

Russia's Many Foreign Policies

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What are Russian foreign policy objectives? It depends on whom you ask. In making assessments of Russia's behavior in the world, it is absolutely critical that we recognize that Russia today is not a totalitarian state ruled by a Communist Party with a single and clearly articulated foreign policy of expanding world socialism and destroying world capitalism and democracy. That state disappeared in 1991. Rather, Russia is a democratizing state—a weakly institutionalized democracy with several deficiencies, but a democratizing state nonetheless. Russia's foreign policy, in turn, is a product of domestic politics in a pluralistic system.

In democracies, “states” do not have foreign policy objectives. Rather, individual political leaders, parties, and interest groups have foreign policy objectives. Under certain conditions, these various forces come together to support a united purpose in foreign affairs. At other times, these disparate groups can have conflicting views about foreign policy objectives. They can even support the same foreign policy objective for different reasons.¹

Russia today is no different. Although Russian leaders share in supporting a few common, general foreign policy objectives, they disagree on many others. They also disagree on the means that should be deployed to achieve the same foreign policy objective. The foreign policy that eventually results is a product of debate, political struggle, electoral politics, and lobbying by key interest groups. Because Russia is undergoing revolutionary change internally, the foreign policy that results from Russian domestic politics can change quickly.

This article makes the case for the centrality of domestic politics in the articulation and implementation of Russian foreign policy. The first section discusses briefly why realism—a theory that assumes a unitary actor—cannot account

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for Russia's behavior in the international system over the last decade and why the domestic level of analysis offers a better lens for explaining Russian foreign policy. The second section outlines the small set of foreign policy issues around which a consensus has emerged in Russia. The third section describes the major schools of thought in Russia about foreign policy. The fourth section then gives a brief historical overview of the evolution of Russian foreign policy since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, demonstrating how the fates and fortunes of different political groups in Russia have brought changes in Russian foreign policy. The fifth section turns to the Kosovo crisis and shows how these different schools of thought have understood and influenced Russia's role in the conflict. The sixth section discusses how Russia's parliamentary election, scheduled for December 1999, and its presidential election, scheduled for June 2000, could change Russian foreign policy. The conclusion examines the implications of Russia's many foreign policies for U.S.–Russian relations.

Supplementing Realism with Domestic Politics

The mainstream of international relations theory has no place for domestic politics in explaining or predicting state behavior. Realism posits that state behavior can be explained by treating states as rational, unitary actors seeking to survive in an anarchic world.² To provide first for their own security, as well as pursue other objectives of national interest, states seek power.³ As Hans Morganthau starkly stated, “International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim.”⁴ States can acquire power either by internal balancing—increasing internal power capabilities—or by external balancing—alliance building.⁵

Variables that do not relate directly to power capabilities of states are not part of the framework of analysis for realist theorists. Ideologies, domestic politics, economic activity, or international institutions are understood as either epiphenomenal, reflections of power, or components of power. When empirical evidence indicates a role for these “non-realist” variables, such instances are explained as exceptional aberrations beyond the realm of theory.⁶

The realist approach provides a useful starting point for analyzing international politics and foreign policy. With only a few basic and parsimonious assumptions, the realist approach can provide insights into a whole range of problems of international relations. Realism is especially powerful as an explanatory framework concerning static, recurrent events or periods of equilibrium. Nonetheless, certain instances and kinds of state behavior seem *prima facie* to be beyond the reach of realism. For instance, during periods of rapid change in the international system, rational calculations of national interest become increasingly difficult.⁷ Whether or not states behaved in accordance with realist assumptions in such situations can be known only after the fact. Similarly, the outcomes of unique situations (such as crises) or unexpected changes are difficult to explain from the realist perspective. Kenneth Waltz has gone so far as to assert that theories should not even *aspire* to explain change because “a theory explains continuities. It tells one what to expect and why to expect it.

Within a system, a theory explains recurrences and repetitions, not change.”⁸ Realism often offers no predictive capabilities regarding a single outcome when multiple outcomes might be consistent with the theory. NATO’s continued existence after the end of the cold war is a prime example, as both its disappearance and its expansion could be explained—and were used to explain—by deploying the realist paradigm. Finally, how *do* we explain state behavior that does not appear even before the fact to be in that state’s national interest? For instance, how can we explain the self-destruction of the Soviet state from a realist point of view?⁹

To explain unique outcomes that depart from realist predictions requires the deployment of supplemental (though not necessarily alternative) theories regarding international politics.¹⁰ One supplemental approach has been concerned with observing the role that *international* ideas, norms, and institutions play in altering or even determining state behavior.¹¹ This approach will not be addressed in this article. A second approach is to examine the role that *domestic* ideas, institutions, bureaucracies, and societal forces can play in affecting foreign policy decision making.¹² Although many treat this approach as an alternative to realism, these domestic-based theories are considered here as a supplemental perspective that can be deployed to help explain events and phenomena that deviate from the realist approach.

To draw upon this level of analysis systematically, it is necessary to specify under what conditions domestic-level ideas, institutions, and societal forces play a causal or intervening role in the behavior of states. Many kinds of conditions could be cited that would give domestic factors the opportunity to affect states’ international behavior, but radical change in the organization of the international system may be the most obvious.¹³ Under static conditions, we would expect states to behave according to the basic tenets of the realist perspective. Repeated procedures within a system produce an institutionalized foreign policy decision-making process. Once in equilibrium, only some major shock or disruption will change the preferences and behavior of domestic actors engaged in the foreign policy decision-making process. A major disruption in the equilibrium of the system, however, creates the opportunity for new ideas, new players, and eventually even new institutions to affect the definition of foreign policy.¹⁴ In fact, it is under conditions of high uncertainty that ideas and the actors associated with them can play a most determinative role.¹⁵

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent end of the cold war provided such an exogenous shock to the stable patterns of state interaction previously observed. This event or series of events created the possibility that new ideas backed by new domestic coalitions might amend the existing institutional arrangements that structured state behavior. Because the Soviet Union and then Russia also endured the collapse of old *domestic* institutions, we should expect that the parameters of what is possible for radical change in foreign policy were even more pronounced in Russia than in the West.¹⁶

The combination of the end of the cold war and radical transformation and decay within Russia has left its mark on the formation and implementation of

Russian foreign policy. Groups with radically different conceptions of Russia's place in the world sit side by side in the Duma, in the Ministry of Defense, and even in President Yeltsin's own administration. As in all revolutions, advocates for and against change in Russia have staked out antithetical positions regarding the definition of state borders, the organization of the economy, or the construction of a new polity. In August 1991 and October 1993, these disagreements were so pronounced that they produced armed conflict between different political factions within Russia. Although narrowing over time, the same range of views has emerged regarding foreign policy issues. In this fluid domestic context, Russia behaves like a rational, unitary actor only when individuals with realist beliefs

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dominate the making of Russian foreign policy. For much of the past decade, realists have not dominated the definition or execution of Russian foreign policy.

