Russia’s Potential Futures in the Euro-Atlantic-OECD World

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A country’s international identity forms a supplementary yet integral part of its national identity. The nature and handling of the international identity play a critical role in determining the health and character of the national identity.

In the twentieth century, international institutions have emerged as bearers of international identity. In some cases they have carried enough weight and visibility to provide an effective anchor for their member countries’ national identities. The European Union (EU) and NATO, to take the most important examples, have provided a healthy balance between national and international identities for Germany. This is something that was painfully lacking in previous generations, and its absence tempted the nation-state to reduce its international identity to a function of its own nationalism. The problem was particularly severe in the modernizing latecomers among the great powers—Germany, Russia, Japan, and China—which could not view liberal democracy as a national achievement of their own. Left to its own devices in these countries, national identity led from liberal nationalism to integral nationalism, and then to military adventurism, totalitarianism, and national suicide.

Russia has suffered historically as badly as Germany from the depredations of national identity left to its own devices. Thanks to the unchecked evolution of national sentiment, the Russian empire walked into the Crimean War and World War I, and thence to its destruction. Communism, although formally antinationalist, realized the substance of integral nationalism in totalitarian form, nationalizing all large-scale aspects of socioeconomic life, vilifying all socially autonomous formations as potentially treasonous, and conducting a bitter assault against the external world order. The Russian body politic today, in the aftermath of communism, is infected with various forms of nationalist revivalism, many of them rabid.

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At the same time, Russia has a historic European identity. This identity always came to a shipwreck in previous centuries, when Russia was trying to join a Europe that was self-contradictory on the international level, thanks to the adversarial balance of power system that prevailed prior to 1947. Yet the European identity has always returned, and for good reason: it is Russia’s natural identity within the world as a whole, one that is based on the most powerful objective factors.

Today, unlike the days before 1947, there are institutions, such as the EU and NATO, which seem to hold forth an option of embedding Russia’s European identity within their powerful embrace. The abandonment of communism and of its autarchic empire was motivated in significant part by the idea of becoming part of an integrated Europe; the hope of a “common European home,” both in its continental and its wider Atlantic version, was at the core of the new thinking. Integration would serve to supplement the Russian national identity, anchor it, and validate it in its essential Europeanness. On the other hand, failure to consummate integration with the West would have damaging effects on Russia’s European identity; the option being visible and the goal avowed by Russian Westernists, its fulfillment has become necessary for the validation of Westernism in Russia. Indeed, the weakening of hope in it since 1991 has already served as a severe invalidation for Russian radical Westernizers.

This invalidation is what has led the government to fall back from the Atlanticism of the Kozyrev years to what might be called an “official Eurasianism” of the Viktor Chernomyrdin and Vladimir Putin years. Just as the official nationality of Nicholas I was not the romantic nationalism of the Slavophile wing of the intelligentsia, so official Eurasianism is not the fire-breathing, anti-Western, ideological Eurasianism of Alexander Dugin or Prokhanov or the Communists; it is rather an attempt by the elite to find a pragmatic space for retrenchment, in a period when Euro-Atlanticism has been proving politically unviable and questionable as a basis for Russian diplomacy. It deliberately leaves unresolved the issue of whether this breathing space will be a prelude to a return to Euro-Atlanticism or to a further turn toward a full-scale ideological Eurasianism. The preference of the elite is for Euro-Atlanticism, if it becomes viable, that is, if there are openings for Russian integration with the relevant Western institutions. But if it does not become viable soon, the default option is a further slide into a Eurasianism that becomes increasingly ideological.

Despite the victory of Eurasianism on the surface, the Westernist strand remains powerful in Russia. Chernomyrdin remained an Atlanticist in practice. Under Putin, hope has been transferred from NATO to the EU as the locus of seeking integration. Putin has shown remarkable enthusiasm for Europeanism. Whether it is realistic to think that Russia will any day soon get into the EU, one thing certainly is realistic: some such hope of institutional integration with the West is necessary for the survival of Westernism in Russian politics. The alternative is to abandon Westernism and embrace Eurasianism fully.

