Russian Responses to Crisis Management in the Balkans
How NATO's Past Actions May Shape Russia's Future Involvement

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Many have criticized the actions of Russian leaders in the Bosnia and Kosovo conflicts as chaotic. In fact, Russian responses to those two wars have reflected Russia's unchanging views on the legality, legitimacy, and effectiveness of the use of force versus diplomacy and on the appropriate relationship between the NATO allies and Russia. Russia argued consistently that force was legal in the conflicts only within the terms dictated by the Security Council—as a tool to protect peacekeepers and enforce safe havens and weapons exclusion zones. Force was legitimate only if strike targets were chosen without bias and in consultation with Russian officials. Force was effective only as a tool to reduce open conflict and facilitate diplomatic mediation. According to Russian officials, only diplomacy is capable of resolving entrenched ethnopolitical disputes; force as a tool of conflict resolution is doomed to failure.

In this article I seek to correct the misperception that officials from Moscow tried merely to obstruct the multilateral responses to the two crises. Clearly Russia tried to confine decision making about the multilateral response to venues where it had procedural power, such as the UN Security Council or the Contact Group. But those efforts did not—as is popularly argued—translate into Russia's denouncing multilateral efforts to resolve the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo. To the contrary, although the parliament and the public opposed the use of air power, some members of Russia's executive branch worked consistently with Western powers behind the scenes to reach diplomatic solutions in Bosnia and Kosovo. Moscow's public condemnations of NATO's actions, while likely sincere, did not translate into a complete renunciation of cooperation with the allies.

This last point is critical, because rising separatist sentiment in both Montenegro and Kosovo, coupled with the tenuous hold that newly elected Yugoslav

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president Vojislav Kostunica has over the Serbian state and population, could lead in the coming months to new conflicts in the region that would call on Russia, the United States, and Europe for yet another round of crisis management in the Balkans. An understanding of Russia’s position is critical to ensuring a multi-lateral effort that responds effectively to the situation in the Balkans while maintaining positive relations among the involved states. If we can discern a consistent pattern in Russia’s approach to third-party use of force to resolve entrenched conflicts it may be possible to anticipate Russia’s reaction to renewed multilateral action in the region.

Russia may have proved unwilling to heed its own advice with regard to conflict resolution in its current campaign in Chechnya, but it offered some valid criticism of NATO’s responses to the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo. In the final section of this article I will flesh out a proposal for the Balkans that draws from Russia’s assumptions about legal, legitimate, and effective means to address entrenched crises. The proposal constructs a multilateral arrangement that gives Russia a more central voice in the process by focusing on crisis prevention rather than crisis management or resolution, placing more emphasis on diplomacy than force.

NATO’s Use of Air Power in Bosnia and Kosovo

NATO’s use of force has evolved over the course of the wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. The UN Security Council initially authorized the use of force in March 1993 to enforce UN-mandated safe zones and arms exclusion zones. Russian officials lent their public support, endorsing early strikes on Serb forces that violated UN provisions. Rules of engagement stipulated that NATO forces were to give warnings of imminent attacks prior to the initiation of air strikes, and NATO commanders were ordered to select targets that would minimize civilian and military casualties. Until October 1994, NATO followed that policy, warning Bosnian Serbs of upcoming attacks and launching “pin prick” strikes against unpopulated targets. In early October NATO ministers began allowing multiple-target attacks that were carried out in quicker succession and without warning. NATO employed targeted air strikes nine times between March 1993 and August 1995.

NATO changed tactics on 30 August 1995, when it launched Operation Deliberate Force, a sustained bombing effort that followed a Serb mortar attack in Sarajevo that killed forty-one people. Rather than conduct isolated air strikes, NATO commanders interspersed pauses in a continuous air campaign, giving Serb leaders time to withdraw heavy weapons from the UN-mandated security zones; if they did not do so within a given time, NATO would reinitiate its assault. That continued until 14 September, when the Bosnian Serbs agreed in Belgrade to withdraw heavy weapons from the exclusion zone surrounding Sarajevo, halt attacks on Sarajevo and other safe areas, and allow the free movement of UN personnel and relief workers.

NATO’s 1999 operation in Kosovo, Operation Allied Force, was prosecuted according to operational guidelines different from those followed in Bosnia. Rather than conduct isolated strikes in response to specific violations, NATO
DEMOKRATIZATSIYA

forces sustained an ever-escalating siege of air attacks over the seventy-eight-day campaign, from 24 March through 10 June. NATO had been threatening to use force against Yugoslavia since October 1998 in an effort to compel Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic to halt repression against the Kosovar Albanian community in Kosovo. Following Serbia's refusal to sign a peace deal brokered by the Western powers and Russia in mid-March, NATO launched Operation Allied Force to stop an intensified Serb military campaign against the Kosovar Albanians and to force Milosevic to accept the terms of NATO's political and military settlements. The operation marked the alliance's only attack on a sovereign state in its fifty-year history.