In addition to the conflicting policy positions, the process of policy formation and implementation has also become ad hoc, informal, and deinstitutionalized as the result

of a decade of revolutionary change within the Soviet Union and then Russia. Nearly ten years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, what is still striking about Russia's new democracy is the lack of institutional coherence within the Russian state for implementing policy, be it foreign policy or any other kind.¹⁷ Add a weak, sick, and erratic leader at the top and the result is unpredictable policies. At times, Yeltsin and his “family” (a small group of close advisors with access to the president that includes his daughter, Tatyana Dyachenko, Boris Berezovsky, Roman Abramovich, and Valentin Yumashev) appear to dictate foreign policy. Regarding specific issues, however, different personalities and changing coalitions can dominate. For instance, Russia's military brass seems to control Russian foreign policy toward Georgia, Gazprom has a lot to say about East Central Europe, Lukhail holds sway in the Caspian, and the Ministry of Atomic Energy appears to conduct its own foreign policy in the Middle East.¹⁸ Institutionalized coordination between these policy entrepreneurs often appears to be very weak.

Foreign Policy Objectives Recognized by the Major Political Actors

Russia does have some basic foreign policy objectives recognized by most major actors involved in the foreign policy process. Every major political leader and party in Russia today recognizes that Russia is a country in rapid decline as an economy, a coherent state, and an international player. Since 1991, the Russian economy has contracted faster and longer than that of any previous major power in modern history. With economic decline has come state weak-

ness. The Russian government struggles to provide the most elementary of public goods, such as a single currency, a common market, security, welfare, and education. This domestic feebleness has played havoc with Russia's international clout, turning the once-proud actor into a mere observer with mostly symbolic roles to perform. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization's campaign against Yugoslavia brought Russia's international impotence into painfully sharp focus.

All political leaders and groups in Russia agree, therefore, that Russia's first foreign policy objective must be to reverse Russia's internal decline.¹⁹ Russia cannot be a major international actor with a shrinking economy that today is roughly the size of Denmark's.²⁰ Russia cannot be a serious player on the international stage if it cannot control its own borders. No major political force in Russia disagrees with these objectives. How Russia should achieve economic growth and preserve internal unity, however, remain contested issues.

In addition to reviving the economy and avoiding further disintegration of the federation, almost all of Russia's major political actors agree that Russia must pursue economic, political, and military cooperation within the Commonwealth of Independent States. Russia's foreign policy elite remains committed to establishing a Russian sphere of influence within the region.²¹ Again, they disagree about the means for achieving this objective. But no major political actor opposes greater cooperation within the commonwealth as a Russian foreign policy goal.

A final foreign policy objective recognized by most leaders and parties in Russia is the maintenance of Russia's nuclear superpower status. Russia's nuclear weapons stockpile is the one power attribute that still accords Russia special status in the international system. Russia cannot afford to lose this unique attribute. As Leon Aron has written, "Global nuclear superiority, shared with the United States, is the area of the Russian foreign policy consensus most impervious to domestic and international politics and least prone to challenge and evolution."²²

These objectives shape Russian foreign policy behavior and influence Russian foreign policy responses to other international issues in general and predictable ways. For instance, because of Russia's internal economic problems, it recently has tacitly supported the control of the international oil supply, which has raised oil prices, increased hard currency revenues for Russian oil companies and the Russian government, and indirectly propelled a small boom in the Russian stock market. Because of Russia's problems with its own separatist republics, including first and foremost Chechnya, Russia does not support independence for Kosovo or a peace settlement that might create momentum for independence in the future. Because of Russia's desire to maintain the Commonwealth of Independent States as its sphere of influence, Russia does not support the deployment of American troops in Azerbaijan and fears further NATO expansion toward its borders. On those kinds of issues, Russians are united in defining their foreign policy objectives.

Beyond this rather short list of consensus issues, however, Russians remain

divided over many important foreign policy questions. Rather than discuss every foreign policy issue in detail, the next section outlines the basic approaches to foreign policy from four distinct political groups in Russia today.

The Different Schools of Thought within Russia

Pro-Western Idealists

After seventy years of Soviet communist rule, Russia became an independent state again only in December 1991. Innate structural forces did not cause the Soviet Union to collapse and compel Russia to emerge as an independent state. Rather, Russian democrats—in alliance with democratic forces in the Baltics, the Caucasus, and Ukraine—dissolved the Soviet Union. In their struggle against the Soviet empire, the command economy, and the totalitarian political system, Russian democrats adopted an ideology of opposition inspired principally by the West. Ideas about democracy, the market, self-determination, and integration with the Western capitalist system eventually crystallized during the peak of polarized confrontation in 1990–91 as concepts most clearly antithetical to the Soviet *ancien regime*. Consequently, when Boris Yeltsin assumed control of the newly independent Russian state in December 1991, he and his government were guided by this set of liberal ideas, ideas that included in foreign policy matters a distinctly pro-Western and peaceful foreign policy. Initially, these ideas had everything to do with the domestic revolutionary struggle against Soviet communism and virtually nothing to do with Russian national interests abroad or the interests of economic groups, civic organizations, or the electorate at home. In other words, these groups had a normative commitment to Western values and Western integration and were not driven solely by self-interest.²³

Advocates of this approach to Russian foreign policy (and political and economic reform internally) have always constituted a minority within Russia. In the early part of the decade, Democratic Russia represented this view. Until his dismissal as foreign minister in January 1996, Andrei Kozyrev represented this view regarding Russian foreign policy and performed his functions as foreign minister accordingly. Today, some, though not all, members of the political groups “Right Cause,” headed by Anatoly Chubais, Yegor Gaidar, Boris Nemtsov, and Boris Fyodorov; Yabloko, headed by Grigory Yavlinsky; and Our Home Is Russia, headed by Viktor Chernomyrdin, might still be identified with this normative commitment to reintegrating Russia with the West.

