

Ukraine: Vagaries of the Post-Soviet Transition

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In the aftermath of the collapse of the outer and inner Soviet empires in 1989 and 1991, it was widely believed that the postcommunist states of East-Central Europe and Eurasia, freed from the iron grip of the imperial center, would rid themselves of communism's perverse legacies and, having undergone the appropriate socioeconomic transformations, become "normal" European countries. Some postcommunist nations did, in fact, act in that manner, and now the most advanced of them are members of NATO and candidate members of the European Union, which testifies to the fact that they are indeed on the right track toward European normalcy. Others, however, were not so successful: their transitions to "liberal democracy and market economy" have proved, so far, to be sad failures. Independent Ukraine undoubtedly falls into the latter category. Unlike the Poles or the Balts, proud of their achievements and optimistically looking to the future, most Ukrainians tend to gloomily repeat a fatalistic maxim coined by their first president, Leonid Kravchuk: *maiemo te, shcho maiemo* (we've got what we've got).

Today's Ukraine is a direct successor of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, one of the fifteen "union republics" of the USSR, which was not only an empire but also a totalitarian state. Its disintegration has left Kyiv with a dual and quite unproductive legacy. The imperial nature of the Soviet Union meant when the metropolis collapsed Ukraine was not a complete state but an administrative splinter of Moscow's governing bodies. And totalitarianism was generally responsible for the lack in Ukraine (and other successor states, for that matter) of rule of law, civil society, democracy, market economy, and clear sense of national identity. Also, because of the suddenness of the USSR's unraveling, Ukraine retained the bulk of its Communist elites.

To understand why Ukraine's transition has stalled (or rather, resulted in the creation of a peculiar—but definitely "un-European"—social system), in this article I examine the interrelationship between the Soviet (and, in some cases, even

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pre-Soviet) legacy and the political strategies of the newly born country's rulers. In particular, I explore the historical peculiarities of state- and nation-building in Ukraine, the character of the 1991 "national-democratic revolution," the quality of the local elites, and the true nature of their policies, as well as popular social and political attitudes in Ukraine.

Shaping Ukrainian National Identity: A Historical Perspective

Political theorists have, for quite some time, been pointing out that for a democratic transformation to be successful, it has to rest firmly on a clear sense of community. To borrow from Dankwart Rustow, it is crucial that the population of a democratizing state "have no doubt or mental reservations as to which political community they belong to."¹ What is required is a feeling of national unity, a strong national consciousness. Today's Ukraine was not an independent state during the whole period of modern times, which significantly slowed down and complicated the process of shaping the Ukrainian nation. In contrast to, say, Czechs or Hungarians, who are currently preoccupied with democratization and marketization, the denizens of Ukraine face, besides these two, already quite daunting tasks, the necessity of building a viable modern nation.

Many contemporary Ukrainian historians would present, in a quite teleological manner, the year 1991—Ukraine's *annus mirabilis*—as a glorious event on the long and thorny path of the Ukrainian people toward political independence and a national state. The major signposts on that path, they would assert, are Kievan Rus', the "Ukrainian Cossack State" of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and the Ukrainian People's Republic of 1917–20. According to this linear master narrative, the referendum on independence in December 1991 caps the millennium-long process of Ukrainian state- and nation-building. Harvard professor Roman Szporluk, however, believes that the Ukrainian national project is a much more modern phenomenon. In his opinion, Ukraine quite recently was carved out of the peripheries—"Ukraines"—of three historical empires: Russian, Ottoman, and Austro-Hungarian.² The process of forging a nation on these diverse lands began in earnest only in the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth and is still going on.

The heterogeneity of Ukraine's regions accounts for the different pace in the development of a "national idea." In western Ukraine (the Hapsburgs' Galicia), Ukrainians (Ruthenians) were confronted with the virulent ethnic nationalism of the Poles, who administered the territory and wanted to turn it into a bridgehead for the revival of the Polish state. A bitter and fierce struggle ensued, in the course of which Ukrainian peasants, facing the threat of Polonization and having a distinct religious, social, and ethnic culture, have shaped a strong and clear-cut sense of national identity.

