

The New Russian Identity and the United States

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Abstract: In this article, the author explores the process of identity formation by examining divisions within Russian society and comparing them to “external” divisions between Russia and other states. Arguing that internal, social status-based divisions remain stronger than a sense of national identity, the author suggests that this state of affairs complicates the search for national solidarity, driving a wedge in Russian public opinion between the ruling group and the population, as a whole.

Key words: identity formation, national solidarity, population, public opinion, ruling group, Russia, social cleavages

Asymmetric Response of Russian Citizens toward American Goodwill

Identity formation is a key element within the broader process of human socialization. In the traditional literature, this formation begins at birth and generally finishes with the acquisition of one’s first professional experience. More recent research into social development introduces noticeable amendments into this model, recognizing the fact that the socialization process is not complete after one attains a certain social position. Changes in society occur so rapidly that representatives of the same generation must repeatedly internalize new norms and identities and thereby contribute to the creation of a fundamentally new society.

For the Russian case, all these dynamics were aggravated by the drastic nature of the changes undergone by Russian society from the beginning of the 1980s. The breaking of Soviet-era concepts, dividing the world into “friendly” and “alien” camps, and the territorial disintegration of the country provoked a new process of identity formation. Quite naturally, this process develops most actively among the younger generations, who must reorient themselves toward the expected challenges of their future.¹

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A key component in the process of identity formation is the division of the world into “us” and “them” factions and the development of some perception of how Russians differ from others. From this point of view, the West as a whole, and America as the leader of the Western world, is the mirror in which Russians see themselves—both in terms of their strengths and weaknesses. To a lesser extent this view also contributes to assessments of the West, as well as the actions of Western states.

According to public opinion polls administered by the Foundation for Public Opinion (hereafter, FOM) in May 2002, only one out of every four (23 percent) Russians had a positive view of the United States, about the same number (22 percent) held a negative view, and roughly half of those polled (51 percent) were indifferent (table 1). Therefore, aggregate opinion tends toward neutrality, with roughly equal amounts of pro- and anti-American sentiment and a predominance of indifferent attitudes. Moreover, within the last year, Russians’ attitudes toward the United States took a turn for the worse. Less favorable indicators occurred only in March 2002—following the bitter experience of Russian athletes at the Salt Lake City Winter Olympic Games.² At this point, negative attitudes toward America exceeded positive attitudes by approximately 9 percent (29 percent and 20 percent, correspondingly). However, attitudes toward the United States keep close to neutral: positive exceeds negative by roughly 1 percent.

In May 2001, only 32 percent of the Russians polled had a positive attitude toward the United States, while 17 percent expressed negative attitudes. The tragic events in New York and Washington, DC yielded a brief increase in sympathy towards Americans. Immediately after the September 11 attacks, the share of negative attitudes decreased to only 12 percent. However, by the close of 2001, it again increased to 20 percent. The share of positive attitudes about the United States in 2001 was approximately the same (32 percent, 38 percent, 36 percent), but decreased by one third within the 2002 (20–23 percent). Thus, although in 2001 Russians generally estimated America positively (with the few exceptions cited above), in 2002 Russians’ attitude toward the United States took a drastic decline.

It is important to note the marked asymmetry in American and Russian attitudes toward one another and to recognize that negative perceptions are concentrated primarily on the Russian side. According to Gallup poll data, the past three

TABLE 1. Russians’ Attitudes toward the United States, 2001–2003

%	February 2001	May 2001	September 2001	December 2001	March 2002	May 2002	January 2003
Positive	32	32	38	36	20	23	25
Indifferent	47	45	47	39	46	51	45
Negative	17	17	12	20	29	22	25

Note. $N = 1,500$.

years have witnessed a steady improvement in American attitudes toward Russians. To take November 1999—when just slightly more than one third (38 percent) of Americans viewed Russia positively, while more than half of the total number (58 percent) viewed it negatively—as the reference point, one clearly sees a steady improvement in attitudes over the following three years (table 2). Thus, in March 2000, the week before Russia's most recent presidential election, the share of positive attitudes rose to 40 percent, while negative perceptions decreased to 51 percent. Within another year (February 2001), positive attitudes topped negative ones, 52 percent to 42 percent. Finally, the February 4–6, 2002, poll results saw the share of positive perceptions rise to 66 percent. These were the highest levels in thirteen years, not seen since August 1991. Hence, although aggregated Russian attitudes toward the United States hover between neutral and slightly negative, Americans are demonstrating increased affability toward their former opponent.