The most important advocate of this idealist, pro-Western approach to Russian foreign policy, however, has been Russian president Boris Yeltsin.²⁴ Yeltsin’s identification with liberal ideas and pro-Western foreign policies evolved because of his revolutionary struggle against the Soviet Union and the Communist Party. Because Western capitalist democracies were prosperous and opposed communism, Yeltsin and Russia’s democratic movement looked to Western countries as allies in their common struggle against the Soviet system. Except for democracy and capitalism, there were no other attractive models or ideologies in the international system with which Russian revolutionaries could identify.

That Yeltsin should be associated with these ideals, however, is somewhat an accident of history. Unlike Walesa in Poland or Havel in the Czech Republic, Yeltsin was not a dissident in the Soviet Union, but a Communist Party apparatchik. Yeltsin teamed up with Russia's democrats in the late 1980s because they shared the same enemy—Soviet communism. Had Gorbachev not removed him from the Soviet Communist Party's leadership, he is unlikely to have become such a proponent of capitalism, democracy, and integration with the West. Had Yeltsin risen to power buoyed by a different ideology or backed by a different set of allies, Russian foreign policy might have adopted a more anti-Western bent much earlier.

This brief history of Yeltsin's political career and his beliefs is important for our discussion for two reasons.

First, it underscores how lucky the West was that Yeltsin, and his allies such as Foreign Minister Kozyrev, defined Russian foreign policy objectives in the early part of the decade. Had neonationalist Vladimir Zhirinovskiy won the presidential election in 1991, Russian foreign policy in the 1980s would have been much more anti-

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Western. Likewise, had Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov won the Russian presidential election in 1996, Russian foreign policy today also would be much more anti-Western than it is.²⁵

Second, because Yeltsin was not a pro-Western dissident within the Soviet system during his formative years, his commitment to Western ideals and values is not as deep as those of other anticommunist leaders in the region. Consequently, Yeltsin has wavered over time, especially when under the pressures of electoral politics. Finally, especially in the late years of his presidency, Yeltsin has not been a healthy man. With increasing frequency, he has allowed himself to make off-the-cuff remarks that contradict his own foreign policy objectives. Sometimes, these comments even contradict statements that he made only a day earlier. In this condition, Yeltsin has not dominated Russia's foreign policymaking guided by a consistent set of principles and objectives.

Pro-Western Pragmatists

Eventually, this normative impetus for pursuing liberal, integrationist foreign policies faded, as Russian expectations concerning Western assistance were not and could not be met, and euphoria for the markets, democracy, and the Western way ended. Even by the end of Russia's first year of independence, foreign policy appeared to be drifting back to more anti-Western patterns of the Soviet period. Support for maintaining a pro-Western orientation in foreign policy was reinvigorated, however, when emergent economic interest groups with tangible interests in cooperative relations with Western countries began to assert their

influence. Groups with economic interests—Gazprom, oil companies, mineral exporters, and the bankers—began to replace individuals and groups with political ideas as the main societal forces influencing foreign policy outcomes.

Russian exporters desire access to Western markets, importers need Western goods, and Russian bankers seek partnerships with Western capital. Russian capitalists have used their influence over the Russian state to ensure that the terms of trade remain favorable to local actors and that Russians, rather than foreigners, obtain the most lucrative Russian properties during privatization. These kinds of activities, however, should not be interpreted as ideologically motivated or normatively anti-Western, but are rather a reflection of the foreign policy interests of Russia's capitalist class.

More perversely, Russia's new economic oligarchies also want Western financial institutions to remain engaged in Russia's economic reform process so that they do not have to pay for it alone. A billion dollars in transfers from the International Monetary Fund is a billion dollars that Gazprom does not have to pay in taxes. A multimillion dollar World Bank investment in restructuring the Russian coal industry also represents costs avoided by domestic capitalists. Even the smaller investments in institutional reforms provided by such international actors as the Agency for International Development or the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development represent projects that benefit local capitalists paid for by foreign governments.

The Russian business lobby has a rather limited set of foreign policy interests. Above all else, they seek to maintain access to Western capital and markets. When security issues such as opposition to NATO expansion threaten those access interests, the coalition of liberals within the Russian government and their allies in Russia's economic society cooperated to sustain engagement. Regarding other foreign policy issues that are not seen to have a direct relationship to economic interests, this same coalition either has neglected the problem altogether or allowed other foreign policy entrepreneurs to assume center stage. For instance, Russian oil companies and bankers have demonstrated little interest in arms control issues, allowing other interest groups to dominate debate on issues such as START II or CFE negotiations. Similarly, this engagement coalition has ceded arms trade promotion to the Ministry of Atomic Energy and individual enterprises of the military-industrial complex. When Western diplomats have attempted to link these peripheral issues with integrationist issues, such as linking IMF transfers to the curtailment of Russian sales of nuclear reactor materials to Iran or to START II ratification, their strategy has failed.²⁶

Business people such as bankers, oil exporters, and CEOs at technology companies do not constitute the only group with tangible interests in a pro-Western Russian foreign policy. Many governors of Russian oblasts (such as Titov in Samara or Prusak in Novgorod) and presidents of Russian republics (such as Shaimiev in Tatarstan) see relations with Western companies, banks, and governments as the best way to jumpstart economic growth in their regions.²⁷ Regional leaders have pushed for investment-friendly legislation such as Product Sharing Agreements. Through their control of the upper house of parliament, the Federal Council, region-

al leaders have become an increasingly important political force that has acted as a pragmatic check on the more passionate anti-Western initiatives of their counterparts in the State Duma, the lower house of a parliament. Although a less-powerful political group than regional governors, hundreds of Russian nongovernmental organizations—including church groups, trade unions, student associations, and women's organizations—have cooperative relationships with their Western counterparts and therefore also have a stake in good relations with the West.

