

Feeding the Hand that Bit You: Voting for Ex-authoritarian Rulers in Russia and Bolivia

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Abstract: What could be motivating voters in transition countries to vote for leaders who have proven themselves to be skilled at violating human rights, repressing civil liberties, and ruling without democratic institutions? We test hypotheses related to this question by using a least-similar-systems design in which we search for common predictors of vote choice in presidential elections from two countries that differ in their past and present political and economic situations: Bolivia and Russia. We find consistent patterns in these two very different countries, which leads to the conclusion that voters for ex-authoritarian candidates or parties are not merely motivated by considerations that typically shape vote choice in long-standing democracies, but are also distinguished by a preference for non-democratic political systems.

Key words: authoritarianism, Bolivia, elections, Russia

The late 1980s and early 1990s witnessed an almost unprecedented spread of democracy across the globe, resulting in what Samuel Huntington calls the “third wave” of democratization. At the time, the joy with which citizens greeted the downfall of authoritarianism and tyranny made the march towards freedom seem unstoppable and irreversible. Who can forget the scene of Alexander Dubček, the tragic hero of the 1968 Prague spring, returning to Prague in the fall of 1989 to the roar of the crowds in Wenceslas Square? Or the utter triumph of the Solidarity movement in Poland’s first competitive election of the postcommunist era, in which the ruling communist party lost practically every seat that was subject to legitimate competition?¹ Or the crowds that flowed into the streets of Santiago,

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Chile, upon the news that General Pinochet had lost his plebiscite to extend his personal rule?

A decade and a half later, this inevitable march of democratization seems under attack from multiple fronts. Although most attention has been focused on topics such as international terrorism, ethnic and religious conflict, and the dangers of failed states, it is important to remember that even in the 1990s voters in transition countries around the world chose to cast their ballots for the very leaders and parties that had previously repressed their countries. Long before Russian President Vladimir Putin's most recent moves to restrict the franchise in Russia, substantial portions of the Russian electorate were already casting votes for the remnants of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.² Outside of Russia, the election of ex-communists and members of communist successor parties has been a prevalent trend in many former communist countries.³ Similarly, voters in Latin America have cast their ballots for former dictators, military governors, coup-plotters, and torturers.⁴ In Africa former dictators have also been voted into office in competitive elections.⁵ These elections have come at a time in which, despite the proliferation of electoral democracy, the quality of many new democracies seems to be deteriorating (Diamond 2002, 22; Rose and Shin 2001, 331).⁶ Although questions about the quality of democracy have received attention in political science literature, the topic of why people vote for former authoritarian rulers in free elections has been analyzed less frequently (although see Azpuru 2001; Canache 2002a; and Carrión 2001), and especially not in a cross-regional framework.

We believe that the question deserves more focused consideration. To date, most analyses of why voters support parties and candidates from the pre-democratic era have largely been contained in studies focused on providing explanations of countrywide voting patterns for multiple types of parties and candidates. As a result, hypotheses are not particularly focused on the phenomenon of supporting ex-authoritarian leaders, but rather on voting behavior more generally. In this article, we put the question of why citizens might choose to cast votes in free elections for parties or candidates that ruled in the pre-democratic era at the center of the analysis, testing hypotheses that specifically address this question.

Moreover, we test these hypotheses using a least-similar-systems design in which we search for commonalities in two cases from countries that differ in many respects, thus ensuring that the question of why voters choose to "feed the hand that bit them" remains the focus of the analysis, as opposed to the particular circumstances surrounding either one of these elections. More specifically, we compare the decisions of voters in a Bolivian presidential election with voters in a Russian presidential election. In Bolivia we examine the vote in the 1997 presidential elections for General Hugo Banzer, who had ruled as the military dictator of Bolivia from 1971 to 1978. In Russia we explore why voters cast their ballot for Gennady Zyuganov, the candidate of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) in the 1996 presidential election. Both elections feature a representative of the old, pre-democratic regime, and thus both provide an excellent opportunity for observing why voters choose to cast their votes for ex-authoritarian candidates. At the same time, there are clearly significant differences between

Bolivia and Russia, including the type of non-democratic regime from which each country emerged, the overall economic development and size of the countries, and the context in which the elections occurred. By testing our hypotheses in this manner, we hope to determine whether voters for two candidates with clear connections to authoritarian pasts are motivated by common attitudes in vastly different contexts.

In conducting this analysis, we are particularly interested in the degree to which a vote cast for a former authoritarian candidate can be viewed as a vote against democracy itself, as opposed to a vote for a different option within the confines of a democratic system. Understanding voters' motivations for electing leaders who once wielded the whips of authoritarianism could shed light on whether this voting behavior is one of the reasons for (or a symptom of) the deterioration of democratic quality. If former authoritarians are elected by voters purely because they represent a preferred option within a democratic context, then the risks to democracy might not be serious. However, if the candidate enjoys support precisely because he or she represents a rejection of the democratic transition, then the joint effect of an election of a former authoritarian plus a public that is not committed to democracy could result in democratic decline.

In the next section, we present our hypotheses. We then discuss the benefits of conducting a crossregional comparison and provide some background information on the elections analyzed. The rest of the article is devoted to empirical analyses which, although many faceted, show that in the two cases examined voters choosing ex-authoritarian candidates or parties are in part distinguished by a preference for non-democratic political systems.

Voting for Former Authoritarians

There are a variety of reasons why voters may choose to support ex-authoritarian candidates. First and foremost, supporters of ex-authoritarian candidates could be motivated by antagonism towards democracy itself and want to return to the authoritarian past that these candidates represent. The possibility that citizens who vote for former authoritarian candidates prefer authoritarianism to democracy is alarming, because the combination of a pro-authoritarian mass public and leaders who are experienced in non-democratic governance could cause long-term harm to democratic institutions. A disposition to authoritarianism, or what some have called an "authoritarian personality," has been thought to have motivated support for authoritarianism in a variety of contexts, ranging from Nazi Germany (Adorno et al. 1950) to the authoritarian Soviet and Brazilian regimes (Geddes and Zaller 1989, 339; McFarland et al. 1992). Moreover, recent surveys have shown that in many democracies in which former authoritarians compete in elections, significant percentages of the population express a preference for authoritarianism. For example, in fifteen postcommunist countries surveyed by the New Europe Barometer in 2000, an average of 55 percent of respondents said that their countries should be governed differently, and among this group, 23 percent preferred a return to communist rule, 8 percent preferred military rule, and 33 percent preferred strongman rule (Rose 2001, 99). Survey results from Africa and Latin America also show that

substantial percentages of the populations in some countries where former authoritarians have been elected prefer dictatorship over democracy (Bratton and Mattes 2001, 109; Lagos 2001, 139). We therefore seek to test the hypothesis that respondents who report a preference for authoritarian forms of government and rule are more likely to support ex-authoritarian candidates and parties than those who do not.

An alternative hypothesis is that voters for former authoritarians are firmly committed to democracy, but view the incumbent party or candidates as having failed to provide important goods to society. Having decided not to vote for the incumbent candidate, the voter may then consider the former authoritarian candidate an effective alternative to provide these goods. Such an approach is rooted in the retrospective economic voting literature, which has been found to explain vote choice in many contexts around the world.⁷ Given the nature of new democracies, evaluations of the economy might not be the only concern that motivates voters for former authoritarians. A number of studies have shown that residents in new democracies perceive crime and corruption as having worsened since authoritarian regimes have been replaced by democratic ones (Galeotti 1998; Rose and Shin 2001, 342–43; Weyland 1998). Grigoriev and Lantz (1996, 160), for example, draw a link between the fact that income fell and crime rose in Russia prior to the 1995 parliamentary election and the subsequent success of the communists in that election. From this viewpoint, the ex-authoritarian leader is just one of many opposition figures who could stand to benefit from dissatisfaction with the performance of the current government. However, to the extent that voters associate the pre-democratic period with “better times” in regard to any of these concerns, we suspect that the ex-authoritarian leader may be uniquely positioned to benefit from such voter dissatisfaction.⁸

Although one way to test whether concerns about the ability of the government to provide goods is to directly ask respondents, another approach is to examine the sociodemographic variables that identify respondents likely to be worse off economically (for example, those with less money or less education). In this sense, sociodemographic variables provide another, less subjective, way of testing the retrospective economic voting arguments described in the previous paragraph. We therefore also include sociodemographic variables in the analysis. An additional advantage of including these variables is to insure that any effects we identify for either the subjective retrospective voting concerns or pro-authoritarian attitudes are not serving merely as proxies for certain demographic characteristics of the respondents. And although there are, of course, other explanations for voting behavior that we could test in our analysis, including measures of both sociodemographic variables and retrospective economic concerns provides a strong baseline of “normal” democratic behavior with which to contrast the effect of pro-authoritarian attitudes.