Significant differences also present themselves when one examines how Russians and Americans rate one another's countries relative to other nations. As indi-

TABLE 2. Americans' Attitudes toward RF (the USSR), 1989–2002

	% favorable	% unfavorable
V. Putin's period	49.6	43.3
February 4–6, 2002	66	27
February 1–4, 2001	52	42
November 13–15, 2000	40	53
March 17–19, 2000	40	51
B. Yeltsin's period	47.9	44.6
November 4–7, 1999	38	58
May 7–9, 1999	46	49
April 13–14, 1999	33	59
February 8–9, 1999	44	44
November 21–23, 1997	56	36
March 8–10, 1996	52	39
April 21–24, 1995	49	44
February 26–28, 1994	56	39
February 6–9, 1992	57	33
M. Gorbachev's period	56.8	33.6
November 21–24, 1991	52	36
August 23–25, 1991	60	31
August 8–11, 1991	66	25
March 14–17, 1991	50	42
January 30–February 2, 1991	57	35
September 10–11, 1990	58	32
August 10–13, 1990	51	40
May 17–20, 1990	55	32
February 28–March 27, 1989	62	29

Source. Gallup Organization.

cated in table 3, recent Gallup data³ rank modern Russia among the group of countries toward which the absolute majority (60–70 percent) of Americans share *favorable* attitudes⁴ (table 3). Russia shares this ranking with Mexico—America’s southern neighbor and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) partner—and Taiwan—a long-standing ally of the United States in Southeast Asia. Russia’s entrance into this group clearly demonstrates its increasing favorable status in the eyes of the American public.⁵

In marked contrast, data from the FOM indicate that, as of June 2002, practically every second Russian resident (50 percent) believed that the United States is an unfriendly country,⁶ while only 37 percent had the opposite opinion (table 4). Separate data for St. Petersburg indicate that, even among residents of this “window to the West,” America was viewed as a threat. Only 43 percent of St. Petersburg respondents felt that the United States was not a threat to Russia, while 57 percent saw a real threat from overseas.⁷ Apparently, the closeness and intensity of contact that St. Petersburg residents enjoy with foreigners generally, and Americans in particular, does not necessarily result in warmer attitudes toward the United States.

Surveys administered during the past decade indicate that a high suspicion of the United States in relation to Russia’s national security is one of the dramatic outcomes of the late 1990s, while only several years ago Russians expressed greater benevolence toward America. However, in all fairness, one should note

TABLE 3. Americans’ Attitudes toward Various Countries, 1989–2002

Country	% favorable	% unfavorable
Group 1. Countries with highly favorable attitude		
Canada	92	5
United Kingdom	90	7
Germany	83	11
France	79	16
Japan	79	16
Group 2. Countries with significantly favorable attitude		
Mexico	72	22
Russia	66	27
Taiwan	62	22
Group 6. Extremely critically estimated countries		
Libya	15	68
Palestinian Autonomy	14	76
Iran	11	84
Iraq	6	88

Source. Gallup Organization.

that Russians' increasing ire has not limited itself to the United States, but has manifested in attitudes toward other states as well. Data from the All-Russia Center for the Study of Public Opinion (VTsIOM) indicate a steady decrease in the share of positive attitudes toward ten major countries—both “western” and “eastern.” That said, the maximum decrease occurred in attitudes toward the United States (41 percent), while China enjoyed a decrease of only 2 percent. At the same time, the share of those who agree with the statement that “aggression from abroad threatens Russia” more than doubled from 18 percent to 40 percent.⁸ Clearly, among the Russian population, the second half of the 1990s witnessed an increasing distrust of foreign countries.

All of the abovementioned trends strengthen the tendency of Russians to seek out “a special path” for their country’s development and have contributed to a growing sense of isolationism. Although in 1995 almost two out of every three Russians

TABLE 4. Russians' Ideas of the United States

	Friendly country	Unfriendly country
Russia as a whole (FOM, <i>N</i> = 1,500; 2001)	37	50
St. Petersburg (ASI,* <i>N</i> = 1,000; 2002)	43	57

*Agency of Social Information.