Finally, opinion polls show that the majority of Russian citizens still see good relations with the West as an important objective of Russian foreign policy. This pro-Western orientation, however, has waned over the years. After the NATO bombing campaign in Yugoslavia, over 70 percent of Russians polled in early April 1999 had a negative view of the United States, while only 14 percent still held a positive view.²⁸

Anti-Western Pragmatists

Like the second group, a third group that influences foreign policy debates in Russia today also attempts to define Russian foreign policy objectives in terms of interests rather than ideas, norms, or missions. However, this group does not think that Russia stands to gain from a pro-Western foreign policy or Western integration more generally. Rather than seeing Western-Russian cooperation as a “win-win” proposition, this group perceives international politics as a zero-sum game. If the West (and the United States in particular) is gaining, it means that Russia is losing. As self-proclaimed realists and balance-of-power strategists, this group sees the weakening of the United States and its NATO allies as *the* principal foreign policy objective of Russian diplomacy. These foreign policy thinkers want to transform the unipolar international system dominated by the United States into a multipolar system in which Russia would be one of many poles. Russia must pursue three strategies simultaneously to achieve this goal—become internally stronger in both economic and military terms, weaken the Western alliance by fomenting divisions, and balance Western power by forming anti-Western alliances with countries such as China, Iran, Iraq, and India. Though less threatening to the West, this group also sees strengthening military ties among commonwealth states as a way to weaken American hegemony.

At the same time, this group is also acutely aware of Russia's current weakness on the international stage. They understand that Russia has few levers of power to threaten or undermine American hegemony. In the short term, they recognize that Russia needs Western financial assistance to avoid further economic decline. Consequently, for pragmatic reasons, they understand the necessity of cooperation with the West even if their long-term objective remains the weakening of the United States and its allies.

This view of world politics is most prevalent among Russia's foreign policy elite, and its chief proponent is Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov. Moderate members of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) also adhere to these foreign policy goals, as do some important nationalist organizations such as Spiritual Heritage.²⁹ Directors of military enterprises, Ministry of Defense offi-

cials, and the Russian intelligence communities also understand foreign policy through this lens.

At times, Moscow mayor Yurii Luzhkov and his new party, Fatherland, issue statements on foreign policy that sound similar to this perspective. The Krasnoyarsk governor, General Aleksandr Lebed, also often sounds like an anti-Western pragmatist and sometimes even echoes themes articulated by anti-Western ideologues. Yet neither of these potential presidential candidates has developed a comprehensive foreign policy agenda, in part because neither candidate has been involved with foreign policy issues.

Anti-Western Ideologues

A fourth perspective on Russian foreign policy is passionately anti-Western.³⁰ This group also sees international relations as primarily a balance-of-power battle between Russia and the West. In contrast to the anti-Western pragmatists, however, this group believes that material interests should not be the only motivation in foreign policy, but that ethnic, civilizational, and reputational concerns should be part of the equation.

For some in this camp, such as Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, Russia must defend the Slavic nations of the world from NATO aggression as well as Islamic fundamentalism. China also features prominently as a civilizational threat to Russia for many foreign policy thinkers in this school. For more openly fascist groups such as the Russian National Union, Russian foreign policy must be openly anti-Western, anti-Semitic, and anti-Islamic. From their perspective, Coca-Cola and MTV are just as much threats to Russian national security as is NATO. Radical groups on the left, such as Viktor Anpilov's Working Russia, hold the same view of the world, but their messianic mission is still world communism, not Pan-Slavism.

Even for more mainstream groups such as the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, passionate foreign policy aims can eclipse Russian material interests. For instance, Russia has a security and economic interest in ratifying the START II and moving on to START III because Russia simply cannot afford to maintain START II levels of nuclear warheads. Yet Communist leaders in the Duma have blocked ratification because they perceive START II ratification as fulfillment of an American foreign policy objective.

As mentioned, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's Liberal Democratic Party of Russia is the best known political group in Russia that espouses this approach to Russian foreign policy. Radical groups such as RNU and Working Russia also belong in this group, as do many members of the CPRF. Although these Russian leaders often attract the most attention in the West for their radical pronouncements, they are also the smallest and weakest lobby when it comes to the actual conduct of Russian foreign policy.

The Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy: From Pro-Western Romanticism to Anti-Western Pragmatism

Over the last decade, the ebb and flow of the political fortunes of the four groups just described have influenced the definition of Russian foreign policy objectives

and the conduct of Russian foreign policy. In the euphoric days soon after the collapse of Soviet communism, pro-Western idealists dominated the definition of foreign policy objectives and the conduct of Russian foreign policy. Under the leadership of Andrei Kozyrev, Russian diplomacy aimed first and foremost to promote Russian integration into the West, as well as to secure Western assistance for the internal transformation of Russia's economy and polity. To achieve those objectives, Russia's foreign policymakers were prepared to accommodate Western interests on a whole range of issues.

The sway of liberal idealists over Russian foreign policy suffered its first setback after the 1993 parliamentary elections when Vladimir Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) captured almost a quarter of the vote. In the next parliamentary election, in 1995, pro-Western political forces suffered an even greater defeat when the CPRF emerged victorious replacing the LDPR as Russia's main opposition party. In response to this electoral outcome, Yeltsin fired Kozyrev and replaced him at the Foreign Ministry with Yevgeny Primakov, a candidate that the Communist Party applauded.

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Primakov's appointment as foreign minister, however, did not signal a radical change in Russian foreign policy. Although Primakov himself was (and still is) an anti-Western pragmatist, he did not dominate the definition of Russian foreign policy objectives during his first years in office. Rather, Russia's financial groups played a key role in Russian foreign policy, especially after Yeltsin's reelection victory in 1996. Russia's westward foreign policy orientation faced a major challenge during this period in the form of NATO expansion. No political actor of importance in Russia today, including even unabashed, pro-Western liberals, has supported NATO expansion. Yet, despite the black-and-white nature of this foreign policy issue within Russia, Russian liberals and economic interest groups that benefit from Western integration did not allow NATO expansion to derail Russian relations with the West.

