After Kosovo: The Impact of NATO Expansion on Russian Political Parties

Johanna Granville

During the heated debate leading up to the Senate’s ratification of the Clinton administration decision to enlarge NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), opponents predicted that expansion would alienate Russia, with dire consequences for world peace. Nevertheless, by a vote of 80 to 19, the Senate endorsed the policy on 30 April 1998. One by one, over the ensuing months, parliaments in other NATO member countries ratified the expansion decision as well. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic became the newest members of NATO in a ceremony held in Independence, Missouri, on 12 March 1999.

The crisis in Kosovo that occasioned NATO military action against the Russian-favored Yugoslavian government and its president, Slobodan Milosevic, has ended. However, the issues of NATO expansion and Kosovo will no doubt figure prominently in the Russian presidential election in June 2000. The time is right to take stock and ask: Have recent NATO decisions discredited the liberal Russian political parties and strengthened the conservative ultranationalist and Communist parties?

A common shortcoming of articles predicting the worst in this regard has been the tendency to treat Russia as a unified body. Perhaps this was permissible, indeed necessary, when the West lacked detailed information about the Kremlin during the cold war period. Today, however, a more discriminating analysis is not only possible, but imperative. Russia has a more-or-less free press and more than one hundred political parties (forty-three of which gained enough support to run slates of candidates in the December 1995 Duma elections). Unlike many oversimplified articles by Western pundits with a political agenda, in this article I will draw mainly on statements made by Russians themselves.

I will provide a framework for assessing the impact of the NATO expansion policy on internal Russian politics and public opinion using the positions and motivations of the Russian political parties. After a brief discussion of the Yeltsin administration’s viewpoint, I will summarize the views of each of the other key

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parties across the political spectrum and will show that, while most Russian political parties oppose the expansion policy, they do so for different reasons.4

Why NATO Expansion?
The origins of the U.S. decision have been covered extensively elsewhere, and will be touched on only briefly here.5 In the first term of the Clinton presidency, not long after the Soviet collapse, Washington policymakers acknowledged that the United States has a vital interest in Russia’s evolution toward democratic stability and in its incorporation into the newly developing European security order. President Clinton stated as much in his May 1997 document “National Security Strategy for a New Century.” A Partnership for Peace (PfP) program between Russia and NATO, signed on 27 May 1997, constituted an important step toward this goal.6

Policymakers also realized that Russia still has about 7,000 long-range missiles capable of reaching the United States, and that implementing the START II treaty, which would eliminate 3,000 of those warheads, was a top priority. Yet, concurrent with PfP negotiations between Russia and NATO, the Clinton administration in 1994 abruptly announced a separate NATO enlargement program, with plans to expand the alliance by admitting qualified Eastern European countries. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry disclosed in his latest book that he warned the president at a top-level meeting on 21 December 1994 that “early expansion was a mistake” because it would provoke “distrust” in Russia and undermine cooperation on arms control.7 NATO allies were also puzzled. As one European diplomat said, “Like everyone else, we assumed that PfP would last for a decade at least, and Clinton took us by surprise in 1994 with NATO expansion. We couldn’t afford another split with the USA, after what happened in Bosnia, so we went along with it.”8 The persistent lobbying by representatives of the so-called Visegrad countries (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia) and Clinton’s desire to attract votes from Polish-Americans are probably two key factors influencing the decision.

Yeltsin Administration: Tempered Resistance
The Russian response to NATO expansion has in general been rather disorganized and erratic. Initially President Boris Yeltsin agreed to former Soviet satellites’ joining NATO. In 1992–93, Russia’s declared position was that each Central European state had a right to participate in any international organization, and that Russia could not “forbid anyone from joining NATO.”9 Yeltsin signed a joint declaration with Polish president Walesa in August 1993, stating that, in the long term, Poland’s decision to join NATO was in the interest of furthering its European integration and did not go against the interests of Russia.10 Later that year, perhaps after additional consultation with his advisers, Yeltsin stepped back slightly from his original remarks by stressing that NATO enlargement must also take Russian security concerns into consideration and that Central European states should become NATO members only if Russia was permitted the same opportunity.11 Even so, at the January 1994 Moscow summit with President Clin-
ton, Yeltsin continued to strongly endorse the PfP as a beneficial relationship for NATO and Russia.

By the end of 1994, when it was clear Russia would not be invited to join NATO—at least not in the first round—and that PfP would provide no veto power to Russia in NATO security matters, President Yeltsin’s rhetoric turned dramatically against NATO expansion. In December 1994, he warned that Europe was in danger of falling into a “cold peace” and that NATO expansion would create new demarcation lines in Europe, “sowing the seeds of mistrust.” As the December 1995 State Duma elections and June 1996 presidential elections approached, Yeltsin inveighed further against NATO expansion. At a September 1995 press conference, he told reporters that NATO expansion could lead to a “conflagration of war” and that Russia would rebuild another Warsaw Pact in that event. That same month, he repeated his warnings that an enlarged NATO bumping Russia’s borders would lead to the formation of a countering military bloc of former Soviet republics.

In 1998–99, Yeltsin made increasingly strident remarks against NATO expansion and military action in Kosovo. To protest NATO bombing, he immediately suspended Russia’s participation in the Partnership for Peace; recalled Russia’s chief military envoy to NATO (Lieutenant General Viktor Zavarzin); closed Russia’s offices at NATO headquarters; and recalled one hundred members of the Kosovo Verification Team from Macedonia. These actions stem in part from Yeltsin’s single-digit approval ratings and the need to appease deputies from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) in the Duma who were endeavoring to impeach him. Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov, for example, once a loyalist, now criticizes Yeltsin for “his lack of will to lift the country out of the crisis,” and has called for a restriction of presidential authority and a broader mandate for parliament.

One should consider Yevgeny Primakov’s views, since many people, including Mikhail Gorbachev, believe he may become the next Russian president.
makov’s dismissal (by Yeltsin) as prime minister on 12 May 1999 may increase his popularity, as did Yeltsin’s dismissal of Lebedev, and earlier, Gorbachev’s dismissal of Yeltsin. After replacing Sergei Kiriyenko as prime minister in September 1998, Primakov criticized NATO expansion more vigorously. While he opposes the alliance’s expansion in general, he “flatly object[s] to the possible accession of former USSR republics to NATO.” He said, “We will be forced to take a number of measures if any of the former USSR republics joins it.” Primakov has referred often to NATO’s actions in Iraq and Kosovo as evidence of NATO aggressive intentions to circumvent the United Nations. To counter NATO, he suggested forming a Russia-China-India triangle. Having opposed military force against Milosevic in response to the latter’s treatment of Albanians in Kosovo, Primakov canceled his visit to Washington in late March 1999 when the bombings started.