In the early days of the campaign, cruise missiles were launched from U.S. ships and submarines in the Adriatic Sea and from B-52 strategic bombers. The plan was to degrade Yugoslavia's air defenses quickly and then introduce a second phase that would use low-flying jets to attack Serb tanks and troops threatening Kosovar Albanians in Kosovo. Initial targets included Serbian radar, communication, and military infrastructures. By the end of March, NATO had expanded its targets to include sites in downtown Belgrade, including government ministries. In contrast to NATO's bombing in Bosnia, the attack on Serbia was sustained and targeted areas with a high likelihood of casualties. NATO negotiations with Belgrade continued through this period, ultimately succeeding on 10 June 1999, when Milosevic agreed to remove Serb forces from Kosovo and allow the insertion of a UN-sponsored peacekeeping force.

As NATO grew more assertive in employing force to compel change on the ground in Bosnia and Kosovo, Russian opposition intensified. The Russians believed that the increasingly frequent air strikes disproportionately targeted the Serbs. Their dissatisfaction culminated in Russian opposition to Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia, which carried over to a full-scale rejection of NATO's military action in Kosovo.

Russian officials launched three main criticisms of NATO's bombing. First, when NATO strayed from a narrow interpretation of its UN mandate in Bosnia and when it acted without a UN mandate in Kosovo, Russia labeled NATO's action illegal. Second, when Russia perceived NATO to be targeting Serbs disproportionately and when attacks were launched without consultation with Russian officials, Russia called the strikes illegitimate. Third, when Russia saw that bombing was used to motivate combatants to resolve their conflicts rather than to protect peacekeepers and enforce safe areas and arms exclusion zones, Russian officials warned that NATO's bombing would be ineffective. Diplomacy, not force, was needed to resolve conflicts like those in Bosnia and Kosovo.

Operation Deliberate Force: Transgressing a UN Mandate
As mentioned previously, Russia accepted the legality of NATO's air strikes through mid-1994. Three U.S. F-16C fighters carried out the first attack on 28 February 1994, firing air-to-air missiles at four suspected Bosnian Serb ground-attack jets operating within the UN-imposed no-fly zone over central Bosnia. The engagement marked the first combat action of NATO's fifty-year existence. The
Russian Foreign Ministry supported the action, issuing a statement that read, “Whatever side has conducted a military flight over Bosnia, in violation of the corresponding resolutions of the UN Security Council regarding the no-fly zone, has to bear full responsibility for what has happened.”

Acceptance had vanished, however, by the time NATO launched Operation Deliberate Force in August 1995. Russia argued that the operation lay outside of the actions mandated by previous UN Security Council resolutions. President Yeltsin criticized NATO for taking on the role of “judge in the conflict, as well as that of executor.” Western sources rejected this, stating that the UN resolutions that Russia had previously voted in favor of placed responsibility for the mandate’s fulfillment with NATO. The West defended Operation Deliberate Force as necessary to ensure safety in UN security zones. In the Security Council, Russia responded to NATO’s actions by attempting unsuccessfully to introduce a draft resolution that would bring an end to NATO’s campaign.

**Operation Allied Force: Clear Violation of International Law**

Russian officials and the Russian public widely condemned NATO’s air campaign in Kosovo as an illegal act that circumvented the UN Security Council. The official position adopted by the Russian government was that Chapter 7, Article 42 of the UN Charter rendered any threat or use of force not authorized by the Security Council (outside force used for the purposes of self-defense) an aggressive and illegal act. Since NATO proceeded with Operation Allied Force without a Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force, NATO’s actions violated international law. President Yeltsin issued a statement the day NATO launched its attack that read,

> Russia is deeply indignant at the NATO military action against sovereign Yugoslavia, which is nothing other than open aggression. Only the Security Council has the right to take the decision on what measures, including measures of force, should be undertaken to maintain or restore international peace and security. The UN Security Council has not taken such decisions with regard to Yugoslavia. Not only the UN Charter has been violated, but also the founding act on mutual relations, cooperation and security between Russia and NATO. A dangerous precedent has been created for the rebirth of a policy of forcible dictate, and the whole contemporary international legal order has been put under threat.

Russia’s procedural response to Operation Allied Force was similar to its response to Deliberate Force. Sergey Lavrov, Russia’s permanent representative to the United Nations, sponsored a Security Council resolution calling for an immediate end to NATO’s bombing campaign. The resolution was defeated twelve to three.