Since these paragraphs were written, the events of 11 September 2001 have changed the picture, raising prospects for much more rapid integration on the strategic level while also changing the Russian posture from Eurasianism back to
Atlanticism. Strategic integration has returned to the forefront as the urgent task of the present period, relegating economic integration and Europeanism to their more appropriate places as longer-term concerns. This does not invalidate what is said herein; it was the purpose of this article to partially deconstruct the Europeanist and economics-first scenario, which has now been deconstructed by events. NATO is once again the central issue; the EU and OECD are relegated to a distant horizon on the agenda, although WTO has been moved forward. Putin has abandoned his earlier careful mix of Eurasianism and Europeanism; he has made a dramatic embrace of Euro-Atlanticism, leaving much of the political elite far behind him. His resulting political vulnerability and need for external validation has been widely remarked in both Russia and the West, and accurately so. In the words of one analyst, he has gone “beyond the point of no return.”

Fortunately, Putin has proved a much better communicator with the West than Mr. Yeltsin on the main point: that the key validation that Russia needs and wants is not some kind of financial compensation, welcome though that might be, but a real share in making the decisions for the alliance policies on the basis of which Russia is to be cooperating with the West. This is only fair: no alliance can be viable if one of the biggest allies has no role in making the decisions but is only expected to follow the lead of the other allies year after year. Western officials, particularly Prime Minister Tony Blair, have grasped the point and made proposals for inclusion of Russia in a new half-way house, not yet inside NATO but no longer completely out-of-doors: a new joint Russia-NATO council that would meet regularly, discuss many matters before NATO has reached a decision on them, and aim at joint policy formation. This would in effect be an upgrading of the present NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council so that it could work the way it was originally intended to work, but had been preventing from working when the U.S. Congress passed resolutions against any serious consultations with Russia. How well it will work in practice, and for how long, remains to be seen. In the end, it is still only a half-way house along the path to membership, one that is bound to run aground of its own contradictions if perpetuated too long without further upgrading; but since it is being given a start in a spirit of wartime collaboration, it may well prove this time a positive start rather than a stillborn gesture. For policy studies relevant to this institutional step and further institutional options for Russia in relation to NATO, see the materials referenced in the footnotes to this article.

The question I will address is twofold: which international institutions could perform this integrative and identity-forming function, if Russia were able to join them; and which of them would Russia actually have a serious chance of joining?

Globalization or Euro-Atlanticism?
Global institutions of which Russia is already a member do relatively little in the way of integration and identity formation for Russia. The UN restrains nationalism but not very effectively. Through the Bretton Woods system—the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and World Trade Organization (WTO)—Russia is joining the world economy; it is a member of the first two institutions, and is working toward joining the third. This is having only a weak
effect, however, on its political identity, to some extent a negative effect, as something against which to react in the name of saving Russia from its seeming dissolution into a world where it does not recognize itself.

There is a tendency in Russia to equate Westernization with globalization. This serves less to anchor Russia to the West than to discredit Westernization in Russia. The reason is that globalization is widely seen—not without reason—as weakening national society and the state. It ill serves Westernists in Russia to be accused of weakening the country; it feeds the accusations of treason.

The actual Euro-Atlantic institutions are far from identical with stateless globalization. Rather, they serve as a supplement to the national state, limiting its excesses but also enhancing its ability to perform its proper functions. But that is not always noticed. The fact that the West, and particularly the United States, has promoted globalization is something that has contributed to the confusion of Westernism with globalization.

Part of the problem lies in the near-invisibility of the Atlantic system of institutions—NATO, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), G-7—as an international system in its own right, with a particular social and ideological substance of its own. Europeanism—the EU and the Council of Europe—is better advertised; even as it does the work of globalization and opens up the economies and societies of its member states, it is recognized as a home that provides a supplement to the national home and an alternative to pure, unrestrained globalization.

