Toward an Uncivil Society? Contextualizing the Decline of Post-Soviet Russian Parties of the Extreme Right Wing

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In this article I use some findings of research into non-Russian civil societies and ultranationalisms, as well as selected examples of nonparty Russian right-wing extremism, to illustrate that the relative decline in radically nationalist party politics toward the end of the 1990s should not be seen as an unequivocal indication that "antiliberal statism" has lost its appeal in Russia. I also attempt to show that the considerable diversification in the nongovernmental, not-for-profit sector of Russian society since the mid-1980s cannot be regarded as exclusively beneficial in terms of Russia's polyarchic consolidation and further democratization. Not only is a Russian "civic public" or "civic community" developing slowly, but some of the more significant pre- and post-Soviet groups, movements, and trends within the Russian voluntary sector are unsupportive or explicitly critical of liberal democracy. A number of major nonstate institutions and networks in Russian society contain ultranationalist, fundamentalist, and protofascist subsectors whose nature casts doubt on the use of the construct civil society to designate them. These organizations' or groupings' primary function is less or not at all to enhance people's inclination and ability to participate effectively in political activities that could promote further democratization. Instead, they provide a medium for the spread of radically particularistic world views, ascriptive notions about human nature, and illiberal and/or bellicose political ideas, as well as an organizational training ground for potential political activists holding such ideas.

The article is divided in two parts. In the first I argue the necessity of continuing attention to Russian right-wing extremist tendencies in general, and to such trends in civil society in particular, in spite of an apparent recent decline of extreme right-wing parties. I do so by referring to certain particulars of Russian politics today and some analogies from contemporary West European history. I

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specifically address the performance of the four major ultranationalist parties: LDPR—Liberal'no-demokraticheskaya partiya Rossii (Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia)—a misnamed ultranationalist, populist parliamentary party founded in 1990, led by Vladimir Zhirinovsky, and present in the State Duma since December 1993; RNE—Russkoe Natsional'noe Edinstvo (Russian National Unity)—a neo-Nazi, paramilitary, extraparliamentary party founded in 1991 by Alexander Barkashov that split into several groups in fall 2000; KPRF—Komunisticheskaya Partiya Rossiskoi Federatsii (Communist Party of the Russian Federation)—the major successor organization of the CPSU, founded in 1993 and led by Gennady Zyuganov, a major player in the State Duma since December 1993; and NBP—Natsional-Bol'shevistskaya Partiya (National-Bolshevik Party)—a radical, extraparliamentary neo- (but not mimetically) fascist party founded in 1993 as the National-Bolshevik Front by Eduard Limonov and Alexander Dugin (who later departed from the party).

The second part contains a short description of one particular sphere of Russia's emerging uncivil society—intellectual centers. In it I briefly introduce various think tanks, paying special attention to the network of publishing, educational, and other institutions created by Alexander Dugin. The article thus does not represent a comprehensive estimation of the current strength and reach of uncivil society in Russia. However, the sophistication, organizational capacity, and deep infiltration into mainstream social institutions of some of the groups chosen here as illustrative should be sufficient to indicate that, for the foreseeable future, right-wing extremist ideas will continue to play a role in Russian politics independently of the individual fates of such figures as Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Alexander Barkashov, or Eduard Limonov.

Civil Society’s Relevance for Right-Wing Extremism Studies

A multitude of factors have inhibited the emergence of a full-fledged post-Soviet party system in general, and the growth and rise of ultranationalist parties in particular, in Russia. Among the reasons for the latter is a notion often invoked by Russian observers that, supposedly, there is a peculiarly Russian antipathy against ultranationalist ideas. Whether that is an appropriate interpretation or not, the relatively poor performance of many individuals and parties of the extreme right wing in Russia's elections thus far should not be interpreted as indicating that the prospects of ultranationalist politics in Russia are principally negligible.

Some Peculiar Dilemmas of Russian Ultranationalist Politics in the 1990s

In considering the limited electoral success of right-wing extremist parties or politicians during the last decade in Russia, it is noteworthy that all four major political organizations that promoted various ultranationalist ideas and took part in elections—the LDPR, RNE, KPRF, and NBP—suffered from certain basic impasses rooted in their history or leadership.

First, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the dictatorial leader of the LDPR, has a Jewish father. Although Zhirinovsky cannot be regarded as being Jewish in any meaningful sense, and although he sees himself as being fully Russian, his family
background constituted a major predicament\textsuperscript{14} for his acceptance by many right-wing extremist politicians, intellectuals, activists, and voters.\textsuperscript{15} Some prominent figures in the extreme right, such as the former editor of the prestigious \textit{Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal} (Military-Historical Journal), Viktor Filatov, did not seem to regard Zhirinovsky’s ancestry as a problem and cooperated or still cooperates with him. However, it seems not too far-fetched to speculate that a majority of Russia’s ultranationalists would regard the idea of a Russian president with a Jewish father as undesirable.\textsuperscript{16}

Second, the party that came to occupy most of the outer fringe, the explicitly antisystemic counterculture, violence prone niche of the Russian party spectrum was the RNE.\textsuperscript{17} The party used some barely modified German Nazi symbols, such as the swastika and Roman salute, and ideas such as biological racism. I shall not go into the details of the various problems that an explicitly neo-Nazi profile such as the RNE’s would encounter everywhere in the world (including Germany) but did encounter in Russia.\textsuperscript{18} It may suffice to say that this particular characteristic predestined the RNE from its creation to political isolation and, arguably, eventual failure.\textsuperscript{19} When, in autumn 2000, the RNE finally fell apart, one of its major successor organizations, the all-Russian sociopolitical movement \textit{Russkoe Vozrozhdenie} (Russian Rebirth), abandoned the swastika as its emblem.\textsuperscript{20}

Third, the political profile of the KPRF—if indeed one regards its ideology as essentially right-wing and extremist\textsuperscript{21}—remains fundamentally compromised by ideological inconsistencies stemming from its original left-wing roots.\textsuperscript{22} This is in spite of the CPSU’s impregnation with cryptonationalist ideas as far back as Stalin’s day,\textsuperscript{23} and the sophistication of the KPRF’s gradual switch to an increasingly explicit ultranationalist discourse, represented by the ever more elaborate Russophile ideology developed in the numerous publications of its political leader and major ideologist, Gennady A. Zyuganov.\textsuperscript{24} Zyuganov’s bold, undisguised adoption of the ideas of prominent Russian and European right-wing thinkers, including, for instance, the émigré monarchist political theorist Ivan A. Il’in (1883–1954), has led him to move the KPRF in a more and more obviously non- and even implicitly anticommunist direction.\textsuperscript{25} However, the party has not repudiated its role as the main successor organization of the CPSU. It is thus seen by a number of leading right-wing spokesmen (few women are to be found in this spectrum), and presumably many nationalist voters, as being responsible for many of Russia’s misfortunes of the twentieth century. It is, correctly or not, perceived as not being a genuinely antiuniversalist party, and as one that, moreover, has an ideological heritage going back to the theories of a German Jew. At least, as long as the party keeps “Communist” in its name, it will remain vulnerable not only to liberal, but—what is more important—also nationalist critique referring to its Marxist roots and Soviet past.\textsuperscript{26}