Primakov’s successor as foreign minister, Igor Ivanov, and Russia’s representative to the UN, Sergei Lavrov, also denounced the “NATO aggression” as a “crude violation of the UN Charter.” Ivanov has played a large role as an advocate of Yeltsin’s policy abroad. He thinks that NATO expansion, rather than erasing cold war dividing lines, only draws new lines. To counter NATO’s moves in the Balkans, Ivanov has been courting Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic, even going so far as to pledge Russian military support in case NATO bombs the former Yugoslavia over the Kosovo issue. (Fortunately, this did not happen.) He also suggested thwarting NATO expansion with preemptive moves, such as co-opting the Baltic states before NATO absorbed them. Ivanov hinted that Russia may need to beef up defense in Kaliningrad if an effective partnership is not forged with the Baltic states.

Another opponent of NATO expansion in Yeltsin’s administration, Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev, goes further by tackling the issue of eventual Russian membership in NATO. Russia could never join NATO, he said, because the alliance would then cease to exist; NATO’s sole purpose is to oppose Russia militarily. Showing his strong suspicion toward NATO, Sergeyev has pushed for Russia to seek other alliances, specifically with Beijing. After the NATO bombings of Kosovo, Sergeyev proposed the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus.

Although the NATO attack on Yugoslavia intensified anti-NATO sentiment in Russia, it was tempered by Russia’s need for economic assistance. One should note the actions Yeltsin did not take in retaliation against the NATO bombings. He could have threatened to shelve the START II treaty and send military aid to Yugoslavia. For economic reasons, centrist politicians such as Yavlinsky have criticized Primakov for canceling talks with key Clinton administration officials, during which he planned to negotiate for new International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans. Russia’s total foreign debts have reached $150 billion, and its reserves are down to less than $11 billion.

**Russian Domestic Political Positions**

President Yeltsin was not the only Russian to voice early concern and frustration over the NATO expansion issue. Various members of the Russian Duma also
became more vocal in their criticism as it became clearer that Russia was not going to influence policy regarding the expansion of the Western alliance. Members of the Russian parliament play an important role in Russian foreign policy, because they control the budget, have the power to ratify treaties, and help shape public opinion.

In January 1997, deputies in the State Duma organized an anti-NATO association within that body to hamper or reverse NATO expansion plans. The association now consists of 350 Russian parliamentarian deputies. In January 1998, they passed a resolution calling NATO enlargement the “most serious military threat to our country since 1945” and demanded that President Yeltsin immediately begin working with the government to develop a countering plan of action. Lobbying by this group resulted in the Duma’s holding hearings on NATO expansion in early March 1999. The leaders of the two biggest parties in the Duma (the CPRF and LDPR) said: “It is necessary to do everything possible to counter the threats to Russia’s national security, posed by the North Atlantic Alliance’s eastward enlargement.”

As a part of those proceedings, the deputies considered a proposal that linked the START II treaty with guarantees of no further NATO expansion. It calls for “sufficient international legal guarantees for NATO’s non-expansion to the East and revision of the nature of the alliance.” Out of the hearings the conclusion emerged that “NATO’s expansion and its new blueprint will pose the most serious threat to Russia at the beginning of the 21st century.” The hearings in the Duma indicate that NATO has reason to be concerned over the Russian reaction. A majority (350 out of 450) of deputies have joined the anti-NATO association, enabling the Duma to react to NATO expansion in any way it sees fit.

**Right-Wing Conservatives/Reactionaries:**

Communists and Ultranalationalists

For analytical purposes, we can describe the Russian political spectrum today in terms of five main political groups: (1) communists, (2) ultranationalists, (3) centrist bureaucrats, (4) centrist democrats, and (5) radical liberals. Since 1994, a near-universal consensus against NATO enlargement has developed across this spectrum. Together the CPRF and LDPR hold a plurality of seats in the State Duma; thus it is appropriate to start with them. Their anti-Western orientation antedates the NATO expansion controversy, and it is therefore not surprising that they have protested the most loudly against both the expansion and NATO bombing of Yugoslavia. The Communists view the expansion as merely a Western imperialist excuse to gain a stronger foothold in the region and eventually cause Russia’s downfall. Dedicated as some are to restoring the original borders of the USSR, they have focused their opposition on the prospect of NATO’s further expansion beyond the so-called red line, into former Soviet-controlled territory, to encompass Soviet successor states such as Ukraine and the Baltic countries.

With more than a half a million members and in control of 22.3 percent of Duma seats (157 out of 450), the CPRF wields considerable power. Its leader, Gennady Zyuganov, is a serious rival of Yeltsin, having come so close to defeat-
ing him in the 1996 presidential election that a run-off was needed. In that sec-
second round, Zyuganov garnered a respectable 29 million votes, to Yeltsin’s 38 mil-
lion. He is certain to be a major contender in the next Russian presidential race.

An opportunist, Zyuganov has portrayed himself as more of a nationalist than a
Communist on some issues, arguing that “Marxism has outlived its usefulness”
and that “Russia’s historical and cultural uniqueness is much more important in
determining the country’s future than is the theory of class warfare.” Calling the
PfP agreement (notwithstanding NATO enlargement) “U.S. expansionism aimed
at Russia,” he has compared it to Operation Barbarossa, the code name for the 1941
Nazi invasion of Russia.

The rhetoric has not stopped there. Zyuganov referred to the Russia–NATO
PfP plan as a new Treaty of Versailles with a Russian victim, and portrayed Yeltsin
as shortsighted and unpatriotic. “We have no trust in our president [Yeltsin], who
cannot plan two steps in advance and is guilty of completely betraying the nation-
al interests of the country.” Speaking at a Russian military academy in April
1997, Zyuganov warned that NATO enlargement was sparking a renewed arms
race and that the West was dictating the conditions. As Zyuganov told the cadets,
“The West has realized that it is impossible to defeat us by force and therefore is
continuing the Cold War in a more perverted, barbarie manner.”

Most recently, however, Zyuganov blames the incumbent president for the
alliance’s expansion. At parliamentary hearings on “Military and Other Threats
to Russia in the Context of NATO’s Expansion,” he said: “NATO’s expansion can
be stopped if stability in Russia is restored. The policy pursued now is making
this an unattainable goal. The authorities have completely lost control; the pres-
ident is unable to work and the prime minister has been sent to Sochi, like Gor-
bachev was once sent to Foros.”