In both conflicts Russian officials insisted that any military action follow specific guidelines set up by the international legal community. By doing otherwise, NATO violated UN regulations, which weakened the bonds of international law generally and increased the potential for anarchic and antagonistic relations. Then-prime minister Yevgeny Primakov stated in an interview with Moscow Obshchaya Gazeta on 25 March, “We see a special danger—I have already spo-
ken of this more than once—in unilateral acts of force not backed by a UN Security Council mandate, whether they be in Iraq or Kosovo. Such actions destroy trust in the Security Council, which is the linchpin of the entire established system for maintaining international peace.”

But it is important to keep in mind that the European allies were also initially opposed to operating without a UN mandate in Kosovo. Until October 1998, when they feared that Milosevic’s campaign of repression in Kosovo was going to escalate into the widespread displacement and murder of Kosovar Albanians, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Germany were adamant about the need for a Security Council resolution prior to the use of force. Only when the Europeans concluded that Milosevic would not halt his military actions in Kosovo without NATO’s demonstrating its willingness to use force did they overcome their belief in the need for UN authorization.

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Russian officials’ support of the multilateral effort correlated with their belief in the legitimacy of NATO’s actions. So long as Russian officials felt that NATO strikes were carried out in an unbiased manner against those who violated UN proscriptions and that strikes were decided in consultation with Moscow, they considered the strikes to be legitimate. Operations Deliberate Force and Allied Force, however, transgressed those standards.

Until late 1994, NATO military action in Bosnia-Herzegovina sparked only mild protest from Moscow. When Bosnian Serb forces were clearly in violation of UN resolutions in Bosnia, Russian officials supported NATO’s actions. Russia went so far as to break off diplomatic ties with the Bosnian Serbs following NATO’s 5 August attacks on Bosnian Serb forces near Sarajevo, linking the re-establishment of ties to Serb acceptance of a peace plan offered by the Contact Group. As the Russians came to see NATO’s actions as biased against the Serbs, their objections grew more strenuous. For example, Moscow officially supported NATO’s attack on a Serb-held airfield in Croatia, stating that the Krajina Serbs’ dropping of cassette and napalm bombs on the UN safe zone of Bihac “cannot be justified.” Foreign Ministry spokesman Grigory Karasin and Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev stated that they believed that the NATO bombing occurred according to UN guidelines and was not a unilateral NATO action.

As air strikes continued, however, government officials began to express doubt as to whether NATO was truly impartial in its actions. One unnamed Russian diplomat told Agence France Presse, “It is impossible not to notice that the international community is slowly sliding towards forceful support of only one of the sides (Bosnian Moslem) engaged in the conflict.” Russian officials came to view air strikes not as a neutral tool used to protect international peacekeepers, but as
“part of the combat operations, that is to say, part of the war... [This] is what we do not agree with, be it NATO or anyone else.”31 Even Alexei Arbatov, the liberal and reformist chairman of the Duma’s defense committee, noted the bias in NATO’s attacks:

During the war in Bosnia, ethnic cleansing by Serbs against Bosnians and Croats was broadly covered by mass media and served as the principal justification for the NATO air raids against Serbian forces in 1995. However, then Croatian and Bosnian forces undertook a counteroffensive, [and] while Yugoslavia under U.S. pressure stopped its aid to Serbian troops, about 300,000 Serbs were expelled from the Krajina and Croatia. This was the largest ethnic cleansing during the whole Bosnian war. Many thousands of refugees perished in the process under the Croatian fire and attacks of marauders. And nothing was done by the West, not even any obvious political pressure on Tudjman’s regime in Croatia, to say nothing of military action to save the peaceful Serbian population.32

Kosovo reaffirmed this perception for Russians. Both average citizens and government officials viewed the multilateral response as biased against Serbs. Some charged NATO with targeting civilian areas and fighting to protect Albanian terrorists.33 The Western allies were also sensitive to that charge. According to the account of Kosovo offered by Ivo Daalder and Michael O’Hanlon, the allies expressed concern that NATO’s ultimatum to the two sides on accepting an interim political agreement in spring 1999 targeted Belgrade alone, even though the KLA in Kosovo was just as culpable in provoking violence.34

Russian officials were also consistent in arguing that neither war would be resolved through forceful measures.35 Using diplomacy to sway the Serbs—an arena in which Russia had a seeming advantage over its Western collaborators—was seen as more fruitful. Moscow “opposed mixing humanitarian, peacekeeping, and hostile military functions.”36 Following the initiation of Operation Deliberate Force in August 1995, Yeltsin issued an unequivocal statement regarding the inability of force to promote conflict resolution. “Bombing has never yielded results. The Bosnian conflict cannot be resolved by force. If force is applied, what will result is a century-long war that may engulf other European countries.”37

This argument was repeated almost verbatim as Russian officials responded to NATO’s campaign in Kosovo. The sentiment was repeated consistently, across different strata within the Russian government, that any resolution to the conflict would be political and that force only delayed and frustrated that process.38 President Yeltsin issued this prescription in his statement responding to the initiation of air strikes: “The settlement of the situation in Kosovo, just as the resolution of other, similar problems, are possible only through negotiations. The sooner they are resumed, the more opportunities there will be for the international community to arrive at a political settlement.”39 European leaders were worried about this possibility as well, though they were considerably more constrained in expressing their doubts.40 Despite those concerns, however, the NATO allies remained convinced that force was absolutely necessary to gain Milosevic’s capitulation.

