The Patriarch and the President: Religion and Political Choice in Russia

VICKI L. HESLI, EBRU ERDEM, WILLIAM REISINGER, AND ARTHUR MILLER

In this article, we argue that the political attitudes and electoral behavior of Orthodox adherents in Russia today exemplify the traditional symphonic ideal of church-state relations. As supporters of President Yeltsin, Orthodox believers are carrying forward the idea of sobornost, whereby subjects, while devoted to the church, submit freely to just rulers. In addition, following the tradition of a Christian citizen, believers have the obligation and responsibility to go to the polls and participate in voting.

To test our hypothesis that religion is an important factor that influences individual political behavior in Russia, we provide evidence of the effect through personal interviews. We evaluate the responses to our survey questions and identify the points of contact between religious identity and political behavior in the following focal areas: voter turnout, presidential vote choice, and institutional support/distrust. We are able to demonstrate that traditional religious identities, still strong after decades of suppression, are among the major determining factors in vote choice. We find that the religious faithful in Russia are dubious of government institutions, yet concurrently, the faithful support the president and participate in voting at higher rates than nonbelievers.

Under the old theoretical paradigm, religion was to be weakened with modernization. A more recent thesis is that the modern world is witnessing the "deprivatization" of religion—meaning that religions are refusing to accept the marginal and privatized roles that theories of modernity and secularization had reserved for them. Thus, religions are (re)entering the public sphere not only to "defend their traditional turf," but also to "participate in the very struggles to define . . . private and public spheres."1

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The Russian Orthodox Church is one such religion that is re-entering the public sphere. The Orthodox Church is participating in the collective construction and affirmation of new institutional structures. As we shall show, Orthodoxy in Russia today is serving to legitimize the current regime, yet that support is reserved and skeptical. The relationship between religion and politics is, therefore, complex, as the church plays a dual role of legitimator and critic. Given the complexity of these roles, even conflicting roles, the untangling of these interactions will only be started here.

Theoretical Considerations

If we see the 1990s as the historical epoch when Russian voters first received the democratic franchise (arguing that until recently their votes meant little), then it is our responsibility as scholars to identify the major societal cleavages of this era, as they will have a defining impact on the future alignments of parties and voters. According to the Lipset and Rokkan tradition, Russian politics is being built on the major lines of cleavage characteristic of that society today. Because Russia is well along in the modernization process, one might think that the Lipset and Rokkan framework has less applicability for this new democracy, but the historical struggle for power between the church and advocates of a secular state has not yet been played out in Russia.

To further specify the foundations of political behavior in post-Soviet societies, one question that must be addressed is whether religious influences can be separated from those of class or economic interest. If religious differences simply mask a clash of economic or class interests, we can think of “religion as surrogate.” In Kenneth Wald’s conceptualization of this idea, “religion is relevant to politics only as a surrogate for some other form of ‘real’ social conflict. For example, the religion of a low status group may simply reflect the correlation between the pattern of religious affiliation and socio-economic status.” Another application of this idea would be that higher-status individuals are more likely to adopt regime-supportive interpretations of the shared symbols than are lower-status people. Wald’s own analysis, however, prompts him to “dismiss the notion that religion was a mere surrogate for social disadvantage.” Nonetheless, the question still needs to be answered in the Russian setting: Do economic concerns reinforce religious influences on political behavior, or are these cross-cutting cleavages?

Our primary theoretical focus is a cultural one that posits religious faith as identifying a “reality” that becomes part and parcel of individual lives and ultimately influences political behavior. Because of religion’s ability to sacralize culture, religion serves to preserve cultural forms intact and unaltered over long periods. In terms of a familiar intellectual tradition, our approach builds on the ideas of Max Weber as articulated in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. According to Weber, certain components of Calvinism, as emphasized by the Puritans, upheld activities important for the capitalist enterprise. Similarly, Michael Parenti identified a religious culture associated with Catholicism that has social and political repercussions. David Laitin also has applied the tradition that religious doctrines have practical implications. Kenneth Wald further developed
the idea of religion as a belief system that transmits political orientations that affect behavior in secular situations. Relatedly, Ramet states:

Religion is not merely a set of beliefs about a “world beyond” but also, and perhaps more important, a set of beliefs about how the present world should be organized, what the relations of hierarchy in society should be, and what the nature of authority and law is. [This means that] liturgy and ritual are less important for their own sake than as occasions for the reaffirmation by a community of the authority of . . . leaders.