Another vocal Communist is former Russian vice president and October 1993
putsch leader Aleksandr Rutskoi. Now leading the Power (Derzhava) Party, Rut-
skoi has continually advocated a common movement to embrace both Commu-
nists and nationalists. In a July 1994 interview, he lambasted the Russian PfP
plan, calling it a national betrayal and humiliating agreement intended to force
Russia to “submit to the will of America.” He continued that “it would make more
sense to direct our efforts toward Asian and European countries” instead of playing
into the hands of American policymakers.

Ultranationalists and the Political Advantages of NATO Expansion
In contrast to the Communists, the ultranationalists are radically opposed to all
forms of NATO expansion, including the membership of Visegrad states and for-
mer Soviet states past the red line. They also oppose, to differing degrees, any
Russian cooperation with NATO, either as a PfP member or eventual full-fledged
NATO member. Many would not acquiesce in Russia’s becoming a NATO mem-
ber even in the case of an earnest plea by the West to join.

Russian ultranationalism is defined here as an exaggerated and intolerant form
of national feeling. It embraces collectivist, authoritarian, and imperialist con-
cepts and should not be confused with patriotism. As Russian historian Dmitri
Likhachev put it, “Patriotism spiritually enriches individuals and nations; that is the noblest of feelings. Nationalism, on the other hand, only pretends to be based on love for one’s country, but in fact is spawned by malice for other nations and people who think differently.” Ultranationalism, then, stems from a sense of inadequacy and lack of confidence, and thus manifests a nation’s weakness, not its strength. There are several ultranationalist, anti-market parties on the right, such as the Agrarian Party, Power to the People, and the Russian Communist Workers’ Party. However, the party with the most Duma seats other than the CPRF, is the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, led by Vladimir Zhirinovsky, which occupies 50 of the 450 seats. Zhirinovsky ran for president in 1996, finishing fifth with over four million votes. If enough signatures can be collected, he will also probably run for president in the 2000 elections, although lately he appears less popular than Zyuganov, Primakov, Stepashin, and Yavlinsky.

In a 1996 interview, Zhirinovsky vowed that if NATO expanded, Russia would launch a third world war in Europe in the next millennium. Not waiting for NATO to come to Russia’s borders, he said Russia would attack first and “rout NATO divisions on the territory of East European countries.”

Later, in October 1998, Zhirinovsky proposed that Yugoslavia be allowed to join the Commonwealth of Independent States. Emphasizing the strong ties between the LDPR and the Serbian ultranationalists led by Milosevic, Zhirinovsky has condoned the persecution of Albanians in Kosovo and admired the Serbs’ refusal to acquiesce to NATO. More recently, Zhirinovsky submitted a proposal to the State Duma calling on Russia to cut off supplies of Russian natural gas to the Czech Republic on 13 March 1999, one day after the Czech Republic formally became a NATO member.

Alexei Mitrofanov is another key member of Zhirinovsky’s LDPR, and currently chairman of the Geopolitics Committee of the Duma. He has stated that the West is “openly disregarding Russia’s interests” by expanding NATO, and that it is now time to dismiss any illusions that Russia will integrate itself with the West, either economically or politically. Mitrofanov disapproves of the stagnant Yeltsin government and is actively exploring the possibility of alliances with other nations on Russia’s “natural” borders, such as Germany, Japan, or China. Apparently intrigued by the idea of thwarting NATO expansion by co-opting one or more of its members, Mitrofanov suggested that for the next round of expansion, Russia could pledge concrete support for Turkey in exchange for a veto of further expansion beyond the red line. Some LDPR members, although they fulminate against NATO expansion, actu-
ally welcome the policy. They hope it will provoke a new confrontation between Russia and the West, which will serve to (1) provide an ideal external environment for discrediting the current Russian leadership, (2) restore order in Russia, (3) resurrect the empire by force across the former Soviet space, and (4) revive Moscow’s cooperation with anti-Western regimes in the developing world. In many ways, then, Zyuganov the Communist and Zhirinovsky the nationalist hold similar views on NATO expansion. Both use extreme rhetoric and would not allow Russia to join NATO even if invited. They only differ slightly about where to draw the line.

Retired Lieutenant General Alexander Lebed leads another rightist political party, the Russian Peoples’ Republican Party. Lebed, who served as the Fourteenth Army commander in Moldova and later as Yeltsin’s national security adviser, now governs the Siberian region of Krasnoyarsk. Along with Yevgeny Primakov, Grigory Yavlinsky, Sergei Stepashin, and Yuri Luzhkov, Lebed is likely to be a fairly strong contender in the presidential elections of 2000. During a 1995 interview, Lebed echoed Zhirinovsky’s threats by stating that NATO expansion threatens Russia and may bring about a third world war. Later that year, Lebed said NATO enlargement was “forcing Russia to renounce treaties and agreements it has already signed” and was forcing another arms race. “Deep within [NATO] headquarters,” he added, “future operations against Russia may be the motive for expansion.” Since those remarks, Lebed’s position has softened somewhat. When asked by an interviewer in February 1997 if NATO enlargement was inevitable, he responded, “We should have worried about all that before. Today, all we can do is contain the damage.” At a conference in Berlin in October 1997, he said he did not oppose the Baltic states’ membership in NATO but said that it should occur only after the Russian economy has improved. Explaining why he no longer viewed NATO as a threat to Russia, Lebed observed that “the rich and satisfied will never attack the poor and hungry.”

Despite the statements by individual politicians in the rightist parties, many of which are no doubt heartfelt, one cannot ignore the fact that NATO expansion and the NATO bombings in Kosovo yield concrete political advantages with presidential elections around the corner. According to Viktor Filatov, the LDPR’s public relations director, the party’s approval ratings rose by 10 percent in March 1999, during the height of the Kosovo crisis. The party currently has about 800,000 members, up from 450,000 a couple of years ago. Half-jokingly Filatov said, “We need one million signatures by January 1, so please launch an attack somewhere else, and we will reach our goal.” Moreover, the ratings of CPRF leader Zyuganov rose steadily from March to May 1999, above those for Primakov and Yavlinsky, the other two most popular leaders during the crisis.

Russian Military: Strategic Imbalance

The Russian military generally sympathizes with nationalists of the extreme right. Military officials view NATO expansion as a threat to Russian national security, specifically to Russia’s military industrial complex. The commander-in-chief of Russian ground forces, Colonel General Vladimir Semenov, stated in 1995 that NATO is expanding its sphere of influence under the “pretense of
strengthening trust,” but with NATO “approaching Russia’s borders, we should regard this as a threat.” Colonel General Valery Manilov, first deputy chief of the Russian General Staff, stated that NATO is an “obvious anachronism” that would force Russia to take countermeasures that could lead to a “suicidal war.”