Russia pushed to resolve both conflicts through diplomatic efforts coordinat ed through the G-8 and the Contact Group, preferring the Contact Group to other
They called for meetings throughout both campaigns in an attempt to rein in NATO's military action and bring alliance members closer to Russia's positions regarding the need for a UN mandate and the limited effectiveness of air strikes in an enlarged campaign. The United States in particular was reluctant to adopt venues other than NATO to coordinate the multilateral response because it feared (rightly) that Russia would use the alternative settings to torpedo NATO's ability to employ force to pressure Milosevic.

Russian officials criticized NATO's actions as ineffective on other grounds as well. Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev argued that Serb forces would still be able to fight, even during a sustained air attack. Russian officials warned that air attacks would unify the Serb population against NATO and strengthen their resolve to fight. Moscow's Rossiyskaya Gazeta issued this caution: "Foreign bombs cannot resolve the Kosovo conflict. It is not hard to imagine that those bombs will harden the Serbs' resolve even more and will exacerbate the ethnic confrontation in Kosovo."

Russian officials also expressed concern that NATO's bombing campaigns would only exacerbate fighting throughout the Balkans. Western allies expressed the same fear in 1994 as they decided to escalate bombing in an effort to press the warring sides to sign a peace agreement, and again as they prepared for Operation Allied Force in 1999. Luckily, both the Bosnia and Kosovo conflicts remained contained throughout NATO's bombing campaigns.

**Russia's Role in the Multilateral Effort**

How did their objections to NATO's bombing campaigns influence Russia's contributions to the multilateral responses in Bosnia and Kosovo? Two trends are readily observable. First, Russian officials tried to contain the multilateral approach to both conflicts to venues in which they had significant procedural power, primarily the Contact Group, but also the G-8 and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Russia also consistently demanded that all military action route through the UN Security Council. During the bombing campaign in Kosovo, Russia pressured its Western partners to adopt the G-8 as the venue for political discussions on the conflict, resulting in a meeting in Bonn on 21 May 1999, in which the members adopted the negotiating protocol that served as the basis for a subsequent diplomatic effort.

That tactic had some positive results. Referring specifically to Russia's role in Kosovo, Oksana Antonenko, research fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, noted,

> despite Russia's present weakness and its rupture in relations with NATO, it still retains some influence over European security. It was Russia's relations with, and membership of, non-NATO institutions, which provided the framework for Russia's constructive engagement in resolving the Kosovo crisis. And that engagement has been judged, rightly, as a critical factor in ending the war.

The second important trend to note in Russia's responses was the continuing commitment of some officials to act multilaterally to resolve the two conflicts. The allies were successful in their endeavors when Russian officials worked with
them in managing the conflicts (Sergeyev at Helsinki, for example, and Chernomyrdin). But when no Russian official could be found to work with NATO, their efforts were frustrated (for example, efforts to gain a Security Council resolution for air strikes or to pull together the parameters of KFOR [Kosovo peacekeeping force] prior to the meeting at Helsinki). Future multilateral endeavors could rest on the ability of Western officials to find agreeable Russian counterparts. Cultivating those relationships now could have significant payoffs later.

This trend is best illustrated by Russian actions during Operation Allied Force. After the initiation of air strikes on 24 March, Russia suspended its participation in the Russian-NATO Founding Act and the Partnership for Peace Program; it withdrew its military mission from Brussels and suspended talks on an information office that NATO was in the process of opening in Moscow. Yet while the most precipitous deterioration in Russian-Western relations since the failure of détente was occurring publicly, Russian officials were actually closely involved in the multilateral diplomatic effort to resolve the conflict.

On 14 April, President Yeltsin dispatched former prime minister Viktor Chernomyrdin to serve as Russia’s special envoy to Yugoslavia. Chernomyrdin worked closely with U.S. deputy secretary of state Strobe Talbott and Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari in gaining Milosevic’s acceptance of NATO’s cease-fire demands. Chernomyrdin has been criticized in Russia for playing “postman between NATO and Belgrade, which naturally turned into imposing the Western peace proposals on Yugoslavia,” a charge that his American counterpart, Strobe Talbott, denied. It is true that Chernomyrdin negotiated from NATO positions—positions that were codified in a statement of principles issued at a G-8 meeting of foreign ministers that May. But that showed the willingness of some within Russia to work with the Western powers, even if it meant taking actions that countered Russia’s public position.