One way to conceptualize the role of religion in politics is put forward by a group of scholars that we can label consensual theorists. Consensual theorists see religious symbols and imagery as tools to be used in the process of national integration such as by affirming a common citizenship. In a definitive formulation of this theory, the church is seen as “the hegemonic apparatus of the ruling group.” It is in the interest of the state, and the specific privileged group that it represents, to “absorb the Church in order to better preserve its monopoly with the support of that zone of ‘civil society’ which the Church represents.” The church itself feels “very strongly the need for doctrinal unity of the whole mass of the faithful. . . . Religion, or a particular church, maintains its community of faithful.”

As we will see in the section below on the current status of church-state relations in Russia, the 1997 Law on Religion does serve to define and protect a broad sphere of influence—both public and private—for the Orthodox Church.

In a contrasting theoretical formulation, the cultural rhetoric of the society is characterized by “dualism,” by a division between religious adherents and secularists. In this conceptualization, we expect that a believer-versus-nonbeliever societal cleavage would emerge and be highly evident, possibly even supersed-ing that of class. In the Russian context, one might expect to see such a cleavage, as we could hypothesize little common ground between the secularists (nonbelievers) and the Orthodox.

Yet another model is the “pluralist paradigm,” whereby Russian society, because of its size and diversity, can be seen as a kind of competitive marketplace for both ideas and votes. It is difficult, however, to think of Russia as a place where denominations exist in a competitive religious market and where churches work at making their messages attractive to potential adherents. In fact, the 1997 Law on Religion gives the Orthodox Church definitive advantages. The implications of these conceptualizations are important, as research demonstrates that religious commitment tends to be higher in situations where religious competition exists.

Our starting hypothesis is that traditional Orthodox doctrines will be reflected in current belief systems and that they will affect the political behavior of adherents. Recent survey data reveal that 55 percent of residents in the Russian Federation identify themselves as religious believers. The majority of these believers, 90 percent, are of the Russian Orthodox faith, with a minority, 8 percent, being Muslim. Thus, the major divide is between nonbelievers and Russian Orthodox adherents. Following the dualism paradigm, adherents are expected to have different orientations toward politics than nonbelievers.
The nature of the church-state relationship, however, is contingent not only on the nature of religious identities, but also on the degree to which religious and political life overlie one another and interact. Given the stated goal of the Yeltsin regime to establish democratic governance, religious influences could be considered negative if they interfere with the development of democratic values. Notably, some researchers have argued that religiosity may contribute to intolerant political orientations, although the evidence that relates religious beliefs to political tolerance has been mixed. Thus, in positing that believers will differ from nonbelievers, we will also explore in the analysis below whether one group is more or less “tolerant” than the other.

Guy Swanson argues that as legislatures gain power, that is, as the system becomes more democratic, the tendency is toward increased religious tolerance. Following Swanson’s line of reasoning, religious changes are tied to changes in the political realm. “This assumption implies that a process of collective discussion and collective search must intervene between the rise of basic political novelties and the emergence and acceptance of a theological interpretation appropriate to them.” This means that for the Russian setting, given recent political changes, the theological orientation of society may be in a state of flux. Thus, as an alternate hypothesis, one might also reason that given the recent dramatic changes in government structure, religious doctrines may be uncertain and will, therefore, have no discernible effects on the political orientations and behaviors of believers. According to this line of thought, we will not be able to find evidence of patterned differences between believers and nonbelievers.

Antonio Gramsci also makes the argument that changes in authority structures, for example, lessening the degree of coercion exercised over society, will lead to the emergence of new ideologies. New systems of living and working, requiring new customs and habits, can create a “crisis of morals” that gives rise to new ideologies, new religions: “But why call this unity of faith ‘religion’ and not ‘ideology,’ or even frankly ‘politics’? . . . Hence the reason why philosophy cannot be divorced from politics.”

This analysis can be put into the broader scholarly debate about the nature of the democratic transition in Russia. Arguments have been made that democratic political cultures must precede (to some degree) democratic political forms. If so, does Russian Orthodoxy provide fertile ground for the growth of Russian democracy? The problem is that the specified role for religion in democratic theory is as nuanced and debatable as democratic theories themselves.

A separate, but related, theoretical framework is represented by the work on political cognition that argues that political attitudes can be predicted on the basis of affective attitudes toward salient or highly visible groups. For many citizens, group-related attitudes provide cognitive structures through which the political world can be simplified and more efficiently understood. In this tradition, religious group identifications have also been shown to predict political attitudes. However, the more complicated the cognitive structures involved, that is, the greater the number of salient groups, the more difficult the processing becomes, and thus, the effect on political thought and action becomes less determinant.
An important question for Russia is the degree to which religious identity does require the identification of an outgroup.