Unilateral NATO bombings in Kosovo and Serbia convinced many military officials that the Russia–NATO Founding Act was a sham. In February 1999, for example, the chief of the General Staff, General Anatoly Kvasninin, said cautiously, “Everything depends on the future actions of all NATO members and their attitude toward Russia’s position. The Russia–NATO Founding Act stipulates that we are not adversaries, but partners. A single country should not do anything without coordination. If NATO takes unilateral steps, then, excuse me, we have our own pride. We will do whatever is necessary. Russia may pull out of the Russia–NATO Founding Act if the situation calls for it” [emphasis added].

Other military officials are keenly aware of the changing military balance: that NATO will now acquire twelve divisions, representing more than a 15 percent increase in the number of tanks, aircraft, and naval weapons systems. Noting this, Colonel General Leonid Ivashov, a top official in the Russian Defense Ministry, said, “This is nothing more than an attempt to create a unipolar European model against the background of a unipolar world.” They are also concerned about how arms treaties and strategic plans will be altered as a result of expansion. Many officials believe that several arms treaties governing European countries, such as the Conventional Arms in Europe (CFE) treaty, should be revised in light of NATO expansion. According to Colonel General Manilov, NATO expansion to the east “destroys the present system of treaties in the sphere of disarmament and arms cuts.” The ratification of the START-II treaty, which is currently being debated in the Duma, remains in jeopardy. State Duma speaker Gennady Seleznev told Strobe Talbott in October 1997 that the Duma might very well have ratified the START II treaty as early as 1994 or 1995 had NATO not decided to pursue an expansion program.

Perhaps in retaliation for NATO’s accepting Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic as members, the Russian military held a series of maneuvers in western Russia. However, the Defense Ministry officially denied that the exercises, in the North Caucasus Military District, for example, were “directed against the West in any way.” Rhetoric aside, like the CPRF and LDPR, the Defense Ministry has tried to benefit from NATO expansion. Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev repeatedly pleaded for an increase in defense spending. However, after much wrangling, the government ended up allocating more to foreign creditors than to the military: 110.88 billion rubles ($4.56 billion) or 2.17 percent of GDP will go to defense next year, and $9.5 billion will be set aside for expected payments to foreign countries against debts totaling 17.5 billion. Foreign creditors have decided to restructure Russia’s debt.

Centrists: Stab in the Back
Even before NATO expansion, the party programs of the right-wing ultranationalists and Communists were based on suspicion of the West. It is the disillusionment of the centrists and liberals in Russian politics that should most concern
Western policymakers. A sense of guilt, humiliation, and betrayal prevails among politicians across the board, but it is especially acute among the centrists and liberals for two main reasons: First, many of them see NATO as shutting Russia out of Europe, when their original intention was to tie Russia more closely to Europe. Inadvertently they had set in motion the forces that led to NATO’s expansion. Many of these liberals had been Gorbachev’s supporters and had adhered closely to his concept of the Obshchii Evropeiskii Dom [common European house], which would tightly integrate Russia with Europe. Gorbachev had hoped that by promoting tighter European integration a new European collective security organization could develop, and as a result, both cold war alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, could be disbanded.

Circulated internally among Foreign Ministry and Central Committee members in 1987 was a particularly influential report by Vyacheslav Dashichev of the Academy of Sciences’ Institute of the Economy of the World Socialist System, claiming that Europe could never be fully united until Germany was united. A “unilateral initiative” on Gorbachev’s part to promote German integration would “encounter irresistible support from the German population and put the Western powers on the defensive.” Dashichev, of course, had advocated unification on the basis of Germany’s neutrality and withdrawal from both of the two blocs. He reasoned that without Germany, NATO would lose its raison d’etre, and the Soviet Union would then be in a good position to propose the immediate dissolution of the two blocs. France and Great Britain would seek better relations with the USSR to counterbalance Germany. What Gorbachev and his liberal followers failed to anticipate was the Warsaw Pact’s quick collapse after unified Germany became part of NATO. To their chagrin, NATO not only did not disband but decided to expand by admitting former Soviet allies, but shutting out Russia. Thus the exact opposite of what the liberal, pro-Western policymakers had hoped actually took place. Arms control talks, the CFE treaty, for example, which had originally made Gorbachev a hero in the West, now humiliated him and his colleagues.

Second, the centrists and liberals feel betrayed. Gorbachev had agreed to the inclusion of a unified Germany in NATO based on the understanding that NATO would not expand to the east. Key conversations about this promise or “gentlemen’s agreement” have been documented by Gorbachev, Primakov, Jack Matlock (U.S. ambassador to the USSR), and others. Essentially, during the Two-plus-Four negotiations in 1990, Gorbachev stated that “any extension of the zone of NATO is unacceptable.” U.S. Secretary of State Baker replied, “I agree.” Sergei Karaganov, a member of the Russian Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, explains why Gorbachev did not get this promise in writing:

In 1990 we were told quite clearly by the West that dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and German unification would not lead to NATO expansion. We did not demand written guarantees because in the euphoric atmosphere of the time it would have seemed almost indecent, like two girlfriends giving written promises not to seduce each other’s husbands.

No wonder these policymakers are now dubious about NATO’s verbal assurances that it does not intend to place nuclear weapons in Central Europe. After
Yeltsin failed to obtain veto power in the Russia–NATO PfP agreement, and failed (when the Russia–NATO Founding Act was signed in 1997) to win a guarantee that NATO would not place nuclear weapons in the Visegrad states, the more pragmatic centrista charged that NATO expansion was isolating Russia from Western Europe and preventing reform, integration into free markets, and inclusion in key decision making forums regarding European security. Significantly, almost all of Yeltsin’s “Young Turk” pro–Western reformers either are now semiretired from politics or remain active but are extremely unpopular. Over the past year, for example, 83 percent to 85 percent of poll respondents month after month considered themselves nedoveriaiushchii (untrusting) of Yegor Gaidar.67 For Chubais, the ratings were only a fraction better: 80–83 percent did not trust him.68 Kozyrev is no longer visible. One possible exception is Yavlinsky, but he recently has decided to team up with Luzhkov (who has made very anti–American remarks), at least for the upcoming parliamentary elections.