TABLE 5. Ratio of Positive and Negative Assessment for Ten Countries of the World in 1995 and 2001 (VTsIOM, *N* = 1,200)

Country	1995			2001		
	% mainly positive	% mainly negative	% don't know	% mainly positive	% mainly negative	% don't know
France	79	3	18	64	8	28
Canada	73	2	25	58	8	34
United Kingdom	77	4	19	55	15	31
Germany	69	12	20	54	18	28
Japan	69	9	23	53	16	31
India	59	5	36	53	10	38
China	41	21	38	39	21	40
United States	78	9	14	37	39	24
Israel	41	20	39	27	33	40
Iraq	22	35	44	18	39	44

(62 percent) felt that Russia “should turn its face to the world, and become like other countries,” six years later only 42 percent agreed with this statement (table 7). At the same time, although the number of Russians agreeing with the statement that “Russia has bent more towards the East than the West” increased from 12 percent to 21 percent, such attitudes manifested themselves only in slight decreases in the rate of distrust toward actual “eastern” countries (India by 7 percent, Japan by 16 percent, and Iraq by 4 percent) relative to others (table 7).

Thus, the past several years have witnessed an increase in vigilance, isolationism, and the general perception of a country that somehow lies outside of the global context. There is no reason to consider it to be the result of recriminatory vigilance from other countries’ residents, or at least not from Americans toward Russians. More likely, it is the troublesome forming (framing) of their own identity by modern Russia’s citizens, which is the reason for the transient and seemingly unmotivated changes in their perception of other countries.

Moscow-Washington Axis in Russian Public Mind

Nevertheless, it would be wrong to assume that an intensification of isolationism among the Russian public is the only scenario in which present attitudes of Russians toward the West and to the outside world may develop. Despite the fact that one can easily find all the attributes of isolationism and defensiveness in everyday Russian reality⁹ (including, naturally, the political sphere), attitudes toward Western values, and in particular to the American way of life, remain more than positive. Russians still consider American society to be, if not an example for simple implantation, at least a guide to orient them in many spheres of social life.¹⁰

According to the FOM data, almost every second (46 percent) a Russian agrees with the statement that American society is arranged more fairly while only a quarter (25 percent) disagree with this statement.¹¹ Moreover, when compared with Russian society, American society comes out significantly ahead: just 17 percent of Russians are certain that they are living in fairer social conditions than citizens of the United States. A slightly lesser portion of Russians (14 percent)

TABLE 6. Distribution of Answers about Developed Western Countries’ Attitudes toward Russia (VTsIOM, N = 1,200)

	1995 (%)	1997 (%)	2001 (%)
These countries sincerely want to help Russia	7	7	5
They are indifferent to Russia’s destiny, they solve their own problems here	44	46	44
Western countries want to enfeeble Russia, to turn it into a subject nation	31	31	37
Don’t know	14	16	14

thinks that both societies are arranged unfairly. However, nearly half (48 percent) of those polled stated that Americans live according to fairer laws. One can presume that the majority of those who consider American society unfair are also critical of Russian social relations. In other words, if “they” live well overseas, then they live better than us—and even if they do not, we live worse.

As one can see, Russians view American society as more just than their own.¹² In terms of social justice, their own modern social order lies at the periphery of all possible and existing societies. “Self-determination via the interface, qualification of own society, culture and group as the borderline one . . . indicates deep problems in communal identification.”¹³ Russian public opinion places its own country at the social periphery or “provinces” of the modern world.¹⁴

The first conclusion is that Russian citizens themselves identify Russia in a provincial sense, and then somehow try to fit it into a global context. Moreover, the United States, as the social “center,” is accepted as the standard against which one measures and weighs the periphery.

Second, despite the fact that, for the majority of Russians, American society seems to be a model for a more just set of social arrangements, the United States remains a threat to Russian society. This constitutes a radical difference from Russian public attitudes toward the United States during the Soviet period. At that time the United States seemed to be the key menace *and* the average Soviet citizen viewed American society as being less just than their own.¹⁵ The two societies opposed one another with equal confidence in the superiority and just nature of their own social arrangements. Now Russians stand opposed (in their mind) to societies that they feel are both more and less just than our own. In this case, isolationism emerges as a reaction against an unattainable ideal—an expression of frustration.