Additional work has emphasized that even though a particular social/religious group may share identification with certain cultural symbols and language, the strength of this identification varies, as does the interpretation of the symbols. Arguably, not only the nature of the religious identities themselves will affect the diverse interpretations of the common set of symbols, but so will social (economic) and political identities. “The fact that different members of a group experience the group differently means that there are always possibilities for diverse understandings of what the doctrine means.”

Of course, none of these conceptual approaches excludes the others; rather they quite likely overlap and reinforce one another. Because the belief systems approach puts emphasis on how religious beliefs affect behavior, our focus on this perspective requires a cultural/historical overview: What are the traditional Orthodox doctrines that we expect to have repercussions in Russian society today?

**Church-State Relations in Russia: Historical Overview**

Although the role of the Orthodox Church in Russian society has varied depending on the historical period under consideration, scholars tend to agree that “perhaps no-where in Europe was religious identity so closely linked to national and ethnic identity as in Russia.” Indeed, Russian peasants have historically referred to themselves as “Orthodox” (pravoslavnyi). Robert Tucker states that “Russian society was a political community of the faithful, an Orthodox Tsardom.” The traditional Orthodox doctrine of symphonia—the striving for a harmonious relationship between religious and political spheres—is especially critical in this regard. Within the credo of harmony between church and state is the belief that each is responsible for a separate sphere. Even as “unity and concord in all things among the government and the clergy” are held as ideals, the patriarch is conceived of as having responsibilities separate from the emperor.

Yet weakness of state power in Russia has historically been tied to stronger church authority. For example, the authority of the church weakened under Peter the Great. The church lost sovereignty when Peter replaced the Patriarch with an appointed administrative body in 1721. An appeal to the tsar by the metropolitan of St. Petersburg at the start of the twentieth century reveals a concern about the lack of guaranteed freedom for church affairs. In 1905, a council of bishops called for the restoration of the patriarchate and a greater voice for the clergy in social and public affairs. But it was only with the disintegration of the Russian empire that Patriarch Tikhon was elected in 1917.

Thus, one could say that public support for the church increases and the church assumes a more prominent role in the society during times of government turmoil. Given the totalitarian nature of the Bolshevik state, the church once again receded into the background. By the end of the first Five Year Plan, nearly 95 percent of Orthodox churches had been closed. True to the historical pattern, “when Soviet power receded ever so briefly during World War II, the popularity of the
church quickly reasserted itself.” Stalin’s successors, however, renewed the campaign for atheism, and a majority of Orthodox churches were once again closed.

Although the Soviet state was successful at repressing overt religious activities, including religious education, we know that religious identities persisted. Religious messages can be transmitted and kept alive in a multitude of ways; not only through formal participation in religious services or religious schools, but through cultural practices, narratives, and images. One of the major traditional doctrines that was kept alive was that of *symphonia*.

The *symphonic* ideal of church-state relations was maintained throughout the Soviet period in émigré writings, the underground (Catacombal) church, and through other forms of dissident activity. The writings of Anton V. Kartashev and Georgy Fedotov provide examples of those who carried forward the traditional religious views. Fedotov, for example, examined the idea of *sobornost*, whereby “subjects subject themselves freely and where the rulers do not rule but serve.” The word *sobornost* itself, being derived from an old Russian root meaning “cathedral” or (religious) gathering, was originally proposed in the early nineteenth century by Slavophile thinkers and implies devotion to religious-based norms. According to this view, the church has a dual responsibility: to serve as a government critic, but also to submit to and to support just rulers. The role of a Christian citizen is essential to Fedotov’s conception of an ideal democracy: political participation should be accepted as an obligation and a responsibility. Rulers are to be wise and just, bound by their own conscience and their own understanding of the common good.

This political theology represents an Orthodox view of the rights and responsibilities of government: the good ruler deserves the right to rule, unencumbered by anything but his own conscience. A bad governor, however, must be chastised. Such a political theology is important because it provides not only an alternative to communism (which history proved to be disastrous in the Soviet context) but also an alternative to Western conceptions of liberal democracy, which many Russians reject as being foreign and unworkable in the Slavic context. Russian historical documents reveal that the role of the church and religious believers is to provide both support for and a check on government. This Orthodox view of the Christian citizen leads us to propose two hypotheses to be tested: that higher levels of voting participation and support for the president will be found among religious adherents in comparison with nonbelievers and, in contrast, that believers will be skeptical of the “government” and will reveal distrust of the new “democratic” institutions.