A fourth, lesser known, but at least temporarily important ultranationalist group, which seemed to be on the rise in the late 1990s,\textsuperscript{27} is the National-Bolshevik Party. Like the RNE, this party belongs to the countercultural, expressly antisystemic current in Russian ultranationalism. Nevertheless, it must refrain from violating some basic strictures of the political sector that it aims to occupy
to achieve larger support. In other words, in spite of its distinctly novitistic profile, it too has to remain within some basic ideological fixed points of Russian right-wing extremist discourse to gain wider acceptance among nationalist voters. The NBP faced in this regard not only the dilemma that its eccentric leader, the novelist Eduard Limonov, had spent a large part of his earlier life in the West. Before becoming involved in politics, Limonov had described his sexual encounters with men in the United States in perhaps his most infamous novel, Eto ya—Edichka (It's me, Eddie).28 Alexander Solzhenitsyn illustrated the dominant view in mainstream Russian nationalist intellectual circles by referring to Limonov as "a little insect who writes pornography."29

These characteristics constituted profound contradictions in the public profile of the four ultranationalist parties introduced here. One should, therefore, be cautious about inferring from the relative electoral impotence of organized political ultranationalism in Russia in the 1990s a general lack of political prospects for extreme right-wing ideas.

Evaluating Declining Ultranationalist Parties: Some Lessons from German History

Not only was the Russian extreme right inhibited by the above intricacies from the outset. After reaching a certain peak in 1993–95, its political fortunes seem to have dwindled further in recent years. First, Zhirinovsky's electoral support decreased in the 1996 presidential elections (5.7 percent) and 1999 State Duma elections (6 percent) and, especially, in the 2000 presidential elections (2.7 percent—the lowest result he ever received in federal elections). Second, the nationalist Agrarian Party, which was prominent in post-Soviet Russia's first parliaments and received considerable support in the first multiparty parliamentary elections of 1993 (7.9 percent) has since become a second-rate political factor, at best. Third, the large difference between unpopular Boris Yeltsin's and little-known Vladimir Putin's outcomes, on the one side, and Zyuganov's results in the 1996 (second-round) and 2000 (first-round) presidential elections, on the other, has also been interpreted to signal the fading of a serious antiliberal alternative in Russia. Since, moreover, the KPRF has been relying heavily on elderly voters, a future decline of the party might be merely a matter of time30 (in spite of some surprising gains in opinion polls in 2001 and 2002).31 Fourth, the RNE split in autumn 2000 into several minor organizations.32 Last but not least, NBP leader Limonov has, by summer 2002, been in prison for illegal ownership of weapons for several months.33 Is right-wing extremism dead in Russia?34

A glance at the history of ultranationalist movements elsewhere would caution against a quick answer. For instance, modern German political anti-Semitism is marked by a fundamental discontinuity—one could say a paradox—in its history that might be suggestive. At the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, the young German party system experienced a significant change through the fall of most of its explicitly antisemitic components.35 Only a few years before, some seemingly vigorous ultranationalist parties, founded during the 1870s–80s, had been on the rise and, together with the
increasingly antisemitic Conservative Party, won a majority in the 1893 Reichstag elections. Also, a plethora of anti-Semitic literature had been circulating in Germany for more than two decades at that point. Yet, "[t]he electoral fortunes of the antisemitic parties, other than the Conservative Party, declined in the first decade of the twentieth century." Otto Kulka specifies that "the diminishing importance of the antisemitic parties towards the end of the nineteenth century . . . does not indicate a parallel decline underlying their critique of Judaism. Rather it suggests the penetration of this criticism into the ideologies of most of the large political parties at the end of the imperial age and during the Weimar era."

What is even more relevant for the present analysis is that the latter development was, in the words of Daniel Goldhagen, "true not only of political institutions but also of the Tocquevillian substructures of society, the associations that provided the staging ground for people’s political education and activity." Werner Jochmann even writes that "a wealth of examples shows how, in the [1890s, anti-Semitism infiltrated in this way into every last citizens’ association, penetrating folk clubs and cultural societies."

For those reasons, among others, Peter Pulzer warns that an emphasis on the overall meager direct political influence of the German anti-Semitic parties and their leaders until 1918 would miss the point: "Thirty years of incessant propaganda had been more effective than men thought at the time; antisemitism was no longer disgraceful in wide social and academic circles. . . Insofar as they had impregnated wide sections of the population with antisemitic ideas, the antisemitic parties had not only succeeded in their object but also worked themselves out of a job."

Goldhagen concludes that

the decline of the antisemitic parties was therefore not symptomatic of a decline in antisemitism, for these particular parties had already performed their historic role of moving antisemitism from the street and the beer hall’s Stammtisch into the electoral booth and the seat of parliament, into, in Max Weber’s formulation, the house of power. The antisemitic parties had rendered themselves moot. They could quietly disappear, leaving the political terrain to more potent successors who were fit for the next upsurge in antisemitic expression and activity.

It would clearly be misleading to draw far-reaching parallels between the type, salience, and radicalness of anti-Semitism in pre-Nazi German and post-Soviet Russian society. Nor would it be adequate to claim that exactly the same process of transfer of ultranationalist ideas from waning fringe parties to the political mainstream as well as to civil society sectors is taking place in Russia today. However, the example—and there were more such cases in prefascist Europe—illuminates that a deterioration of the electoral and organizational performance of right-wing extremist parties cannot in every case be seen as an unequivocal indication of a diminishing appeal of their ideas. It also indicates that attention to developments within civil society and not only politics may assist in drawing a fuller picture of the spread, nature, and virulence of antidemocratic ideas in a given country.
Civil Society's Role in Democratic Transition, Consolidation, and Breakdown

Not only can declining nationalist parties, in a certain context, create misleading impressions about a population's propensity to support antidemocratic politics, but in some recent research, there has also been serious questioning of the contribution of a strong civil society to the creation and fortification of polyarchies. Whereas a mainstream approach—sometimes called "neo-Toquevillian" and principally inspired by Robert Putnam's seminal study *Making Democracy Work*—assumes an important positive effect of civil society on democratization, some dissenting voices have argued that a strong civil society may have only limited relevance for certain attempts to establish polyarchies, or it may, in particular circumstances, even contribute to the breakdown of unconsolidated polyarchies. For instance, Omar G. Encarión showed in a recent paper that "Spain constructed a viable and very successful new democracy with a notable deficit in civil society development as reflected in the absence of the conditions most conducive to the production of social capital." Insofar as Spain constitutes "the paradigmatic case for the study of democratic transitions," and as it has been said that, for Eastern Europe, "the optimistic scenario is to retrace the path of Spain," this finding, if correct, should have significant consequences for our understanding of how polyarchies emerge.

