

# From Decline to Disintegration: The Russian Military Meets the Millennium

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History shows us that when empires collapse, regimes change, and states form, the armed forces inevitably play a crucial role in determining the outcome. In Russia, this historical lesson seems to have been turned on its head: Observers have been astonished by the passivity of the Russian military. It has not actively resisted the breakup of the Soviet Union, nor has it been at center stage trying to affect the democratization process. Perhaps even more surprising, it has failed to resist its loss in status both domestically and abroad and has allowed its material interests and organizational integrity to be severely compromised through extensive budget cuts. The evidence suggests that soldiers seem resigned to the armed forces' progressive fragmentation and disintegration.

These observations have given rise to a degree of complacency. Many analysts of Russian politics have concluded that a disintegrating Russian army cannot pose an immediate political threat to the current political regime or be an important player in the international arena. As a consequence, most policymakers here and in Russia have felt justified in putting Russian military reform on the back burner while they attend to more pressing issues such as managing the economy.

While it is unlikely that the Russian military will launch a coup in the next decade or purposely attack a NATO member, there are significant changes in the nature and functioning of the Russian armed forces that merit attention. To cope with the deterioration of their organization, the new economic hardships in which they find themselves, and pressures from domestic political actors who have encouraged increased military involvement in politics, Russian soldiers are taking independent actions and forging new political and economic alliances that undermine the ability of federal/state officials to implement both domestic and foreign policy. These changes are significant because not only do they have the potential to affect the future of stability and democracy in Russia, but they can undermine the Russian government's ability to follow through on its commitment to international security agreements.

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Some of the new trends in Russian civil-military relations appear in recent interactions in four spheres: electoral politics, center-periphery relations, the official and non-official economy, and foreign policy.

### **The Russian Military and Elections**

There has been increasing involvement of military officers in partisan politics. There is, of course, a Soviet precedent for this behavior. Under communism, soldiers were encouraged to be members of the Communist Party, and they always showed up at political rallies in their uniforms. When the Russian army was being formed, there was discussion about whether restrictions should be placed on military involvement in electoral politics. Some legal measures were taken to limit military involvement, but they were never enforced.

In the 1993 parliamentary elections, the Ministry of Defense did not actively encourage soldiers to run for office. It did, however, invite political parties to publish their positions in the Defense Ministry's official newspaper, *Krasnaia Zvezda*. Only four of thirty party lists did not have military officers on them. In the end, eleven military officers were elected to the Duma, nine from single-mandate districts and two from party lists. From studies of voting patterns at polling locations on military bases, some analysts concluded that the majority of the military vote had gone to protest movements such as Zhironovsky's Liberal Democratic Party. Some put the estimate as high as 70 percent, others as low as 33 percent. The assessments of the Ministry of Defense were more ambiguous because although some officials denied a high level of support for protest candidates, saying that the data sample represented only 1 percent of the entire military vote, others claimed that the vote was an indication of military support for new politicians who had more "patriotically oriented" policies.<sup>1</sup>

In the 1995 Duma elections, the Russian Ministry of Defense urged officers to run for office. Articles and editorials in *Krasnaia Zvezda* suggested that the armed forces needed to ally with the military-industrial complex and become a more active political lobby. One commentator wrote: "The army needs its own people in parliament just like the agrarians and Gazprom, the banks and others."<sup>2</sup> A number of officers ran on party lists, and 120 officers were actually fielded by the Ministry of Defense to run as "nonpartisan" candidates in the 225 single-mandate districts. They were put on temporary military leave. And although they did not get military funds to run, they were given a great deal of attention in the military press.

The nonpartisan military candidates did not fare well in the elections. Only two of the 119 officers who ran were elected. In total, only ten servicemen were elected to parliament. At the same time, military participation in the vote was high: over 90 percent voted. The Communist Party and the Liberal Democratic Party once again received the largest number of votes in military areas.