The coalition of political leaders and economic interest groups in favor of Western integration suffered a real setback after the August 1998 financial crash. As a result of this economic crisis, Russia's financial oligarchs lost their influence within the Russian government, Yeltsin became a much weaker president, Primakov became prime minister, and Primakov's loyal aide, Igor Ivanov, became foreign minister.³¹ With this new configuration of power internally, Primakov had the opportunity to play a much more influential role in Russian foreign policy.

Although the anti-Western pragmatists have assumed a dominant position in the conduct of Russian foreign policy since the August 1998 financial collapse,

even after Yeltsin fired Primakov in the spring of 1999, they do not have a monopoly on foreign policy. Pro-Western idealists have been severely weakened, but still are not extinct. Through their special relationship with Yeltsin, liberals such as Anatoly Chubais continue to have a marginal role in foreign policy matters as do the liberal-dominated media in Russia. On the other side of the spectrum, anti-Western ideologues have more prominence in Russia today than they did only three years ago, but these political groups are still not central players in foreign policy. The coalition of pro-Western pragmatists, however, still does compete for influence over Russian foreign policy even if they no longer dominate the process. On different issues, different coalitions emerge to define policy. Debates and foreign policy changes in response to the Kosovo conflict offer a vivid example of how competition between different interest groups influences Russian foreign policy.

Russia and Kosovo

As no other international crisis of the last decade, NATO's bombing campaign against Yugoslavia has threatened to isolate Russia from the West. Siding with Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic and thwarting liberal reforms at home do not serve the long-term interests of Russia as a world power or Russians as a people. In the passion of the moment, however, Russian leaders have been tempted to take drastic measures to assist Serbia. Had they done so (or if they do so in the future), they would have precipitated a passionate anti-Russian response in the West. To date, however, the worst-case scenarios have not unfolded. Although anti-American sentiment in Russia has skyrocketed and may remain widespread for some time to come, Russian foreign policy in response to Kosovo gradually has gravitated toward finding a solution to the crisis that served both Western and Russian interests. This evolution has been the direct consequence of Russian domestic politics and the rise and fall of different foreign policy groups over the course of the crisis.

The initial response to the NATO bombing campaign against Yugoslavia was passionately negative. Yeltsin, Primakov, and even some foreign policy experts from liberal parties such as Yabloko adopted the rhetoric of anti-Western ideologues to record their outrage against NATO aggression. Conveniently forgetting the Soviet invasions of Hungary in 1956 and of Czechoslovakia in 1968, Foreign Minister Ivanov called the NATO bombing the worst aggression in Europe since World War II. No one in Russia is prepared to disagree publicly. Nationalists and Communists long have rallied to the anti-American battle cry. Communist Party leader Gennady A. Zyuganov has compared "NATO ideology" to "Hitlerism," and several members of his party called for a military response. In the heat of the moment, Lebed advocated the transfer of anti-aircraft weapons to Serbia, Zhirinovsky's LDPR signed up thousands of Russian volunteers to send to assist Milosevic, and the Duma voted to form a new Slavic nation by uniting the countries of Russia, Belarus, and Yugoslavia. At anti-Western protests near the American embassy in Moscow, Zhirinovsky and his ilk were front and center. Yeltsin even sent a Russian intelligence-gathering ship into the Adriatic Sea. Russian liberal

leaders, many of whom privately detest Milosevic, nonetheless joined the anti-American chorus.

Russian public opinion was also united in its criticism of the NATO campaign. According to some polls, 90 percent of the Russian population believed that the NATO bombing campaign was a mistake, and 65 percent believed that NATO was the aggressor in the conflict.³² Anti-American sentiment in Russia, of course, is nothing new. What is new about this crisis, however, is both the degree of consensus and the new composition of the anti-American chorus. Traditionally, Russia's foreign policy elite rant about U.S. hegemony, and Russian grandmothers show up at anti-American demonstrations. At the beginning of the Kosovo conflict, however, it was young people throwing beer bottles at the U.S. embassy in Moscow and organizing university teach-ins. In a first, Russian yuppies joined skinheads in protesting against U.S. "hegemony." Burned by the financial meltdown last August, Russia's young elite may no longer believe their future is best served by Western integration. A poll conducted by the Foundation for Public Opinion in April 1999 showed that 67 percent of people between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five had a negative view of the United States, compared with only 18 percent who had a positive view.³³

As the initial point person on the Kosovo crisis in Russia, Prime Minister Primakov did not allow passionate anti-Western rhetoric to dictate Russian foreign policy. The gap between rhetoric and action has been pronounced. Primakov must have rejoiced at NATO's internal divisions over Kosovo, as he and his allies in Russia celebrate any outcome that weakens or potentially divides the NATO alliance and makes the United States look bad on the international stage. Yet, Primakov the pragmatist also understood that Russia's interests would not be served by a military conflict with NATO. (In this regard, the overwhelmingly majority of Russian citizens concurred. Less than 15 percent of Russians polled recommended that Russia get involved militarily in the Yugoslav war.) Russia could not afford a war. And even as NATO bombed a former Russian ally, Primakov understood that Russia still needed engagement with the West—and first and foremost, the IMF—to address its economic woes. Rearming Milosevic would ensure that Russia would be treated as a rogue state on the periphery of the international world system for years to come.

Instead, Primakov championed Russia as a peacemaker. Overnight, Primakov and other Russian foreign policy officials became the world's leading proponents of international law and most vocal defenders of the United Nations. Primakov welcomed Russia's new, high-profile role in international affairs and saw a no-lose situation in the Kosovo conflict for Russian foreign policy aims. If peace talks began, Russia could take credit for them. If the war continued, Russia's image as a peaceful nation would stand in sharp contrast to NATO's belligerent profile. In advocating a peaceful resolution to the conflict, Primakov could still hope to weaken NATO by advocating terms favorable to Milosevic. Domestically, Primakov also gained, as his stature as a presidential hopeful, well seasoned in the ways of the world, grew.