John Pinder, the leader of the European Federalists, has illuminated this with his conception of negative integration and positive integration—the idea that removal of barriers (negative integration) needs to be balanced by construction of joint policymaking capabilities (positive integration) to replace those national capabilities that have been eroded for the sake of negative integration. His idea has become an entrenched part of Europeanism. It is less well known in the Atlantic milieu, even though Atlantic institutions perform somewhat similar positive functions on a looser scale.

Globalization has meant virtually all negative integration with very little positive integration to balance or supplement it. It thus cannot provide a substantively adequate home for the Russian national identity. Only the European and Atlantic levels of organization could do that.

To understand this point in greater depth, I will compare how OECD and the IMF have fared as advisers to Russia, before going on to compare the potential of the various Euro-Atlantic institutions for helping Russia with its identity problem.

**OECD and IMF:**

**Atlanticist and Globalist Counseling for Russia in Practice**

The economic advice to Russia from the OECD has appeared to be of higher caliber and greater consistency than that from the IMF. The OECD's advice has been more attentive to Russia's social requirements. Its style has been more considerate and engaged; it has not been lacking in dispassionate analysis, but its dispas-
sion could never be confused with contempt. It gives a feeling of gradualism, even if it is not actually more gradualist on most specific points.

It is not my purpose here to demonstrate that the better tone corresponds to better advice. It is possible that the advice has been no better from an economic standpoint; even in that case, however, OECD would still have shown a better approach with regard to the management of the entire socioeconomic transition. My purpose is simply to consider this question: Why the difference in tone?

The answer lies in a difference of institutional cultures and history. The OECD represents the culture of Atlanticism; the IMF, even though it is largely dominated by the OECD countries, represents the culture of globalization.

The OECD is the direct institutional grandchild of the Marshall Plan: its predecessor, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), was the institution created in 1947 to implement the Marshall Plan. The Marshall Plan required European economic cooperation as a precondition for receiving aid, and the OEEC was formed accordingly. It set in motion the process of European integration that proceeded to take shape subsequently in the European Economic Community (EEC), the European Community (EC), and EU. OEEC became semiredundant after the creation of the EEC in 1957, so it was reorganized as OECD. The United States and Canada, which had been "associated" countries in OEEC, became full members; Australia, New Zealand, and Japan soon joined as well. Atlanticism thus bled historically into trilateralism. A few years later, people who appreciated the significance of this formed the Trilateral Commission to promote deeper discussion among the elites of the OECD countries. Trilateralism has been the stuff of conspiracy theories ever since.

From the start, OECD was in some respects looser than the old OEEC, given that it no longer had the impetus of Marshall Plan money, and that the United States as a member was not ready to go as far as the smaller European countries with integration into a supranational union. Nevertheless, it retained far more of the integrationist heritage and culture of the Marshall Plan than the average international institution. It has emphasized intimate consultations with and among its members to arrive at a far-reaching array of coordinated standards and policies and to create a kind of common economic space among the industrial democracies.

OECD has had a culture of understanding in depth the specific conditions, needs, and potentialities of its member countries.
because they were all allies and needed each other to be strong and to stand together); and of helping countries develop reform programs of their own to meet the conditions for aid, with a sense of “ownership” of their programs, while still upholding effective standards for the aid. It has also maintained a respectable balance between aid and advice. The Marshall Plan itself was on a scale that made it possible to insist on far-reaching conditions and effective, intrusive oversight without seeming unjustly intrusive. Subsequent OECD aid programs to third world countries, although on a smaller scale, have had conditions and oversight adjusted to what the traffic would carry; they seem never to have brought onto the OECD the kind of resentment that the IMF seems to have almost universally won for itself and nobly borne.