As Russia moves into its campaign season, it is clear that candidates for both the parliamentary elections to be held in December 1999 and the presidential election in June 2000 are paying considerable attention to the military. Announcements of information meetings for soldiers, held on military bases by different political

parties, are growing in frequency. Presidential candidates are meeting with top military officials, and current Duma members, many of them likely to run again, are courting the military by showing concern for the state of the armed forces and meeting with top military officials.<sup>3</sup> In a gesture of support, the Duma passed a resolution that called for increasing the combat capacities of the armed forces.<sup>4</sup>

Thus, as we look at the emerging trend, it seems clear that there is general acceptance on the part of both civilian authorities and military officials that officers have a potentially important role to play in electoral politics. Officials in the Ministry of Defense are already holding informal negotiations with various political blocs to ensure military inclusion on party lists.<sup>5</sup> In view of the lack of success of the military officers who ran as nonpartisan candidates in the last elections, it is likely that in the December elections, many more officers will try to appear on party lists or will overtly declare party affiliation.<sup>6</sup>

### **The Russian Military and the Regions**

One important consequence of the economic cutbacks and the ill-conceived reform program has been the forging of new economic ties between local military units and regional political authorities. As the commander of the Volga Military District, Anatoly Sergeev, explained, "The garrison chiefs make friends with the local administrations, and the division, brigade and regiment commanders with the leadership of industrial enterprises and agricultural producers. And in fact, thanks to this we resolve together the question of district troop survival with such meager financing."<sup>7</sup>

Insight into the character of these developing civil-military relationships around the country is offered by the example of the ties that have been established between units located in and around the city of Severomorsk, a main base of the Northern Fleet, and the city's administration, headed by Mayor Vitaly Voloshin.<sup>8</sup> According to federal law, servicemen are entitled to subsidized housing, free transport, and privileged access to social services. Moscow has failed to provide adequate funds to fulfill these legal obligations. Thus, Mayor Voloshin, with the city council, has tried to fill in some of the gaps. For example, the city has compensated the Severomorsk Motor Transport Enterprise for free transport given to soldiers. It has taken over the administration and upkeep of housing previously managed by the military. City officials have provided funds for building a cultural center, library, telegraph office, post offices, and bank in Safonovo-1 and Severomorsk-3, two towns falling under the authority of the city's administration. In an effort to help discharged soldiers find work, city officials have developed a retraining center. They have solicited help from the Norwegians and from private businesses operating in the area. A number of these private businesses are run by former servicemen who not only are willing to take on new employees but also are also willing to give money directly to the city and to military units.

These developments are important because there is every reason to expect that economic ties will translate into political loyalties. Soldiers will be increasingly indebted and loyal to regional and local officials rather than to the federal government. The new relationships are likely to play out in future local elections,

with military units increasing in importance as a potential voting bloc for officials seeking re-election. In the longer term, if regional leaders decide to seek regional autonomy by refusing to obey the central government's decrees or laws, a federal-regional struggle over the loyalty of the armed forces could ensue.

### **The New Russian Military Entrepreneurs**

In addition to forging ties with local political authorities to an unprecedented degree, soldiers and officers have been forced to enter into both the legal and the illegal economy. Activity organized by Captain Kuznetsov of the White Sea Naval Base of the Northern Fleet is a case in point.<sup>9</sup> During the winter, units located in the Arkhangelsk oblast and along the entire coastline of the White Sea rely on food and basic supplies that are delivered by auxiliary fleet vessels during the summer, navigational months. As a consequence of economic cutbacks, many of the vessels have been decommissioned, and others are in need of repair if they are to stay afloat. In the absence of financing from Moscow, the officers of the rear services have negotiated contracts and financial arrangements with shipyards and commercial enterprises to get the job done. Without this entrepreneurial activity, many units may have been deprived of basic supplies last winter.

On an individual level, soldiers have tried to supplement their meager and sometimes nonexistent wages by getting other work. Some have hired out their services to local enterprises, various security forces, and the growing number of private armies, many of which are Mafia-run. All of these examples point to a new phenomenon: the establishment of civil-military relationships that revolve around economic gain as opposed to national security.

Although some of these relationships are relatively benign, a number threaten the stability and security of the Russian state. This, of course, is the central problem posed by Russian soldier involvement in criminal activities.

Russian armed forces' involvement in criminal activity is far-reaching and ranges from narcotics to prostitution and gambling, from financial fraud to illegal dumping of toxic wastes. According to Defense Ministry statistics, in the first eleven months of 1998 reported crimes in the armed forces totaled 10,500, up from 10,000 in the previous year.<sup>10</sup>

A recent investigation by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) into Russian military activity in Dagestan revealed that officers deployed in the Caucasus were engaging in slave-trading: they were selling the labor of their soldiers to the Chechens. A number of the Russian soldiers were not returned to their garrisons; instead they were kidnapped and held for ransom by the Chechens.<sup>11</sup>