What lies at the roots of such attitudes? Obviously, there is no single irrefutable answer to this question.¹⁶ I will touch upon the aspect, related to the problem of identity framing, and specifically with regard to its spatial component. I am going to review how an individual’s ideas about the social relationship system within his member group project on his ideas related to relationships in the global world. Needless to say, I am opposed to denying other factors shaping such ideas, but for a resident of modern Russia, whose notions about the outworld are obtained mainly from school and mass media, this factor is of higher importance.

During the first phase of reforms in Russia, the United States and the West as a whole were perceived not only as model,¹⁷ but also as a factor spurring the home government to implement more liberal policies toward its citizens. Russians assumed that the activities of the national government were the main obstacles to improving life for the population to transform the government, via election or putsch (followed by the latter’s suppression), and life would naturally change for the better. At the same time, the population’s own activities and attitudes—with regard to work, money, the law, and even God—could remain the same.¹⁸

Generally speaking, a human being attributes the causes for major life events to himself or transfers the responsibility to some external factor. In the first case, a human being *predominantly* attributes events to his character, inclinations, abilities, or specific actions. In the second case, he explains events by reference to

TABLE 7. Scale of Agreement with Opinion about Russia in 1995 and 2001 (VTsIOM, N = 1,200)

	1997 (%)	2001 (%)
Russia is the great power and shall make other states and nations to respect it	82	85
Russia has more bent to the East than to the West	12	21
Aggression from abroad threatens Russia	18	40
We can make the world to respect us only by upgrading economics and consolidating democracy	85	84
It is necessary to turn the face to the world and to become like everybody	62	42

the actions of other people, bosses, government, or the environment.¹⁹ Naturally, Western governments, globalization, “world Zionism,” and so on provide ample targets within this category.

Over the past fourteen years (since autumn 1991), the Samara Foundation for Social Research has periodically addressed the same question to Samara residents: “Does your material well-being depend on you yourself or on outside factors (other people, bosses, etc.)?” As indicated in the February 2002 data, approximately two of every five Samara city residents (44 percent) assigned primary responsibility for their existing welfare to external factors. One third of Samara residents (34 percent) accepted primary responsibility, and the rest (22 percent) placed responsibility equally on themselves and outside influences. As we see, among residents of a large Russian industrial and trade center, only one third took primary responsibility for their current situation.

During the last decade, the portion of individuals taking primary responsibility for their life situation continued to grow;²⁰ this process is evident in other parts of the country as well, including in those regions that continue to actively cooperate with the West. Nevertheless, the tendency to place responsibility on outside factors continues to dominate.²¹

Russian residents consider the West a spatially remote authority within a series of other authorities; in other words, they understand it as a supranational extension of power. Thus, the more critically people estimate those relations, which currently exist between the central government and Samara region, the more critically they also estimate present relations between Russia and the West (table 8). In other words, they divide global space not into Russia and the outside world, but into the world of various authorities and the world of the individual’s everyday being.

For this individual, “power” runs the gamut between one’s boss or a local notable (elected or appointed) and world government—mythic (world Zionism) or actual (European Union, International Monetary Fund, World Trade Organi-

TABLE 8. Correlation between Assessment of Russia's Cooperation with Western Countries and Assessments of Relations between the Federal Center, Regional Economics, and Personal Welfare Standard (*N* = 800, Samara region)

Relations with the center	Relations with Western countries affect national economics as follows	
	Weaken (%)	Consolidate (%)
Unfair	67	16
Fair	45	35
Correlation factor		0.19
Personal welfare standard		
Turned to the worse	43	22
Turned to the better	59	18
Correlation factor		0.00

zation, etc.). Relations between local communities and the Moscow Federal Government lie within the same hierarchy of power relations as relations between Russia and the West. Authorities—national, local, or supranational—are juxtaposed to mass consciousness; they become a single object, which the public mind takes as a whole without discriminating between its individual units (a job boss, a mayor, a governor, a president, etc.).