From 1989 to 1991, it was pretty widely understood, among those who knew their international acronyms, that OECD was the appropriate venue for coordinating and administering a program of aid and integration for the countries emerging from communism. When the Christian Science Monitor and other newspapers ran an article, “Complete the Marshall Plan” the “plan” in it used OECD as the institution for organizing a program of aid and organizing it on terms that would push toward the integration of the postcommunist countries with one another and with the West. It used OECD structures for this integration as well as for coordinating the aid, as opposed to, say, pushing the emerging countries into separate national structural adjustment programs with all the consequences for the break up of the eastern market.2

As we all know, that did not happen. The Bush administration had already conducted a vigorous polemic against any new or renewed Marshall Plan by the time that article came out; instead it allowed only some nationally targeted aid and adjustment programs—and reluctantly at that. It seems that nevertheless it, too, initially thought of the OECD as the venue for the coordination of aid, which was only natural, given that OECD had been the venue for the coordination of Western aid programs for decades. The administration did not insist on this, however; it yielded readily to a French preference for instead having the European Community as the leader/coordinator of the aid program, with a “Group of 24” (consisting of precisely the same countries as OECD but without using OECD as an institution) getting together for the EC to lead them. This got the United States off the hook of having to provide leadership and put up a creditable share of the money. It also meant that there would be no substantial program of aid; the EC lacked the budgetary authority to raise substantial funds for such a program; it could only coordinate the programs of its member countries. It also lacked enough institutional strength to be able to lead the United States or Japan. In a somewhat parallel move, the Bush administration turned over the question of Yugoslavia to the EC; that had similar practical implications—that the Yugoslav problem would be punted, left to fall into civil war. Although it is doubtful that the Bush administration wished for the consequences that ensued (as many Croatian and Bosnian intellectuals have believed, conspiracy theory–style), it is certainly the case that the policy of punting to the EC was a result not merely of a premature desire on the part of the French and of the EC to assert their prece-
dence, but also of the Bush administration's wish to wash its hands of these matters and avoid any far-reaching programs of aid or engagement. The OECD having been dropped and the EC quickly proving inadequate, the actual leadership on dealing with questions of aid to, and reform in, the East slipped into the hands of the IMF. Washington could not really punt the ball to Brussels, not as long as there was no one in Brussels to catch it; when the ball finally came down, it was found that it had only floated a couple blocks across town, from the White House to the IMF.

The IMF sometimes acknowledged that this work was outside of its realm and was being thrust upon it. It knew a lot about currency stabilization, and something about structural adjustment programs for third world market economies, but nothing about transforming industrialized societies from comprehensive state socialism to market economies. Nevertheless, as an official institution, the IMF did not shirk the responsibility—or the opportunity for institutional aggrandizement. It seems fair to say that it has played a constructive role in making itself available as a funnel for loans on those occasions when the West has been willing to give loans—notably in 1996, when this was done as a means of stabilizing the Yeltsin-Chernomyrdin government and giving it a fighting chance to come from behind and win the elections against Zyuganov; and in 1998, when loans were given, at the last minute and in very whittled-down form, in the hope of stabilizing the Nemtsov-Chubais-Kiriyenko government. It is another question whether the conditions that the IMF attached to those loans—inevitably attached, under its rules—were useful, given Russian circumstances. The long delays in the 1997–1998 negotiations, occasioned by the pressure in Western circles and in particular in Congress for exacting ever stricter conditions, had a heavy cost. The various conditions and delays strayed some distance from the real purposes of the loans, but that was an unavoidable price of using the IMF as a funnel for aid. When the 1998 loan was announced, all the commentators in the West expressed pride that the IMF had held out so long, had whittled down the loan to so low a figure, and had been so exacting in its conditions. When Soros called it “too little too late” and the ruble collapsed anyway, the costs of this attitude became apparent, although the aid-bashing that ensued did little to improve the climate for any future conjuncture.