A clear split existed within Russia’s foreign policy community. Many in the Foreign Ministry supported Serbia in the two encounters out of opposition to the West, a sentiment that was only exacerbated by air strikes, which were viewed through the lens of pan-Slavic affiliation. The Defense Ministry was even more hawkish. General Leonid Ivashov, chief of international relations for the Defense Ministry, labeled NATO a “criminal organization which has no right to exist.” General Anatoly Kvashnin, chief of the General Staff, portrayed NATO’s military action in Kosovo as a direct threat to Russia itself. When those individuals were left in charge of negotiating the parameters of Russia’s participation in an international presence in Kosovo, NATO planners found fierce resistance at every turn.

Russian and NATO planners integrated Russian troops into IFOR (implementation force) and SFOR (stabilization force) in 1995 in Bosnia by placing the First Russian Separate Airborne Brigade within the U.S.-led multinational division in the northeastern sector of Bosnia. By May and June 1999, however, Russian officials had rejected this configuration as a model for KFOR and demanded their own sector, to be placed under UN authority. Western powers rejected this as a de facto partition of Kosovo, enraging some mid-level officials in the Russian military. It is unclear who authorized the action, but on 10 June a Russian peace-
keeping contingent from Bosnia marched into Kosovo and took possession of the Slatina airport in Pristina. The Russians apparently thought that if they could move Russian peacekeepers into Kosovo and physically occupy territory, NATO would be forced to accept the de facto Russian sector. A tense standoff with NATO troops followed until Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev came to an agreement with NATO officials in Helsinki on 19 June regarding the composition of KFOR. Roughly 3,600 Russian troops would be dispersed throughout the other sectors in Kosovo, retaining operational control over their units.

The tensions over the composition of the international presence in Kosovo lend credence to an observation made by the former Balkan desk officer at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oleg Levitin, who noted that while there were many in Moscow who hated NATO and the cost to Russian prestige of the bombing campaign, “there were just as many at the same high level who had no sympathy for Milosevic and who did not question the importance of partnership with the West.” They disliked Milosevic for refusing to grant them any sort of preferential treatment during the diplomatic efforts leading up to the initiation of NATO’s actions, and some held lingering resentment for Milosevic’s support for the failed coup attempt against President Mikhail Gorbachev in 1991.

In summary, yes, Russia consistently sought to frustrate its Western partners’ attempts to employ NATO force that excluded Russia from decision-making control. And yes, Russia contributed substantively to the ultimate resolution of both conflicts. That second point is critical if one is to accept that Russia has a useful role to play in future multilateral efforts at crisis management.

**Russian Inconsistency on Chechnya?**

One is forced to question the sincerity of Russia’s positions regarding the legitimacy and effectiveness of the use of force in light of Russia’s current campaign in Chechnya. Russia’s indiscriminate bombing campaigns against populated areas are arguably disproportionate and are hardly impartial. Russia has adopted a strategy of pure military repression; Putin, who claims that no individual exists in Chechnya with the authority to speak for the Chechen people, has repeatedly rejected negotiations or other attempts at a diplomatic resolution to the conflict.

One may even charge the Russian government with hypocrisy by pointing out that Russian leaders adopted the same strategies and operational procedures in Chechnya that they condemned in the Balkans. Moscow consciously used NATO’s actions in Kosovo as the pattern for military actions in Chechnya. The parallels are striking: “a heavy reliance on air-power; targeting of civilian infrastructure such as bridges and oil refineries, television stations and transmitters; even Jamie Shea-style press briefings with precise accounts of sorties flown and allegations of Chechen ‘ethnic cleansing’ against local Russians.”

It is important to remember that Russia views its problem with Chechnya as an issue truly distinct from the situation in Kosovo, and that may be why they see their approach in Chechnya as acceptable while NATO’s was not. Officials have stated repeatedly that the two conflicts are of different types. They view Russia’s war with Chechnya as a police action within sovereign territory (resolving
the legality issue);\textsuperscript{67} the Chechens are terrorists who bombed Moscow and invaded Dagestan in August 1999 (deflecting the legitimacy and effectiveness issues).\textsuperscript{68} Moscow also claims to be committed to rebuilding Chechen society. At any rate, while Russian officials may have shown inconsistency in their judgments of their campaign and NATO’s, that is a topic for another article and is not central to a discussion of Russia’s reactions to multilateral action in Bosnia and Kosovo.