The Primakov policy on Kosovo—talk loud and carry a small stick—did not

last long. Yeltsin loathed the spotlight on Primakov and therefore moved to turn the lights off his prime minister by appointing former prime minister Viktor Chernomyrdin as his special envoy for Yugoslavia. Pro-Western liberals lobbied hard for Chernomyrdin's appointment. After taking over, Chernomyrdin tried to find a solution of mutual benefit for the West and Russia. Although Chernomyrdin has little mediation experience and knows virtually nothing about the Balkans, he has good friends in the United States, including Vice President Gore. His reasoned statements on Kosovo were welcomed in Washington in contrast to the fiery rhetoric of Primakov and other anti-Western politicians in Russia. By cashing in on his old network of American friends, Chernomyrdin helped to rebuild Russia's image in the West and restart his own political career at home.

Had Chernomyrdin enjoyed solid domestic support in the Russian parliament or within the ministries of defense and foreign affairs, he might have been able to portray his accomplishments as a negotiator as a win for both NATO and Russia. As a mediator, he could claim to have stopped the NATO bombing campaign, preserved the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, internationalized the peacekeeping force, and brought the settlement under the auspices of the United Nations. This list of accomplishments is actually very similar to the list of objectives articulated by Gennadii Zyuganov at the beginning of June 1999.³⁴ Chernomyrdin's efforts also helped to counter Russia's negative image in the United States, which might have proved useful in securing IMF funds or new levels of American assistance.

But Chernomyrdin did not have a solid following within Russia, and he therefore got little credit for his efforts. Communists, nationalists, and senior military leaders labeled him a traitor. Yeltsin did endorse the peace accord negotiated by Chernomyrdin but did not quiet the critics. Once Chernomyrdin had outlived his usefulness to President Yeltsin, who originally appointed him to undermine Primakov, Chernomyrdin became an easy target for those dissatisfied with the peace settlement. The anti-Western forces—pragmatists and ideologues alike—took advantage of Chernomyrdin's weak domestic standing to alter Russian foreign policy toward Kosovo during the implementation of the peace. Allegedly under the orders of Generals Ivashov and Kvashnin, Russian troops moved into Kosovo without the sanction of the NATO alliance. The *de facto* division of Kosovo into NATO-dominated sectors deeply offended Russian military commanders who had expected a UN unified command and a Russian sector. Sensing that NATO was presenting Russia with a *fait accompli*, it appears that Russia's generals decided to create their own facts on the ground by moving into Kosovo before a political agreement about Russian military participation in the peacekeeping mission had been reached.

The final (or, at least, latest) Russian foreign policy toward Kosovo took a turn against the anti-Western coalition when Yeltsin instructed his minister of defense, Igor Sergeyev, to reach an accord with NATO about Russian participation in the Kosovo peacekeeping mission. Yeltsin wanted a deal signed before he attended the G-8 summit in Germany on 13 June 1999, as Yeltsin planned to go to that meeting to espouse Russian integration in return for Western economic assistance. During intense negotiations between Sergeyev and U.S. Secretary of

Defense William Cohen, the Russian side relented on their previous demand to control an independent sector. Instead, the Russian military agreed to serve in three Western sectors under NATO command. Most interpreted this agreement as a major setback for the Russian military, who only a week earlier looked as if they were in the driver's seat concerning Russia's policy on Kosovo. At the G-8 summit, Yeltsin declared that "we need to make up after a fight."³⁵ After lambasting NATO aggression just days earlier, Yeltsin now observed that he was among "friends" at the G-8 summit and assumed a very cooperative posture with the West in discussing foreign policy issues.

None of these shifts in foreign policy, especially after Primakov's removal as prime minister, could have occurred without Yeltsin's acquiescence. The decision to appoint Chernomyrdin and allow him to negotiate was Yeltsin's decision. The decision then to undermine Chernomyrdin by sending Russian troops into Kosovo was almost certainly not, as some analysts have suggested, made independently of the Kremlin. Although details are still sketchy, past patterns of behavior suggest a similar logic in the decision about Russian troop deployment. Indeed, that maneuver was classic Yeltsin, very reminiscent of the way he "decided" to invade Chechnya. In both situations, Yeltsin deliberately developed two camps—hawks and doves—within his administration. In Chechnya, he gave a vague set of orders to Russian armed forces about preserving law and order in Chechnya. He then disappeared (for an operation on his nose) and allowed the hawks to take the initiative. If they failed, Yeltsin could always distance himself from them. If they succeeded, he could take the credit. In sum, Yeltsin's style of leadership has allowed domestic politics to influence Russian foreign policy in a direct, dramatic, and changing way.

That Russian foreign policy is the product of the interplay of competing domestic groups is, of course, a vast improvement over the Soviet system of foreign policymaking. Russia today is not a totalitarian state ruled by a Communist Party with a single and clearly articulated foreign policy of expanding world socialism and destroying world capitalism and democracy. But until Russia resolves its domestic problems, it will be unable to conduct a responsible, coherent, and consistent foreign policy. And as long as Yeltsin remains president of Russia, the decision-making process in Moscow on any issue, including Kosovo, is likely to remain muddled and erratic.

Russia's Electoral Cycle and Foreign Policy

The Yeltsin era is quickly coming to a close. Although Yeltsin has made countless blunders and tragic mistakes during his time in office, his administration on the whole has demonstrated an unusual degree of cooperation with the United States over the last decade. Russia's presidential election, currently scheduled for the summer of 2000, will be the biggest event in U.S.–Russian relations for the foreseeable future. Almost all analysts agree that Russian foreign policy will change after this election. However, little agreement exists as to how it will change. Nonetheless, a few basic parameters will guide the next president in making foreign policy no matter who wins the election.

First, the next president will still have to contend with Russian weakness, and that means continued reliance on Western financial assistance. Bold foreign policy initiatives cannot be financed. Even minor military innovations such as the development of a new tactical nuclear weapon or the integration of Belarus are unlikely to occur because Russia will not have the resources to finance them. Second, the next Russian president will not have any romantic illusions about Western intentions. Pro-Western liberals, who still have access to Yeltsin today, will probably be marginalized from the foreign policy process after the next election.³⁶ Third, the next president is unlikely to represent or be influenced by anti-Western ideologists. This point is significant and often forgotten in Western policy circles.

“In Russia, the NATO military action in the Balkans has confirmed what hard-liner nationalists and communists believed all along about Western intentions.”