The OECD remained in the background through all of this. Nevertheless, it did begin to play a quiet role over the years, developing intimate dialogues with the eastern countries concerning the state of their economies and the methods of reform. It did this within the context of a perspective that they would all eventually become OECD members themselves (thus reintegrating into their former common economic space, via the common OECD space). The quality of its advice has reflected its institutional culture as an organization dedicated from its very inception as OEEC to the integration of modern industrial societies. Since 1947 it was always involved with the reform of European societies from the distorting inheritances of war and totalitarianism, and although the circumstances of postcommunist countries after 1989 were different in many ways from those of postwar and post-Nazi countries after 1945, there were still far more similarities
than there were with, for example, third world structural adjustment problems or the IMF's brief. Also, OECD was always sensitive to the sociopolitical side of reform. Its advice has always reflected to some extent the attitude of a stakeholder, interested in the entirety of the fate of the object countries as social organisms, not just an external consultant or a shareholder interested in near-term profits. This sense of being a stakeholder has to some extent carried over from the West, where the OECD is dealing with its own members, to the countries of the former East bloc. This is natural, given that OECD plans to bring the area in as a full part of the extended West bloc for which OECD is the widest institutional gathering place. It is an outlook that leads to what might be called an "internal" attitude, a concern for the cohesion and success of the societies of the East; whereas an "external," consultant-type attitude might be suspected of leading to socially careless advice, such as to try a big shock and see how the therapy goes.

If Russia is to have a home in which it can feel its identity secured and anchored, it can only be a home within the world of Euro-Atlantic institutions.

**What Euro-Atlantic Institutions Want Russia as a Member?**

*OECD:* yes. OECD has officially embraced the goal of membership for Russia as well as the others in the East. Russia in turn seeks membership in OECD without any of the ambiguity that it (understandably) displays in regard to NATO; it formally asked for membership in 1996. And it did not object when several other post-Soviet bloc countries—Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic—were admitted to full OECD membership in 1996.

*EU:* no. In accepting the goal of Russian membership, OECD is far ahead of the EU or even NATO. The EU has formally welcomed Russia's interest but has gently let it be known that Russian membership is out of the question. In the EU's scenario, it will take a couple generations to fully assimilate the small states of Eastern Europe and the Balkans, and then it might consider moving on to Ukraine and Belarus if they have meanwhile reformed, but Russia will remain off its map for as far into the future as the mind's eye can see.

*NATO:* maybe. NATO's case is more ambiguous. Its statements in 1994, when adopting the Partnership for Peace (PFP), seemed to establish a goal of accepting Russia as a member, much like OECD's posture, but NATO has been backtracking ever since. Its formal posture, oft-repeated, is simply that the possibility of Russian membership is "not excluded," that someday it might make sense, and that Russia has the right to submit a membership application, which would be judged on whether Russia has met the standards. Russians do not, however, take these professions of "possible" "eventual" openness very seriously, and for good reason: The standards are a hodgepodge ranging from relevant to irrelevant for the case of Russian membership, and from realistic to utopian. They do not establish a real plan for Russia to join, and they can always be fudged to say that Russia does not qualify.
Nevertheless, NATO is the core institution of the Atlantic system, the one that it is most important for Russia to join. It is the identity-bearing institution of the system: it carries the word “Atlantic” in its name; it has a feeling of existential responsibility for the cohesion of the Atlantic community; and its members see it as carrying a major part of their destinies, that is, as embodying the “community of destiny” (to use the Germanic term of art). Conversely, for Russia the question of relations with NATO is also an existential question: as a military alliance, it tends to be an either-or relation, either friend or foe. If it is not a closely cooperative relation, ultimately an organic relation of membership, then it must instead become once again an adversarial relation as NATO expands to reach Russia’s borders.