However, the overwhelming majority of ethnic Ukrainians lived in "Russian Ukraine" as subjects of the Russian czar. The officials of His Imperial Majesty were preoccupied not with national consciousness but with the political loyalty of the governed peoples. Unlike in Polish-ruled Galicia, in the Romanov Empire Ukrainians were offered a two-tiered identity—an imperial one (which was much

broader than the ethnic term *russkii*) and a regional one (*maloruski*)—as long as the latter was politically compatible with the former. A distinct *Ukrainian* national identity—one implying a radical shift of loyalty away from empire and toward the Ukrainian nation—was very rare before 1917 and was confined predominantly to a narrow circle of local intellectuals.

Even at the peak of national mobilization during the Revolution and civil war, a sense of group identity in Ukraine remained rather amorphous and fluid. In the words of an English diplomatic report dated May 1918,

The peasants speak the Little Russian dialect; a small group of nationalist intelligentsia now professes a Ukrainian identity distinct from that of the Great Russians. Whether such a nationality exists is usually discussed in terms in which the question can receive no answer. Were one to ask the average peasant in the Ukraine his nationality, he would answer that he is Greek Orthodox; if pressed to say whether he is a Great Russian, a Pole, or a Ukrainian, he would probably reply that he is a peasant; and if one insisted on knowing what language he spoke, he would say that he talked the "local tongue." One might perhaps get him to call himself by a proper national name and say that he is "russkii," but this declaration would hardly prejudice the question of a Ukrainian relationship; he simply doesn't think of nationality in the terms familiar to the intelligentsia. Again, if one tried to find out to what State he desires to belong—whether he wanted to be ruled by an All-Russian or a separate Ukrainian Government—one would find that in his opinion all Governments alike are a nuisance, and that it would be best if the "Christian peasant-folk" were left to themselves.³

The turmoil of the revolutionary period raised somewhat the level of national consciousness of Ukrainian peasants. They came to distinguish between themselves and the scores of intruders from the (Russian-speaking) cities, who would talk a different tongue and sneer at the local dialect and culture. Red Army units (*prodotriady*) would ransack the Ukrainian countryside and take wheat from the peasants to feed their troops. "They quickly perceived that the conflict between themselves and these strangers was a struggle to control the food they grew."⁴ Out of their "petty bourgeois" indignation and economic wrath a political notion was born that "alien rule is illegitimate rule," that Ukrainians—those honest and hard-working land tillers—should be governed by the people of their kin. Guided by this idea, millions of Ukrainian peasants became a social base (albeit a rather volatile one) for a succession of Ukrainian independent governments in 1917–20.

Although that first attempt to establish a sovereign Ukrainian state failed, the level of national self-consciousness attained by the Ukrainian masses compelled the victorious Moscow Bolsheviks to seek a compromise with the regained former imperial borderland to legitimize Communist rule. This compromise was realized through the establishment of the Socialist Ukrainian (quasi) state—Ukrainian SSR—the Communist Party of Ukraine, and an affirmative action-like cultural and linguistic policy—*Ukrainizatsiya*. It is important to stress, however, that from the outset the "policy of national rebirth" in Ukraine was under Moscow's control, with the Main Political Directorate and the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs policing "excesses" in the spheres of local academia and culture.

Even at its height, Ukrainianization produced quite mixed results. In 1930 the Soviet Ukrainian writer Borys Antonenko-Davydovych was complaining,

One could live one's entire life in a Ukrainian city and not know Ukrainian. You could ask the conductor in a Kyiv streetcar a question in Ukrainian and he would not understand or would pretend that he did not understand you. A Ukrainian writer, appearing before a provincial audience, might discover that ninety percent of the audience had never read any of his works or heard anything about him at all. But it should be axiomatic that it is best and most "natural" to learn Ukrainian in a Ukrainian city, for the most part to hear Ukrainian on Kyiv's streets, and for eighty percent of the readers to borrow Ukrainian books from urban libraries. $2 \times 2 = 4$, right? But this equation has yet to be demonstrated under our conditions in Ukraine. For us, this is still a theorem.⁵