Potential Conflict in the Balkans: Independence Drives in Kosovo and Montenegro

How can Russia’s responses to NATO’s actions in Bosnia and Kosovo be read in the context of potential future multilateral efforts in the Balkans? Developments in Yugoslavia over the past year give this question more than theoretical importance. International attention has centered on the future status of Kosovo, particularly as the ever-dwindling group of Kosovar moderates seems to be admitting the inevitability of an independence drive. One of the group’s most prominent figures, Veton Surroi, remarked in connection with Serbia’s December elections, “Even if Serbia elects Mother Teresa as their president, the Kosovars won’t accept Serbia as their state.”\textsuperscript{69} Both presidential candidates in the fall 2000 elections in Kosovo advocated independence, and though Ibrahim Rugova (the more moderate of the two) won with 58 percent of the vote, he has consistently declared that there is nothing Serbia can do to prevent the region from seeking and ultimately gaining independence.\textsuperscript{70}

But Kosovo is not the only area where a secession attempt could call the international community back into the region; Serbia’s brother republic Montenegro has begun taking definite steps toward independence over the past year and has shown no willingness to shelve the process after Milosevic’s departure. In a poll reported by the Montenegrin daily \textit{Vijesti} on 30 October 2000, a majority of respondents indicated that they would favor independence if a referendum were held (though a majority also indicated that they favored some sort of future association with Serbia).\textsuperscript{71} On 3 November, Montenegrin president Milo Djukanovic announced that Montenegro would in fact hold a referendum on the Yugoslav republic’s status in June 2001.\textsuperscript{72} Ten days later, Montenegrin leadership announced that the Yugoslav dinar would no longer be considered the republic’s official currency; it would be replaced by the German mark until 2002, when Montenegro would adopt the Euro.\textsuperscript{73}

If Montenegro actually votes in favor of independence this summer, provoking the final dissolution of Yugoslavia, it is unlikely that Kosovar Albanians will be willing to stay behind with Serbia. The West has held out hope that Kosovo’s final status could be resolved by giving Kosovo autonomy within Yugoslavia (since autonomy within Serbia is unacceptable to Kosovar Albanians). If Yugoslavia ceases to exist, so does any chance of Kosovar autonomy outside of Serbia. At this point it is highly likely that Kosovar Albanians will launch an independence drive to sever their affiliation with Serbia, using Montenegro’s secession as both catalyst and diversion. Newly elected Yugoslav president Vojislav Kostunica has voiced a willingness to discuss alternatives to Kosovo’s status, but has also indi-
icated his absolute opposition to independence for Kosovo. If the Kosovars were to try to leave, it is likely that he would employ force to try to stop them.

The European powers and the United States will have to decide whether to watch a burgeoning civil war from the sidelines or attempt to craft a less-violent, political solution. True, the states have made clear their utter lack of desire to be roped into yet another crisis in the Balkans, but if the situation spirals toward open conflict, jeopardizing the tenuous status quo in Bosnia, they would be hard-pressed to ignore it.

A Russian Approach to the Conflicts in the Balkans

Given Russia’s responses to previous multilateral action in the Balkans, it is possible to devise a “Russian” approach to this scenario. An effort constructed on Russian standards would rely primarily on conflict prevention, centering on a diplomatic effort through institutions in which Russia has meaningful procedural leverage. Although Western allies were unwilling to adopt such an approach as a viable framework for crisis management and resolution in Bosnia and Kosovo, if the international community mobilizes before Montenegro’s vote in summer 2001, they may see meaningful results.

Some might claim that Moscow lacks both the credibility and leverage to be an effective mediator in the disputes. After its complicity in NATO’s 1999 campaign, the Serbs would be disinclined to trust Russia’s proposals. Certainly the Kosovar Albanians would reject Russia as the sole mediator in a dispute between Pristina and Belgrade, given their perception that Russia allies itself too closely with Serbia.

Russia would likely prefer not to work alone in any case; the blow to its prestige if a “solo mission” failed would be too great. Russia could, however, take the lead in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to initiate mediation efforts, serving on a team with the United Nation’s special representative in Kosovo, Hans Haekkerup, and a representative from NATO’s Quad (the United States, Britain, France, and Germany). This troika would reassure all sides that their interests would be represented and that intransigence by any of the disputants would not be tolerated.

While Haekkerup and the third mediator would have to devise incentives sufficient to convince Djukanovic to postpone a referendum on independence, Russia would focus its attention on Belgrade. Negotiations with Montenegro should begin immediately, because it is the referendum in June that would serve as the likely tipping point for Kosovo’s secession. Montenegro is also more tractable, giving Russia an added incentive to approach it first, before wrestling with a potentially irreconcilable problem in Kosovo. Russian officials might see the Montenegro situation as a relatively easy problem, but failure to resolve it quickly virtually guarantees a violent conflict in Kosovo.

Kostunica’s public statements have indicated a certain flexibility with respect to Montenegro. After the election, in an interview in Der Spiegel, he indicated his willingness to discuss the future of Montenegro, affirming that he “will not react aggressively [to a referendum on independence], and will maintain the dialogue,
without wavering.\textsuperscript{78} Russian mediators can expect that they have in Kostunica a
man who may be willing to negotiate, unlike his predecessor.