As these hypotheses concerning voting behavior are not mutually exclusive—voters can be both dissatisfied with governmental goods provision and with democracy—we can *a priori* specify four ideal types of voting behavior (see table 1).⁹ The most troubling finding for the prospect of democratic consolidation would be if the decision to vote for an ex-authoritarian candidate was motivated almost entirely by

a preference for authoritarianism over democracy, but not by retrospective dissatisfaction with the ability of the government to provide goods (*Authoritarian Voting Behavior*). This scenario would be worrisome because it could indicate that voters for the candidate valued authoritarianism as an end unto itself, and thus would likely be supportive of former authoritarians reinstating an authoritarian mode of government. A slightly less daunting although still troubling scenario would be if those who voted for ex-authoritarian candidates were influenced by authoritarian attitudes, but also by dissatisfaction with the ability of incumbents to provide goods (*Mixed Standard/Authoritarian Voting Behavior*). This would suggest that supporters of former authoritarian candidates were casting their ballots not necessarily because they favored authoritarianism for its own sake, but rather because they believed that authoritarian modes of governing might facilitate goods provision. Although such a scenario suggests that the desires of the candidate’s supporters for a return to authoritarianism might not be as strong as in the first scenario, it still suggests that voters for the candidate

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would be willing to tolerate antidemocratic political developments for instrumental reasons. The most encouraging set of findings from the perspective of democratic consolidation would be if supporters of former authoritarian candidates were not influenced by pro-authoritarian attitudes, but were casting their ballots on the basis of more standard notions of goods provision that the aforementioned studies have found common in established democracies (*Democratic Voting Behavior*).¹⁰ This would suggest that voters were supporting former authoritarian candidates for reasons consistent with democratic norms and institutions. The most puzzling finding would be if none of the hypotheses explain the vote for former authoritarians

TABLE 1. Possible Influences on Vote Choice for Former Authoritarians

	Voting is influenced by retrospective attitudes and sociodemographic characteristics	Voting is not influenced by retrospective attitudes and sociodemographic characteristics
Voting is motivated by authoritarian attitudes	Mixed standard/authoritarian voting behavior	Authoritarian voting behavior
Voting is not motivated by authoritarian attitudes	Democratic voting behavior	Undetermined voting behavior

(*Undetermined Voting*). Were this finding to emerge from our analysis, we would seek additional, less intuitive, explanations for vote choice.

The Advantages of Cross-regional Comparison

We test these theories on the cases of the Russian and Bolivian electorates. At first glance, it may seem that Russia and Bolivia are such different countries that it is unreasonable to compare the voting behavior of their populations. They differ in their economic histories, since Bolivia has had no experience with state socialism whereas Russia had seventy years of it. They also differ in their contemporary standard of living, as Russians are, on average, wealthier than Bolivians, are better educated, and have longer life expectancies.¹¹ Bolivians were ruled by a military dictatorship, Russians by a ruling one-party state. Moreover, Russia was a super-power, while Bolivia has never been even a regional power.

While acknowledging the stark differences between Russia and Bolivia, comparing countries with such differences has the advantage of allowing us to search for similarities among the cases by employing a least-similar-systems design (Keman 1999, 11–12; Przeworski and Teune 1970). We follow the advice of Peters (1998, 38–40), who writes that a “most different design” is the best strategy when the researcher is looking at individual behavior, as we are here in our examination of voter choice. According to Peters, this design allows us to spot robust relationships that hold in different places, which can give us “greater confidence that there is a true relationship, not one produced by some unmeasured third or fourth or fifth variables that exist in all relatively similar systems” (Peters 1998, 40). The differences between Bolivia and Russia make any similarities that we find in the motivations of their electorates more consequential for attempts at theory building than had the countries we are studying shared traits in the way that countries from a similar region, such as Latin American or Eastern Europe, do with each other.

Moreover, as the phenomenon of voting for ex-authoritarian rulers is indeed a truly international one, comparative analysis across traditional regional boundaries is a useful means of advancing the literature. By focusing on two countries, we are able to preserve the advantage of detailed microlevel analysis of specific voting behavior while introducing a comparative dimension to the analysis. To the best of our knowledge, such a study has not before been attempted in this manner, so we consider this research a useful first step in trying to understand why voters generally support ex-authoritarians in democratic elections.

The Electoral Context

Before exploring the data, we provide background information on our two cases, beginning with Bolivia. General Hugo Banzer ruled as the dictator of Bolivia from 1971, when he ascended to the presidency by orchestrating a military coup, until 1978, when another military coup removed him from the executive office. Throughout Banzer’s rule he demonstrated contempt for democratic liberties. For example, at one point he ordered the military to crush a protest staged by a group of Quechua-speaking indigenous people, which resulted in the massacre of seventy-eight of them. He also ordered repressive acts against civil society groups, universities, polit-

ical parties, unions, and the media (Conde 2001, 19–20; Calderón and Szmukler 2000, 145; Langer 1999, 81; Dávila 1978, 19–21).

Upon being ousted from his dictatorial post, Banzer founded a new political party called *Acción Democrática Nacionalista* (ADN, Nationalist Democratic Action). He ran for president in the first post-authoritarian election, in 1979, but won only 12.9 percent of the vote. His vote share increased in subsequent elections, however. He won 14.7 percent of the vote in 1980, 28.5 percent in 1985, 22.7 percent in 1989, 20 percent in 1993, and 22.3 percent in 1997, when he was elected president (Corte Nacional Electoral 2003; Romero Ballivián 1998, 21–43; see Appendix I for full results).¹² Even though Banzer paid lip service to democracy during his presidential campaigns, he was clearly identified as an authoritarian candidate by competing political parties and the media. For example, before Banzer's 1979 presidential campaign, journalists' associations reminded voters that during Banzer's dictatorship journalists were repressed (Rivadeneira Prada 1980, 164). Also during that campaign, political parties such as the left-of-center Democratic and Popular Unity (UDP) coalition and the right-of-center Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR) reminded voters of Banzer's responsibility for human rights violations (Rivadeneira Prada 1980, 78–79, 124). In the 1985 presidential elections the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) presidential candidate cast himself as a more democratic candidate than Banzer (Toranzo Roca 1989, 128). Finally, in the 1997 campaign, advertisements in Bolivian newspapers warned of the "national and regional consequences that the probable rise to power of the former dictator could bring to the region" (McFarren 1997).