In the early 1930s, Kremlin leaders sensed that they could do without concessions made to Ukrainians (and the other Soviet national minorities, *natsmeny*). In the aftermath of Stalin's revolution from above, the Ukrainianization was resolutely reversed and its champions (together with the new national cadres created) were decimated. After that, and increasingly after World War II, Moscow in its dealings with Ukraine resorted to a policy that more and more resembled the one pursued by Imperial Russia. In the words of one historian,

Soviet nationality policy placed Ukrainians in an uncertain situation, for it forced them to choose between two ephemeral identities: "Ukrainian," which, in the sense of a modern, national identity, had little chance to establish itself throughout Ukraine, and "Soviet," which was still in the process of formation. In effect, when the USSR collapsed in 1991, Ukrainians found themselves drifting between two rather hazy concepts.⁶

Thus, it would be fair to say that, with a handful of fiery Ukrainian nationalist dissidents put away safely in a gulag, almost no one in Ukraine before 1989 ever thought of creating an independent state or made any attempts to attain one. Even when Rukh—the most widely backed national-democratic organization—emerged, its official name was "The Movement in Support of Perestroika Policies."

1991: The Second Attempt

One preliminary conclusion is in order. Ukrainian independence was not the result of an eventual triumph of a "submerged people" over its "colonizers" but rather the unexpected and incidental by-product of the inglorious failure of the weakened and divided Center. It was not a "rebellious Ukrainian nation" (together with other peoples of the former USSR) that brought the Communist empire down, but rather the other way around: the collapse of communism eventually gave rise to the independent Ukrainian state.

In fact, events in 1991 somewhat resembled those of 1917. In 1917, in the tempestuous days of "revolutionary March," the power crisis in Petrograd was used by Ukrainian political activists as a pretext to form Kyiv Central Rada and extend its jurisdiction over nine Ukrainian provinces. The precipitously shrinking power of Gorbachev in the wake of the August 1991 coup prompted Ukraine's Communist elite to grab their chance and do away with central control. That is not to say that there was no popular support for self-determination. There was Rukh, led

by Kyiv and Lviv intelligentsia, who were guided by traditional nationalist perceptions. There were also broader “toiling masses,” mostly sick and tired of dislocations caused by perestroika, who sincerely believed that they would be better off in “economically rich” and “socially calm” sovereign Ukraine. Popular attitudes in 1991–92 were similar to those in 1917–18. A number of polls conducted recently by the Kyiv-based Democratic Initiatives Research Center and the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology clearly reveal the existence of a deep-rooted mass conviction that neighboring countries (above all, Russia) have continuously been draining everything of value from Ukraine. This popular suspicion found its apt reflection in a mocking propaganda slogan, *Moskali z'ily nashe salo!* (the Russians have eaten up our pig fat), which cannot help evoking the Ukrainian peasants' attitude toward the Russian Red Guards' *prodtriady* ransacking the Ukrainian countryside during the civil war.

Thus the momentous events of 1991 should not be viewed as the logical end of a protracted and heroic national-liberation struggle (which did not exist) but rather as a compromise struck by the three major groups making up the Ukrainian population. As a result, the wiliest Kyiv Communist apparatchiks, who were smart enough to understand that the only way to remain on top was to immediately turn their coats and masquerade as true nationalists, managed to set themselves free from their Moscow masters and retain full political and economic power. Unlike the old nomenklatura, true nationalists (mostly western Ukrainians, the Rukh movement, and some intellectuals) did not receive anything tangible but still got the coveted symbolic prize, Ukraine's independence—a dreamed-of goal but one that would have remained absolutely unattainable but for the deal with the Communists. And finally, the bulk of the *narod*—the people (mostly from the eastern and southern regions of the country) who threw their overwhelming support behind the idea of independence in the 1 December 1991 referendum—hoped, first and foremost, for a better and more prosperous life in the bountiful “breadbasket of Europe.”

The Soviet legacy directly influenced the way in which the historic compromise in Ukraine was achieved. The nature of that compromise has to a large extent determined the future social development of the country and the character of its bungled “transition.”