Russia can use the debt that Serbia owes it for energy as an additional induc-
ment. Kostunica has offered to repay his country's debt to Russia in goods, and
Russian officials have some leeway either to forgive the debt altogether or allow
a repayment schedule and structure favorable to Belgrade.\textsuperscript{79} An additional in-
centive is the gas that Russia supplies Serbia to help bring heat to Serb homes; 50
percent of homes were without heat this past winter, and the situation would have
been more desperate without Russia's help.\textsuperscript{80} As temperatures rise, that gift
becomes less persuasive, but officials can use it now as an added incentive to
engage Kostunica in dialogue.

At the end of the day, however, Russia may not need to push too hard to gain
Kostunica's acceptance of its help with Montenegro. Kostunica is more pragmatic
than Milosevic and, unlike Milosevic, seems to welcome Russia as a counterbal-
ance to the United States in the region.\textsuperscript{81} This is a role Russia would gladly accept.
It would also increase the probability of Belgrade's success in Kosovo. If Kostu-
nica acts as a good-faith bargainer with Montenegro (maybe allowing for a
change in the constitutional arrangement between the two republics and decreas-
ing Belgrade's military presence in Montenegro), he will improve his bargaining
position with respect to Kosovo. His willingness to work with the troika on Mont-
enegro enables the West to approach him as a leader committed to the political
resolution of conflicts. The burden would be on the Kosovar Albanians to prove
a similar commitment.

Containing a Kosovar independence movement will be a difficult task no mat-
ter how Kostunica approaches negotiations. Kostunica has indicated his support
for a continued international presence in the region (likely because he realizes
that KFOR is the only thing keeping the area attached to Yugoslavia)\textsuperscript{82} and for
substantial autonomy for Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo.\textsuperscript{83} He has stated flatly
that he rejects independence for the region but is willing to negotiate an alterna-
tive status.\textsuperscript{84}

The Kosovars are harder to bring to the table. Haekkerup and the third medi-
atior will have to impress on their representatives that there would be no white
knight in NATO this time and that the entire international community opposes
their independence. Russia has very little leverage over the Kosovars. The only
card Moscow could possibly play would be a promise to come to Serbia's aid
should the Kosovars launch a violent secessionist attempt. It is highly unlikely
that the Western states would ever endorse such a commitment by Russia; more
than likely their fierce opposition would keep such an offer from ever being made
publicly to Belgrade.

In any case, that motivation may not be needed. Montenegrins and Kosovars
know that they would be severely out-gunned in any military encounter with Serb
forces. The West has made its opposition to independence plain and has stated
that it would lend no support to secessionist attempts.\textsuperscript{85} For leaders from these
areas to agree to political mediation it is critical (particularly for the Kosovars)
that they believe that the West would not come to their aid. The presence of
George W. Bush in one White House and Vladimir Putin in the other should give this warning credibility.

If Russian officials proved willing and able to take the lead in this campaign immediately, they might stave off any secessionist attempts by Kosovo or Montenegro, obviating the need for any use of force by the international community. If diplomacy proved unable to prevent violent secessionist drives by Montenegro and Kosovo, Russians would likely accept the use of force for the purposes of protecting peacekeepers and enforcing safe areas and arms exclusion zones if force were legalized through the prior authorization of a UN Security Council resolution, and if strikes were conducted without bias and in consultation with Russian officials.

Is this approach to a military campaign feasible? Given the West’s aversion to allowing Russia “veto power” over NATO planning and action, it is not very likely that they would be willing to consult closely with Russian officials on the mechanics of any hypothetical military action. They would also follow their own interpretation of what constitutes an “unbiased” strike and of the boundaries of their mission and mandate. Those realities spell trouble for a Russian government that is watched closely by a public highly distrustful of NATO’s capabilities and intentions.

As Jack Snyder illustrated well in his book *Myths of Empire*, statesmen’s public rhetoric has the ability to come back to haunt them when citizens come to believe the public myths perpetuated by their leaders. Officials in Moscow may be able to wink and nod if NATO undertakes another unauthorized military action, but not the Russian public. Public outrage, stoked by the denunciations that Russian leaders issued in 1999, would make it very difficult for Russian officials to participate, even quietly, in a multilateral action that included the use of force if it lacked UN authorization. But there are some mitigating factors that may ease Russia’s opposition to future military action by NATO in the Balkans. The desire among Western officials to have a UN mandate before agreeing to use force and the fact that force would likely be used to protect Serbs in Kosovo from Kosvar Albanian attacks increase the likelihood that Russian officials and the Russian public would be willing to accept NATO action in the region in the future.