As opposed to Banzer, Gennady Zyuganov had never personally ruled a non-democratic Russia. Zyuganov became a Communist Party official in Russia's Orlov region in 1974. He remained in party positions until the collapse of the Soviet Union, beginning work for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in Moscow in 1983 before rising to become a member of the Politburo and secretariat of the newly formed Russian Communist Party in 1990 (Urban and Solovei 1997, 39).¹³ In 1993, he co-founded the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, which was the primary heir to the legacy of the former Communist Party of the Soviet Union that had ruled Russia since 1917.¹⁴ Unlike many Eastern European successor parties, the KPRF consciously eschewed recasting itself as a reformed social-democratic party.¹⁵ After leading the party in the 1995 parliamentary elections, Zyuganov became the KPRF's candidate in the 1996 presidential election. Although his general campaign message vacillated between appealing to the Russian center and the more traditional left, it clearly included many themes related to the communist era, including reviving Russian prestige abroad, rebuilding the Soviet Union, more state control over the economy, and a greater role for workers in the government (McFaul 1996). Indeed, Zyuganov has been called a "one-dimensional 'communist revanche'" (Otto, 1999, 37). Thus, by comparing Zyuganov and Banzer, we are able to add another comparative dimension to our least-similar design by comparing the vote for a presidential candidate who had personally ruled as a dictator to the vote for a candidate who represented the party that had ruled during the non-democratic era.

The 1996 elections in Russia took place in the aftermath of a disastrous showing for progovernment and pro-reform parties in the December 1995 Russian parliamentary elections; in particular, the KPRF emerged from this election as the dominant party in the parliament (Miller, Reisinger and Hesli 1998; Tsipko 1996). In the immediate aftermath of the parliamentary election, and only six months before the presidential elections, the anticommunist incumbent Boris Yeltsin had an 8 percent approval rating, and all signs “heralded Yeltsin’s crushing defeat in the June 1996 presidential election, a conclusion reached by many in Russia and the West” (Brudny 1997, 255). Yeltsin’s primary opponents were Zyuganov, nationalists Aleksandr Lebed and Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, and the more reformist oriented Grigory Yavlinsky. Despite the poor initial support, Yeltsin managed to regain popularity and win the first round of the presidential election, receiving 35.3 percent of the vote, compared to Zyuganov’s 32 percent (White, Rose, and McAllister 1997, 260). As neither received a majority, Yeltsin and Zyuganov advanced to a second round, where Yeltsin soundly defeated Zyuganov (McFaul 1996; McFaul 1997; Wyman 1997). Full results of the election can be found in Appendix I.

A final point is necessary to emphasize why we include only Zyuganov as the “ex-authoritarian” candidate in our study, as there were other candidates competing in the election with communist pasts. Yeltsin himself had been a prominent communist official, Lebed a Soviet military hero, and even Yavlinsky had been a member of the Communist Party from 1985–1991 (Yeltsin 1990; Kipp 1999; Rutland 1999). These backgrounds notwithstanding, we focus our attention solely on Zyuganov because he was the candidate running as the official candidate of the KPRF, the primary successor to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union that had ruled Russia since the time of Lenin. Our goal is to explore how voters respond to a candidate representing an authoritarian past; in Russia that past belonged to the Communist Party and Zyuganov was the only candidate of that party in this election. To say that other candidates had been members of the Communist Party is to miss the context of this election, which McFaul (1996, 319) describes as the “last ‘revolutionary’ election in which voters were asked to choose between two fundamentally different systems . . . [which can be] understood as the last ‘referendum’ on Communism.” Regardless of Yeltsin’s or Yavlinsky’s pasts, there was only one candidate in this election that represented the pro-communist vote in this referendum, and that was Zyuganov.¹⁶ Moreover, the clear association of Zyuganov with the communist past—and indeed, the central role that highlighting this association played in the Yeltsin campaign strategy¹⁷—makes this a particularly appropriate case for testing the appeal of a candidate connected to the communist era in the Russia context.

Data and Methods



To study the vote for Banzer, we analyze a national public opinion survey carried out in July 1998, thirteen months after the June 1, 1997 presidential election. The survey was carried out as part of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), now at Vanderbilt University, and executed by Encuestas y Estudios,

the Gallup International affiliate in Bolivia.¹⁸ Although the timing of the survey may be problematic, since there is some tendency among survey respondents to claim in retrospective voting items that they voted for the winning candidate even though they did not, the percentage of Bolivians who actually voted for Banzer (22.3 percent) is only slightly lower than the percent in our survey who report having voted for him (27 percent). Of the 2,272 respondents who reported voting, 622 reported voting for Banzer. In our preliminary analyses, we coded people who voted for Banzer as 1 and all other voters (including those casting a null ballot) as 0; we omitted nonvoters and those who could not identify for whom they voted from the analysis.¹⁹

To test our hypotheses in the Russian context, we present evidence from a three-wave national election survey of Russians. The survey includes 2,841 respondents and was conducted under the direction of Timothy Colton and William Zimmerman.²⁰ In our analysis we are limited to the 86.4 percent (2,456) of respondents who completed the third wave of the survey when the question regarding presidential vote choice was asked. If the respondent voted for Zyuganov, we code the dependent variable as 1; if the respondent voted for any other candidate (or against all) we code the dependent variable as 0.²¹ This leaves us with a sample of 2,078 voters, 639 (31 percent) of whom reported voting for Zyuganov.²² As we are analyzing data from two separate surveys, we conduct separate statistical analyses of the Bolivian and Russian data. Whenever possible, we have attempted to use the same variables (see Appendix II for coding details). Most of the variables across surveys are quite comparable.

As our primary theoretical concern is distinguishing the vote for the ex-authoritarian candidate from the vote for any other candidate, the analyses discussed in the following section employ binomial logit analysis. In addition to mirroring our theoretical concern, binomial logit analysis has the added advantage of producing concise tables of coefficients and standard errors that can be easily presented. However, binomial logit has the disadvantage of leaving us unable to exclude the possibility that the effects we are observing may be driven primarily by the nature of the “other” category. We address this concern in the penultimate section of the article, presenting statistical evidence from multinomial logit analysis—as well as additional binomial logit analyses—that allows us to refute this possibility.²³

Another shortcoming of logit analysis is that coefficients lack intuitive substantive meaning. Thus, to facilitate a discussion of the substantive effect of different variables, we have also calculated first-difference measures of the change in the predicted probabilities of supporting Banzer and Zyuganov when all variables are held at their mean and the variable in question is shifted from its minimum to its maximum.²⁴ All first differences are calculated from the full versions of the analyses (Model 3), and can be found in figures 1 and 2.²⁵ Although we report first differences for all of the variables, if we have little confidence in the coefficient of the variable, we should have little confidence in the first difference as well. Thus we include an indicator of our statistical confidence in each variable on figures 1 and 2.



Empirical Results

Beginning with the traditional explanations for democratic voting behavior, we can make several observations. In regard to retrospective voting, there is empirical evidence that these types of factors matter in both the Bolivian and Russian cases. In the Bolivian case, those who feel unemployment is the most serious problem facing the nation and those who report having been asked for bribes are more likely to vote for Banzer than for other candidates (see table 2). The substantive magnitude of the *Unemployment* and *Corruption* variables seem to be roughly similar, with respondents being 6 percent and 8 percent, respectively, more likely to support Banzer if they are concerned about these problems (see figure 1). In Russia, voter dissatisfaction with economic conditions had a clear and substantively large impact on the vote for Zyuganov (see table 3). Indeed, economic dissatisfaction appears to be the second most crucial factor in influencing the vote for Zyuganov, with those who are most dissatisfied with the economy over the past twelve

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months being 29 percent more likely to support Zyuganov than those who are most satisfied (see figure 2).²⁶ Somewhat surprisingly, the *Crime* variable is statistically and substantively significant in the wrong direction.²⁷

In terms of demographic characteristics of respondents, the clearest finding is that in both Bolivia and Russia older voters were more likely to support ex-authoritarian candidates.²⁸ We suspect that older voters may remember with fondness some of the benefits of the authoritarian period, but there are other possible explanations. Younger voters may be less likely to vote for former authoritarians because they have been socialized under democratic regimes in which the authoritarian past may have been portrayed negatively by their teachers and in the media, although this is more likely the case in Bolivia than Russia, due to the longer period of time that had passed since the end of the authoritarian period. Alternatively, older voters—and especially pensioners—may prefer the short-term economic benefits that a return to authoritarian rule could deliver, even if there is a long-term cost to political and economic development from abandoning the democratic framework. We suspect younger voters to be less likely to support this trade-off.