The Old-New Elite

In his perceptive essay “The Problem of Russian-Ukrainian Relations in the Light of History,” which came out in Prague in 1930, Petr Mikhailovich Bitsilli, a Russian émigré-scholar living in Sofia, pointed out that

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the drive toward cultural and political secession only to a certain extent is a fruit of the [nationalist] intelligentsia's liberalism. In many cases the real—although hidden—motives here are careerism, a desire to promote oneself, to play a role. A new state means a multitude of new possibilities—parliamentary seats, diplomatic posts, ministerial portfolios. In a new capital a modest school teacher can count on getting a position of academician, a company commander—a position of the chief of General Staff.”⁷

What class or group of people in the post-Soviet Ukraine could benefit most from the country's political secession?

In the almost total absence of a mature nation, civil society, political culture, democratic institutions, or experienced counterelite, only the old Communist cadres were in a position to advance serious claims to leadership in the newly independent Ukrainian state. They simply had no strong competitors. According to various estimates, up to 80 percent of the sovereign Ukraine's government elite, both in Kyiv and regional centers, are members of the old nomenklatura. Some of the most farsighted Ukrainian analysts of the past, such as Viacheslav Lypyns'ky, a conservative thinker and historian from the Ukrainian interwar emigration, had predicted that the creation of an independent state would not be possible without cooperation between nationalists and Communists. There is no doubt, however, that even for Lypyns'ky the almost complete holdover of personnel that occurred in Ukraine after 1991 would seem to be too much.

In the opinion of the historian Orest Subtelny, there are two types of news with regard to the present-day Ukrainian rulers—good and bad. The good news, Subtelny argued in his presentation at this year's convention of the Association for the Study of Nationalities, is that Ukraine had finally acquired its own elite, meaning that for the first time in its history the country is being governed by locals, the people who were born in the territory.

The bad news, however, is that this “national” elite is a “nasty bunch of people.” The Ukrainian political scientist Dmytro Vydrin, who at one time served as an adviser to President Leonid Kuchma, substantiates Subtelny's assessment. Vydrin attempted—based on his own observations and experience—to summarize the key tenets of the Ukrainian post-Soviet elite's political philosophy. Almost all members of the elite, he asserted, share the following beliefs:

- Power and hierarchy are of absolute and highest worth—higher than money, higher than even life itself.
- The country, state, people, common citizens are the tools of the power, the means for attaining the power and authority.
- The current objectives of the government officials are more important than the long-term strategic objectives of the country.
- Dignity, pride, and free thinking are features that prevent people from being good performers and specialists.
- The opposition are those who obstruct the elite in being effective rulers.
- Stability is a situation when nobody criticizes the authority.
- Strategic foreign partners are the countries that extend credits and ask no questions about how they are expended.

- Potential foreign enemies are the countries who either do not extend credits or demand that they be paid back.
- Reforms are the recommendations of the International Monetary Fund that do not have to be implemented, but for which money can be obtained.
- Regions are places inhabited by second-rate people, who lack either the brains or the money to live in the capital.

How can such an elite respond to the challenges of Ukraine's four-pronged transition: shaping a nation, building a state, constructing democratic institutions, and carrying out liberal economic reforms? The answer is rather simple: What many Western analysts and advisers view as the only true path to political and economic normality may not necessarily be on the agenda of the current Ukrainian rulers. Even if the elites in Kyiv wanted to undertake the transition in earnest, any Ukrainian leader would still need, according to Taras Kuzio's witticism, to "combine the qualities of Abraham Lincoln, Adam Smith, and Nelson Mandela."⁹ The truth is that the personal interests of the people who came to power in Ukraine at the end of 1991 infrequently coincide with what may be termed national or state interests.