There are two types of centrista: statist bureaucrats and statist democrats. Statist bureaucrats favor partnerships with the West but resist any perceived diminution of Russia’s sphere of influence or threat to Russia’s security interests. Although generally pragmatic, they do not hesitate to challenge Western agendas perceived as hostile to Russia’s interests. One group of statist bureaucrats is the Our Home is Russia (Nash Dom Rossii, or NDR) party, which holds 55 State Duma seats and is led by former prime minister Viktor Chernomyrdin. Apparently fearing a new cold war, Chernomyrdin warned in September 1997 that NATO expansion is the “largest strategic mistake since the end of the Cold War” and a “threat to Russia’s security.”69 His unwaveringly critical assessment of NATO enlargement stems from the view that NATO itself has outgrown its usefulness since the demise of the Soviet Union.

In contrast to the ultranationalists and Communists, statist bureaucrats usually refrain from extremist rhetoric. For example, Alexei Pushkov, a member of the NDR party and of the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy, argues that if Russia opposes the United States, it must do so in a rational, results-oriented manner. Oleg Lobov, former Security Council member and special envoy to Chechnya, also advocates moderation. While Lobov opposes NATO enlargement, he believes Russia should “neither dramatize, nor resort to steps of military or economic pressure in retaliation.”70 Another group of statist bureaucrats is the centrist coalition Fatherland (Otechestvo) that Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov established in November 1998. The Fatherland movement is emerging as a new party of power for the 1999 elections, not unlike the development of Our Home is Russia in 1995. Within a month, Fatherland established seventy-three regional chap-
The Impact of NATO Expansion

ters and about twenty regional governors are prepared to back Luzhkov. However, Fatherland lacks the highly organized national infrastructure of the CPRF. More recently, Luzhkov said that NATO’s eastward expansion “runs counter to the interests and philosophy of Russia, which is an integrated part of Europe.” As he told journalists, “I cannot see anything positive in this decision; I cannot understand its meaning. It is obviously aimed against Russia’s interests.”

Statist Democrats

Statist democrats, like the statist bureaucrats, oppose NATO expansion, but for different reasons. Perhaps slightly more than statist bureaucrats, they support partnerships with the West. In recent years, however, they have been careful to insist on agreements that preserve Russia’s co-equal status. The strongest statist democratic party is the Yabloko Party, which controls 45 State Duma seats. It is led by Grigory Yavlinsky and, to a lesser degree, Vladimir Lukin and Yuri Boldyrev. Yavlinsky is a market reformist who competed in the 1996 presidential election and plans to run again in 2000. Yabloko’s weakness is that the bulk of its votes, for example in the 1995 parliamentary elections, tend to come from Moscow and St. Petersburg, not the provinces.

In contrast to right-wing parties, the Yabloko Party denounces NATO expansion not for security reasons (the loss of the Eastern European buffer zone), but because it views the policy as “imprudent” and politically damaging to the Russian democratic forces. Yabloko officials had agreed with NATO that the alliance needed to be transformed into a collective security organization. Yavlinsky had even suggested contributing Russian antimissile systems for Europe’s collective security. But now that NATO has admitted only three countries and excluded Russia, Russian military programs will have to “be adjusted to take into consideration these new series of NATO states.” As Sergey Ivanenko, deputy head of Yabloko said, “Yabloko believes NATO’s eastward expansion is imprudent. There is no threat of war between Europe and Russia, which is why the NATO problem should be solved by setting up a collective security system.”

Yabloko officials also denounce the policy because it strengthens the right wing in the Duma. The policy will be a “gift from heaven for the imperialistically minded saber-rattlers among the Russian military” who will not “miss the opportunity to resurrect their comfortable old enemy image [to] push forward with their expansionist plans.” Yavlinsky considers it “plain fantasy” to think Russia will be militarily threatened by this expansion policy.

Former Russian ambassador to the United States Vladimir Lukin is another statist democrat and a member of the Yabloko Party. Currently chairman of the State Duma Foreign Affairs Committee, Lukin is one example of a reformer who sees NATO expansion as a stab in the back. He maintains that NATO enlargement is the worst way to enhance European security because it unequally divides Europe into security zones, disrupting the balance of power. Nevertheless, like Yavlinsky, he asserts that confrontation between Russia and the West over NATO expansion makes no sense, and that Russia’s interests should be considered throughout the process.
Lukin, more than Yavlinsky, realizes that NATO expansion may indirectly threaten Russian interests. To many Russians, it symbolizes Western indifference to Russian foreign policy aims. This, he fears, could force Russia to respond by looking for new allies, refusing to ratify treaties, insisting on adjusting conventional forces, and increasing nuclear defense measures. Recently Lukin advised the Duma against forging anti-NATO military relationships with rogue nations.75 During U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s January 1999 visit to Moscow, Duma speaker Gennady Seleznev told her that U.S. actions in Iraq had further postponed Russia’s ratification of START II.76 He and Alexei Arbatov, a Yabloko member and member of the Defense Committee in the Duma, question statements made by U.S. officials that NATO expansion does not in any way change the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty or START II.77

More recently, center-right politicians associated with free market, democratic reforms formed a centrist coalition to participate in the State Duma elections in December and to halt the Communist-nationalist advance. Members of the coalition include former prime ministers Yegor Gaidar and Sergei Kiriyenko; former deputy premiers Boris Nemtsov, Anatoly Chubais, and Boris Fyodorov; former ministers Yevgeny Yassin, Yakov Urinson, and Andrei Nechayev; and former Politburo member Alexander Yakovlev (the architect of perestroika).78

The coalition views Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov and Fatherland as its chief rival because both groups appeal to the same electorate. Cooperation between the new coalition and Yabloko or NDR is also unlikely, because of the clashing political ambitions of Grigory Yavlinsky (chairman of Yabloko) and Viktor Chernomyrdin (leader of Our Home Is Russia). Another obstacle is the fact that the Gaidar-Kiriyenko coalition is not very well known among regional governors, as only one governor, Vladimir Platov of the Tver oblast, north of Moscow, has joined the movement. Boris Nemtsov, head of the Presidential Council for Local Self-Government, wields considerable leverage to entice city mayors to join and support the center-right coalition. He recently condemned NATO expansion because it will “bring communists to power in Russia” and “impede Russian integration into the world economy and the European Union.”79