Even more relevant for the present context is that another paradigmatic case for the comparative study of regime change, namely, the fall of the German Weimar Republic in 1930-34, is marked by the presence and active involvement of an exceptionally varied and thriving voluntary sector, by both historical and comparative standards. As Sheri Berman has noted,

"[In contrast to what neo-Toquevillian theories would predict, high levels of associationism, absent strong and responsive national government and political parties, served to fragment rather than unite German society. . . . Weimar's rich associative life provided critical training ground for eventual Nazi cadres and a base from which the National Socialist Workers' Party (NSDAP) could launch its *Machtgreifung* (seizure of power). Had German civil society been weaker, the Nazis would never have been able to capture so many citizens for their cause or eviscerate their opponents so swiftly. . . . [T]he NSDAP rose to power, not by attracting alienated, apolitical Germans, but rather by recruiting highly activist individuals and then exploiting their skills and associational affiliations to expand the party's appeal and consolidate its position as the largest political force in Germany."

The peculiarity of German social associations of this time was that, instead of indicating deep democratic inclinations on the part of the German population, Berman contends that they grew during periods of strain. When national political institutions and structures proved either unwilling or unable to address their citizens' needs, many Germans turned away from them and found succor and support in the institutions of civil society instead. . . . This growth of associations during these years did not signal a growth in liberal values or democratic political structures; instead, it reflected and furthered the fragmentation of German political life and the delegitimization of national political institutions.
A somewhat similar argument has been made for the case of Northern Italy, where the post–World War I Fascist movement emerged from a relatively well-developed network of civil society institutions (thus calling into question Putnam’s famous thesis). These findings seem to indicate that the role that civil society plays in a regime change is conditioned by the concrete political circumstances, such as the strength of political institutions, and the nature and legitimacy of the existing political regime. Berman concludes that “[p]erhaps, therefore, associationism should be considered a politically neutral multiplier—neither inherently good nor inherently bad, but rather dependent for its effects on the wider political context.”

A partial solution to the dilemma of the simultaneously democratization-furthering and -inhibiting role that civil society may play can be found in analyses that tried to distinguish between different types of nonstate/not-for-profit institutions—namely between those that have democratic and antidemocratic inclinations. For instance, the most prominent of the rapidly growing organizations within the voluntary sector of the Weimar Republic were the various nationalist associations that became popular after World War I. These nationalist associations are best viewed as “symptoms and agencies of change. They were formed as distinctive organizations within a space which the difficulties and obsolescence of an older mode of dominant-class politics had opened up.” Nonparty institutions such as the nationalist associations were peculiar in that they came to substitute for political parties—a pattern that, since World War II, has again become relevant in Germany and other countries. They should also be seen not as representing manifestations of civil society proper, but as constituting “uncivil groups,” or “uncivil movements.”

This issue has been specifically addressed in a recent paper by Ami Pedahzur and Leonard Weinberg, who proposed to introduce the previously known, but hitherto insufficiently elaborated concept of uncivil society in the comparative study of right-wing extremism. Pedahzur and Weinberg observe that, since the early 1970s, nonparty forms of linkages between state and society have become more prominent in general. They argue that not only has civil society proper thus gained importance, but nonparty challengers of democracy, or various permutations of uncivil society, have also become more relevant in established democracies, whether as substitutes for, or as complementary players of, strong right-wing extremist parties.

Electoral versus Other Activities of the Western Extreme Right Today

Even before those theoretical arguments were made, empirical research on recent developments in German and other Western ultranationalisms called for attention to the nonparty realm. Unlike Herbert Kitschelt, who focused his path-breaking book on the “New Radical Right” in Western Europe of the 1970s–90s, mainly on political parties, Michael Minkenberg, in his comparative study of right-wing radicalism in post-1968 Germany, France, and the United States, for instance, considers a wide variety of groups within uncivil society apart from parties. These include intellectual circles, subcultural milieus, religious organizations, youth gangs, publishing houses, and other institutions. Minkenberg’s attention to
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these phenomena is useful in that it provides the basis for a more adequate assessment of the penetration of right-wing radical ideas into society—especially with regard to countries that have not experienced the impressive surges of radically right-wing parties that Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs), Italy (Alleanza Nazionale), and France (Front national) have known.

Minkenberg also addresses, more adequately than Kitschelt, the fact that activists espousing such ideas have been using different strategies to promote their views depending on the sociopolitical context, cultural traditions, and legal-institutional setting in which they operate. Minkenberg, for instance, notes that, in the United States, certain xenophobic and fundamentalist groups have, instead of forming their own parties, used Republican front organizations to penetrate the state via the GOP. In Germany, a “New Right” discourse on national history and identity has become influential in public debates. Instead of engaging in party-building, this section of the German radical right has had considerable success in affecting German political culture in general and the agendas of the moderate right-wing parties in particular. The “New Right” has done so, moreover, quite consciously by adopting the well-known Gramscian notion of the necessity for an ideological group to achieve “cultural hegemony” in a society as a means to acquire political power. On the territory of the former German Democratic Republic, too, to the surprise of many observers, right-wing radical parties have, with only few exceptions, not fared well in elections so far. Yet East German ultranationalism has become disturbingly strong on the grassroots and subcultural levels, especially among youth.

The Groupuscule

An important subsector of postwar uncivil society—namely, the multitude of minuscule and relatively closed ultranationalist and often Fascist groupings across the world—has recently been conceptualized in a novel and, it appears, heuristically fruitful way by Roger Griffin as “groupuscules.” Distancing himself from approaches that have dismissed this spectrum of small extremist groups as hardly worth studying, Griffin argues that there is a certain subcategory of minor ultranationalist groupings that should, in spite of their small size, be taken seriously as objects of study. This class would include such organizations as the Groupe Union Défense, White Aryan Resistance, or European Liberation Front. These “groupuscules,” after unsuccessful performance in electoral contests, have either left high politics but continued to thrive as parochial associations, or never conceived to become full-fledged parties, having continued to serve mainly small circles of members and supporters. Although some of the groupuscules call themselves “parties,” they should be conceptualized as belonging, at best, to a diminished subtype of the generic political party.

[T]he term “groupuscule” is being used . . . to refer to a political organization which by the standards of national party politics has minute active membership, and may have an extremely low or non-existent public profile, yet is a fully ripened fruit within its own ideological vine-yard. . . . Its diminutive size, marginality, and relative inconspicuousness bestow on it qualities which suit the purposes of its organizers.


It is thus not useful to consider groupuscules solely as the remnants of abortive attempts at party-building. Instead, they should be regarded either as a peculiar subsector of uncivil society or as hybrid phenomena fluctuating between political and civil society—the latter, shifting pattern being typical of a number of voluntary sector organizations in modern societies in general.