In Bolivia, there is little additional evidence of demographic factors affecting the vote for Banzer. In the Russian case, however, we find fairly constant effects for both *Low Income* and *Working Class*. The magnitude of these effects is smaller than *Age*, leading to a 6 percent and 7 percent increase, respectively, in the likelihood of supporting Zyuganov. Moreover, there is evidence that additional education might make respondents less likely to support Zyuganov, although this effect disappears

TABLE 2. Estimated Binomial Logit Coefficients and (Standard Errors) of Vote for Banzer

Category	Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Socioeconomic and demographic characteristics	Gender	-.119 (.108)	-.143 (.108)	-.144 (.111)
	Age	.016*** (.004)	.017*** (.004)	.016*** (.004)
	Education	.004 (.013)	.009 (.013)	.006 (.014)
	Wealth	-.236 (.360)	-.268 (.365)	-.296 (.372)
	Working class	.084 (.109)	.114 (.110)	.100 (.112)
Retrospective voting	Crime	.305 (.310)		.224 (.318)
	Unemployment	.284* (.125)		.276* (.127)
	Corruption victim	.340** (.114)		.349** (.117)
Authoritarian attitudes	Dictatorship vs. democracy		.506** (.189)	.441* (.193)
	Order vs. liberty		.256* (.106)	.209* (.108)
	Constant	-1.217*** (.320)	-1.326*** (.321)	-1.342*** (.333)
	N	1717	1716	1653

Note. * $p \leq .05$, ** $p \leq .01$, *** $p \leq .001$.

TABLE 3. Estimated Binomial Logit Coefficients and (Standard Errors) of Vote for Zzyuganov

Category	Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Socioeconomic and demographic characteristics	Gender	-.043 (.112)	-.177 (.127)	-.162 (.129)
	Age	1.91*** (.289)	1.29*** (.318)	1.33*** (.325)
	High education	-.508** (.167)	.094 (.189)	.110 (.192)
	Mid education	-.308* (.133)	-.047 (.148)	-.093 (.151)
	Low income	.378** (.124)	.320* (.138)	.289* (.140)
	Working class	.368** (.109)	.376** (.122)	.357** (.124)
Retrospective voting	Crime	-.730** (.279)		-.796** (.308)
	Unemployment	.191 (.140)		.062 (.160)
	Retrospective economy	-2.74*** (.226)		-1.80*** (.260)
Authoritarian attitudes	Soviet political system		2.38*** (.122)	2.22*** (.124)
	Order vs. freedom		1.26*** (.293)	1.06*** (.301)
	Constant	-.735** (.216)	-3.39*** (.308)	-2.61*** (.330)
	N	1992	1992	1992

Note. * $p \leq .05$, ** $p \leq .01$, *** $p \leq .001$.

once we control for authoritarian attitudes. This suggests that the path from education to support for an ex-authoritarian candidate might run through authoritarian attitudes, with additional education making people less likely to hold authoritarian views.²⁹

Turning to authoritarian attitudes, we focus on two variables: one that captures a preference for an authoritarian form of government—in Bolivia, a dictatorship (*Dictatorship vs. Democracy*), in Russia, the Soviet political system (*Soviet Political System*)³⁰—and one that measures a preference for order. In the Bolivian case, the predilection for order is framed as a tradeoff between *Order vs. Liberty*; in the Russian case, it is a choice between *Order vs. Freedom* (see Appendix II for coding details).

The results are strongly supportive of the authoritarian hypothesis. In both Russia and Bolivia, the vote for an ex-authoritarian candidate is at least in part associated with a preference for authoritarianism. In all of the specifications of the model, the coefficients on the authoritarian variables are positive, have relatively large ratios of coefficients to standard errors, and have substantively meaningful effects. Moreover, these effects are present when controlling for both demographic characteristics of the respondents and more traditional retrospective evaluations.

Given that the empirical evidence is supportive of the authoritarianism hypothesis in both the Bolivian and Russian cases, it is possible to make two further distinctions about the findings. First, there appears to be a larger effect for the preference for an authoritarian form of government than for the more general preference for order. In both cases, the substantive effect of the former variable is at least twice as large as the latter (see figures 1 and 2). Additionally, in both cases the ratio of the coefficient to the standard error is larger for the former, regardless of whether we look at the reduced form of the model (Model 2 in tables 2 and 3) or the full model (Model 3 in tables 2 and 3). Second, the effects appear to be more important in the Russian case than in the Bolivian case. In terms of statistical significance, both Russian variables are significant at a $p < .001$ level in the full model, while the coefficients from Bolivian variables are closer to $p = .05$. Moreover, the magnitude of the effects from the Russian variables—45 percent for *Soviet Political System* and 18 percent for *Order vs. Freedom*—are larger than their Bolivian counterparts. In the Russian case, preference for the Soviet political system seems to be by far the strongest predictor of the likelihood of voting for the ex-authoritarian candidates, while in the Bolivian case, there are other variables that have similarly strong effects.³¹ These distinctions, however, should not detract from the basic finding that there is strong evidence to suggest a common explanatory variable across the disparate contexts of Russia and Bolivia to help explain the vote for ex-authoritarian candidates: preference for authoritarianism.

Overall, we found support in both the Bolivian and Russian cases for the *Mixed Standard/Authoritarian Voting Behavior* ideal type. Support for neither Banzer nor Zyuganov was driven entirely by pro-authoritarian views, but in both cases these factors clearly were important. Thus, although traditional democratic con-

cerns such as dissatisfaction with economic concerns made a vote for these ex-authoritarian presidential candidates more likely, so too did a preference for more authoritarian forms of government.

Additional Empirical Tests

As noted above, one of the shortcomings of binomial logit analysis is that it cannot exclude the possibility that the results one finds are being driven primarily by one of the parties in the “other” category. It is possible that by switching our party of interest with another party, we could find largely the same results from a similar binomial logit analysis. We would then be making claims about the vote for ex-authoritarian candidates that could just as easily be demonstrated for other candidates, thus undercutting our theoretical objective. In this section, therefore, we present three additional tests to assure readers that this is not the case.

First, in tables 4 and 5 we present the results of a series of additional binomial logit analyses where, in turn, we

coded each of the other candidates who received more than 5 percent of the vote as the dependent variable. If the results we observe for Zyuganov and Banzer are primarily being driven by the vote for one particular “other” candidate, we would expect to see results that are similar to what we find for the ex-authoritarian candidate for a number of the other candidates. Were this the case, we could conclude that the results we find for the ex-authoritarian candidates are simply an artifact of pulling any one party out and making it the focal point of the analysis as long as some other primary party is still included in the “other” category. Tables 4 and 5, however, demonstrate that this is not the case. Strikingly, there is almost no case where we can find a variable that is statistically significant for either Banzer or Zyuganov that is matched by a variable of similar magnitude, significance, and direction in any of the other regressions, let alone a pattern of multiple variables across candidates.³²

As a second test, we run multinomial logit analyses (MNL) of both elections. The seven-category dependent variable in each case includes five categories for each of the five candidates who received more than 5 percent of the vote. We also include a category in the Russian data for respondents who cast a vote against all parties, and in the Bolivian data for respondents who submitted a null ballot. Additionally, we create a residual “other” category for anyone who reported voting for a candidate who received less than 5 percent of the vote. Figures 3 and 4 present first differences calculated from these MNL analyses that show the predicted effect of variables on the likelihood of a respondent supporting each of the candidates (including the against all, null, and other categories).³³ The fig-

“In the Russian case, the preference for the Soviet political system seems to be by far the strongest predictor of the likelihood of voting for the ex-authoritarian candidates, while in the Bolivian case, there are other variables that have similarly strong effects.”