Yegor Gaidar, another member of this unnamed center-right movement, heads the Democratic Choice Party (Demokraticheskii Vybor Rossii), which holds nine Duma seats and currently has about 8,000 members. In September 1995, he told reporters that his party favored close cooperation with NATO and did not view the alliance’s expansion as a security threat.80 According to one of the party’s members, the Kosovo crisis “had a negative effect on the party’s membership.”81 Like Yabloko members, Gaidar is concerned about the hardliners’ manipulation of the issue. “Eastern Europe will be much safer outside of NATO with democrats governing Russia, than in NATO but with fascist forces in power in Moscow,” he warned.82

**Radical Liberals: Political and Economic Priorities**

Although politicians across the spectrum have raised their voices against NATO expansion, a small number of radical democrats tended at first to be less critical,
especially when they believed membership for Russia was a possibility. Some supported the idea of allowing even Baltic states and Ukraine to join NATO if they wished to do so, on the condition that Russia also be included eventually. Focused on continuing economic reforms, they generally supported concessions to the West (including acquiescence to NATO expansion) in exchange for financial assistance from the IMF and other Western institutions. Their criticisms grew sharper, however, when the prospect of Russian membership faded and NATO proceeded with the bombing of Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, they remained grimly realistic: Russia’s need for IMF loans was more crucial than its disapproval of NATO policy in Kosovo.

The objections that the radical democrats raise to NATO expansion concern the lost arms market in Eastern Europe and the political ammunition the policy gives to the Communists and ultranationalists in the Duma. Russian democrats see companies such as Boeing and Lockheed-Martin as engineering Senate approval of NATO expansion and a vast U.S. military-industrial complex pushing an enlarged NATO to maintain its influence in Europe and deprive Russia of its traditional arms market.84 Faced with the competition, Russia cannot hope to retain that market for long. Rigid NATO requirements compel Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic to modernize their military equipment and achieve interoperability with other NATO members. Western defense contractors are lobbying these countries incessantly to buy aircraft and other equipment from them.85

Second, in private conversations, many pro-Western radical democrats admit their anti-NATO enlargement stance relates more to the precarious internal political environment than to real security fears.86 They are genuinely concerned that NATO enlargement will benefit the anti-Western nationalists, who seek to influence foreign policy and stir up the Russian population, whose view of NATO remains colored by over forty years of anti-NATO Soviet propaganda.87 For many Communists and ultranationalists, NATO serves conveniently as the “new Hun,” representing the same sort of nationalist lever that Stalin found in the German Wehrmacht in 1941. Thus, if they denounce NATO expansion publicly, it is possibly to preempt the hardliners and protect themselves from charges of being soft on the West.

Andrei Kozyrev was the first Russian foreign minister to represent Russian interests on NATO expansion and has never considered the NATO defense alliance to be an enemy of Russia. His work to consummate the PfP agreement was viewed as an effort to soften the impact of NATO expansion on Russia as well as the anticipated reaction. Although fired by President Yeltsin in January 1996 for being too conciliatory and pro-Western on this and other issues, Kozyrev inveighed more frequently against NATO enlargement as time passed.

Influence on Public Opinion

How has anti-NATO rhetoric affected the Russian public, which now wields power through the new, but delicate, democratic electoral process? Both Western and Russian analysts have long claimed that the Russian public was more concerned about the economy than about foreign policy.88 This may have been true in
the early stages of the expansion debate. One Russian citizen, perhaps expressing the feelings of Russians weary of nationalist politicians' using the national security argument against NATO expansion, wrote in a February 1997 newspaper editorial, "Should we trust people who are unable even to grasp how far removed their 'strategic' waffle about Russia's state interests is from the real position of the Russians about whose security they are allegedly so concerned? Where is this national security? We have not seen any internal security for a long time, so why should we fear the lack of external security? I have nothing to fear anymore."

However, in looking at the poll results over time, one can see a marked growth in opposition to NATO expansion. In January 1996, the All-Russia Center for Public Opinion Research asked a sample of 2,426 Russians if Poland's membership in NATO posed a threat to Russian security. Eighteen percent of the respondents said that it did, and another 18 percent said it did not. The majority (approximately 64 percent) said they had no opinion on the issue.

A second poll by the All-Russia Center for Public Opinion Research in February 1997 asked 1,600 Russians their attitude concerning former Warsaw Pact countries' entering NATO. Thirty-eight percent of respondents believed those countries did not have the right to join NATO, and 14 percent believed that they did. Again, a vast number (49 percent) were either indifferent to, or ignorant on, the subject.

Finally, the Russian Independent Institute of Social and Ethnic Issues took a nationwide poll in June 1997 of 2,020 adults from many different professions. Forty percent opposed expansion, viewing it as negative to Russian interests; 23 percent viewed it as inevitable and said that Russia should extract political and economic benefits from the West; 6 percent supported NATO expansion as serving the interests of Russian democratic development; and 31 percent had no opinion.

NATO involvement in Kosovo has stimulated further opposition to the alliance's expansion. Several key questions were posed in a poll taken on 10 and 11 July 1999. When asked if NATO expansion presented a threat to Russia, 66 percent of respondents said yes, 14 percent said it did not, and 21 percent could not think of an answer. Moreover, 53 percent of respondents said it frightened them personally (menya lichno eto trevozhit) to think of the Baltic states' joining NATO; 18 percent said it did not; and 21 percent said they were indifferent. In the same poll, when asked what Russia should do to prevent the alleged threat, 25 percent advocated making use of all available political and diplomatic means to prevent NATO expansion; 22 percent favored accumulating military power by which to threaten NATO; 16 percent suggested forming defense alliances with other non-NATO states; and 5 percent favored NATO membership. Finally, when asked if they were interested in political news, 66 percent said they were, and 31 percent said they were not.

In addition, the Kosovo crisis has stimulated popular indignation in Russia against Western NATO countries. On 24 March, about 150 Russians threw eggs at the U.S. embassy in Moscow and U.S. consulate in St. Petersburg. In Kosovo itself, according to Komsomolskaya Pravda, the Russian paratroopers who arrived there on 11 June before NATO had orders to stop British forces from gain-
The Impact of NATO Expansion

ing access to a Yugoslav military storage area containing classified equipment, including radar devices belonging to an air force unit. In a June 1999 poll, only 39 percent believed that “cooperation with Western countries was beneficial to Russia,” and 36 percent believed it harmed Russia. In May 1998, 47 percent believed in cooperation and 31 percent thought it harmful.

Yet NATO’s actions in the Kosovo crisis have apparently inspired fearful respect. In a July 1999 poll, 45 percent of respondents were convinced that “Russia should increase its cooperation with NATO.” Forty-five percent also believed that NATO’s actions in Yugoslavia signified “the growth of this military bloc in world politics” and the “weakening of the UN’s role.” Finally, asked if Russia’s actions to stop the bombing had brought about an increase in Russia’s authority in world politics, 43 percent said no, and 39 percent said yes.