Gaining a UN Security Council resolution to support the use of force for the purposes sketched above would likely be a necessary condition for Russia and the NATO allies alike. It is important to keep in mind just how exceptional NATO’s operating without a UN mandate in Kosovo was for the allies. It was only the threat of Milosevic’s launching a concerted and sustained campaign of violence against the ethnic majority in Kosovo that finally overcame their reluctance to proceed with air strikes without a Security Council resolution. Those who worry about a slippery slope toward rogue NATO action misunderstand the unique position presented by Milosevic.

Second, Russian officials and the public may be more inclined to accept NATO military action in response to the scenario I have outlined because the likely effect of such a mission would be to protect ethnic Serbs from violence during a Kosovo independence campaign. As noted earlier, one of the main factors behind Rus-
Russia's rejection of NATO's actions in the past was their perception that air strikes were biased against Serbs. If NATO were to use force to protect peacekeepers in Kosovo or enforce safe areas or arms exclusion zones, that would not be the case. Kosovar Albanians would likely be the targets of many NATO attacks. Ironically, sentiment may tip in favor of NATO action sooner in Russia than in the intervention-skittish Western nations.

Conclusion

Russia's responses to the previous multilateral efforts in the Balkans warrant another examination, given recent events in the region. Although it seems on the surface that Russia has taken a somewhat schizophrenic approach to actions in the region, I have tried to draw out some of the continuities expressed by Russian leaders over the past seven years and, in doing so, suggest what Russia's past preferences might mean for potential future diplomatic and military engagements. Even if the situation in the Balkans cools over the next few months, this analysis can provide a template for how to incorporate Russia into multilateral crisis prevention and management in the future.

NOTES

2. Ibid.
4. Conflict prevention "recognizes conflict's causes and deals with them before the conflicts have a chance to turn violent"; "conflict resolution refers to removing the causes as well as the manifestations of a conflict between parties and eliminating the sources of incompatibility in their positions. . . . Conflict management refers to eliminating the violent and violence-related means of pursuing the conflict, leaving it to be worked out on the purely political level." I. William Zartman and J. Lewis Rasmussen, eds., Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques (Washington, D.C.: USIP, 1997), 11, 17.
10. Ivo Daalder, Getting to Dayton (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 133. For an interesting account of the final negotiations that led to the cease-fire, see Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: Random House, 1999), 147–52. The 14 September date corresponds to the date in Belgrade when the cease-fire was signed. The date was 13 September in Washington.


13. That is, when the use of force was employed for the purposes of conflict resolution rather than conflict management.


18. The actual text reads as follows: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” United Nations Charter, Chapter 1, Article 2, Section 4.

19. According to Chapter 7, Article 39 of the UN Charter, “The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.” Article 42 deals with the Security Council’s role in employing force to restore international security.


34. Daalder and O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 73.
42. ITAR-TASS, "Contact Group to Meet over Bosnia in Moscow in Mid-October," 1 October 1995; Vitaly Dymarsky, "NATO Hits Bosnian Serbs," Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 31 August 1995, 7.
43. Judah, Kosovo, 218.
44. FBIS-SOV-99-0408, 8 April 1999.
53. Judah, Kosovo, 274.
Daalder and O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 168–74; Judah, Kosovo, 274–79.
56. Judah, Kosovo, 274.
57. Of course not all in Moscow shared this position. Foreign Minister Ivanov acknowledged “certain differences in points of view” between himself and Chernomyrdin, though he was quick to assure that the two were “working together” according to Yeltsin’s direction. FBIS-SOV-1999-0605, 5 June 1999.
58. Deborah Yarsike Ball, “Spurred by Kosovo, the Russian Military Is Down but Not Out,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 11, no. 6 (1 June 1999).
64. Arbatov, “The Kosovo Crisis,” 22.
68. FBIS-SOV-2000-0221, 21 February 2000. Officials in Moscow have labeled Chechens responsible for the apartment bombings in Moscow, but the accuracy of those charges is unclear.
69. RFE/RL Newsline, Southeastern Europe, 4 December 2000, pt. 2.
72. RFE/RL Newsline, Southeastern Europe, 3 November 2000.
73. RFE/RL Newsline, Southeastern Europe, 13 November 2000.
75. One alternative that has been rejected by the West in the past, but may be resurrected in the future, would be to grant Kosovo republic status within Yugoslavia. In this scenario, Montenegro would leave the federation, and Kosovo would join it.
77. Adem Thaci, head of the dismantled Kosovo Liberation Army and runner-up in last fall’s presidential election in Kosovo, has placed the spring parliamentary elections as the date for Kosovo’s separation attempt. (See Sergey Rudchenko, “Region of Close Attention: Where Kosovo Province Is Drifting,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 25 October 2000, 7). However, it is more likely that separatists would be able to rally public sentiment only after Montenegro had announced its independence.
86. Judah, Kosovo, 182.
89. Judah, Kosovo, 176–86.