The form of the groupuscule has been chosen by many extreme right-wing activists in the West, as they had to adapt to an increasingly depoliticized and “denationalized” public in the post–World War II context. The groupuscules thus largely define themselves by their “renunciation of any aspirations to create a mass membership base, appeal to a wide political constituency in the general public, or to enter into alliances or compromises with other political actors in the pursuit of maximum influence.” Instead, groupuscules have taken the form of cadre organizations run by small elites of activists, which keep alive the prospect of having an impact on society by remaining open to linkages with kindred spirits on the extreme right and publicizing its existence through effective propaganda directed at the chosen few. [The Internet, moreover] allows the creation of a “virtual community”... cocooning its members against contacts with the outside world. . . . Each groupuscule, no matter how small, [can] act as a nodal point in a vast, constantly evolving network of extremist organizations of far greater significance than the sum of its parts: the groupuscular right. . . . Perhaps the most important aspect of the groupuscular right for political science lies [thus] in the structure it has come to adopt in order to act not as a single corporate body, but as a network of ideological formation and activist coordination made up of self-contained grouplets. . . . Cumulatively these “groupuscules” can be conceived as constituting a new type of political subculture or actor, the “groupuscular right,” which has an aggregate substance, influence, and longevity disproportionate to the size, impact, and stability of any of its components.

The importance of the individual groupuscule stems not only from being embedded in a larger network of similar components, but also—resembling the function of many other civil society organizations—from its potential as a training ground and educational institution for future political activists. The groupuscule can have a formative impact on the careers of particular individuals in search of grand narratives and total truth by playing a crucial role in transforming ill-defined resentments into a personal sense of higher mission to “do something about it.” In extreme cases the groupuscule has made decisive contributions to turning a disaffected loner into a fanatical “lone wolf” ready to carry out ruthless acts of terrorism at symbols of society’s decadence whatever the cost in human life, as Timothy McVeigh and David Copeland dramatically illustrate.

For the case of Russia, this category of groupings within the ultranationalist spectrum has clearly been relevant, as will be illustrated in a forthcoming article by Markus Mathyl in Patterns of Prejudice. It seems recently to have gained further importance when a new Law on Parties was adopted. The law requires that political parties that wish to register as such with the Justice Ministry have to document, apart from other things, significant organizational capacity across Russia, such as an overall membership of at least ten thousand, and one hundred or more members in each of Russia’s eighty-nine regions. As official registra-
tion is indispensable for parties to take part in high politics, especially elections, the high threshold for registration that the new Law on Parties creates has pushed dozens of political organizations that explicitly regarded themselves as power-seeking organizations into the nonelectoral realm, where most of those that continue to exist as organized groups will, in the foreseeable future, presumably, remain locked. Adopting a back-stage/groupuscular, rather than front-stage/electoral, strategy may constitute a pragmatic option for many extremist organizations if they want to continue to have at least a minor impact in Russia today. Above all, it might be a way to survive organizationally and remain prepared for situations that would allow them to re-enter high politics.

Griffin's concluding remark in his first publication on this issue concerns the Western context but is at least equally relevant for Russia. The groupuscular right "is a political force which guarantees that if conditions of profound socio-economic crisis were ever to emerge again in the West's democratic heartland to make mass support for revolutionary nationalism a realistic possibility, then many countries would have not only the dedicated cadres prepared to lead it, but a plentiful reserve of ideological resources to fuel it."

Further Manifestations of Uncivil Society in Contemporary Russia

There are a number of other phenomena in Russian uncivil society that would be worth considering in connection with the argument of this paper. They include the following, among others:

- the infiltration of established civil society institutions, such as the trade union movement, with antidemocratic ideas of various kinds
- the emergence of a number of new volunteer, grassroots, and self-help organizations, such as various ecological groups, antidrug initiatives, or child-support organizations that, in spite of owing their existence to liberal democracy, do not promote, or even explicitly reject, its normative foundations
- certain tendencies in the Russian Christian-Orthodox churches, especially within the Moscow Patriarchy
- many of the new or revived Russian Orthodox brotherhoods
- the ultranationalist sections of the neopagan movement
- a large part of the Cossack movement (containing some primary examples of "uncivil movements" in Russia)
- the ultranationalist hard-rock and punk scene
- the fast-growing skinhead movement
- the multitude of ultranationalist Web sites
- a number of organizations calling themselves "parties" that should, however, be conceptualized as hybrids between proper political parties, on the one side, and groupuscules on the other, including, perhaps, the RNE and NBP, and that thus fulfill both functions in this political spectrum (with the groupuscular one often being the more or even only important aspect of their activities), as well as some further groupings constituting proper groupuscules (as defined above) that do not fall into any of the other categories listed here
• ultranationalist tendencies in visual arts\textsuperscript{95}
• the enormously important nationalist literary scene, under both the czarist and Soviet rule, with its well-known “thick journals”\textsuperscript{96}

I largely ignore these certainly significant phenomena here not only for lack of space, but also because they have been subject to at least some scholarly scrutiny before. In a number of cases, considerable research has already been done on the phenomena. That seems to be less the case with regard to the intellectual centers in general and their institution-building, networking, and propaganda efforts in particular. The concise summary of some activities in the latter realm below is meant to complement previous content analyses and interpretations of the publications of these think tanks and to suggest stronger attention in future research to what industrious, successful, and influential organizations these centers actually are, and not only what their ideas are about.

**Ultranationalist Intellectual Centers in Contemporary Russia**

Below, I survey briefly the sphere of Russia’s uncivil society represented by its think tanks (in Russian, mozgovye tsentry, “brain-centers”) and theoretical circles, and their propaganda, publishing, and educational activities.

**Sergei Kurginyan’s Experimental-Creative Center**

There have been several networks of nationalist intellectuals in postwar Soviet Russia within the dissident scene and, more important, around the semiofficial “thick-journals.”\textsuperscript{97} Some articles and books published in those frameworks gained relevance for the formulation of the programs of the newly emerging nationalist parties in Russia in the late 1980s and early 1990s and even became more broadly spread seminal texts in general political discourse.\textsuperscript{98} However, eventually many writings of these publicists and novelists became outdated when the Russian political system and society transmuted ever more deeply. Although most of the important Soviet-era “thick journals” keep appearing, some new initiatives, often by previously unknown intellectuals, have gained prominence since 1990. Among those more recent institutions are the following:

• Alexander Podberezkin’s Center for International and Strategic Research, publishing company RAU-korporatsiya (Russian-American University Corporation), and foundation/movement Dukhovnoe nasledie (Spiritual Heritage; perhaps, the most important set of institutions in this list)\textsuperscript{99}
• Yevgeny Troitsky’s Association for the Complex Study of the Russian Nation
• Sergei Shatokhin’s and Yevgeny Morozov’s International Institute of Geopolitics
• the Moscow Historical-Politological Center, attached to the ultranationalist party Russkii obshchenatsional’nyi soyu (Russian All-National Union)\textsuperscript{100}
• General Major Konstantin Petrov’s popular movement K bogoderzhaviyu (Toward God’s Rule)\textsuperscript{101}
• Igor Démin’s orthodox-monarchic analytical center Al’fa & Omega

• Oleg Bakhtiyarov’s center Perspektivnye issledovaniya i razrabotki PIR (Future-Oriented Analyses and Projects)

Besides their relative novelty, these centers are distinct for being underresearched so far—an omission that, especially with regard to Podberezkin’s influential foundation/movement Dukhovnoe nasledie and productive publishing house RAU-Korporatsiya, is unfortunate.

