitrenko Narodna Opozytsiya) Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine (Progresivna Sotsialistychna Partiya Ukrayiny) Party "Rus'-Ukrainian Union" (Partiya "Rus'ko-Ukrayins'kyj Soyuz" [Rus'])	743,704	2.93	0

Lytvyn's Peoples Bloc (Narodnyi Blok Lytvyna) People's Party (Narodna Partiya) Party of All-Ukrainian Union of the Left "Justice" (Partiya Vseukrayins'kogo Obyednannya Livikh "Spravedlyvist") Ukrainian Peasant Democratic Party (Ukrayins'ka Selyanska Demokratychna Partiya)	619,905	2.44	0
Ukrainian National Bloc of Kostenko and Plyushch (Ukrayinskyj Narodnyj Blok Kostenka i Plyushcha) Party of Free Peasants and Entrepreneurs of Ukraine (Partiya Vil'nykh Selyan i Pidpryemtsiv Ukrayin) Political Party Cathedral Ukraine (Politychna Partiya "Ukrayni Soborna") Ukrainian People's Party (Ukrains'ka Narodna Partiya) Viche (Council)	476,155	1.87	0
Civil Political Bloc Pora-Reforms and Order Party Pora (It Is Time) Reforms and Order Party (Partiya Reformy i Poriadok)	373,478	1.47	0
Opposition Bloc Ne Tak (Opozyciyniy Blok Ne Tak) Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (United) Republican Party of Ukraine Women for the Future All-Ukrainian Political Union Political Party All-Ukrainian Union Center	257,106	1.01	0
Others remaining (< 1%)	1,785,299	7.04	0
Against all	449,650	1.77	—
Invalid ballot papers	490,595	1.93	—
Total	25,352,380	100	450

Source. Central Election Commission of Ukraine, <http://www.cvk.gov.ua/vnd2006/> (accessed July 2006).