Most disturbing from the standpoint of the West has been Russian leaders' inability to prevent armed forces involvement in the theft and illegal sale of ammunition, equipment, and weapons. The severity of this particular problem was underlined in a study conducted by the U.S. Air Force Institute for National Security Studies. It concluded that "Russian military and security organizations are the primary sources for the flourishing illegal weapons trade within and outside of the FSU." It further emphasized the importance of the links between military criminals and criminal organizations.<sup>12</sup>

The real increase in weapons theft dates back to the end of the Soviet era. Thefts rose 50 percent between 1989 and 1990. In 1992 there were 3,923 thefts at weapons depots. By the next year, the number had risen to 6,430.<sup>13</sup> One should note that these are reported instances only. While civilians are frequently involved in the thefts (sometimes colluding with military guards and at other times simply attacking weapons depots), there are numerous reported instances of armed forces personnel being the actual sellers of the stolen property. A large supply of the weapons are purchased in various "hot spots" around the former Soviet Union (for example, Tadjikistan and Nagorno-Karabakh). According to a 1996 MVD report, more than 5,000 illegally held firearms were confiscated in the North Caucasus, and MVD agents in the Leningrad and Pskov regions seized more than 7,000 smuggled weapons.<sup>14</sup>

Some of the more recent customers for stolen Russian weapons have been the Chechens. According to an investigation carried out by Russian presidential advisers, the Chechens purchased arms from Russian military officers even after the Russian invasion in December 1994. In individual-to-individual sales, Chechen fighters bought weapons and munitions from the Russian soldiers they were supposed to be fighting. A second category of transactions were organized and involved large volumes of weapons. One incident reported to be under investigation was the attempted sale of a large quantity of plastic explosives, grenade launchers, and ammunition by the 104th Guards Airborne Division paratroopers to the Chechens in May 1995.<sup>15</sup>

In May 1999, Russian law enforcement bodies uncovered two schemes that probably are just the tip of an iceberg. In Vladivostok, Russian intelligence officers seized large amounts of weapons and explosives that soldiers from the Russian navy's Pacific Fleet were trying to sell on the black market. Nikolai Sotnikov, a senior official of the Federal Security Service (FSB) stated that police had been able to stop a number of similar operations over the last two years.<sup>16</sup> In another episode in Kaliningrad, Russian law enforcement officials uncovered a scheme set up by a retired officer. He had founded a company, Baltrybsbyt, and was illegally transporting military equipment to a company in Poland. Supplies included hydro-acoustic systems and equipment for defense against torpedo attacks.<sup>17</sup>

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### **The Russian Military as Foreign Policy Maker**

Changes in military behavior have implications also for Russia's role in the international arena. As a consequence of lack of direction from civilian leaders, the military seems to have increased its ability to influence foreign policy decisions,

particularly in the case of conflicts in the former Soviet republics. For example, during negotiations on the withdrawal of troops from Lithuania some years back, Russian military authorities took steps to curtail the ability of civilians in the Russian Foreign Ministry to affect policy. They drew up an agreement on a timetable for troop withdrawal and sent it to the Foreign Ministry two days before it was due to be signed, leaving civilian authorities little time to make amendments.<sup>18</sup> In negotiations over hot spots such as Abkhazia, Georgia, Tadjikistan, and Moldova, Russian military leaders have been prominent in negotiating cease-fires and peacekeeping operations. At one point, Foreign Minister Kozyrev complained "Wholesale transfers of arms are taking place in the Transcaucasus and Moldova. . . . Under what agreement is this effected, I would like to ask . . . ? Why are the military deciding the most important political issues?"<sup>19</sup>

In the recent crisis in Kosovo, military officers have also maintained a high profile as commentators on the crisis and sharp critics of NATO policy. The two most vocal military participants in the Russian debate over Kosovo have been Defense Minister Sergeev and Colonel General Ivashov. In May, Defense Minister Sergeev warned that as a consequence of the bombing campaign Russia would have to freeze all of its military and technical cooperation with NATO countries. He accused NATO of violating recognized principles of international relations and, through its policy, poisoning Europe on the brink of military conflagration.<sup>20</sup> He insisted that any peacekeeping force sent to Kosovo act under a UN mandate and urged countries that have not played a large role in the actual bombing operation to contribute troops (Greece, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Luxembourg, Iceland, Belgium, Denmark, and Norway). As a final act of defiance, he refused to sign several military agreements with NATO member Norway and threatened to reconsider the terms of the recently concluded Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.<sup>21</sup> Ivashov, head of the Defense Ministry's International Cooperation Department, has been even more strident in his comments, calling NATO "a criminal organization which has no right to exist."<sup>22</sup>