Among the first of the new intellectual centers that did attract some attention from Western scholars was the so-called international foundation Eksperimental’nyi tvorcheski tsentr (Experimental-Creative Center, or ETT), established in February 1989 by the USSR Council of Ministers. The ETT was headed by the mathematician, former research fellow of the Moscow Geological Institute, certified theater director, one-time advisor to CPSU Moscow organization head Yuri Prokof’ev, and 1990 Patriotic Bloc elections candidate Sergei Ervandovich Kurginyan (b. 1949). In 1989–91, the center represented “the most serious attempt to revise official ideology into a nationalist creed.” Russian journalists described the ETT as “the think tank of the [ultraconservative] deputy group ‘Soyuz’” of the USSR’s Congress of People’s Deputies and Kurginyan as the “mysterious advisor for the Kremlin leaders,” as well as “the last mystical hope of the neo-Bolsheviks, savior of the CPSU, [and] theoretician of communism as a new religion.” As John Dunlop has observed,

Kurginyan has been assailed by Russian “democrats” as “a political shaman,” “a charlatan,” and “the new Rasputin.” Yet despite such often-expressed contempt for Kurginyan, the “democrats” could scarcely deny the extraordinary influence that he exerted on Russian and Soviet politics during the period from 1989 through 1991. Among those he reportedly counseled were the Soviet president Gorbachev, two Soviet prime ministers—Nikolai Ryzhkov and Valentin Pavlov—Ivan Polozkov, head of the Russian Communist party, and Vladimir Kryuchkov, chairman of the KGB.

In October 1990 and February 1991, the Ryzhkov and Pavlov governments, respectively, issued decrees granting ETT international status and broad prerogatives at home and directed the USSR Ministries of Defense and Internal Affairs and the KGB to assign to the center high-ranking officers from their active reserve. In 1991, the think tank had, according to one source, a yearly budget of approximately 70 million rubles and about two thousand employees who included (apart from up to one hundred political analysts) “mainly programmers, physicists, biologists, and constructors.”

The center apparently reached the peak of its political influence in the late summer and fall of 1990 in connection with discussion among the Soviet leadership of Grigory Yavlinsky’s and Stanislav Shatalin’s “five hundred days” plan of transition to a market economy. According to John Dunlop, in August-September 1990 Kurginyan’s center advised Prime Minister Ryzhkov in his resistance against the adoption and implementation of the “five hundred days” plan. At a brainstorming session of the USSR Council of Ministers, Kurginyan described the authors of the plan as acting as “agents of imperialism.” In late 1990, ETT
presented its own vision for the Soviet Union’s postcommunist future, which was tellingly titled “Post-perestroika.”

Subsequently, ETT developed geopolitical models, reform programs, and schemes for the fight against increasing crime. Among other things, it published a draft proposal for a new CPSU platform in July 1991 and contributed to the economics section of the platform of the ultranationalist National-Republican Party of Russia, of Nikolay Lysenko. Later, Kurginyan created special appendixes for the spread of ETT’s ideas: in 1992, the inter-regional club Postperestroika and, in 1994, the elite club Soderzhatel’noe edinstvo (Substantive Unity), which included among its more than a hundred members former Constitutional Court chairman Valery Zorkin, former CPSU politburo member Oleg Shenin, former KGB chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov, and former USSR prime minister Nikolay Ryzhkov. Since 1993, Kurginyan’s ETT has published, in addition to other things, the highbrow journal Rossiya XXI (Russia in the Twenty-First Century), with contributions from a variety of mainly nationalist authors, including the prominent publicist Ksenya Myalo.

The basic idea of Kurginyan’s grouping in the early 1990s seemed to be that the world is divided into individualistic and collectivistic civilizations, with Russia belonging to the latter type. The Communist Party would need to ally itself with the Orthodox Church, recentralize the state, lead the country on a developmental path modeled on the Japanese or Chinese examples, create a “religion of science,” and reject the introduction of Western institutions, which would have led to the USSR’s enserfment to Western economies. Kurginyan wanted, as he announced in 1991, to make his contribution to this process by “creating an alternative national elite.” Some peculiarities worth noting in Kurginyan’s approach have been his gloomy warnings about the possibility of Russia’s becoming a Fascist state, his radical critique of Dugin (see below), and his negative attitude toward Germany, a country that, at least in the 1990s, was seen as the preferred partner for Russia by most Russian nationalists, whether moderate or extreme.

At the beginning of the 1990s, Kurginyan’s center constituted the most significant, clearly nationalist think tank and publishing house (along with the older “think journals”). However, although Kurginyan still occasionally appears in the media, ETT has since then seemingly lost most of its impact on the Russian elite.

The Dugin Phenomenon

A more steadily influential institution on the far-right fringe throughout the 1990s was the Analytical Center of the most important post-Soviet ultranationalist weekly Den’ (The Day), which was founded in November 1990 and later renamed Zavtra (Tomorrow). The newspaper also calls itself an “organ of the spiritual opposition.” Since its creation it has been edited by the well-known journalist and novelist and one-time rocketry engineer, forester, Asia-Africa correspondent of the highbrow weekly Literaturnaya gazeta, and secretary of the RSFSR Writer’s Union Alexander Andreevich Prokhanov (b. 1938). Prokhanov is perhaps the ideologist of the Russian extreme right who has, so far, attracted the most Western attention. For his previous glorification of the Soviet Afghanistan adventure
and general militarism Prokhanov was labeled, among other things, the “nightingale of the [Army] General Staff.” Igor Klyamkin noted as early as mid-1988 his growing political influence.

Prokhanov’s core ideas are summarized in his programmatic essay “The Ideology of Survival,” published in 1990. The essay is paradigmatic for the discourse of the whole Russian extreme right in that it shows in an exemplary way the ambivalent relationship of the ultranationalists to Russia’s Soviet past. On the one hand, original Bolshevism (in some instances including Lenin) is rejected and often equated with the post-Soviet democrats (frequently portrayed as “criminals”). On the other hand, the “achievements” (sometimes including the purges) of Stalin, who, despite being Georgian, is seen as a Russian national hero rather than yet another Bolshevik, are greatly appreciated.

With the gradual breakup of the Soviet Union in 1990–91, Prokhanov’s major focus of activity switched from writing to being an editor and organizer for the extreme right. That process led to the regular publication of his weekly Den’ from January 1991 and the gathering of a distinguished circle of ultranationalist analysts as the newspaper’s regular contributors. Among the Analytical Center’s aims were and are to introduce to nationalist intellectuals via Den’/Zavtra new trends in Russian and foreign right-wing thought and to analyze the current power structures as well as to provide interpretations of their activities from a “patriotic” point of view. Prokhanov’s aim, in particular, is to use Den’/Zavtra to bring about the coordination and unification of the various brands of Russian ultranationalism. The weekly has included, at one point or another, most major Russian opposition figures of the 1990s (with the notable exceptions of Zhirinovsky, Barkashov, and Limonov) on its editorial board, including the above-mentioned Dugin and Zyuganov. Prokhanov has been a driving force behind various broad alliances of and ideological innovations (including the spread of Eurasianism) in the Russian extreme right. Having devoted most of his energies to editorial and organizational work for the extreme right during the 1990s, Prokhanov, in 2001, made himself again widely known as a notable ultranationalist writer in his own right. He published, under the imprint of the respected Moscow press Ad Marginem, a best-selling political novel called Gospodin Geksogen (Mr. Hexogen) fictionalizing the 1999 apartment-block bombings in Moscow and other cities. In May 2002, the notorious book won him the prestigious 2001 National Bestseller Prize. Prokhanov promptly donated the $10,000 prize money to the defense of NBP leader Eduard Limonov, who was then awaiting his trial on charges of illegal arms ownership and attempting to overthrow the constitutional order.