A research strategy based on the study of interests revealed a very important fact: Ukrainian leadership simulates the key function of representing and protecting the interests of the nation-state rather than actually fulfilling it. The German scholar Andreas Wittkowski calls this the "major dilemma of [post-Soviet] political economy": What is being realized in everyday Ukrainian politics is not so much national interests as individual and group interests. That is what has made the postcommunist transformation in Ukraine a "five-year period without a plan." The struggle among interest groups (and between societal institutions), which is being waged in the framework of all four transitions, makes any planned reform virtually impossible. The participants in the struggle usually take up simple rent seeking—deriving income from politically guaranteed redistribution, in other words, conversion of power into property.¹⁰

Virtual Economy

It is unbridled rent seeking—milking properties under one's control for personal gain—that is behind Ukraine's "virtual economy," a system where

most processes have several meanings. Terms of exchange of goods do not reflect their market values since almost half of all transactions take place in barter. Book profits have little to do with firms' revenues since most debts remain unpaid for many months. Budget deficit does not reflect a balance between planned revenues and expenditures since some of the government commitments remain unfulfilled.¹¹

The key characteristic of virtual economy is that it is absolutely nontransparent—it is impossible to see through it and hard to understand how it works. Because the real value of bartered goods is difficult to calculate, barter transactions, including tax payments via mutual debt cancellations, create opportunities for corruption and theft. Such a system also encourages an unhealthy relationship between the government bureaucracy and business because, given the general

weakness of the banking system, the state remains the largest single agent capable of providing financing to firms. Thus, to become rich in Ukraine, instead of thinking how to boost production and organize efficient distribution, one should rather try to cut deals with the state *chinovniki*. Those privileged few who have managed to establish and maintain mutually beneficial relationships with state representatives are guaranteed that with some palm greasing they will capture enormous profits based on government subsidies, tax write-offs, official regulations, access to energy inputs, legal monopolies, export licenses, and high-interest government debt.

So who in Ukraine will act as the major agent of change and resolutely proceed toward real market relations? The answer is not obvious because the people actually running the national economy—enterprise managers and government officials—are exactly those who have built the present highly corrupt and unproductive system of barter, nonpayment, and mutual cancellation of debts.

Shadow Politics

Rent seeking by elites also poisons and perverts Ukraine's political system and institutions. The majority of local political parties are nothing more than lobbying groups organized around clusters of economic interests. The overwhelming majority of the Ukrainian tycoons have become leaders of political parties and members of parliament to better influence decision making in the spheres affecting their interests. Some observers persuasively argue that, along with the shadow economy, in Ukraine there is also shadow politics. That would normally comprise behind-the-scenes discussions and deals between the Ukrainian potentates from both the executive and legislature on such touchy issues as privatization, extending of privileges to certain interest groups, access to government credits, creation of "free economic zones," and so forth. Like its economic counterpart, shadow politics is nontransparent, too. The Ukrainian public is unaware of the nature of the relationship between government and big business or that between central and regional bureaucracies. In the murky realm of shadow politics, the rules of the game are established not by the laws but by the players themselves. According to data provided by the Ukrainian parliament's Institute of Legislation, of thirty thousand legal acts, the laws constitute only 4.6 percent. This means that the country does not live according to its constitution and laws but has to abide by the innumerable normative acts, resolutions, and directives designed by self-interested state bureaucracy and issued by various branches of government.

According to Kyiv-based political analyst Volodymyr Polokhalo, a political black market has emerged in Ukraine, where the main object of buying and selling political decisions takes the form of bills, laws, amendments, decrees, state officials' orders, and so forth. It is on this basis that the current political regime has taken shape. The key players of the regime are the so-called consortia (or corporate clans) formed by representatives of political and business elites.¹² Anders Aslund of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace echoes Polokhalo: "Ukraine is ruled by a trinity of the government, business and parliament, all living off and for corruption and rent seeking."¹³ What about the transition to true

political democracy and rule of law? Who, what social forces, will carry out this transformation? Again, there appears to be no meaningful answer to this question. One thing is clear though: The current leaders of Ukraine are busy doing something else.

Divided Nation, Weak State

Some have argued that in Ukraine, given its posttotalitarian, postimperial legacies, it was easier to build a nation and state than to struggle with the nearly insurmountable challenges of political and economic reform. That is why, the argument goes, Kravchuk and Kuchma concentrated their efforts on the tasks of nation- and state-building, and even achieved some moderate successes. Seemingly sound theoretically, this supposition looks rather dubious if one looks at what actually happened.