In mid-June, the Russian military surprised Western policymakers by sending a group of 500 soldiers previously stationed in the Bosnian Serb town of Ugljevi into Pristina, ahead of NATO peacekeepers. They took this step before any agreement had been reached about the type of relationship Russian peacekeeping forces would establish with NATO command. News from Moscow suggested that the idea for this initiative came from the General Staff, who, frustrated by the lack of clear signals from civilian leaders and concerned that Russia would lose any chance to acquire its own sector of influence in Kosovo, tried to influence the terms of the peacekeeping agreement from the ground.<sup>23</sup>

### **The New Russian Military: A Threat to the Russian State, to Democratic Consolidation, and to International Stability**

Many of the new civil-military alliances that have been forged, coupled with new norms for soldier behavior, are disturbing because they serve as an impediment to future democratic development and give rise to potentially destabilizing domestic political forces. More important, from the West's perspective, they chal-

lenge Russia's ability to formulate a unified foreign policy and adhere to its international commitments.

The implications of an expanded role of the military elite in electoral politics are perhaps the most difficult to assess. Some commentators have downplayed the importance of this development. They argue that Russian officers are acting in their own interests and that their behavior should not be seen as reflecting a general politicization of the armed forces as an institution. They further point to the fact that military alliances with a number of different parties dilute the threat of one group being able to play the military card. Finally, they argue that military voting patterns reflect social voting preferences, and so the likelihood of mobilizing the military as a voting bloc is weak.<sup>24</sup>

The importance of soldier involvement in electoral politics should not be underestimated. The politicization of soldiers in the context of a pluralistic political system translates into opportunities for military partisanship. It is instructive to note that traditionally democratic states have not allowed active duty officers to hold political office. When a soldier puts on his uniform and goes to the podium he is making a political statement: he is indicating not that he is simply an independent citizen but that he is representing a powerful institution—or at least is loosely connected to a powerful institution. This sets a dangerous precedent, for it helps to legitimize the idea that the military has a role to play in domestic politics. As historical experience has shown, military involvement in politics is in the long run incompatible with democracy.

The new roles that soldiers have been forced to adopt as a consequence of economic hardship and the growing dependence of local military units on regional political authorities have more obviously negative potential implications for domestic stability. One can anticipate a number of scenarios in which soldiers who either depend on local authorities for maintaining their units, or alternatively, who moonlight for private enterprises, could find their loyalties divided. What would happen if a region decided to separate, and federal forces were sent in to quash the rebellion. Where would the loyalty of the local forces reside?

The complexities and dangers of some of these new relationships are brought out in an article published this spring in *Moskovskii Komsomolets* during the Yeltsin impeachment hearings. The authors suggest a disturbingly realistic hypothetical scenario for a violent outbreak in the capital.<sup>25</sup> They begin by describing the various military and nonmilitary units that might become involved in a political conflict in Moscow. The key players would be three internal troop formations: the ODon (Separate Special Purpose Division), the Sofrino Brigade, and a police brigade. Other players would be the OMON (Special Purpose Police Force) and the Administration for Combating Organized Crime Special Rapid Reaction Detachment, both operating under the aegis of the MVD, the Moscow City Internal Affairs Administration Special Rapid Reaction Detachment, the FSB (Federal Security Service) Alfa group, and the Taman and Kantemir divisions, army armored units. The problem, as the authors underscore, stems from the fact that these various branches are subordinate to commanding officers who have very different political allegiances. Thus, for example, the ODon troops are

under Commander-in-Chief General Ovchinnikov. The police and Sofrino Brigades are subordinate to Moscow District Internal Troops Commander General Baskayev. Ovchinnikov is a Yeltsin loyalist, and Baskayev is a firm supporter of Moscow Mayor Luzhkov.

The article then describes the following scenario: Suppose Yeltsin dissolves the Duma and announces a state of emergency, as he did in fall 1993. Yeltsin tells Ovchinnikov to move the internal troops into the center of Moscow and blockade the Duma. Luzhkov, who as we know has very tense relations with Yeltsin, might oppose the idea of tanks in his city and might task Baskayev to play for time. Then people from city hall and deputies from the Duma might start lobby-

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ing both the internal troops and the Taman and Kantemir divisions to ignore the demands of the current “criminal” regime. What would the troops do? Particularly, what would the Moscow district troops loyal to Luzhkov do? Would they be likely to put themselves behind the mayor and opposition deputies, or would they decide to obey their commander-in-

chief, Yeltsin? In this type of crisis, even if, as many analysts would argue, the troops’ first reaction would be to refuse to do anything, it would not take much to ignite violence. All it would take is an exchange of bullets between soldiers from one brigade with soldiers from another; as the authors of the article write, “They will shoot each other until there are no more bullets left and we have many more bullets than people.” Under these conditions, a regional civil war begins to look quite possible.