One of Den’/Zavtra’s Analytical Center’s initially most prolific contributors, erudite theorists, and industrious publicists has been the previously mentioned mysticist Alexander Gel’evich Dugin (b. 1962). In Alexander Yanov’s words, “[H]aving nearly monopolized the central periodical of the opposition, Den’, Dugin was [in mid-1992] halfway to elbowing Kurginyan out of the opposition’s intellectual leadership.” In spite of Dugin’s early 1990s successes as a publicist within the far right, the study of his ideas has until recently been the exclu-
sive domain of students of Russian subcultures, lunatic fringe politics, and occultism with a taste for the bizarre. However, the establishment in 2001 of the sociopolitical movement Eurasia (see below) under Dugin's leadership represents merely the latest link in a chain of consequential initiatives by him throughout the 1990s. Perhaps counterintuitively to many observers of Russia, the content, spread, and reception of Dugin's quixotic ideas are becoming relevant for an adequate assessment of mainstream Russian political, social, and cultural trends, too.

Several researchers have examined Dugin's writings. Although Dugin has, especially recently, tried to present his agenda as a variety of or even as mainstream "Eurasianism" or "neo-Eurasianism" and "geopolitics," his ideas not only constitute radicalized permutations of those schools of thought, but owe, in fact, much more to the German interwar "Conservative Revolution" and other international sources of mystical, occult, protofascist, and conspiriological thought, including, for instance, works of Hermann Wirth, Julius Evola, Jean Parvulesco, and Aleister Crowley. He thus writes not merely about certain contradictions between Western civilization and Russia, as, for instance, Kurginyan does. Instead, he draws the picture of an ancient conflict between Atlanticist sea powers ("thallocracies"), going back to the sunken world of Atlantis and now headed by the "mondistalist" United States, on the one side, and the Eurasian land powers ("tellurocracies"), originating with the mythic country of "Hyperborea" and now headed by Russia, on the other. According to Dugin, the secret orders of those two antagonistic civilizations have been engaged in an age-old mortal struggle that is now entering its final stage. This demands Russian national rebirth via a "conservative," permanent revolution informed by the ideology of "national Bolshevism" and an exclusively "geopolitical" approach to international relations. That would create a "New Socialism" and imply territorial expansion as well as the formation of a Eurasian bloc of fundamentalist land powers (including a traditionalist Israel!) against intrusive, individualist Anglo-Saxon imperialism.

Such ideas notwithstanding, one cannot dismiss Dugin as not constituting a relevant political phenomenon. Early on in his career, the future post-Soviet ideologist was already exceptional in that he sought contacts with leading Western right-wing extremist intellectuals. During a visit to Western Europe in 1989, for instance, he met a number of well-known ultranationalist European publicists, including Alain de Benoist, Jean-François Thiriart, and Claudio Mutti. Later, those men, together with other, similarly oriented theorists, visited Dugin in Moscow and participated to one degree or another in his various projects.

In many regards, in the early 1990s, Dugin's activities resembled those of the above listed intellectuals and some others: He was building up his own research and publication center and trying to propagate his ideas among ultranationalist political organizations and among potential supporters in such spheres as youth groups, the military, secret services, and academia. The two principal institutions that Dugin founded in 1990–91, and that later continued to be his main instruments for spreading his views, were the historical-religious association
Arktogeya (Northern Country, which also functions as a publishing house)\textsuperscript{145} and the Center for Special Meta-Strategic Studies, a think tank. Numerous institutions such as these sprang up in Russia in the early 1990s; many of them have since vanished.

Dugin's various publications, however,\textsuperscript{146} especially his new journal \textit{Elementy: Evraziiskoe obozrenie} (Elements: Eurasian Review; nine issues published in 1992–98)\textsuperscript{147} and some other periodicals,\textsuperscript{148} were more original and widely read in nationalist circles than the drier works of other publicists such as Kurginyan (not least because of the frequent contributions by or references to inter- and postwar Western authors).\textsuperscript{149} Dugin's approach was, as Markus Mathyl has pointed out,\textsuperscript{150} also exceptional in that his circle quickly managed to establish ties with the countercultural youth scene, among them popular nationalist rock and punk musicians such as Egor Letov, Sergei Troitsky, Roman Neumoev, or the late Sergei Kurekhin.\textsuperscript{151} In recent years, moreover, the Dugin circle has become exceptional in that it has created a sophisticated, interconnected set of Web sites\textsuperscript{152} that offer most of the circle's publications, above all Dugin's books, in electronic form.\textsuperscript{153}

In the mid-1990s, Dugin seems to have followed a dual strategy of, on the one side, affiliating himself to, and trying to impregnate with his ideas, the most radical antisystemic segments in Russia's emerging uncivil society, and on the other side, entering Moscow's political establishment and gaining a wider readership. Thus in 1993–98, Dugin, somewhat paradoxically, was a cofounder, leader, and major ideologist of Eduard Limonov's expressly revolutionary National-Bolshevik Party\textsuperscript{154} while at the same time appearing on national radio and TV,\textsuperscript{155} publishing in the highbrow liberal newspaper \textit{Nezavisimaya gazeta},\textsuperscript{156} and reading lectures on philosophy, world history, and international relations ("geopolitics") at, among other institutions, the Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

The contradiction in Dugin's simultaneously groupuscular\textsuperscript{157} and Gramscian strategy\textsuperscript{158} was resolved in 1998 when Dugin and a group of his supporters left the NBP and established themselves first as an advisory group to and later as an analytical division of no less an institution than the office of the Speaker of the Russian State Duma, Gennady I. Seleznev.\textsuperscript{159} A year before, in 1997, Dugin had published the first edition of his perhaps most influential work, \textit{The Foundations of Geopolitics},\textsuperscript{160} which quickly sold out, acquired the status of a seminal study, and became a textbook at various Russian higher education institutions. The book earned him not only wide attention in the nationalist section of Russia's elite but perhaps the sympathy of Seleznev. By 2000, the work had gone through four editions (all of which were apparently snapped up quickly)\textsuperscript{161} and become a major political pamphlet with a wide readership in academic and political circles.\textsuperscript{162} Probably in connection with those trends, Dugin's presence in mainstream Russian media and conferences has increased dramatically since 1998. In September 1998, Dugin launched an apparently abortive attempt to establish his own "New University."\textsuperscript{163}

Dugin's most important project, bringing him even broader attention in the
press, was the foundation of the so-called sociopolitical movement “Eurasia” in spring 2001. Dugin’s earlier affiliations with the General Staff Academy and office of the Speaker of the State Duma may have been seen as merely temporary, if not accidental, phenomena. With the foundation of Eurasia, the Dugin phenomenon has arguably made a qualitative leap from the footnotes to the major plot of post-Soviet Russian history. What might be most significant about Eurasia is not that its foundation was evidently supported by the Presidential Administration (i.e., it is probably a project advanced by the Kremlin’s notorious “political technologist” Gleb Pavlovsky) or that it claimed more than fifty regional organizations and about two thousand activists at its first congress in April 2001. One may not even regard the presence of such high religious figures as Talgat Tadzhuddin, the chief mufti of the Russian Muslim Spiritual Directorate, and other representatives of Christian-Orthodox, Jewish, and Buddhist religious organizations in the movement’s Central and Political Councils as its most significant characteristic (as they may have been told by the Kremlin to join Dugin’s organization or may regard Eurasia mainly as an instrument to further their social careers and not as an organization fully expressing their world views and political aspirations).