Given these observations, one should question the hypothesis portraying the opposition between the West as a “society of plenty” and Russia as a society deprived by the last decade’s transformation. Public opinion analyses indicate no connection between assessments of one’s personal fortunes and assessments of the West’s influence on Russia’s national economy. Although the Pearson’s correlation coefficient between attitudes toward cooperation with the West and attitudes toward relations between Moscow and Samara region is equal to 0.19 ($p \leq .01$), one finds no significant relationship between personal welfare and cooperation with Western countries.

In other words, the public’s perceptions of the West are associated not with the material welfare of Russians, but with a kind of projection, or more precisely, extension, of general attitudes toward the nearest authorities. And in this context it represents not a social status of this person, but his ideas about the possibility of self-consistent responsible activities within this social system.

The “Westernizing” Elite

A comparison of mass and elite opinion polls suggests that Russian authorities are well aware of the above-stated relations. Thus, in May 2001, although approximately one third of Russians (32 percent) gave positive assessments of the United States, more than half of regional elite representatives (51 percent) viewed the United States in a positive manner (table 9).

More striking differences arise from a comparison of elite and mass attitudes toward American society. Almost two thirds (64 percent) of the regional elite, expressed their certainty that American society is fairly arranged, while less than half of the population (46 percent) adhered to this opinion (table 10). The opinion gap continues to widen when one examines assessments of American society relative to Russian social relations. Although almost half (48 percent) of the public feels that society is more just in America, the elite share increases to 76 percent (table 11). Such figures bear out popular perceptions concerning relations between the Russian governing and information elite on one hand, and the United States on the other. The Russian elite clearly hold more affable feelings toward the West than do the Russian masses.

TABLE 9. Attitudes of Russian Population and Russian Political Elite toward the United States (FOM, May 2001)

	Own attitude (%)		Estimate of the population's majority attitude toward the United States (%)	
	Population	Elite	By population	By elite
Well	32	51	46	21
Bad	17	21	22	42
Indifferent	44	27	24	26

TABLE 10. Assessment of American Society by RF Population and Political Elite (FOM, May 2001)

	Population (%)	Elite (%)
Fair	46	64
Unfair	25	28

TABLE 11. Comparative Assessment of American and Russian Societies by RF Population and Political Elite (FOM, May 2001)

	Population (%)	Elite (%)
Russian is fairer	17	64
American is fairer	48	76

Elites themselves are aware of this disparity. Of those surveyed, 46 percent felt that the majority of Russians hold negative attitudes toward the United States (table 9) and, by implication, that these numbers are higher than those for the elites themselves. Remember that the actual figure for Russians who hold positive attitudes toward the United States stands at 32 percent (against only 17 percent negative and 44 percent indifferent). These data suggest that the elite noticeably overestimate the existing level of mass “anti-Americanism” and point to a significant disconnect in communication between elites and masses.

Meanwhile, Russian society’s general notions of its attitudes toward America come much closer to actual survey results. More than one third of Russians (46 percent) believe that the majority of counterparts hold affable views towards the United States, 22 percent hold negative views, and that 24 percent feel indifferent. Obviously, society’s internal social communications function efficiently enough, especially when contrasted to the level of communication between society and elites.

The quoted data demonstrate that attitudes toward the United States and the West differ significantly between the elite and masses. The population of the country views its own government in part as the branch of an imaginary world government. Thus, Russian society, at least on the level of public opinion, is characterized less by vertical lines that both divide society and reinforce national solidarity than by horizontal lines that divide the national community into groups with markedly different social statuses. These lines complicate the search for national solidarity and national identity by hindering the establishment of trust between the ruling group and the population as a whole.

Because the Russian elite is fully (and perhaps uneasily) aware of its Westernization, it occasionally seeks to demonstrate its anti-Westernism and anti-Americanism by publicly directing attention toward public opinion regarding the contradictions between Russia and America (read: Russian and American elites). In the process, they draw upon their mistaken estimates of Russian mass attitudes toward the United States. Searching for a national idea, one can expect Russian political actors to continue such public demonstrations of national solidarity in the form of keen criticism toward foreign policy of Western countries. The target for this criticism will be Russian public opinion rather than Western governments.