TABLE 4. Estimated Binomial Logit Coefficients and (Standard Errors) of Vote for Bolivian Candidates

Category	Variable	Banzer (ADN)	Durán (MNR)	Zamora (MIR)	Kuljis (UCS)	Loza (COND)
Socioeconomic and demographic characteristics	Gender	-.144 (.111)	.273* (.134)	-.092 (.146)	.248 (.174)	.037 (.211)
	Age	.016*** (.004)	.002 (.005)	.013* (.006)	-.019** (.007)	-.020* (.009)
	Education	.006 (.014)	-.025 (.017)	-.008 (.018)	-.035 (.022)	-.031 (.027)
	Wealth	-.296 (.372)	.673 (.447)	.477 (.485)	-.559 (.591)	-1.716* (.732)
	Working class	.100 (.112)	.016 (.137)	.115 (.146)	-.313 (.182)	-.173 (.216)
Retrospective voting	Crime	.224 (.318)	.232 (.365)	-1.098 (.657)	-.042 (.512)	-.472 (.710)
	Unemployment	.276* (.127)	-.040 (.159)	-.090 (.173)	.067 (.198)	-.441 (.274)
	Corruption victim	.349** (.117)	-.316* (.151)	-.118 (.159)	-.263 (.196)	.197 (.222)
Authoritarian attitudes	Dictatorship vs. democracy	.441* (.193)	.073 (.238)	-.334 (.297)	-.252 (.333)	-.411 (.411)
	Order vs. liberty	.209* (.108)	-.022 (.129)	.096 (.142)	.125 (.167)	-.295 (.202)
	Constant	-1.342*** (.333)	-1.880*** (.401)	-1.225** (.438)	-1.199* (.519)	-.768 (.630)
	N	1653	1653	1653	1653	1653

Note. * $p \leq .05$, ** $p \leq .01$, *** $p \leq .001$.


TABLE 5. Estimated Binomial Logit Coefficients and (Standard Errors) of Vote for Russian Candidates


Category	Variable	Zyuganov	Yeltsin	Lebed	Yavlinsky	Zhirinov
Socioeconomic and demographic characteristics	Gender	-.162 (.129)	.281* (.113)	-.003 (.126)	-.094 (.167)	-.386 (.250)
	Age	1.33*** (.325)	.570 (.295)	-.895** (.334)	-1.01* (.468)	-1.70* (.676)
	High education	.110 (.192)	-.073 (.168)	-.014 (.199)	.671* (.284)	-1.03* (.449)
	Mid education	-.093 (.151)	-.249 (.146)	.250 (.163)	.546* (.259)	-.278 (.302)
	Low income	.289* (.140)	-.026 (.137)	-.052 (.152)	-.565* (.252)	.353 (.276)
	Working class	.357** (.124)	-.110 (.112)	-.045 (.126)	.028 (.172)	-.243 (.256)
Retrospective voting	Crime	-.796** (.308)	.397 (.240)	-.001 (.285)	-.225 (.409)	.556 (.486)
	Unemployment	.062 (.160)	.008 (.147)	-.078 (.163)	-.120 (.231)	.017 (.318)
	Retrospective economy	-1.80*** (.260)	2.13*** (.230)	-.457 (.255)	-.788* (.344)	-.867 (.520)
Authoritarian attitudes	Soviet political system	2.22*** (.124)	-1.92*** (.149)	-.464** (.144)	-.969*** (.231)	.098 (.273)
	Order vs. freedom	1.06*** (.301)	-.993*** (.238)	.668** (.280)	-.252 (.352)	-1.22 (.550)
	Constant	-2.61*** (.330)	-.420 (.277)	-1.46*** (.318)	-1.60*** (.433)	-1.81** (.597)
N	1992	1992	1992	1992	1992	1992

Note. * $p \leq .05$, ** $p \leq .01$, *** $p \leq .001$.

ures only display these effects for the variables that we found to be statistically significant predictors of the vote for Zyuganov or Banzer in the binomial logit analyses, as these are the effects whose legitimacy we need to check. If the binomial logit results mask the fact that the results are being driven by the vote for another candidate, then we would expect to see numerous other candidates with first differences that are similar to those we find for the ex-authoritarian candidate in terms of both size and direction.

Again, figures 3 and 4 clearly demonstrate that this is not the case. Far from finding numerous instances of similar substantive effects of variables on other candidates, we find almost none. In almost every case, the substantive effect of the variable on the vote for Zyuganov or Banzer is clearly distinguishable from the effect of that variable on all of the other candidates. Again, the lone exception is the preference for order as opposed to freedom in the Russian case, where there are significant effects for both Lebed and Zyuganov, although the effect is twice as large for Zyuganov as it is for Lebed.³⁴ In sum, the statistical analyses of the vote for other candidates in the Bolivian and Russian elections provide additional support for the contention that the vote for Banzer and





Zyuganov was, to a certain degree, motivated by pro-authoritarian sentiments on the part of Bolivian and Russian citizens, and that overall reflects the *Mixed Standard/Authoritarian* ideal type.

The Russian data offers the possibility for a final test to demonstrate that our results are not being driven primarily by the nature of the opposition. Although the

results presented earlier analyze the vote in the first round of the 1996 presidential elections, there was a second round of voting between the top two candidates from first round, Zyuganov and Yeltsin. We therefore rerun our analysis using the vote for Zyuganov in the second round as the dependent variable. In this case, there could be no concern that the results were being driven by the composition of the "other" category, as the choice is now dichotomous. Were our findings to have changed greatly across these two analyses, then we would again have reason to be concerned that all of the findings above were being driven by candidates that were no longer involved in the second round of the election (although this would have been highly doubtful given the fact that Yeltsin and Zyuganov received close to 70 percent of the vote between them in first round). Table 6 confirms that this is not the case, as the results are very similar. There is almost no effect on either the authoritarian variables. Indeed, the only real change of note is that the low income and crime variables cease to be statistically significant predictors in the second round of the elections (although neither change the direction of their effect).

Comparative Assessment and Implications of Findings

We began this article with the puzzle of why people would vote in free elections for rulers or parties that had once repressed them in a prior non-democratic regime. In particular, we were interested in whether these votes represented a preference

TABLE 6. Estimated Binomial Logit Coefficients and (Standard Errors) of Vote for Zyuganov in First and Second Rounds

Category	Variable	Zyuganov Round 1	Zyuganov Round 2
Socioeconomic and demographic characteristics	Gender	-.162 (.129)	-.194 (.127)
	Age	1.33*** (.325)	.691* (.317)
	High education	.110 (.192)	-.097 (.186)
	Mid education	-.093 (.151)	-.197 (.151)
	Low income	.289* (.140)	.131 (.142)
	Working class	.357** (.124)	.429*** (.123)
Retrospective voting	Crime	-.796** (.308)	-.400 (.282)
	Unemployment	.062 (.160)	-.185 (.164)
	Retrospective economy	-1.80*** (.260)	-2.39*** (.261)
Authoritarian attitudes	Soviet political system	2.22*** (.124)	2.45*** (.125)
	Order vs. freedom	1.06*** (.301)	1.00*** (.295)
	Constant	-2.61*** (.330)	-1.65*** (.318)
	<i>N</i>	1992	1998

Note. * $p \leq .05$, ** $p \leq .01$, *** $p \leq .001$.

for candidates within a democratic framework—and, thus, were motivated by standard concerns common to democratic citizens worldwide—or whether these votes represented a more fundamental opposition to democracy. What we found in both the Russian and Bolivian cases was a combination of these factors.

To a certain extent, citizens in both Russia and Bolivia appeared in these elections to be voting for prominent opposition figures due to dissatisfaction with the current state of the economy. In the Bolivian case, we found that voters who were concerned with unemployment or who had been victims of corruption were more likely to support Banzer than other candidates. In Russia, dissatisfaction with the economy was a powerful predictor of the vote for Zyuganov. Moreover, the sociodemographic characteristics of Zyuganov supporters—older and poorer citizens, as well as those employed in working class industries—also suggest that Zyuganov attracted support from the “losers” of the economic transition, which is consistent with an economic motivation story. Although it may be troubling that the downtrodden in both societies have turned to an ex-dictator or a communist in a free election, there is nothing inherently undemocratic about those dissatisfied with the state of the economy casting their votes for opposition figures. Indeed, such behavior is wholly consistent with what we observe in established democracies without ex-authoritarian figures competing for office.