The increasing involvement of the armed forces in criminal activities is a particularly grave challenge to the integrity of the state. One analyst who has done much comparative work on state collapse writes: “Probably the ultimate danger sign is when the center loses control over its own state agents, who begin to operate on their own account. Officials exact payments for their own pockets, and law and order is consistently broken by the agents of law and order, the police and army units becoming gangs and brigands.”<sup>26</sup> A similar sentiment has been expressed by President Yeltsin, who has stated that “corruption in the organs of power and administration is literally eating away the body of the Russian state from top to bottom.”<sup>27</sup>

Finally, the expanded role of the military in foreign policy decisions is particularly detrimental to Russia’s international role and its prospects for democratic development. First, independent military participation in international diplomacy hampers the ability of the state to articulate and follow a unified foreign policy. A particularly good illustration can be found by looking at Russian negotiations during the Chechen crisis, when frequently the policies declared by Defense

Minister Grachev, chief negotiator General Lebed, President Yeltsin, and the Foreign Ministry were at odds with each other. A similar problem is emerging in the Kosovo crisis, where the statements and actions of military officers do not always correspond to the negotiating position adopted by the Foreign Ministry or the president's office.

Second, as a consequence of the recent expansion of military prerogatives in the foreign policy domain, civilians are in danger of losing some of their ability to set the foreign policy agenda and control policy formation. The Kosovo crisis has revealed a growing acceptance among both the High Command and civilian elites that high-ranking military officers have a right to initiate diplomatic overtures and shape security policy. Such a development amounts to a civilian loss of power and serves as yet another instance of the weakening of the fundamental core of democratic governance in Russia.

### **Future Trends and Coping with the Disintegration of Russian Armed Forces**

What can be done about the sorry state of the Russian armed forces and the perverse behavior that some Russian soldiers have adopted in response to the new political and economic environment in which they find themselves? The power to effect change lies primarily in the hands of the Russian president and parliament. Unfortunately, the prognosis for positive changes in the near future is not good.

With the recent change in the Russian government and the preoccupation of the Kremlin with its internecine struggles, further progress in military reforms before the upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections is unlikely. Although there has been much talk in the new government about the need to implement a comprehensive military reform program that includes a realistic plan for streamlining and downsizing the armed forces, there are few signs that concrete steps are being taken in that direction.<sup>28</sup> In the draft budget for 2000, the government has allocated 2.3 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) for defense. The Ministry of Economy believes that a minimum of 3 percent of GDP must be spent to prevent the military from deteriorating further.<sup>29</sup> It is unclear how the government's proposed fund allocation will suffice to cover military reforms, maintain army personnel, and replace obsolescent equipment.<sup>30</sup> Russia's participation in peacekeeping operations has added a further strain on the defense budget. Currently Russia owes \$16 to \$20 million for maintaining its contingent in Bosnia. The cost of its participation in Kosovo is estimated at \$69 million a year.<sup>31</sup>

In addition to draining funds badly needed to finance military reform, by legitimating the role of military officers as policymakers the Kosovo crisis has set back the effort to achieve greater civilian control. One of the lessons that Russian policymakers and the Russian public seem to be drawing from Kosovo is that military power, and not diplomacy, is the key to international politics: a retreat to the old thinking against which Gorbachev struggled. Although in some ways this may be a positive development if it increases attention and funding for the armed forces, it may also lead Russia to try ill-advised shortcuts to bolster its military power, such as the contemplated build-up of Russia's nuclear forces at the

expense of its conventional forces. A Russian analyst recently discussed the problem with this strategy warning:

Making the decision to place all our efforts into building up our nuclear forces, which we can only use as a last resort, forces us to move closer to a last resort situation, because we cannot simultaneously increase our nuclear strength and support our conventional forces; we don't have the resources. This means that our conventional forces will continue to wither and the ability of Russia to respond in any other way than with nuclear weapons will decline and a catastrophe, where to save itself Russia is forced to initiate a nuclear strike and receive one in return, becomes imminent.<sup>32</sup>

The United States can and should react to these developments in four ways. First, it must prepare for the fact that in the near future it will have to deal simultaneously with a multitude of contradictory Russian policies. American policymakers must recognize that any international agreements they conclude with Russia may be undermined, not because of ill-will on the part of civilian negotiators, but as a consequence of their inability to ensure that domestic actors such as the military comply to the terms of official agreements. Most important, they must prepare for this eventuality in their own foreign policy planning.