Had those forces performed better in elections in Russia in the last decade—had Zhirinovsky won the 1991 presidential election or Zyuganov won the 1996 presidential election—Russia would have adopted a much more militantly anti-Western foreign policy. Instead of a struggle between liberals and fascists, the battle for influence over Russian foreign

policy is likely to be a struggle between anti-Western and pro-Western pragmatists.

Candidates will pull Russian foreign policy in different directions. As president, Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov or former prime minister Primakov will define Russian foreign policy in zero-sum terms when dealing with the West. Even Zyuganov will still recognize the need to maintain some kind of relationship with the United States, but either Zyuganov or Primakov is likely to establish the weakening of the West (and especially the United States) as a long-term strategic objective.

Yavlinsky would be the most pro-Western president in the field of candidates today. But he is also very unlikely to win. Lebed has expressed a bizarre mix of very pro-Western policies and belligerent anti-Western policies, making him one of the most unpredictable presidential candidates. But he is also a dark horse candidate.

The foreign policy consequences of a Luzhkov presidency are also hard to predict but more consequential as he is one of the strongest candidates in the race to date. Luzhkov has made openly bellicose statements regarding neighboring countries such as Latvia and Ukraine. At the same time, his statements about Kosovo have been rather pragmatic, emphasizing that Russia must focus on rebuilding its economy, rather than fighting a new Balkan war to reemerge as an international power. In making this kind of statement, Luzhkov wants to position his political organization as a “party of peace” in contrast to the Communist “party of war.” Recently, he has invited experienced foreign policy experts to

assume major positions in his new party, Fatherland, including former presidential advisors Andrei Kokoshin and Sergei Yastrzhembsky. Fatherland's umbrella, however, is a big one and still includes more-militant nationalists, as well as some moderate communists, making it difficult to predict what a Luzhkov presidency will mean for Russian foreign policy.

Implications for U.S. –Russian Relations.

Well before the Kosovo crisis, U.S.–Russian relations had suffered a series of major setbacks. Russia's nuclear technology transfers to Iran, NATO expansion, Russian military involvement in the Caucasus, U.S. plans to deploy a national missile defense, and Russia's financial meltdown are only a handful of the issues and events that have soured the bilateral relationship. Kosovo, however, has challenged Russian-American relations like no other event in this decade. In the United States, the blame game for "who lost Russia" began well before the NATO bombing campaign, but gained even greater steam during the Kosovo crisis when it appeared that Russia was ready to back an American enemy. In Russia, the NATO military action in the Balkans has confirmed what hard-liner nationalists and communists believed all along about Western intentions. The NATO military campaign also has undermined liberal, pro-Western forces within Russia and made these friends of the West question their previous allegiance. In Washington, analysts now talk openly about the need to return to a policy of containment. In Moscow, foreign policy elites speak about the return of the cold war.

These fatalist assessments of U.S.–Russia relations are premature. Russia has not yet been "lost." Fascists or militant communists bent on conflict with the United States may control the Russian state someday, but they are not in power today and do not appear close to seizing power anytime soon. Pro-Western idealists also are not in power and are unlikely to regain power in Russia anytime soon, although this group still plays a more influential role in the making of foreign policy than their ideological enemies on the far right or left. The real battle in Russia regarding foreign policy is between anti-Western and pro-Western pragmatists. Even after Kosovo, advocates of pragmatic engagement with the West have maintained substantial influence over the conduct of foreign policy, especially in areas of special interest to them. Their continued existence, despite all odds, leaves the door open for U.S.–Russian cooperation of mutual benefit in the future.

If anti-Western forces were in firm control of Russian foreign policymaking, Russian troops would not still be deployed in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Conventional Threat Reduction (CTR) would have been closed down a long time ago. At a minimum, we should have expected that these programs would have been suspended after the Kosovo crisis. But most were not. Likewise, Primakov's government and then Stepashin's government have continued to negotiate with the IMF and have not limited any U.S. assistance programs within Russia. Cooperation between American and Russian nongovernmental organizations has continued throughout the Kosovo crisis, and the small handful of Western investors still involved in Russia have not been asked to leave. To protest the NATO bombing campaign, Prime Minister Primakov did turn his plane around and refuse to meet

with Vice President Gore in the first days of the war, but the working groups of the Gore-Primakov Commission did meet nonetheless. Some programs such as shared early warning have been suspended temporarily after Kosovo, Russia's participation in the Partnership for Peace program is dead in the water, CFE negotiations have slowed, and the prospects of START II ratification are slimmer than ever before. In certain issue areas, however, U.S.–Russian engagement continues unabated by recent geopolitical developments in the Balkans. The resilience of the cooperative bilateral relationship may be greater than most expected.

The U.S. strategy of engagement with Russia has not transformed Russia into an ally. Given Russia's size, history, and culture, this was an unrealistic expectation from the very beginning. Moreover, over the last decade, the United States has failed to make the level of investments necessary to have any real influence over Russia's internal developments. Lack of U.S. presidential leadership combined with a public not fearful of external threats translated into a strategy of engagement with Russia on the cheap. Given the small amounts that we have been willing to invest in the Russian relationship, it is surprising, in fact, that the possibility of Russian-American cooperation still remains.

Now is not the time to give up on Russia or abandon the strategy of engagement. Although anti-Western forces in Russia are more powerful than anytime in the last decade, they do not enjoy a monopoly over policymaking in either domestic or international affairs. While pro-Western forces still exist in Russia, the United States should pursue those foreign policies that encourage their development and avoid those policies that promote their rivals. Disagreements between Russian and American diplomats over Iraq, Iran, or Serbia or past failures regarding aid programs are not arguments for abandoning engagement, but evidence for the need to improve the policy.

NOTES

1. In the United States, the debate over NATO expansion is a recent but classic case in which different groups supported the policy but for very different reasons. Likewise, opponents of the ideas also had very different motivations. See James Goldgeier, *Not Whether but When: The U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999).

2. There are many brands of realism—classical realism, neorealism, structural realism, and so forth. This essay is not concerned with evaluating the different explanatory powers of these variations. Realism in its most generic form will be treated as *one* approach to international politics. The classic explication of structural realism is Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, 1979). For a discussion of Waltz's theory along with a presentation of these variations on realism, see Robert Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and Its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).