The USSR’s 1990 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations represented an official reinauguration of religion onto the political scene. The evolving church-state relationship is represented in the newest law (approved by Yeltsin in September 1997) and in the ways in which it differs from the previous one. Indeed, we posit that it is because the Orthodox Church has provided the new regime with a high level of (diffuse) support that the state responded with the new 1997 law on religion. The final version of the 1997 law clearly shows increased favoritism toward the Russian Orthodox Church and is more restrictive
of the “nontraditional” religions. The preamble states that the Russian Federation is a secular state but also that it recognizes the “special role of Orthodoxy in the history of Russia and in the establishment and development of its spirituality and culture.” A “foreign” religious organization “may be granted the right to [have] representation on the territory of the Russian federation, [but that] representation may not engage in cultural and other religious activity nor does it have the status of a religious association established by the . . . federal law” (Article 9.2).

In addition, several provincial governments passed legislation in favor of Orthodoxy that serves to further constrain freedom of conscience and inhibit the functioning of competing religious organizations. Non-Orthodox organizations also suffer indirect official repression through means such as visa denials, shipment blocks, unfair treatment of believers, and even raids on temples. On the other hand, the unsettled state enables unconstrained religious activity for most organizations as long as they do not become subjects of official pressure.

In the context of the new religious law, the Russian Orthodox Church is seeking to reestablish itself as the major spiritual and cultural pillar of the Russian society. The Orthodox Church wants to gain back the believers and the property it has lost, although it does not explicitly demand “state religion” status. The relationship with politics has been give-and-take: In return for the 1997 law, extended social roles, and improved church-military relations, the church provides political support in elections and for policies. Politicians, for their part, respect the ability of the church to manipulate political outcomes. Some have incorporated Orthodoxy as a main part of their ideology. Alexander Barkashov of Russian National Unity and Alexander Lebed have clearly bowed to the church. Others appeal more indirectly to the Orthodox population: Gennady Zyuganov, in the period just before the 3 July 1996 runoff elections, declared his intent to ban foreign missionaries other than Orthodox.

In the tensions between Yeltsin and the parliament, legislators attempted to bring the church into their camp as an ally. Legislators criticized Yeltsin, on nationalistic grounds, for yielding to the Western powers in his thoughts of vetoing the 1997 law on religion. Yet, Yeltsin has the upper hand from a traditional Orthodox perspective, as he is the embodiment of the “emperor.” Legislators also more openly support freedom of conscience and secularism. The Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and its proponents, such as Gleb Yakunin and Viktorovich Savitsky, are all-faith advocates.

Other government officials, based on their personal beliefs or their will to appeal to believers, have also acknowledged the power of the church. The mayor of Moscow, Yuri Luzhkov, is a fervent supporter of the church; this may reflect his desire to profit from the Patriarch’s support as Yeltsin did in 1996. Governor Evgeny Nazdratenko of Primorie territory declared: “I will fight inexorably against various kinds of ‘fishers of souls.’ The Orthodox Church must remain in our Russia as the chief church, as it was from time immemorial.”

Given this historical and cultural context, and after reviewing available theories, we think that the Russian situation can best be conceptualized as dualistic, with religious adherents competing primarily with secularists. The Orthodox
Church is working to retain its monopoly by restricting newcomers and preventing a competitive market by encouraging legal sanctions against competitors. Given the strength of the Russian presidency, we conclude that Orthodoxy is unlikely to face any serious challenges to its position as chief doctrine—unless a change away from the centralist nature of the Russian regime should occur. The quid-pro-quo relationship between the church and state should yield higher levels of support for Yeltsin among religious adherents. Thus, we expect that Orthodox adherents will manifest different political behavior in comparison with nonbelievers and atheists. We do not, however, expect to see the same level of conflict of interest between believers and secularists as was historically the case in Western Europe, given the broad sphere of influence that has been carved out for the Orthodox Church.

In Soviet and post-Soviet systems, the prevailing wisdom has been that religion would have a muted effect given the atheistic position taken by the Bolsheviks. This portrait, however, clashes with the historical cultural tradition that emphasizes the essential roles that the church played in Russian society prior to the Bolshevik revolution and even during the Soviet period. We point out, however, that numerous political issues are seen as outside the realm of ideas that the religious core feels the need to control, and thus, a diversity of political attitudes will emerge, even among those with shared religious identities. The Orthodox Church, for example, has not explicitly offered its backing to any particular political party over and above any of the others, and thus we do not try to find a role for religious identity in partisanship in Russia. Other ideas, however, such as those relating to population policies, contraception, and abortion, regularly have religious underpinnings. According to our historical overview, citizen participation (such as voting) is one of the issues that the church sees as within its realm. We expect higher levels of voting participation (turnout) from religious adherents because traditional Orthodox writings emphasize the importance of mutual support between ruler and church. The Russian Orthodox Church provided, to some degree, an endorsement of Yeltsin during the 1996 presidential election; thus, Orthodox believers are expected to report a vote for Yeltsin more frequently than are nonbelievers and atheists.