There exists within the Atlantic system a subsystem of NATO-centered institutions, such as the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (formerly NACC), the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (formerly NAA), the PfP program, and the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC). Russia is a major participant in all of these peripheral institutions, a fact that indicates that the Platonic openness of the NATO door could someday become less Platonic. But to make that openness meaningful soon, before the adversarial relationship is instead fully renewed by other developments and by NATO expansion elsewhere, it would be necessary for NATO to develop an alternative plan of expansion, one that is meant to include Russia—or rather, for NATO and Russia to develop a plan for Russian membership in NATO, one that would benefit both sides.

It would take us too far afield to elaborate such a plan here. Adequate options and materials for this were developed some time ago in two reports of the Committee on Eastern Europe and Russia in NATO: “Bringing Eastern Europe and Russia into NATO” (1994) and “Moving Forward from NATO’s ‘Study on NATO Enlargement’” (1995).3

G-7: yes. The G-7 goes farther than OECD; it has already included Russia in a G-8 for the G-7’s political functions. This has been at times a highly fruitful relationship; it played an essential role as a venue for Russia to rescue NATO from its war in Kosovo. But because the G-8 is not an institution, it can have only a limited effect on Russia’s identity.

The Council of Europe (CE): yes. The CE has also accepted Russia as a member. But it, too, can have only a limited effect on the Russian identity. And the relationship has been a painful one; it often seems to consist mainly of instructing Russia on how it should behave. The council has frequently considered suspending Russia’s membership.

The Long Path into OECD

Given that OECD accepts the goal of Russian membership, is membership in it the next step forward for Russia? Getting into today’s OECD will not be easy or quick for Russia. Although OECD has worked closely with Russia in consultative dialogues, there is not even a timetable for its joining, perhaps because OECD
fears that no such timetable would be realistic. OECD has standards, which have been piled up, one upon another, in the course of the fifty-four years since 1947. Russia is a long way from meeting them. Indeed, OECD has made a long list of recommendations to Russia that it must fulfill before joining.

It would have been different if, in the early 1990s, OECD had coordinated the aid program, Marshall Plan-style—whether or not it named it the second phase of the Marshall Plan—and had brought in all the eastern countries as “associate members,” grouping them into a subcommittee to plan coordinated reform efforts and maintenance of mutual economic relations even while reforming. That would have been what the eastern countries were immediately prepared for. It would have smoothed the way to a profound institutional relationship with them under the aegis of OECD, no matter whether it led quickly or slowly to “full” identical forms of OECD membership with the old OECD countries. This did not happen at the time when it was possible; the prospect for such an enthusiastic approach to the emerging East was killed by Brent Scowcroft’s polemics against “euphoria,”4 Lawrence Eagleburger’s polemics against the Marshall Plan, and former president Bush’s readiness to punt. Today it is quite impossible to imagine there suddenly reemerging a political impetus to make such a program possible. All that can realistically happen today on the OECD level is the continuation of high-quality consultations, within a perspective of eventual accession to membership.

Unfortunately, this prospect is not likely to inspire much active enthusiasm on the Russian side. There are benefits to joining OECD—it means becoming a part of an area that feels to Western investors like a common economic turf, bringing more investments and better international credit ratings—but few ordinary people would think of them. One might doubt how many Russians even know that OECD exists. When I mention OECD in my lectures, most people do not recognize the acronym, and when I spell the words out and translate them, they at best vaguely nod their heads about having somewhere heard the name. Of course, they are no worse than Americans in this regard; but what it suggests is that the Russians are unlikely to make a major effort to meet the standards of OECD for the sake of joining it.

But the energy to meet the standards and join OECD may yet be found through the back door, if not the front door. For one thing, it is in the interest of the Russian economy to meet many of the standards. For another thing, Putin stated, in his meeting with the EU in Paris in 2000, that Russia wants close integration with the EU, that it supports the EU as a part of a multipolar world, that it does not exclude the possibility of joining the EU, and—what is crucial—that Russia will meanwhile work to harmonize its rules with the EU and meet the EU’s standards. Paradoxically, this could end up helping Russia get into OECD, but not the EU.