What to me appears as the most momentous feature of Eurasia’s founding congress on 21 April 2001 was the presence of a prominent Russian political theorist, Alexander Panarin (b. 1940), and a well-known TV journalist of Russia’s first (and most far-reaching) channel ORT, Mikhail Leontev (b. 1958), who even became a member of the movement’s Central Council. Professor Panarin is the chair of political science in the Department of Philosophy of Moscow State University. He thus holds one of the most important posts in the Russian social sciences community. Panarin, moreover, recently won the prestigious Solzhenitsyn prize. Leontev, by one source called “the president’s [Putin’s] favorite journalist,” is the infamous founder, editor-in-chief, and major anchorman of the acerbic daily prime-time political show Odnako (However).

Presumably, for neither of those two well-established figures in Russian society is an affiliation with an organization such as Eurasia a necessity in terms of their respective careers in academia or journalism. Instead, it seems that they may have been genuinely attracted to Dugin and his ideas. With such prominent personalities and commentators at Dugin’s side, one can infer that Dugin has made considerable inroads in mainstream Russian politics, elite thinking, and society as a whole. It is especially dismaying that a scholar such as Panarin would, by writing for and appearing at the founding congress of Eurasia, seemingly acknowledge the intellectual leadership of Dugin (who only recently was awarded a Candidate of Science degree by Rostov State University). It is to be expected that Dugin’s approval by Panarin will further boost the status of Arktogeya’s numerous extremely anti-Western publications and promote their use by educational institutions, above all, universities.

Although it is too early to speak of a principal contamination of Russian civil society resembling that of the German voluntary sector during the Weimar Republic, the example of Dugin’s ascent shows that political liberalism and ethical uni-
universalism seem to be in retreat in Russia. Although Dugin is by no means yet a widely known figure among ordinary Russians, he has become a major actor in what Thomas Metzger calls "the ideological marketplace," the flow of information and ideas, including those that evaluate and critique the state. It includes not only independent mass media but the broader field of autonomous cultural and intellectual activity: universities, think tanks, publishing houses, theaters, films, and artistic performances and networks.172

Inspired by Gramscian theory, the West European "New Right," above all the French Nouvelle Droite and German Neue Rechte, has by now been trying for almost three decades, with only limited success, to erode liberalism's hegemony in mainstream Western political thinking. In contrast, the Russian Novaya pravaya, including Dugin, Panarin, and some other publicists, may currently be well on the way to reorienting a substantial section of post-Soviet Russia's inexperienced social, cultural, and political elites toward a new anti-Western utopia.

NOTES

A grant from the Fritz Thyssen Foundation, Cologne, Germany, made this research possible. The author is grateful to Roger D. Griffin, Michael Minkenberg, Michael Hagemeister, Robert L. Paarlberg, Cas Mudde, an anonymous reviewer, and, especially Robert C. Otto for their comments on sections of this article. Mistakes are, however, the sole responsibility of the author. An earlier version of this article appeared in the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs Working Paper Series (No. 02-03). Amanda Pearson and Nadine Gerstler-Lopes are acknowledged for their kind and effective editorial assistance.

1. This is the (arguably improvable) concept that is used in the pioneering article by Stephen E. Hanson and Jeffrey S. Kopstein, "The Weimar/Russia Comparison," Post-Soviet Affairs 13, no. 3 (1997): 252–83.

2. For the early period, see Anne White, Democratization in Russia under Gorbachev, 1985–91: The Birth of a Voluntary Sector (New York: St. Martin’s, 1999). "Today the number of public organizations registered with the Russian Justice Ministry is approximately 300,000 of which, according to estimations by experts, circa 75,000 are active." Elke Fein, "Zivilgesellschaftlicher Paradigmenwechsel oder PR-Aktion? Zum ersten allrussischen ‘Bürgerforum’ im Kreml," Osteuropa 52, no. 2 (2002): 158–79, at 160.

3. My taxonomy here draws on the conceptualization, proposed by Robert A. Dahl, of democracy as constituting not only an ideal-typical notion, but an ultimately utopian project. Dahl, in my understanding, applies the term "polyarchy" to those regimes that, even if by necessity representing only incomplete implementations of the democratic ideal, are fundamentally inspired by it. Democratization is, within this terminological scheme, seen as a continuous, potentially infinite process. Cf. Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971). A democratization break-through that marks a qualitative change from a non-polyarchic to a polyarchic regime might then have to be labeled "polyarchization." From the above use of the labels follows that I regard Russia as having already made this qualitative change—a view, to be sure, that many observers would regard as debatable.

4. Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Towards Consolidation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 221.


6. For lucid definitions of fascism, and its proper and diminished subtypes, such as protofascism, see Roger D. Griffin, The Nature of Fascism, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 1993).


9. By classifying all four of these parties as “extremely right-wing,” I by no means imply that there are not important differences between them with regard to their organizational structures as well as their agendas. The concept “extreme right,” as I use it here, comprises carriers of such divergent ideologies as fundamentalism, ultraconservatism, and fascism. In addition, the KPRF is not only a far larger, but also a less homogeneous political organization than the other three parties (which also have different factions though). Notwithstanding, “extremely right-wing”—though being too strong or even wrong for some minor trends within the KPRF—would seem to be one of the less inappropriate generic concepts suggested to capture Zyuganov’s political ideas. On the various ideological camps in Russia’s “communist” movement, see Joan Barth Urban and Valery Solovei, Russia’s Communists at the Crossroads (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997).


13. Although this had been common knowledge in the Russian public since the early 1990s, it is significant that Zhirinovsky recently admitted the fact in public. See Washington Post, 18 July 2001, 5. I am grateful to Professor Marshall I. Goldman for bringing this to my attention.


15. The negative PR effect of Zhirinovsky’s antics has often been overrated by West-
ern and Russian observers, according to whom he should have disappeared from politics long ago. Zhirinovsky has consciously been playing the role of the traditional Russian yurodiv (a clown expressing folk wisdom) and has explicitly defended his theatrical style as necessary to keep people's attention. See Martin A. Lee, *The Beast Reawakens* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1997), 323–25.