This study was already in its final stages when the ongoing tensions between the United States and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq broke into armed conflict. The development and transformation of Russian sentiments toward the operations in Iraq will likely be the subjects of a separate study, but there is some value in briefly examining these perceptions within the framework of this study. As evidenced by editorials in state-owned media outlets and public demonstrations organized by *Edinnaia Rossiia* (the largest of which took place near the American embassy in Moscow on the day of Hussein’s regime collapse), the elite once again manipulated and enhanced existing levels of “the people’s” anti-Americanism to demonstrate national unanimity.

During the course of the war, more than half of Russians (57 percent) sympathized with Iraq and only 3 percent with the United States (the balance sympathized

with neither side). However, these figures represent attitudes toward American combat operations rather than opinions about American society per se. General assessments of the United States during this period indicated a growth in negative attitudes from 25 percent in January 2003 to 35 percent in March. Over the same period, the portion of positive attitudes declined from 25 percent to 19 percent. Obviously, this indicates some decline in goodwill toward the United States, but the transformation is wholly disproportional to the attitudes toward the war itself. Furthermore, as soon as full combat operation ceased in April, the ratio of positive and negative attitudes toward the United States quickly rebounded to the rough equality evident in prewar polls (27% and 28%, respectively).²²

In other words, Russian public opinion impacted by foreign-policy events for a short period, turned to be more critical in perception of America. But just after this situational factor ended actual social communication, public opinion seemed to recover its former status.

Summary

Based on results of public opinion surveys in Russia and the United States, Russian and American citizens' attitudes to their former cold war rivals are demonstrated to be increasingly uncorrelated—the growth of positive perceptions among citizens in one country is not matched by similar dynamics in the other. And vice versa, growth of negative attitudes of one side is not accompanied with a rise in vigilance on the other. Presently, mutual perceptions of Russians and Americans are mainly defined not by direct interaction—which remains nearly negligible—but by the way in which each country's image of the "other" relates to the formation of its own self-identity. It is especially real for Russia and Russians.

As a whole, the past five to seven years have witnessed a marked growth in isolationist attitudes among the Russian public. Russian attitudes toward all countries—both East and West—have become more suspicious. Anticipation of a relatively easy entrance into external markets (both economic and cultural) changed to disappointment in the face of the reality of international competition. With the United States as the ostensible leader of open society and free markets, Russian citizens tend to associate their disappointment with their overseas counterpart. The United States becomes the source of any number of failures in Russian domestic economic and political affairs and foreign policy.

But one would be mistaken to attribute this isolationism entirely to the feelings of material deprivation among Russian citizens and their tendency to localize these deprivations' source abroad. In many respects, Russians' image of the West is itself a victim of their ideas on authority as the successively more distant and abstract chain of institutions, which affect their everyday life. This authority originates in the person of a boss, a local functionary, and terminates at the world government, mythic (world Zionism) or otherwise (EU, IMF, WTO, etc.). At that, a person practically lacks the possibility to influence any of these institutions.

As a result, the second component within the "we" and "they" system is identified by public opinion, not as other countries or nations, but as the national elite.

This process of identity formation divides the national community internally into groups based on social status rather than creating divisions exclusively along national lines—a means of identity formation that would at least define Russians vis-à-vis other nations and thereby promote national solidarity. Such a process further complicates the search for national solidarity and national identity, driving a wedge between the ruling group and the population as a whole.

In some cases, the Russian national elite (establishment) invoke public opinion to pay attention to the split between Russia and other countries. To a great extent, it helps the Russian ruling establishment to demonstrate integration with a major part of the population.

One form for accentuation is anti-Americanism, the Russian version of which has some specific features. First, it was developed primarily on the basis of either Soviet propaganda, which to a noticeable extent remained a persistent feature of secondary and higher education, or media reports. Second, it is situational; in certain conditions (Olympics, Yugoslavia, and Iraq events), its level noticeably increases, and in other cases (September 11, 2001), it can drastically decrease. Third, the Russian communicative elite noticeably overestimate the level of anti-Americanism among the population.

Thus, Russian anti-Americanism is mainly of an everyday character; ruling groups attach political character to it not only to affect American authorities, but also to achieve (at least short-term) national solidarity. Such an attitude of Russians toward the United States will remain until the Russian population turns to interpret its own political elite as a result of their own choices and activities.