**Empirical Findings: The Confessional Base of Political Behavior in Russia**

Our major argument is that religious doctrines have behavioral implications in the electoral realm. For Russia, we posit that traditional Orthodox views of the relationship between church and state still manifest themselves in support for the president, as a vote for the president could be likened to the deference and loyalty accorded to the tsar in pre-Soviet times. More directly, in the words of Ramet, religious beliefs provide the foundation for the “reaffirmation by a community of the authority of . . . leaders.”

In Russia, Orthodoxy so thoroughly dominates the confessional landscape that we will focus on differences between believers and nonbelievers, and also on differences depending on the strength of individual religious identity. An alternative hypothesis for the Russian setting is that Orthodoxy is so pervasive as a world
view defining Russian identity that it is a homogenizing force, and that we will thus not be able to discern any political behavior differences among Russian citizens that are due to any kind of religious distinctions. In the tradition established by Kenneth Wald, we will evaluate the power of religious variables to explain behavior with controls for other theoretically relevant considerations such as socioeconomic status and sociotropic and pocketbook economic evaluations.

To set the context, we report that in one of our earlier surveys (1992), 43 percent of respondents in Russia were atheists or nonbelievers, 53 percent were Russian Orthodox, and the remainder followed another faith. Our 1995 survey revealed that 40 percent of respondents in Russia were atheists or nonbelievers, 56 percent were Russian Orthodox, and the remainder followed another faith. In 1997, 45 percent of respondents in Russia were atheists or nonbelievers, 50 percent were Russian Orthodox, and the remainder followed another faith. The figures attest to the fact that the proportion of Orthodox believers in the population has been quite constant through most of the 1990s and no surge of new Orthodox believers has occurred since 1992.

Although nonbelievers are not the same as atheists, the number of atheists is relatively small (6 percent in 1997), and because both categories provide a proper conceptual contrast to believers, atheists and nonbelievers are combined in the analysis that follows. Among the believers, the overwhelming majority are Russian Orthodox (90 percent). The second-largest group of believers are Muslim, but they made up only 4 percent of the population in 1997 (when believers, nonbelievers, and atheists are considered together). Thus, to clarify the distinction between Orthodox believers and nonbelievers (and atheists), Muslims are excluded from the analysis. (For further information on sampling procedures, please contact the authors.)

Before delving into the political repercussions of religiosity, we first identify who the Orthodox believers are in Russia. In the first row of table 1, we see that Orthodox adherents are on average significantly older than nonbelievers. (The asterisks in table 1 mean that on this characteristic the difference between the mean for Russian Orthodox adherents is significantly different from the mean for nonbelievers and atheists using a two-tailed $t$-test.) Because Andrew Greeley has argued that an increase in religiosity is occurring among the young, we also divided our sample into age cohorts, but we do not find proportionately more believers among the youngest cohort. Rather, we see a steady increase in the percentage of Orthodox adherents as one moves into the older cohorts. Thus, no evidence exists of a significant “cohort experience” impact, such as one might expect if socialization during or after the communist experiment was making a difference.

Also from table 1, Orthodox believers in comparison to nonbelievers are significantly less well educated and have lower average incomes. When we combine education, income, and occupation into the socioeconomic status (SES) index, we see that Orthodox believers do have lower socioeconomic status. The percentage of Russian Orthodox adherents is also higher among women than men. Never-married people are least likely to be adherents, while those who are wid-
owed are most likely to be Orthodox adherents. We point out that, contrary to the report of Mark Rhodes, these data do not show a higher percentage of religious adherents in rural areas. Rhodes emphasized the urban/rural residence difference in the believers’ political attitudes. Muslims may reside disproportionately in rural areas, but Orthodox adherents do not.

Age, SES, sex, and marital status are intertwined in the Russian setting. For example, the proportion of Orthodox adherents is lower among younger men than among older men (32 percent and 38 percent respectively); and across all age cohorts, female adherents outnumber male adherents, although the differential is greatest among the oldest cohort. Widows, prevalent among Orthodox believers,
are also most prevalent among the older cohorts. Thus, we will include all of these demographic characteristics (except marital status) in the multivariate analysis to follow.

It is noteworthy that the percentage of Russian Orthodox adherents is higher among those who were previously members of the old Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and lower among those who were never members of the CPSU (bottom of table 1). This may appear to be counterintuitive, as communism preached atheism. Our interpretation is that those who were members of the party were more willing to accept the dominant ideology. When the official ideology switched from communism to Orthodoxy, these people switched along with the ruler. In contrast, among those who were never members of the Communist Party is a group of independent thinkers who are unwilling to adhere to official ideology, whether religious or political. The Orthodox Church has been the state church, and opposition to the state can take the form of opposition to the dominant religion. The important point is that having been a member of the CPSU does not mean that one was socialized into atheism.