25. An interpretation that, in contrast, emphasizes the coherence of Zyuganov's agenda as important for his success in party-building is Stephen E. Hanson, *Ideology, Uncertainty, and the Rise of Anti-System Parties in Postcommunist Russia, Studies in Public Policy* 289 (Glasgow: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, 1997).

26. This vulnerability became relevant in the 1996 presidential campaign when Yeltsin (though himself a former CPSU apparatchik) was able to launch a sophisticated negative campaign against the KPRF leader that referred to Russia's Soviet past. See Michael McFaul, *The 1996 Russian Presidential Elections: The End of Polarized Politics* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1997).


32. Likhachev, “Chto predstavlyaet soboi Russkoe Natsional’noe Edinstvo kak organizatsiya.”


34. In summer 2001, a leading Russian specialist on Russia’s ultranationalist scene came to the conclusion that “the time of the national-radicals is over.” Vyacheslav Likhachev, “My i nash diagnoz: Radikal’nye ul’tiranatsial’nye organizatsii, 14 June 2001, 15. I am grateful to Robert C. Otto for sending me this article.


38. Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing Executioners, 76.


40. Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing Executioners, 72.


43. Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing Executioners, 76.


48. Sheri Berman, “Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic,” World Pol-
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49. ibid., 411, 413.


60. Herbert Kitschelt in collaboration with Anthony J. McGann, The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995). A more recent, important book that, although displaying a less narrow approach to the radical right’s ideology than Kitschelt’s study, also largely limits itself to the analysis of political parties espousing ultranationalist ideologies is Cas Mudde, The Ideology of the Extreme Right (Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 2000).


352–57; Armin Pfahl-Traughber, “Gramscismus von rechts?: Zur Gramsci Rezeption der Neuen Rechten in Frankreich und Deutschland,” Blick nach rechts, 28 September 1992, 3–5. In fact, it might be this openly admitted strategy rather than any particular ideological prescription that constitutes the most important common denominator of the various subgroups within the “New Right” and delineates it from other forms of right-wing extremism.


72. The NBP spoke highly, and later apparently became a member, of the international network of the European Liberation Front. See Pribylovsky, ed., Russkie natsionalisticheskie i pravoradikal'nye organizatsii, 186–87.


75. Diamond, Developing Democracy, 224.


77. Ibid., 2, 8–9.

78. Ibid., 9.


87. As defined by Payne, Uncivil Movements.


92. Likhachev, “Chto predstavlyat soboi Russkoe Natsional’noe Edinstvo kak organizatsiya.”


94. Perhaps some of the various well-researched Pamiat’ groups, as well as their successor organizations, would, apart from a number of other similar groupings such as the Right-Radical Party of Sergei Zharikov, fall in this category. For a recent survey that lists further putative groupuscules, see Alexander Verkhovsky, “Ultra-Nationalists in Russia at the Onset of Putin’s Rule,” Nationalities Papers 28, no. 4 (2000): 707–26.


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99. For a useful collection of various assessments of the impact of these institutions, see Alexander Podberezkin, *Russkii put’: sdelai shag!* 3rd ed. (Moscow: RAU-Universitet, 1998), 300–14.


104. For some basic information, see Oksana Antonenko, *New Russian Analytical Centers and Their Role in Political Decisionmaking* (Cambridge, MA: Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1996).

105. I rely in this survey mainly on secondary literature, and am thus able to deal more closely with only those centers that have already been analyzed to some extent—though by no means sufficiently—by various researchers. A leading specialist in the field has recently aptly noted that, in general, “English-language scholarly sources on fascist tendencies and movements in post-Soviet Russia are meager.” Shenfield, *Russian Fascism*, 299.


109. As quoted in Alexander Yanov, *Weimar Russia—And What We Can Do About It*
12. Ibid., 166.
14. Yanov, Weimar Russia, 274.
15. As quoted in Dunlop, “Sergei Kurginyan,” 166.
18. Sergei Kurginyan, Rossiya: Vlast’ i oppositsiya (Moscow: ET Ts, 1993).
21. As quoted in Yanov, Weimar Russia, 274.
22. One should not be misled by such a stance, as Kurginyan’s ideas can be interpreted as being close to protofascism themselves. See A. James Gregor, “Fascism and the New Russian Nationalism,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 31, no. 1 (1998): 1–15.
23. It might be added that there are a number of fundamental similarities in Kurginyan’s and Dugin’s (see below) world-views. See V. L. Tsymbursky, “Novye pravye’ v Rossii: Natsional’nye predposylyki zaimstvovaniya ideologii,” in Kuda idet Rossiya?: Al’ternativy obshchestvennogo razvitiya, ed. Tatyana I. Zaslavskaya, vol. 2 (Moscow: Aspekt Press, 1995), 472–82, here 478, 481.
24. Yanov, Weimar Russia, 273, 296.
27. As pointed out by Dunlop, “Alexander Prokhanov,” 171.
29. For a succinct summary of this article see Dunlop, “Alexander Prokhanov,” 172–74.
32. Verkhovsky, Papp, and Pribylovsky, Politicheski ekstremizm v Rossii, 284–86.
ru/bookprize/articles/prochanov/print.html. I am grateful to Robert C. Otto for alerting me to these articles.


138. This is, to be sure, not a problem peculiar of contemporary Russian studies. As Roger Griffin mentions in his introduction to the groupuscular right: “Scholarship of this type [i.e. research into groupuscules] requires a passion for the recondite, the arabesque and the Byzantine which is not part of the staple qualities of the university-trained political scientist.” Griffin, “From Slime Mould to Rhizome,” 4.


144. Shenfield, Russian Fascism, 192.


148. Further periodicals edited by Dugin included Mily Angel, Evraziskoe vtorozhchenie, and Evraziiskoe obozrenie.

149. Yanov, Weimar Russia, 275.


151. Mathyl, “Das Entstehen einer nationalistischen Gegenkultur im Postperestrojka-Rußland.”


156. See Dugin, Tampliery proletariata, 324.
159. The official title of the institute attached to Seleznev’s office and headed by Dugin is Center for Geopolitical Expertise of the Expert-Consultative Council on Problems of National Security at the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation.
162. See Shenfield, Russian Fascism, 199; and Ingram, “Alexander Dugin,” 1032.
163. See <http://universitert.virtualave.net/>.
166. I am grateful to Robert C. Otto for highlighting this link to me. See, for instance, Andrey Kolesnikov, “Posle podvodnoi lodki: Na katastrofakh otrabatyvaetsya informatsionnaya politika,” Izvestiya, 29 August 2000, 3.
169. According to some press reports, Panarin also entered the thirteen-member Central Council, “the organ that . . . directs the work of the Movement.” However, he does not appear in the list of Central Council members published on the Movement’s Web site: <http://eurasia.com.ru/syezd.htm>. (I am grateful to Robert Otto for bringing this site to my attention.) In any way, insofar as Panarin is prominently present in “Eurasia’s” publications (on, among others, the World Wide Web), more so than, for instance, Central Council member Leonte’v, the argument below applies to him too.
172. Diamond, Developing Democracy, 222.