**Joining the EU: Dream versus Reality**

In a sense, Russia’s promise to start adopting and meeting EU standards is an act of supreme foolishness. The standards are numerous and difficult. Some of them are onerous and make little sense in themselves; the effort would be worth it only if accompanied by EU membership, which Russia is not going to achieve.
Furthermore, Putin’s gesture of support for the Euro prior to the Nice summit—not supporting it in itself as a constructive step forward in European integration but supporting it vis-à-vis the dollar, as an exercise in multipolarist currency geopolitics—was a mistake from the standpoint of the ruble’s stability, while also potentially damaging from a standpoint of global currency stability. Similarly, Igor Ivanov’s statement of support for a European military force—again, not as a constructive step of integration, but in contrast to NATO, with an obvious hope of dividing the Atlantic—was a misstep. One of the virtues of an integrated EU force would be that it would be far more capable than NATO as a whole of taking joint action without unanimity among its members and without authorization from the UN Security Council, where Russia has a veto. Meanwhile, Ivanov’s endorsement did some political damage to the advocates of EU defense integration at the Nice summit: most Europeans did not want to divide the Atlantic, and he revived their visceral fears of this.

Even if Russia were somehow to meet all eighty thousand pages of legal requirements of the *acquis communautaire* of the EU and incorporate them all into Russian law, the EU would still reject any Russian membership application. It has an entire series of reasons—very serious reasons—for not accepting Russia as a member now or for as far into the future as can be foreseen:

1. Russia is much too far behind economically, in its average living standards, for the EU to think of opening its borders to free movement of Russians. Fear of immigration is growing among EU citizens as the EU expands, even when the expansion is only to its much smaller eastern neighbors, which are considerably wealthier and more stable than Russia; ratification of their memberships will be difficult for this reason. Russia is at the root of much of the fear about the small neighbors: the EU is pushing Poland to close its eastern borders with Russia and the CIS countries so that it will be safer to let Poland into the EU.

2. Russia is far too big for the EU, with its delicate political balance among member countries, to swallow as a full member with a full weighted vote. EU countries already think that Germany is somewhat too big for comfort. Germany has only 80 million people; Russia, 145 million. It is the Atlantic institutions—NATO, OECD, G-7—that have a big enough membership and population base that their balance would not be too badly upset by including Russia.

3. The EU is concerned that the balance of power in its decision making will shift dangerously far to the poor countries and the immature democracies when the EU lets in the small eastern countries that it is already promising eventually to accept. Adding Russia as well would mean further doubling the weight on the poor, unstable, eastern side, far beyond what the EU could bear to accept.

4. Russia still has an independent military with a strategy of its own. The other major EU countries have given this up in favor of integration through NATO, and this spares them any fear of being influenced by military pressure by one or the other when working out common decisions in the EU. To be sure, France is only half integrated in NATO and freeloads a bit on the others, but no one is afraid about whom France might be planning to invade. People are still afraid of Rus-
sia. Until the day when tensions between Russia and NATO are replaced by joint Russia-NATO integration of military planning and training, Russia will not be trusted to join the EU. The solution on NATO has to come first; the attempt to bypass NATO by going the EU route turns out to be a delusion. As Robert Freedman has stated, it is joining NATO that is Russia's path into the EU, not the EU that is its path into NATO.

Whether NATO is also the gateway into the OECD or vice versa is a more complicated question. The fear of Russia's power politics would be less important in OECD than in the EU because of the ballast and balance provided by the United States in OECD as in NATO. Yet even for the OECD, good Russian strategic relations with NATO would be helpful for winning confidence that Russia could be trusted to support good economic relations once it was a member. Progress on integration with NATO needs to be pursued at the same time that Russia is working on joining OECD; the two integration processes are not likely to proceed in a rigid two-stage schedule of NATO first and then OECD, or OECD first and then NATO, but on a complex, loosely interactive schedule.