Before moving to a multivariate evaluation of religious adherence, we need to briefly address the Sullivan et al. and Conover notion of the role that group identities play in cognitive processing. Thus, for the first row of table 2, we have calculated individual means across a set of affective evaluations of, and commonality with, in-groups and out-groups. We then report the mean difference between each respondent’s average evaluation of out-groups and each respondent’s evaluations of Russians (the national in-group). This procedure corrects for response set biases attributed to feeling thermometers. (See Appendix A for a description of all of the scales used in our analysis.)

We found that Orthodox adherents were similar to (not different from) nonbelievers in their tendency to evaluate their national in-group (Russians) more positively than other nationality groups. The same procedure is used to standardize the scores assigned to specific sets of out-groups (rows 2 and 3, table 2). We see that adherence to Orthodoxy, on average, is unrelated (in a bivariate sense) to variations in scores given to non-Russian nationality groups from the near abroad (Ukrainians, Lithuanians, and Jews). When looking at foreign powers, for example, the United States and Germany, Orthodox adherents give lower evaluations than do nonbelievers.

In the first half of table 3, we use this set of theoretical contrasts with out-groups and in-groups, together with sociodemographic characteristics, to predict the probability of being a Russian Orthodox adherent in the Russian setting. In addition to controls for sex, residence in a rural area, age, and socioeconomic status, we introduce measures of sociotropic evaluations of the economy and also pocketbook (personal financial) evaluations. We use logistic analysis, based on the cumulative logistic probability function, to explore the probability of being Orthodox as compared with nonbelievers. In Model A of table 3, the full set of characteristics and evaluations is considered; in Model B, the reduced model, only the best predictors are included. We use the partial correlations between the likelihood of being Orthodox and each of the independent variables to assess
The contribution of each of the included factors. We see that being female is the most important characteristic for predicting the probability of adhering to the Orthodox faith. After sex, the second most important contribution is made by the rural/urban residence dimension (see partial correlation in table 3). Orthodox adherents in comparison with nonbelievers are more likely to be found in urban areas. Those who give negative assessments of out-groups from the near abroad are also more likely to be Orthodox adherents. Thus, when we introduce controls through multivariate analysis, the theoretical argument that religious believers use out-groups as markers of their own identity does receive support. Noteworthy is the finding that with the controls for sex, rural/urban residence, and out-group evaluations included in a multivariate model, age does not emerge as an independent, significant predictor of Orthodox adherence.

In the second part of table 3 we report regression coefficients for a model that seeks to explain our measure of religiosity. We use affective evaluations and commonality with the Russian Orthodox Church to measure religiosity. We think that those who feel closest to and rate the church most positively will be those whose strength of religious identity is the greatest. Table 2, row 4, shows that adherents...
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<tr>
<th>Predictor Variable</th>
<th>Model A</th>
<th>Model B</th>
<th>Model C</th>
<th>Model D</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Estimated Coeff. (SE)</td>
<td>Partial Correlation</td>
<td>Estimated Coeff. (SE)</td>
<td>Partial Correlation</td>
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<td>Female</td>
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<td>Rural residence</td>
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<td>Out-group evaluation</td>
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<td>–.050</td>
<td>–.023* (.013)</td>
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<td>Socioeconomic status</td>
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<td>–.039* (.021)</td>
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<td>In-group evaluation</td>
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<td>.126** (.049)</td>
<td>.090</td>
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<td>Age</td>
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<td>Sociotropic economic</td>
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<td>–.032</td>
<td>–.004 (.044)</td>
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* indicates significance at the .10 level (2-tailed)
** indicates significance at the .05 level (2-tailed)
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<td>Out-group evaluation</td>
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<td>.000</td>
<td>–.021 (.023)</td>
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<td>Constant</td>
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<td>–.150 (.168)</td>
<td>1.33** (.534)</td>
<td>1.800*** (.286)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>789</td>
<td>1,293</td>
<td>822</td>
<td>1,401</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. For the logistic regression models, asterisks represent significance levels for the Wald statistic—tests that the coefficient is zero. The OLS regressions, asterisks represent significance levels for t tests.

*Non-Russians, near abroad.

*Russians.

*Foreigners—U.S. and Germany.

*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .001.
to Orthodoxy register significantly higher scores on the religiosity index than do nonbelievers. In addition, those who rate the Orthodox Church positively are also those most likely to support the idea that Orthodoxy should become the state religion. Similarly, adherents to Orthodoxy are more likely than nonbelievers to say that Orthodoxy should be the state religion (row 5 of table 2). Thus, our measure of religiosity has external validity, and it also operates as we would expect it to when employed as the variable to be explained in an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model.