What is troubling from the point of view of democratic consolidation, however, is that even when controlling for opinions about the state of the economy and sociodemographic characteristics, voters for former authoritarians are motivated by a preference for authoritarian forms of government. Indeed, in Russia, the chances of supporting Zyuganov increase by a staggering 45 percent on the basis of preference for the former Soviet political system. In Bolivia, the magnitude of the effect is smaller, but the direction is the same: preference for dictatorship made voters more likely to support Banzer. The same is true in both cases for a preference for order at the expense of liberty. This suggests that the scenario of voters turning to these candidates out of dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs, but with the expectation that they will continue to operate within the confines of a democratic political system once elected, is at best overly optimistic and at worse dangerously misleading.

In fact, President Banzer did engage in several types of undemocratic behavior once he took office. For example, he declared a state of siege in April of 2000 in response to water-related political protest activity. In another incident in September of that same year, Banzer called upon military and police forces to forcefully remove road blocks set up by protesters who were expressing discontent with the government’s coca eradication policies. The decision to forcefully dismantle road blocks may have been in line with democratic norms because governments may be justified in opening road blocks that inflict hardships on the general population. However, Banzer’s decision to use the military, as opposed to the national police force, was reminiscent of Latin American authoritarian regimes that used the military to fight against internal, rather than external, “enemies.”

In Russia, the situation has been more complicated but potentially no less worrisome. Although Zyuganov was not elected in 1996—nor did he succeed in being

elected in 2000 either—Yeltsin's successor, Vladimir Putin, a former KGB agent, has presided over a period of steadily declining democratic opportunities in Russia. This has included the reestablishment of state control over the media, the continued centralization of power in the Kremlin at the expense of both the parliament and political parties, an increased role for the state in the economic sphere (which has been especially illustrated by the recent Yukos affair), and, as noted in the introduction, recent calls to eliminate competitive elections in the selection of regional executives.

It is also important to realize the limitations of our first step towards examining this question, all of which present interesting avenues for future research. Perhaps most importantly, we are left with a bit of a "chicken" and "egg" question regarding the relationship between economic dissatisfaction and preference for authoritarian forms of government. Is it that economic dissatisfaction leads to preferences for pre-democratic forms of government? If so, then improving the state of the economy should simultaneously improve the chances of successful democratic consolidation. Or is preference for authoritarian forms of government something that is much more deeply ingrained in parts of the populace, a conclusion that is at least in part warranted by the fact that we find these independent effects for authoritarian attitudes after controlling for sociodemographic status and retrospective economic evaluations? If so, this begs the question of why certain citizens continue to harbor such attitudes while others have been more supportive of the new democratic polity.

Another puzzle that emerges from our research is the relationship between the preference for order and the preference for non-democratic forms of government. Here we have presented the preference for order as an indirect indicator of preference for authoritarianism. It is possible that we have this relationship backwards. Perhaps what citizens really want is order, and electing an ex-authoritarian candidate and supporting authoritarian rule are both seen as possible instruments towards restoring order.³⁵ In particular, the relevant sociodemographic factors in the Russian case look consistent with such an interpretation, where poorer and older citizens overwhelmed by the chaos of the transition from state socialism and may have been turning to Zyuganov in a search to bring order to their new world.

Finally, although it is illuminating to have found similar patterns in such different cases, we examined only two cases in which voters have cast their ballots for former authoritarians. It would be valuable to examine whether we find similar patterns in other postcommunist and Latin American countries in an effort to make sure we have not merely stumbled upon an exclusively Bolivian-Russian connection. Within the postcommunist world, for example, it would be particularly interesting to examine whether or not the pro-authoritarian vote still gravitates to communist successor parties that have attempted to reform themselves as European style social democratic parties in countries such as Poland and Hungary.³⁶ Research that explores whether similar patterns can be found in other regions of the world would also be interesting, and hopefully we have provided a framework to allow other researchers to compare their results to ours.³⁷ More-

over, our analysis was deliberately limited to presidential elections to facilitate more seamless comparison across the two cases. Having established a realistic basis for comparison, future work should also consider parliamentary elections, as well as subnational elections, in hopes of seeking further evidence of the generalizability of our findings.

APPENDIX A Election Results

Results of the 1997 Bolivian presidential election

Candidate and (party)	Percentage of the vote
Hugo Banzer (ADN)	22.26
Juan Carlos Durán (MNR)	18.20
Jaime Paz Zamora (MIR)	16.77
Ivo Kuljis (UCS)	16.11
Remedios Loza (CONDEPA)	17.16
Other	9.51

Source: *Corte Nacional Electoral*, <http://www.bolivian.com/cne/nal-r.html>.

Party abbreviations:

ADN: Acción Democrática Nacionalista (Nationalist Democratic Action)

CONDEPA: Conciencia de Patria (Conscience of the Fatherland)

MIR: Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria (Movement of the Revolutionary Left)

MNR: Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (Revolutionary Nationalist Movement)

UCS: Unidad Cívica Solidaridad (Civic Solidarity Union)

Results of the 1996 Russian presidential election

Candidate and (party)	Percentage of the vote: Round 1	Percentage of the vote: Round 2
Boris Yeltsin (Independent)	35.28	53.83
Gennady Zyuganov (KPRF)	32.03	40.30
Aleksandr Lebed (Independent)	14.52	
Grigory Yavlinsky (YAB)	7.34	
Vladimir Zhirinovskiy (LDPR)	5.70	
Others	1.17	
Against all/Invalid	2.96	5.87

Source: *Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation: Vybory Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii 1996*.

Party abbreviations:

KPRF: Communist Party of the Russian Federation

LDPR: Liberal Democratic Party of Russia

YAB: Yabloko Party

APPENDIX B

Coding of Variables

Sociodemographic Variables

In the Bolivian data, *Gender* is coded dichotomously (female is positive), while *Education* (0–18 years) and *Age* (18–96) are coded as continuous variables. We measure *Wealth* by creating an index of household ownership of the following items weighted equally: a refrigerator, a telephone, a car or truck, a washing machine, a microwave oven, a motorcycle, a tractor, electricity, running water, a bicycle, and a sewage system. The scale of the index ranges from 0 to 1, with a higher number indicating that the respondent has more of the items. We coded *Working Class* membership as a dummy variable. We considered all those who identify themselves as industrial workers or just “workers,” farmers employed on farms, employees in shops, or occasional laborers to be working class and coded them as 1. Owners of small and large businesses, owners of farms or land-renters, cattle owners, professionals, upper-level and intermediate-level managers of businesses, members of the military, students, retired people, or housewives are considered to be nonworking-class people, and we coded them as 0.

For the Russian data, *Gender* (female positive) and *Age* (rescaled 0–1) are coded in the same way as the Bolivian case. *Income* and *Education*, however, are coded differently. Lacking a continuous variable for education, we create dummy variables for those without a secondary school diploma (*Low Education*), those who have received a diploma but no further education (*Mid Education*), and those educated beyond secondary school (*High Education*); in the model we omit the *Low Education* dummy. Lacking measures of material possessions, we use information about respondents’ reported monthly income, which we include in the analysis as a dummy variable for the poorest quartile of the population (*Low Income*).³⁸

There is no variable in the Russian survey to directly assess whether or not the respondent is a member of the *Working Class*. Instead, we have information regarding the “branch” in which the respondent works at either their current or, if not working, previous job. Using this information, we create a dummy variable that identifies people who work in either light industry, civilian machine building, military-industrial complex, oil and gas industry, other branches of heavy industry, construction, or agriculture; the excluded categories are communications, administration, education, science and culture, health care, army and militia, trade, consumer services, and finances. Although there is a chance that we are miscoding the administrative head of a construction firm or a janitor who works in a bank, we think that overall this gives us a reasonable proxy to assess working class status.³⁹

Retrospective Voting

Unfortunately, the Bolivian survey does not contain a question that asks respondents to assess the overall state of the economy. In the Russian case, we do have access to such a question, so we use a standard retrospective voting measure (*Ret-*

rospective Economy) that requests an opinion on the state of the national economy over the past twelve months on a five-point scale.