Second, American policymakers should continue actively to pursue arms reduction and control agreements such as Start II and Start III and programs falling under the rubric of cooperative threat reduction. The former will help prevent future nuclear weapons build-up, and the latter may ensure that Russia adopts badly needed safeguards on its nuclear weapons and facilities.

Third, U.S. policymakers must encourage Russian civilian leaders to place priority on the task of restructuring their armies, urging them to provide soldiers with clear political leadership and to punish instances of military insubordination.

Finally, the United States should continue and intensify its cooperative programs with the Russian military: the military-to-military exchange programs, workshops on how to manage the relationships between military and civilian officials in a democratic state, and retraining programs for Russian officers. These initiatives are important because they make up for seriously lacking financial resources, provide positive new ideas about how to restructure the Russian military, and help to foster trust and cooperation between our militaries and our countries. The example of how Europe and the United States have been able to pressure the East European states through NATO to accelerate the process of restructuring their armies and better integrate their armed forces into evolving democratic systems illustrates that there may be potential for much larger international involvement in affecting Russian military reform.

As the new millennium approaches, it is time that policymakers here and abroad review their assumptions about the Russian military and realize that this limping, disintegrating organization has the potential to pose a serious threat both to its own civilian leadership and to the international community. Power is based on organized force; but when organized structures of power begin to disintegrate, new and unexpected forces are released that can be even more dangerous because of their sheer unpredictability.

## NOTES

1. The description of military participation and voting in the 1993 and 1995 parliamentary elections draws primarily on the discussion provided by Robert Barylski, *The Soldier in Russian Politics: Duty, Dictatorship and Democracy under Gorbachev and Yeltsyn* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1998).
2. Vladimir Ermolin, "Kto i kak golosuyet v Gosdume," *Krasnaia Zvezda*, 3 March 1995, cited in Barylski, 338.
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4. "Army Funds Demanded," *Moscow Times*, 1 April 1999 (available: <http://www.moscowtimes.ru>).
5. See Korbut, note 3 above.
6. It will also be interesting to see if in this election the Ministry of Defense will provide campaign contributions to military candidates.
7. "What's in the Soldier's Ration?" *Rossiskaia Gazeta* (electronic version), 22 July 1999, trans. in FBIS-SOV-1999-027 (available: <http://www.wnc.org>).
8. See interview with Mayor Voloshin by Captain 2nd Rank P. Lysenko, "Together with the Fleet," *Morskoi Sbornik*, 1 March 1999, 15–18, trans in FBIS-SOV-1999-0426 (available: <http://www.wnc.org>).
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12. See Graham H. Turbiville, "Weapons Proliferation and Organized Crime: The Russian Military and Security Force Dimension," INSS Occasional Paper 10, USAF Institute for National Security Studies, U.S. Air Force Academy, June 1996, 14–24.
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23. Giulietto Chiesa, "The Conspirators of Operation Kosovo," *La Stampa*, 12 June 1999, reprinted in *Johnson's Russia List* #3342, 15 June 1999.

24. For proponents of this view, see S. Meyer, "The Devolution of Russian Military Power," *Current History* (1995): 322–28, and Deborah Yarsike Ball and Theodore P. Gerber, "The Political Views of Russian Field Grade Officers," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 12, no. 2 (1996): 155–80.

25. Iuliia Kalinina and Mariia Markina, "Voennyi rasklad vremeni Ch," *Moskovskii Komsomolets*, 15 April 1999 (available: <http://news.eastview.com>).

26. William Zartman, ed, *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority* (Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1995).

27. Lee, 394, note 13 above.

28. In a recent government cabinet session, Prime Minister Stepashin allegedly stated, "Our armed forces as a whole and our national defense are in . . . a catastrophic state." "Stepashin Urges Funding for 'Catastrophic Military,'" News program, Moscow NTV 0800 GMT, 10 June 1999 Trans. in FBIS-SOV-1999-0610 (available: <http://www.wnc.org>).

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