Because of Ukraine's regional, ethnic, and linguistic heterogeneity, its leaders in nation-building efforts had no choice but to opt for the "civic" rather than the ethnic concept of a nation. For the civic concept to be successfully realized, the populace must develop a strong sense of territorial and state loyalty. Only on this solid basis is it possible to experiment with "nationalizing" policies aimed at achieving a cultural and national cohesion, for after all, any modern nation is a combination of civic and ethnic components.

As mentioned above, in December 1991 the majority of Ukraine's population enthusiastically backed the idea of independence, for they believed they would be better off in "rich" Ukraine than in the decrepit Soviet Union. As one Rukh leader sadly remarked right after the referendum, "Ukrainians voted not with their hearts but with their stomachs." So it was a typical case of "economic nationalism." The twentieth century witnessed other manifestations of this same phenomenon. For instance, German patriotism and national identity after 1945 were strongly influenced by economic factors, namely the German economic miracle—*Wirtschaftswunder*.

Following the catastrophe of 1945, West German society was very wary of traditional national patriotism. West Germany's self-confidence and thus internal stability were rooted to a considerable degree in the "economic miracle." Many Germans took the opinion that the German state was only justified because it had the task of guaranteeing the people a few more percentage points of prosperity every year.¹⁴

In Ukraine, however, no economic miracle occurred to boost the populace's territorial and state allegiance. To the contrary, the country lived through a tremendous economic decline, and the hopes of millions of people for a better life in independent Ukraine were dramatically dashed. The leaders in Kyiv lost the chance to shape a modern nation—a coherent group of people committed to one identity, one state, and (preferably) one language—by building on that initial upsurge of economic nationalism. Ukraine remains a deeply divided society, lacking popular cohesion and national consensus.

Mixed results were achieved in the realm of the fourth transition—building a state. True, Kyiv managed to create the accouterments of modern state—legations to international organizations, embassies and a diplomatic corps, armed forces

and border guards, police and secret service. However, in terms of effectiveness, the Ukrainian state is extremely weak, mainly because of the self-aggrandizing instincts of its elites. The practice of rent seeking and its inevitable product, a corrupt virtual economy, are undermining the state's ability to govern effectively. In Ukraine almost no one pays taxes. However, if a state is unable to collect enough taxes, it cannot properly provide for its education system and health care institutions; it cannot support and modernize its military and pay off its debts. Such a state may seem to be strong when it deals with an individual citizen, who can easily be bullied by some thuggish bureaucrat in the absence of the rule of law. In all other important respects, the Ukrainian state is almost impotent.

Popular Attitudes

What about the *narod*? What do Ukraine's people think about the "transition period"? Judging by the results of numerous opinion polls, the mainstream popular sentiment can be tersely described as a combination of deep dissatisfaction and utter hopelessness. It is not surprising that Ukrainians are unhappy about growing impoverishment and misery or the undemocratic ways of their rulers. However, data cited by leading Ukrainian sociologist Evhen Holovakha register some alarming trends. Polls indicate a steady increase in the number of people disappointed in the idea of transforming the economy into a market-based system. Similarly, although the level of public satisfaction with the state of democracy in Ukraine is dropping, the number of people who disagree with the Western path of development, or who think that Ukrainian democracy has nothing in common with Western democracy, is on the rise. Ukrainian public opinion also reflects a growing mistrust of political institutions, parties, and political leaders.¹⁵ In a word, people are extremely unhappy but not ready to change the situation for the better.

Such popular attitudes seem paradoxical. But an average Ukrainian is mostly preoccupied with the problem of physical survival. As long as he can somehow muddle through under the current conditions, he is very reluctant to tip the existing balance, fearing that things might change for the worse. Instead, he adjusts to the status quo, no matter how detestable it might be. In Holovakha's phrase, Ukrainian masses definitely prefer a "bad peace" to a "good war." Interestingly, this aversion to social change—presumably based on the fear of social chaos—unites Ukraine's rulers and ruled. The former are afraid of losing power and acquired wealth, the latter, of losing what little they have.