To test for the impact of concern over crime and unemployment we rely on similar questions from both surveys. In the Bolivian surveys, respondents were asked, “In your opinion, what is the most serious problem that this country is facing?” The interviewer read a series of possible responses, including crime and unemployment. Using this question, we create two dummy variables to identify those most concerned with *Crime* and *Unemployment*.

The Russian survey also had a question that asked voters to assess the most serious problem facing the country; unlike the Bolivian survey, the Russian question was open ended and answers were later slotted into numerical categories by the surveyors. We again create two dummy variables to identify those most concerned with *Crime* and *Unemployment*.

The other asymmetry between the two surveys concerns our measure for corruption. The Bolivian survey asked voters “Has a police officer asked you for a bribe?” We code this variable as a dummy variable (*Corruption Victim*) that identifies respondents who answered in the affirmative. The Russian survey did not contain an analogous question.⁴⁰

Preference for Authoritarianism

As noted in the text, we include two variables to test for a preference for authoritarianism, one of which directly asked respondents about their preference for an authoritarian system of government and one of which tested a preference for order more generally at the expense of freedom or liberty. In the case of the direct preference for an authoritarian system of government, we are fortunate to have context-specific questions in each of the surveys. In the Bolivian case, we use the following question: “Some people prefer to live under a democracy because it protects human and individual rights, even though sometimes it can be inefficient and disorderly. Others prefer to live under a dictatorship because of its order and efficiency. What do you prefer more, a democracy or a dictatorship?” “Dictatorship” is coded as 1, and “democracy” is coded as 0 (*Dictatorship vs. Democracy*). In the Russian case, however, the reference is not to a dictatorship, but rather the political system of the Soviet era. More specifically, the question asked voters, “What kind of political system, in your opinion, would be most appropriate for Russia?” We coded respondents who chose “the Soviet system we had in our country before perestroika” (*Soviet Political System*) as 1.⁴¹

The questions regarding a preference for order at the expense of liberty or freedom are fairly similar. The Bolivian survey asked respondents, “Some people say that it is more important to live in an orderly society than to have a lot of liberty. In your opinion, what is more important, order or liberty?” “Order” is coded as 1, “liberty” is coded as 0 (*Order vs. Liberty*). Russian respondents were asked how strongly they agreed (on a five-point scale from Strongly Agree to Strongly Disagree) with the statement “it is better to live in a society with strict order than to give people so much freedom that they may destroy society” (*Order vs. Freedom*).

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NOTES

1. The magnitude of this defeat cannot be overstated. The Solidarity movement won 99 of the 100 senate seats and all 161 contested seats in the lower house of the parliament. See Heyns and Bialecki 1991; and Biskupski 2000, 171, for details; as well as Ash 1993, 25–46, for a wonderful description of the shock these results produced.
2. We refer here to Putin's speech on September 13, 2004, in which he reacted to the tragedy in Beslan, Russia by calling for popularly elected regional executives to be hereafter appointed directly by the president (see, for example, Medetsky 2004; Petrov 2004).
3. Communist successor parties won parliamentary elections in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland during the 1990s (Tokes 1996; Zhelev 1996). The first democratically elected president in Romania, Ion Iliescu, and the current president of Poland, Aleksander Kwasniewski, were also officials in communist regimes (Higley, Kullberg, and Pakulski 1996, 143; Karpinski 1995).
4. In Argentina, voters elected to gubernatorial and mayoral positions three former military governors (Antonio Bussi, José David Ruiz Palacios, and Roberto Ulloa), a leader of two military rebellions (Aldo Rico), and a former police officer (Luis Patti) who is accused by the Argentine National Commission about Disappeared People of torturing prisoners during the dictatorship (Seligson 2002). In 1997 Bolivian voters elected a former dictator as president, Hugo Banzer. Former coup-plotter Hugo Chávez won the 1998 Venezuelan presidential election (Canache 2002b), and former coup-plotter Lucio Gutiérrez won the 2002 Ecuadorian presidential election. The former dictator of Guatemala, Colonel Efraín Ríos Montt, was elected president of the legislature in 1993 and in 1999 (Azpuru 2001). In Peru, Alberto Fujimori, the architect of an executive coup in 1992, was reelected president in 1995 (Carrión 2001).
5. Former dictators Moi of Kenya, Rawlings of Ghana, Kerekov of Benin, and Ratsiraka of Madagascar were elected president of their countries during the 1990s (Barkan and Ng'ethe 1998; Herbst 2001, 365).
6. See as well Levitsky and Way 2002 and the many works they cite in note 1.
7. See, for example, Kinder and Kiewiet 1981; MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1992; Alvarez and Nagler 1995; Lewis-Beck and Nadeau 2000; Nadeau, Niemi, and Yoshinaka 2002; Nannestad, Paldam, and Rosholm 2003; Sanders 2003.
8. For a similar argument that focuses more specifically on the appeal of communist successor parties to economic losers in postcommunist countries, see Tucker 2004 and Tucker forthcoming, chapter 2.
9. These categories are similar to those proposed by Morlino (1998, 137) in his study of southern Europeans who were forming opinions about new democratic regimes after long periods of authoritarianism.
10. Indeed, the notion of being able to "throw the bums out" as a result of dissatisfac-

tion is often considered an important component of democratic accountability (Przeworski, Stokes, and Manin 1999).

11. In Russia, the GNP per capita in 1999 was \$2,270; in Bolivia it was only \$1,010. Twenty-two percent of Bolivian women over the age of fifteen, and 9 percent of men, were illiterate in 1998, while only 1 percent of Russian women and less than 1 percent of men were illiterate. The difference in infant mortality rates is even more striking. While the infant mortality rate per one thousand live births in 1998 was only seventeen in Russia, it was sixty in Bolivia (World Bank 2000, 274–75, 286–87).

12. In Bolivia, the Congress chooses the president if no candidate receives a majority of the vote.

13. For an article-length biography of Zyuganov, see Otto 1999.

14. In Russia, a number of parties initially lay claim to the mantle of the true successor to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, but the one party that unambiguously emerged to play this role and enjoy electoral success in the 1990s was Communist Party of the Russian Federation. For more on the various communist successor parties that emerged in Russia in the early 1990s, including the KPRF, see Lentini 1992, Urban 1996, Sakwa 2002, and especially Urban and Solovei 1997.

15. Rose and Munro (2002) describe the KPRF as a party of “old brand Communist . . . not rebranded like its Polish or Hungarian counterparts” (134).

16. Likewise, the purpose of this article is not to explain why people vote for candidates who espouse authoritarian attitudes or programs generally—were this the case, we would certainly have examined the vote for Zhirinovskiy and Lebed as well—but instead to focus directly on the phenomenon of voting for ex-authoritarian rulers or representatives of ex-authoritarian ruling parties.

17. For more on Yeltsin’s campaign strategy, see in particular Rose and Tikhomirov 1996; Brudny 1997; and McFaul 1996, 1997.

18. The 2,977 respondents were selected through a multistage stratified sample. First, the country was divided into its nine departments. Then, within each department, the sample was further subdivided into four strata by population size: towns or cities that had (1) more than 20,000 people, (2) between 2,000 and 20,000 people, (3) between 500 and 1,999 people, and (4) fewer than 500 people. The sample size within the departments was proportional to population size, but the departmental samples were drawn so as not to have extremely small *N*s in sparsely populated departments such as Pando and Beni. We subsequently weighted the data so that the population size of each departmental stratum was proportional to the national population distribution. All interviews were conducted in person in Spanish, except for a small number of monolingual Quechua- and Aymara-speaking respondents, who were interviewed in their own language using translated versions of the questionnaire. The response rate was 83.3 percent.