NOTES

1. L. E. Keselman and M. G. Matskevich, "Individualnyi optimizm: pessimizm v sovremennoi rossiiskoi transformatsii," *Sotsiologicheskii Zhurnal*, nos. 1/2 (1998): 39–54.
2. A. S. Petrova, "Obidelis...," *Soobshcheniya FOM* March 7, 2002.
3. Lydia Saad, "Canada and Britain Is On The Top Americans' Country Ratings Once Again," <http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr020304.asp>.
4. The first group includes traditional friends and allies of America within the whole second half of the twentieth century (Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Japan, and Germany), toward which 80 to 90 percent of Americans had a favorable attitude.
5. B. Doktorov, and B. Zimmerman, "Bolee poloviny peterburzhtsev polagaet, chto Amerika ugrozhaet bezopasnosti Rossii," *Teleskop: nablyudeniya za povsednevnoi zhiznyu peterburzhtsev* no. 3(2002): 15–20.
6. "Itogi vizita Dzh. Busha v Rossiyu," *Soobshcheniya FOM*, June 6, 2002, <http://bd.fom.ru/report/map/d022212>.
7. One thousand St. Petersburg residents participated in the poll held by the Agency of Social Information.
8. A. Zdravomyslov, "Natsionalnoe samosoznanie rossiyan: Ekonomicheskie I sotsialnye peremeny. Monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniya," *Informatsionnyi byulleten* no. 2 (2002): 48–54.
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10. Yu. S. Arzhakova, "Obekty simpatii i identifikatsii starsheklassnikov: Revolyutsiya prityazanii i izmenenie zhiznennykh strategii molodezhi: 1985–1995 gg./M," *Izd-vo IS RAN* (1998): 91–96.

11. "Rossiya i SSHA." *Soobshcheniya FOM*, May 31, 2001, <http://www.usa.fom.ru>.
12. It is clear that assessment of justice has a sophisticated structure, but analysis of this structure is beyond the scope of the present article.
13. B. Dubin, "Zapad, granitsa, osobyi put: simbolika 'drugogo' v politicheskoi mifologii Rossii," *Neprikosnovennyi zapas* no. 3 (2001), <http://magazines.russ.ru/nz/2001/3/dub.html>.
15. In 1954, within one of the most obscure periods of the cold war, as per Gallup Organization data, 88 percent of Americans treated their cold war opponents critically, and only 5 percent favorably. It is clear that we lack quantitative indices of the Soviet people's attitude toward the United States as of half a century ago, but, most likely, it was not less critical toward the American state.
16. It is clear that relations between states, as institutions, and political elites impose on the perception of one country by citizens of another. But very often, actual international relations are exactly formed based on countries' public-mind perception of each other. The most well-known example is the "football war" between Honduras and El Salvador in 1971–73, when the result of the sport competition, multiplied by a riot, grew into both the reason and the actual mover of the war. The Russian-Turkish war of 1877–78 is a similar example from Russian history, as it started practically under pressure of Russia's public opinion.
17. L. Gudkov, "Chem my khuzhe?" *Neprikosnovennyi zapas* no. 2 (2002), <http://magazines.russ.ru/nz/2002/2/gudkov.html>.
18. L. Keselman and M. Matskevich, "Sotsialnoe prosyranstvo narkotizma," *SPb, Meditsinskaya pressa* (2001): 96–109.
19. K. Muzdybaev, *Psikhologiya otvetstvennosti*. L. 1983.
20. Molodezh samarskoi oblasti v 2000–2001 gg. Pod red. V. Zvonovskogo. Samara, (2002): 85–105.
21. M. Matskevich, "Lokalizatsiya otvetstvennosti i adaptatsiya k postsovetsskoi deistvitelnosti," *Teleskop: nablyudeniya za povsednevnoi zhiznyu peterburzhtsev* no. 3 (2001): 15–20.
22. FOM data from <http://www.fom.ru/reports/frames/d031623.html> and others. Very interesting is the set in "Vopreki ozhidaniyam rossiyan okazalos, chto Irak—ne Vietnam . . ." <http://www.fom.ru/virtual/frames/>.