The regression (table 3, Model D) shows that the highest levels of religiosity are found among women, people low in socioeconomic status, and urban dwellers. Positive assessments of Russians (the national identity in-group for Russian Orthodox believers) are also significantly related to more positive orientations toward the Orthodox Church, given the controls for sex, residence, and SES. Noteworthy is the finding that in the reduced model—which covers many more cases than the full model (because of missing data in the full model on some of the variables that proved to be unrelated and are now excluded)—being female again emerges as the best predictor (see partial correlation) of religiosity. Lower socioeconomic status, although it did not emerge as one of the best predictors of the likelihood of being Orthodox, does emerge as the second most important predictor of religiosity in the reduced model.

With these measures of religiosity and Orthodox adherence in hand, we move now into the realm of political behavior. We are interested in whether voting behavior is related to religious adherence, given controls for other relevant predictors. We find that the data do affirm Fedotov’s view of a Christian citizen who has an obligation to participate in the political process. In a bivariate sense, the frequency of taking part in elections (both presidential and parliamentary) is higher among Russian Orthodox adherents as compared with nonbelievers (see voting participation index in table 4). We also break down the percentage of adherents to Orthodoxy by participation in the first round of the 1996 presidential election. Among those who did vote, we see a significantly higher percentage of Orthodox believers. Nonvoters tend more frequently to be nonbelievers. Other votes as well, for example in the second round of the presidential election and in the 1995 parliamentary election, show the same pattern.

To determine whether these relationships are robust when we introduce controls for other factors that have been identified as affecting turnout, we have built a predictive model of voting behavior. For Models A and B in table 5, we employ logistic regression analysis to predict the probability of having voted in the first round of the presidential election. Again we introduce controls for sex, residence in a rural area, age, socioeconomic status, sociotropic evaluations of the economy, and personal financial evaluations. There is some controversy in the literature as to whether sociotropic evaluations (of the economy in general) or pocketbook evaluations have the greatest impact on voting behavior, so we include both in our analysis. To measure the relationship between religion and voting behavior we include a dummy variable for adherence to Orthodoxy and also our measure of religiosity as described above.
If we move our discussion immediately to the more parsimonious Model B in table 5 (with fewer predictor variables, we have less missing data), we see that the best single predictor of the probability of having voted in the presidential election is age—with older people being more likely to participate. In addition, those of higher socioeconomic status are more likely to vote. Significantly, even with controls for age and SES, Russian Orthodox believers are also more likely to vote than are nonbelievers and atheists. Thus, table 5 provides evidence that an addition must be made to the voting behavior models in the literature: In the Russian setting, an explanation of turnout is incomplete without taking into consideration the impact of adherence to the Orthodox faith. Such adherence contributes to a higher level of voting participation.

The finding is confirmed in the OLS regression model that predicts frequency of participation in elections (table 5, Model D). This measure of frequency of participation combines reports of voting in both rounds of the 1996 presidential election and in the parliamentary election of 1995. Again we see that older people, those with higher SES, and Russian Orthodox adherents vote more frequently. We also see in Model D that rural residents are more likely to turn out than are city dwellers. It is noteworthy that neither sociotropic nor pocketbook evaluations emerge as independent significant predictors of voting participation.51

In table 4, the breakdown of the percentage of Russian Orthodox adherents versus nonbelievers is given for each of the candidates in the first round of the presidential election. Three of the candidates, Yeltsin, Lebed, and Yavlinsky, received votes disproportionately from Russian Orthodox adherents. In contrast, the vote for Zhirinovsky came disproportionately from nonbelievers, while Zyuganov’s vote was split evenly between Orthodox believers and nonbelievers.

In the second round of the 1996 presidential election, the choice of candidates was narrowed to that between Yeltsin and Gennady Zyuganov (the Communist

### Table 4. Voting Behavior of Orthodox Adherents and Nonbelievers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participation and Vote</th>
<th>Russian Orthodox Adherents</th>
<th>Nonbelievers and Atheists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voting participation index (mean scores)</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.0**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonvoting participation index (mean scores)</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>.60*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not participate in 1st round of presidential election</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>51.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st-round presidential vote (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boris Yeltsin</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>41.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gennady Zyuganov</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>46.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexsander Lebed</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>44.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grigory Yavlinsky</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>42.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vladimir Zhirinovsky</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>52.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .1. **p < .05.