19. There were 468 voters who reported that they could not remember for whom they had cast their vote.

20. A multistage area-probability sample was drawn from the voting-age population, and selection of respondents within households followed the Kish procedure. Interviewers made three attempts to reach potential respondents, and the response rate for the initial wave was 79.8 percent. The retention rate was quite strong, with 2,776 (97.7 percent) respondents completing the second wave and 2,456 (86.4 percent) completing the third wave. All interviews were conducted in person. For more on the survey, see Colton 2000.

21. Those who either found it “hard to say” for whom they voted or refused to declare their vote choice are also dropped from the analysis. Very few respondents chose these answers: they represented 0.6 percent and 3.3 percent of those who reported voting, respectively.

22. This figure is quite close to the 32 percent of voters who actually cast ballots for Zyuganov in the elections (see Appendix I for details). Not surprisingly given the proximity of the survey to the election, there were fewer voters in the Russian case—only 82—who were unable to state for whom they voted than in the Bolivian case. When these vot-

ers are removed from the sample, the percentage of the remaining voters in the survey supporting Zyuganov almost exactly mirrors his actual support in the election at 32 percent. We rescaled all independent variables from the Russian data along a 0–1 continuum to facilitate comparison of coefficients (Achen 1982).

23. Running the full version of the model (Model 3) for the Russian data with listwise deletion of missing data results in the loss of more than 300 respondents, $N = 1,682$; see King et al. 2001 for concerns about listwise deletion. For this reason, we employed multiple methods in conducting our analyses of the Russian data. The results we report in the body of the paper use “mean replacement” in which all nonrespondents to questions with substantial missing data (defined as approximately 100 or more nonrespondents) are assigned the mean value of the sample that did answer the question. To address concerns that we might be underestimating our standard errors by this approach, we run the regression again using a series of dummy variables to identify all of the nonrespondents for each particular question; this method allows us to estimate the effect of the variables in question using only the information provided by those who did choose to answer the question. (We thank Larry Bartels for suggesting this approach.) The results were nearly identical between using these two approaches. Moreover, the results were almost exactly the same when we used the smaller listwise deleted samples.

24. As most of the explanatory variables are dummy variables, we chose this approach as the best way to mimic a constant shift across all variables. We calculated predicted probabilities using Clarify 2.1 (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003) and SPost (Long and Freese 2001).

25. When we report an increase in the likelihood of supporting a candidate, we are referring to the actual percentage point change in the predicted chance that the respondent has of supporting the candidate, not the percentage of the increase relative to the original chance of supporting the candidate. Thus, a predicted change from a 20 percent to a 60 percent chance of voting for Zyuganov is reported as an increase of 40 percent in the likelihood of supporting Zyuganov, not a 200-percent increase.

26. There are other ways of measuring respondents’ views of the state of the economy, but as the focus of the paper is not primarily on economic voting we rely only on the most commonly reported indicator, the respondent’s view of the state of the national economy in the period of time preceding the election. Work by Colton (2000) using the same dataset suggests that reliance on pocketbook as opposed to sociotropic economic evaluations would have yielded similar results of a smaller magnitude (see especially Colton 2000, table 3.7). See also Colton 1996, table 7.

27. Even more surprisingly, the biggest beneficiaries of concern over crime were not the nationalists Lebed or Zhirinovsky but, rather, the incumbent Yeltsin, which runs counter to the basic retrospective expectation. People who felt crime was the most serious issue were only 1 percent and 3 percent more likely to support Lebed and Zhirinovsky, respectively. The likelihood of supporting Yeltsin, though, increased by 7 percent.

28. Although we code age as a continuous variable, the effect remains constant when we rerun the analysis coding age as either a single dummy variable or a series of dummy variables. In both instances when we use a series of dummy variables and omit the lowest age group, the size of the coefficients increases as the dummy variables capture older sections of the populations. This suggests a monotonically increasing relationship. Rerunning the analyses with an age-squared variable included, which is insignificant in both cases, confirms this point.

29. There is evidence to suggest that this is the case in Russia. In particular, 45 percent of respondents who had not received a high school diploma felt that the Soviet political system was the most appropriate system for Russia today, as compared to 28 percent of those who had received only a diploma but no further education, and only 14% of those with additional education (Pearson $\chi^2(2) = 168.13, p < .001$).

30. The question asks voters, “What kind of political system, in your opinion, would be most appropriate for Russia?” We coded the variable as a dummy variable, with respon-

dents who chose “the Soviet system we had in our country before perestroika” assigned a value of 1; other possible answers included “the political system that exists today” or “democracy of the Western type.”

31. The substantive effect of age needs to be treated cautiously, as it represents a shift from the youngest to the oldest voter in the sample. For the rest of the variables—and especially the dummy variables—the first differences represent swings from larger numbers of respondents (for example, of the 1,996 Russian respondents who reported voting in the presidential election, 709 felt the Soviet system was best, as compared to 1,287 who did not).

32. The lone exception to this finding is that Lebed also appears to benefit from a preference for order in a way that is similar, if not quite as strong, as Zyuganov.

33. We choose not to present regression results out of concern for space and because first differences are a more concise way to ascertain if these effects are present. MNL regression results can only describe how the vote for one party is related to another party, and, thus, it would take close to forty pages of results to present all of the permutations from the two analyses. In contrast, first differences can concisely show how a variable affects the vote for each party. See Colton 2000 for an example of a similar approach to reporting MNL results using first differences as opposed to regression coefficients.

34. This raises the question of why the results for Lebed and Zhirinovskiy do not look more similar to those for Zyuganov along the preference for authoritarianism dimension. As both had tried to position themselves as law and order nationalists during the campaign, one might expect them to benefit from these dimensions in a manner similar to what we expected for Zyuganov. Although the topic warrants its own exploration, one tentative explanation for this finding is that proauthoritarian candidates face a credibility problem. They may advocate what sounds like authoritarianism in a campaign platform, but pro-authoritarian voters will not know if these promises are credible. Faced with a choice between multiple pro-authoritarian candidates, the candidate with the strongest credibility as a “real authoritarian” may be the ex-authoritarian candidate or party. This could help to explain why Lebed, who had at least been a relatively successful military officer, might be seen as more credible than the eccentric and outlandish Zhirinovskiy. We thank John Huber for this suggestion.

35. We thank Anna Grymala-Busse for highlighting this possibility.

36. Similarly, it would be illuminating to replicate the analysis in the Czech Republic, where, unlike in Russia, the unreformed Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia also had to compete with a serious non-communist successor social democratic rival (the Czech Social Democratic Party) on the left side of the political spectrum.

37. For example, a study of a country such as Spain, where large numbers of Franco-era members of the bureaucracy were fired following the 1982 electoral victory of Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez, might provide an interesting contrast to Russia in the 1990s, where the bureaucracy was still heavily populated by members of the Soviet era *nomenklatura* (see Arias-King 2003, 159). We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this point.

38. Due to a large number of respondents who refused to answer the question, we choose to code this variable as a series of dummy variables by quartiles and for the non-respondents. However, our initial analyses revealed that the only clear pattern in terms of income was a greater likelihood of the poorest quartile to support Zyuganov. For simplicity, then, we include only the poorest quartile dummy variable in our reported results; including the other dummy variables does not change the findings.

39. Only eighty-nine of the people who reported voting in the election did not answer either of these questions. We included these respondents in the “0” category; results remained the same when we included a dummy variable in the analysis to control for the effect of these particular respondents.

40. Twenty-four respondents did identify corruption as the most serious problem facing the country, but as this represents such a small portion of the sample (< 0.75 percent), we did not include it in our analysis.

41. We code this as a dummy variable; as noted in the text, other possible answers included “the political system that exists today” or “democracy of the Western type.”

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