3. Robert Keohane, "Neorealism and World Politics," in Keohane, *Neorealism and Its Critics*, 7.

4. Hans Morganthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Knopf, 1960), 27.

5. James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, "A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the Post-Cold War Era," *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992). Furthermore, states have two alliance options, balancing or bandwagoning. See Steve Walt, *Ori-*

gins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989).

6. See, for instance, Stephen Krasner's treatment of ideology in *Defending the Nationalist Interest* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978).

7. See William Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War," *International Security* 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994): 91–129. More generally, when old patterns and institutions breakdown, rationalist models are least useful. See George Tsebelis, *Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).

8. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 69.

9. Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War."

10. Goldstein and Keohane, "Ideas and Foreign Policy," 5.

11. See Stephen Krasner, ed., *International Regimes* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1982); Robert Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989); W. Richard Scott, John Meyer, and Associates, eds., *Institutional Environment and Organizations: Structural Complexity and Individualism* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1994); Martha Finnemore, "Norms, Culture, and World Politics," *International Organization* 50 (Spring 1996): 325–48; Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutional Theory," *International Security* 20 (Summer 1995): 39–51.

12. Classic studies from this approach include Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971) and Morton Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1974). Surprisingly, this approach has occupied a marginal place in the study of international relations. For a review of the field with some clues as to why, see Peter Katzenstein, Robert Keohane, and Stephen Krasner, "International Organization and the Study of World Politics," *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (Autumn 1998) 645–86.

13. On the power of ideas in these contexts, see John A. Hall, "Ideas and Social Sciences," in *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change*, Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 48.

14. Ikenberry cites other such "critical turning points" in his "Creating Yesterday's New World Order," in *Ideas and Foreign Policy*, 59.

15. Goldstein and Keohane, *Ideas and Foreign Policy*, 16.

16. This is the argument in Michael McFaul, "Revolutionary Ideas, State Interests, and Russian Foreign Policy," in *Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, Vladimir Tismaneanu, ed. (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), 27–52.

17. See Stephen Larrabee and Theodore Krasik, *Foreign and Security Policy Decision-making under Yeltsin* (Santa Monica: RAND 1997).

18. See Vladimir Lepekhin, "Gruppa Interesov v Sovremennoi Rossii," in *Politika i Obshchestvo Perekhodnogo Perioda*, Sergei Markov, ed. (Moscow: Moscow Carnegie Center, 1997); Igor Khripunov and Mary Matthews, "Russia's Oil and Gas Interest Group and Its Foreign Policy Agenda," *Problems of Post-Communism* 43, no. 3 (May-June 1996): 38–49; Robert Corzine and Chrystia Freeland, "A Lubricator of Exchange," *Financial Times*, 1 April 1996, 17; Irina Savateeva, "Gazprom: Blesk i Nishcheta Imperii," *Izvestiya*, 18 September 1994, 2; Carla Anne Robbins and Andrew Higgins, "Money Hungry, Russia Finds a Foreign Market for Nuclear Knowledge," *Wall Street Journal*, 15 December 1998, 1; and David Phillipov, "What US Calls Arms Proliferation, Russia Calls Business as Usual," *Boston Globe*, 19 August 1998, 1.

19. For instance, in conversations, both liberal Anatolii Chubais and statist Aleksei Podberezkin concur on this issue. My discussions with Chubias in February 1999 and Podberezkin during a roundtable discussion on National Public Radio in Los Angeles in which I participated.

20. For comparisons between Russia's current depression and the American Great Depression, see Branko Milanovic, *Income, Inequality and Poverty during the Transition from Planned to Market Economy* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1998).

21. Because of Russia's preponderance of power in the region, this is one foreign policy issue area in which realist perspectives might be most powerful. See Rajan Menon, "After Empire: Russia and the Southern 'Near Abroad,'" in *The New Russian Foreign Policy*, Michael Mandelbaum, ed. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998), 100–66.

22. Leon Aron, "Foreign Policy Doctrine of Postcommunist Russia," in *The New Russian Foreign Policy*, 28.

23. On the early emergence of new ideas in Soviet foreign policy, see Sarah Mendelson, *Changing Course: Ideas, Politics, and the Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998). On how ideas can impact on foreign policy more generally, see Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane, "Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework," in *Ideas and Foreign Policy*, 3–30.

24. See Coit Blacker, "Russia and the West," in *The New Russian Foreign Policy*, 167–93. Blacker makes a path-dependency argument by asserting that initial liberal, integrationist policies advocated by Yeltsin in the early years of his presidency have constrained the parameters of subsequent Russian foreign policies.

25. This is the argument in Michael McFaul, "The Precarious Peace: Domestic Politics in the Making of Russian Foreign Policy," *International Security* 22, no. 3 (Winter 1997/98): 5–35.

26. On the other hand, Russia and Russian commentators have attempted to use negative linkage, such as threatening to proliferate nuclear weapons if the IMF does not provide financial support to the Russian government. See Nikolai Sokov, "The IMF-Russian Negotiations and the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," PONARS Policy Memo Series, No. 56, March 1999.

27. See "Vneshnyaya politika Tatarstana: pretensii I realnost'," *Panorama-Forum* 16 (Summer 1997).

28. Poll conducted by the Foundation for Public Opinion in April 1999.

29. See Aleksei Podberezkin, *Russkii Put': Sdelai Shag* (Moskva: RAU-Universitet, 1998).

30. See Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, *Poslednii Vagon na Sever* (Moskva: Conjou, 1995).

31. On the power shift, see Michael McFaul, "Authoritarian and Democratic Responses to Financial Meltdown in Russia," *Problems of Post-Communism* (July/August 1999): 1–11.

32. Polls taken by the Foundation for Public Opinion, 3–4 April 1999. See www.fom.ru.

33. *Ibid.*

34. "Press Conference with CPRF Leader Gennady Zyuganov, State Duma," 2 June 1999, translated and distributed by Federal News Service.

35. Barry Schwied, "Clinton, Yeltsin Going Steady Again," *Associated Press*, 22 June 1999.

36. Currently, they are banking on Stepashin as the candidate in 2000, but even Stepashin is not as prone to follow the liberal line on foreign policy as Yeltsin has been.