Conclusion

In summary, the dire predictions of the anti-expansionists have come true: combined with its air strikes in Iraq and Kosovo, NATO expansion has discredited and discouraged the liberal Russian political parties to a great extent, and the conservative ultranationalist and communist parties have reaped gains. The recent crises in Dagestan and Chechnya—as well as the allegedly linked terrorist acts in Moscow—further strengthen the hardliners’ isolationist tendencies. Public statements and polls indicate that NATO enlargement has inflamed feelings of Russian nationalism not only among political parties across the spectrum, but among the general population as well. The most vocal statements seem to come from the nationalists and Communists because while they are highly distrustful of NATO expansion, they reap electoral advantages from Yeltsin’s seemingly soft stance. However, it is the democratic centrist and liberals who are most disappointed. They see NATO expansion as a betrayal that will bar Russia from Europe and discredit democratic forces in Russian politics. Although it is unlikely, if hardliners decide to refuse IMF aid because of pride, there will be no instrument left with which to guide Russia toward market reforms. Such an occurrence could seriously set back the economic and democratic reforms evident since the demise of the Soviet Union.

Russia’s rapid deterioration in military might, lack of force projection capabilities, and absence of allies deny it the capacity to deter, let alone attack, NATO member nations in Europe. Thus, the alienation of Russia would not necessarily translate into a major security threat, to be avoided at all costs, unless it led to rash behavior and loss of control over the remaining nuclear arsenal. Nevertheless, the West, particularly the United States, stands to gain more by cooperation with, rather than coercion of, Russia. Humbling Russia contradicts the U.S. goal of facilitating Russia’s “evolution toward democratic stability” stated in Clinton’s 1997 National Security Document. NATO’s dismissal of Russian concerns in the Kosovo campaign starkly indicates to Russians the unimportance of their concerns to NATO military and political leaders.

The West gained more and helped bring the Kosovo crisis to an end faster when it brought Russia into the diplomatic process. It encouraged Chernomyrdin
in his efforts to negotiate with Milosevic. IMF head Michel Camdessus flew to
Moscow and offered more loans, despite Russia’s recent default on earlier ones
and Primakov’s abrupt cancellation of the Washington meeting in March. The
United States also offered to pay Russia $12 billion in exchange for 500 tons of
weapons-grade uranium from Russia’s nuclear warheads, which will be convert-
ed into fuel for peaceful U.S. nuclear reactors over the next twenty years. This
deal both helps to curb nuclear proliferation and provides Russia with dollars to
pay back loans.98

Despite the verbal threats, one should remember that Russia, as part of the
Contact Group of nations and the OSCE, also stationed peacekeepers in Kosovo
and provides a contingent of 1,200 men to the NATO-led peacekeeping force in
Bosnia. Russian journalists in Kosovo report good relations between Viktor
Zavarzin and NATO’s Lieutenant General Mike Jackson.99 We should be alarmed
by the public opinion polls that show the Russian people’s conclusion that uni-
lateral military might is more important than collective action through the Un-
eted Nations. Soviet Communist Party leaders always believed it crucial to act
“from a position of strength” [s pozitsii sily]. By contrast, Gorbachev and his col-
leagues believed the cold war ended not because they were defeated, but because
they had voluntarily changed their behavior. Now they are back where they
started; they have come full circle in their thinking. Do we really want Russia to
regard the West the way the West regarded the USSR during the cold war? Ameri-
ca needs to set an example by moral, not military, force. Its actions must not dis-
credit the very democratic forces that the United States is trying to foster in Russia.

NOTES

1. Specifically, opponents argued that NATO expansion would stimulate Russian ultra-
nationalists and communists, as well as discredit Yeltsin and his pro-Western government.
See for example John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1998) and Michael MccGwire, NATO Expansion and Euro-
2. This was thirteen votes more than the necessary sixty-seven. Senators who voted
against NATO or did not vote include: Senators Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D, N.Y.), John
Warner (R, Va.), Robert C. Smith (R, N.H.), and Paul Wellstone (D, Minn.). Other oppo-
nents of the policy include former senators Sam Nunn (D, Ga.) and Bill Bradley (R, N.J.);
former Reagan chief of staff and Senate majority leader Howard Baker (R, Tenn.).
3. Some 269 political parties, blocs, and associations in Russia tried to gather enough
signatures to run slates of candidates in the December 1995 Duma elections. See “Russia-
SITE.sut.ac.jp/asia/russia/ciarussia.html.
4. Alexei Arbatov, “Foreign Policy Consensus in Russia,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 14
Eurasia, FBIS-SOV-97-051, 14 March 1997. Arbatov believes that, with the exception of
a small minority of pro-Western democrats, all Russian political groups throughout the
spectrum are against NATO enlargement. “Conservatives (communists and moderate sta-
tists) are against it because they truly fear greater Western strategic superiority over Rus-
sia,” he wrote.
5. See James M. Goldgeier, “NATO Expansion: the Anatomy of a Decision,” Wash-
6. After much debate between NATO and Russian representatives, the PiP plan was
formalized with the signing of the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, and is typically referred to as the NATO-Russia Founding Act.


15. Primakov was ousted as prime minister on 12 May 1999 and Sergei Stepashin took his place.


17. “Russia Ends NATO Cooperation,” *RFE/RL Newsline* no. 59, part 1, 25 March 1999, 2. The speaker of the Russian Parliament, Gennady Seleznev, also spooked the West briefly when he announced that Yeltsin had ordered Russia’s military to retarget nuclear weapons against NATO countries. (As it turned out, they had merely discussed this idea).


29. “Russian Anger over Attack Tempered by Need for Cash,” *New York Times*, 25 March 1999, A13. However, according to this article, “a late-night television call-in show reported that volunteers were flooding nationalist organizations with offers to fight with the Serbs.”