5. Russia itself would be ambivalent about joining the EU. The EU wants to accept only new members that are willing to commit unambiguously to it, and to commit further to its project of becoming a full political union. Russian government organs under Putin originally stated, in contrast to Putin himself, that Russia does not want to join the EU because the EU is a supranational institution and aims to become a full federation.

6. If Russia is not even fit for full membership in the OECD after its fifty-three years of development, but would be fit immediately only for membership in the original OEEC of 1947, which served as historical preparation of countries for OECD, then Russia is hardly fit for joining the EU, whose fifty years of accumulated rules and standards represent the heavy-duty outgrowth of OEEC, compared to which OECD is the lite version.

The EU has already made clear that Russia is off the map of potential members. For Russia to go to all the trouble of preparing itself for the EU and then be rejected would be a terrible humiliation, far more damaging than anything Russia has suffered thus far at the hands of NATO.

The idea of being European but not Atlantic is the perennial fantasy of a certain sector of the Russian political elite, dreaming ever since the days of Brezhnev of uniting with Europe and dividing it from America. The Russian elite learned in the course of the Gorbachev years that this fantasy was a mistake. In the post-Yeltsin years, it seems to be trying to pretend that it has not learned a thing.

How the Dream Could Be Used to Achieve a Decent Reality Anyway

Nevertheless, Russia, in the course of satisfying some of the standards of the EU, might meanwhile satisfy the standards for WTO and OECD membership. The standards for WTO and OECD are all contained as a subset within the more exacting standards for the EU. If Russia cleverly chooses the right subset of EU standards to meet, then WTO and OECD membership could be forthcoming in the
historical present tense, bringing with it real benefits, and bringing also the moderate level of integration that Russia could embrace in this era. In this way, by playing out the fantasy of being European but not Atlantic—playing it out cleverly without being truly taken in by it—Russia might yet find its way into the Atlantic world.\(^5\)

**NOTES**

1. The need for a supranational identity to balance the national identity has been explained philosophically by proponents of European integration in terms of “subsidiarity” and “substitutions.” In its original Catholic usage, which is somewhat different from its current EU usage, this term meant that the various levels of society need to support or “subsidize” one another, that is, shore up one another and fill in for one another when one must of necessity be absent or at least insufficiently present. But scholastic doctrine warned of the danger of “plenary substitutions,” which would occur when one level of society was totally absent, or when a given level of society, having filled in temporarily for another, would try to hold the space permanently for itself rather than yield the space back to its proper occupant. Scholasticism especially warned against the substitution of the particular for the universal, that is, the usurpation of the place of the universal by one or another particularistic power, or what we might call “particularistic universalism.” Dialectics, whether of the scholastic or the Hegelian variety, readily laid bare the implications of plenary substitutions and of particularistic universalism: loss of balance and self-regulation, false identity, fanaticism, poor fit of institutions to functions, frequent institutional failures, redoubling of effort in the face of failure, a spiraling feedback loop between failure and fanaticism.


3. Copies of these reports are available at www.fas.org/man/nato/ceern.

4. The foundation of Brent Scowcroft’s view in 1989 was the widespread belief that all the reforms were a public relations gambit on the part of the Soviet Union, aimed at dividing and deceiving the West. Backstopping theoretically for this view was Henry Kissinger, who argued that national interests are permanent and Russia cannot help but be the adversary of the West, no matter what friendly signals it might put out for the consumption of the naive. Both of them acknowledged the reality of change only belatedly and begrudgingly, and were against helping the process of change. Feeding him arguments to sustain his belief in the unreality of reform and the foolishness of trying to help the reformers was Scowcroft’s resident Sovietologist, Condoleezza Rice. This might seem to have some implications for the present, which I can only hope are wrong.