Social apathy and political passivity, coupled with the servile acquiescence displayed by the overwhelming majority of Ukrainian citizens, have prompted Polokhalo to speak about the mentality of *non-civility* as a key characteristic of an average Ukrainian. "In the post-Soviet Ukraine," he writes, "there is almost no middle class which constitutes the social base of civil society. Instead, a social identity of an 'average Ukrainian' has formed as a base of *non-civil* society."¹⁶ This is bad news for Ukraine's small and poorly organized groups of reform-minded politicians. Without broad popular support, attempts at social change are doomed to failure.

“Zaireization”

A couple of years ago, musing on the prospects of Ukraine’s post-Soviet development, Alexander Motyl mentioned what he believed might be the worst-case scenario: the country’s transformation into a corrupt and impoverished state, or in his word, “Zaireization”—the turning of Ukraine into an East European version of former Zaire. The essence of such a development is that “corrupt elites feed off their state, their society, and their economy, ultimately driving them all to possible perdition.”¹⁷ Judging by all appearances, Ukraine is already moving down this sorry path.

NOTES

1. Dankwart Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy: Towards a Dynamic Model,” *Comparative Politics* 2, no. 3 (1970): 350.
2. See his “Ukraine: From an Imperial Periphery to a Sovereign State,” *Daedalus* 126, no. 3 (1997): 85–119.
3. Marc Raeff, *Political Ideas and Institutions in Imperial Russia* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 66.
4. George O. Liber, *Soviet Nationality Policy, Urban Growth, and Identity Change in the Ukrainian SSR, 1923–1934* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 6.
5. Borys Antonenko-Davydovych, *Zemleiu ukrains’koiu* (Kharkiv: 1930; reprint, Philadelphia: Ukrainian diaspora, 1955), 59–60; quoted in Liber, 1.
6. Orest Subtelny, “An Ambiguities of National Identity: The Case of Ukraine,” in *Ukraine: The Search For a National Identity*, ed. Sharon L. Wolchik and Volodymyr Zvighyanich (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 4.
7. Petr Bitsilli, *Izbrannyye trudy po filologii* (Moscow, 1996), 134.
8. See *Ukraine: Challenges of the Continuing Transition*, Conference Report, Meridian International Center, Washington, 30 June 1999, 49–50.
9. Taras Kuzio, “Ukraine: A Four-Pronged Transition,” in *Contemporary Ukraine: Dynamics of Post-Soviet Transformation*, ed. T. Kuzio (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), 176.
10. See Andreas Wittkowski, *Piatiletka bez plana. Ukraina: 1991–1996: Formirovanie natsional'nogo gosudarstva, ekonomika, elity* (Kyiv, 1998).
11. Alexander Pivovarsky, “The Challenges of Ukraine’s Economic Transition,” in *Ukraine: Challenges of the Continuing Transition*, 23.
12. See Volodymyr Polokhalo, “Negrazhdanskoe obshchestvo kak sotsiopoliticheskii fenomen Ukrainy,” *Polis* 6 (1999): 29.
13. Anders Aslund, “Problems with Economic Transformation in Ukraine,” paper presented at the Fifth Dubrovnik Conference on Transition Economies, 23–25 June 1999; quoted in Jack F. Matlock, “The Nowhere Nation,” *New York Review of Books*, 24 February 2000, 45.
14. Gerhard Simon, “Problems Facing the Formation of the Ukrainian State,” *Aussenpolitik* 45, no. 1 (1994): 64.
15. See Evhen Holovakha, “Popular Social and Political Attitudes in Ukraine,” in *Ukraine: The Search For a National Identity*, 199–212.
16. Polokhalo, “Negrazhdanskoe obshchestvo kak sotsiopoliticheskii fenomen Ukrainy,” 28.
17. Alexander Motyl, “State, Nation, and Elites in Independent Ukraine,” in *Contemporary Ukraine*, 11.