33. Gennadi Seleznev, a Communist and current speaker of the Russian Duma, also supports the incorporation of Yugoslavia into the Commonwealth of Independent States. See Menges and Mihajlov, "Expansion Visions in Russia," B4.
34. Mihailovich, "Zyuganov's Views," FBIS: Trends, 9 May 1996. One should not under-emphasize Zyuganov's opportunism. Given the level of corruption among Duma members, Yeltsin could conceivably control the number of votes for NATO expansion. As Robert Kaiser wrote in the Washington Post, "The price of a vote in the Duma, the national parliament, is reliably described as $30,000 on a big issue such as the impeachment of President Boris Yeltsin, who apparently was saved from this fate in May by quite a few $30,000 payments." See Robert Kaiser. "In Russia, Limited Visibility," Washington Post, 25 July 1999, B1.
40. In Russian these concepts include "Russianness" (russkost), representing collectivist values; "statism" (gosudarstvennost), a desire to return to an authoritarian central government run by a single person; and "power" (derzhava), the quest to reunite the Slavic republics and protect the rights of the twenty-five million ethnic Russians currently living outside Russia in other republics of the former USSR. See Dmitry Radyshevsky, "Corruption Is Better Than Communism?" CDPP 48, no. 26, 24 July 1996, 26.
43. Menges and Mihajlov, "Expansion Visions in Russia." The Yugoslav Parliament voted in April 1999 to join an alliance with Yeltsin's Russia and Lukashenka's Belarus, apparently as a ploy to get Russia's military involved in stopping NATO air raids.
47. Alexei Arbatov, "NATO and Russia," Security Dialogue 26, no. 2 (1995): 145. Arbatov notes that Russian nationalists use NATO expansion as a platform "in their campaign of cursing perestroika [economic restructuring], reviving the fortress mentality, engendering feelings of national humiliation, and propagating re-militarization and anti-Western paranoia." See also Michael Brown, "The Flawed Logic of NATO Expansion," Survival: The International Institute for Strategic Studies Quarterly 37, no. 1 (Spring 1995): 41. The expansion policy may "improve the opposition's chances of seizing power [since] many of Russia's leading nationalist figures and some of its military leaders do not have a deep and abiding commitment to democratic rule."


52. Telephone interview in Moscow with Viktor Ivanovich Filatov, 27 July 1999. Referring to NATO’s _varvarskie_ actions in Kosovo, he said “You helped us very much.” It should be noted, however, that ratings for Zhirinovsky as a possible presidential candidate were significantly lower than those for Zyuganov, Primakov, and Yavlinsky.


58. “Talbott in Moscow for Arms Control Talks,” _RFE/RL Newsline_ 1, no. 135, part 1 (9 October 1997).


60. _RFE/RL Newsline_, 11 June 1999, Part 1


62. Ibid., 71.

63. Russian officials are keenly aware that although they have a “voice” in NATO meetings, they have no veto. They also failed to get a guarantee that nuclear weapons will not be placed on the territory of the Visegrad states.

64. Gorbachev later told Susan Eisenhower that he felt “swindled.” Timothy Gibbons, “Expert: NATO Airstrikes Make Russians Wary,” _Daytona News Journal_, 27 April 1999. As for Baker’s real intentions, it is unclear whether he perhaps consciously mislead Gorbachev on NATO expansion or had to choose between pleasing Helmut Kohl or Gorbachev and opted for the former.


67. “Politicheskie Indikatory, Ezhemesiachnie Voprosy: E. Gaydar,” Fond “Obshchestvennoe Mnenie,” http://www.fom.ru. To be sure, it is not only NATO expansion that has discredited the liberal reformers, but also the economic “shock therapy” promulgated in the early 1990s.

68. Ibid.


70. Sloan and Wochrel, _NATO Enlargement and Russia_, 17.
73. Ibid.
77. Byron Dorgan and Richard Lugar, "Should the United States Be More Sensitive to Russia's Concerns about NATO Expansion?" CQ Researcher 8, no. 20 (22 May 1998), 473. See also "Russia Concerned at Imbalance in European Arms Control Treaty As NATO Expands," Segodnya, 7 January 1999, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts.
78. RFE/RL Newsline 3, no. 143, part 1, 26 July 1999. As for the leader of the alliance, those present at the meeting decided that the coalition's slate at the 1999 elections would be headed by the politician who "enjoys the highest popularity with the populace" on the eve of the election. At this point, the best chances of leading the coalition lie with Boris Nemtsov and Sergei Kiriyenko.
83. Alexei Arbatov noted in March 1997 that "with the exception of a small group of super-liberal politicians, the rest of the spectrum ranging from democrats to communists, patriots, supporters of a strong state, and nationalists consider NATO expansion to be against Russia’s interests." Arbatov is a Western-oriented academic specialist, director of the Russian Center for Geopolitical and Military Forecasts, and deputy in the State Duma. See Alexei Arbatov, "Foreign Policy Consensus in Russia," Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 14 March 1997, 5, in FBIS-SOV-97-051.
87. Sloan and Woehrel, NATO Enlargement and Russia, 2.
88. An article in the Polish newspaper Rzeczpospolita noted, “It is on the bottom of the list of topics of interest for the average voter, who is far more concerned about the fate of his own country and its economy than an imaginary external threat. Thus, the scare tactic of NATO enlargement, which is used by Moscow politicians, is effective abroad but not in Russia.” “Commentary on Poll on NATO Enlargement,” Rzeczpospolita, 26 February 1996, 5, in FBIS-EEU-96-040, 26 February 1996. New York Times columnist Michael Gordon sums it up by stating, “The schism between the NATO-bashing of Russia’s political elite and relative indifference of much of the public reflects the deep distrust many Russians have of their leaders and of the news media, which are increasingly viewed as captives of special interests.” Michael Gordon, “From Public, a Collective Ho-Hum,” New York Times, 28 May 1997, A-10.
89. Stanislav Kondrashov, "Alarm in U.S. Over Russian Anti-NATO Mood," Izvestiya, 19 February 1997, 3, in FBIS-SOV-97-033. Political leaders, on the other hand, grossly exaggerate the extent of public opposition. During a visit to Poland in February 1997,
Duma chairman Gennady Seleznev told the Polish prime minister that “ninety percent of Russia’s population is categorically against the expansion of the North Atlantic Alliance.”


91. Michael Gordon, “From Public, a Collective Ho-Hum.”


94. Associated Press, 25 March 1999. Also, a Russian web site was constructed, entitled “Crisis Center to Stop NATO Aggression in Yugoslavia,” http://www.ru/cgi/redir.cgi. As further anecdotal evidence, a street musician in Moscow in June refused to take my donation when he learned that I was American.

95. Komsomolskaya Pravda, 24 June 1999, in RFE/RL Newsline 3, no. 143, part 1, 26 July 1999. “The article says that the Yugoslav forces did not have enough time to evacuate all of the equipment in time and therefore appealed to the Russians to block the storage area off, allowing them to withdraw the classified hardware. Other materiel stored at the site reportedly included air-to-air and surface-to-surface missiles, and laser-guided bombs.”


97. Ibid.