51
TABLE 5. Predicting the Decision to Vote in Presidential and Parliamentary Elections (Logistic and OLS Regression)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor Variable</th>
<th>Model A</th>
<th>Model B</th>
<th>Model C</th>
<th>Model D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Estimated Coeff. (SE)</td>
<td>Partial Correlation</td>
<td>Estimated Coeff. (SE)</td>
<td>Partial Correlation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>−.103 (.187)</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>−.006 (.073)</td>
<td>−.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural residence</td>
<td>.097 (.121)</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.095* (.048)</td>
<td>.069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.025*** (.006)</td>
<td>.141</td>
<td>.028*** (.005)</td>
<td>.163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socioeconomic status</td>
<td>.041 (.031)</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.069** (.024)</td>
<td>.069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Orthodox believer</td>
<td>.379* (.207)</td>
<td>.040</td>
<td>.255* (.144)</td>
<td>.030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High religiosity</td>
<td>−.132** (.058)</td>
<td>−.061</td>
<td>−.060** (.021)</td>
<td>−.098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociotropic economic evaluation</td>
<td>.050 (.061)</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.023 (.024)</td>
<td>.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pocketbook evaluations</td>
<td>−.012 (.042)</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>−.020 (.017)</td>
<td>−.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>−.392 (.739)</td>
<td>.619* (.363)</td>
<td>.950** (.292)</td>
<td>.595** (.193)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% correctly predicted</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\chi^2$ (df) significance</td>
<td>27.2 (8)***</td>
<td>47.2 (3)***</td>
<td>.084</td>
<td>.078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of variance–$R^2$</td>
<td>1.363</td>
<td>838</td>
<td>1.247</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>913</td>
<td>1,363</td>
<td>838</td>
<td>1,247</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Affect and commonality with Orthodox Church.

b Negative personal finances.

*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .001.
Party candidate). Thus, in table 6, Models A and B, we use the same set of predictors to explain a vote for Yeltsin in contrast to a vote for Zyuganov or against both candidates in the final round of the presidential election. Looking only at the best predictors of the vote (Model B), we see that higher levels of religiosity are tied to increased probability of a vote for Yeltsin. Positive pocketbook evaluations are also tied to a vote for Yeltsin. Economic considerations are entering the calculation of which candidate to support, even though economic calculations do not enter the decision of whether or not to participate in the elections. Those who were most likely to vote for Zyuganov, or against both Yeltsin and Zyuganov, were also most likely to report that they were worse off economically now than before (and also expected to be worse off in the future). The important finding is that, in addition to positive pocketbook evaluations, which are the best predictor of an increased probability of a vote for Yeltsin, a religious influence on presidential vote choice can also be documented with survey data.

### TABLE 6. Predicting the Decision to Vote for Yeltsin in the Second Round of the 1996 Presidential Election (Logistic Regression)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor Variable</th>
<th>Model A</th>
<th>Model B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Estimated Coeff. (SE)</td>
<td>Partial Correlation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>.130 (.177)</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural residence</td>
<td>-.087 (.113)</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.004 (.005)</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socioeconomic status</td>
<td>.019 (.029)</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Orthodox believer</td>
<td>-.169 (.196)</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High religiositya</td>
<td>.163** (.054)</td>
<td>.088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociotropic economic evaluation</td>
<td>-.085 (.059)</td>
<td>-.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pocketbook evaluationb</td>
<td>-.326*** (.046)</td>
<td>-.229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>4.723*** (.769)</td>
<td>4.268*** (.405)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% correctly predicted</td>
<td>66.4 115.34 (8)**</td>
<td>66.6 148.36 (2)***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*aRatings of Orthodox Church. 
*bNegative personal finances. 
**p < .05. ***p < .001.
In table 7, we move from an evaluation of the impact of religion on voting to an evaluation of the impact of religion on evaluations of government institutions. Models A and B (table 7) employ OLS regression to help identify the best predictors of positive evaluations of representative institutions (national and local parliaments) and ministers and other officials of the government. Those who most closely identify with the Orthodox Church give the more negative evaluations of representative institutions and ministers of government. Thus, these data support our argument that Orthodoxy is playing the role of social and political critic and does not accept government institutions unconditionally. As indicated by the significance of the regression coefficients tied to religiosity, age, SES, and residence, support of government institutions (nonpresidential institutions) tends to be highest among those with lower levels of religiosity, among those with higher socioeconomic status, among older people, and among rural residents. These findings emphasize that support for the president needs to be distinguished from support of parliamentary institutions, as a completely different set of traits is associated with each.

Also from table 7 (Models C and D), we see that distrust of government institutions (central organs of power, parliament, national and local governments, and judicial powers) occurs more frequently among those with higher levels of religiosity, among those with the most negative sociotropic evaluations, and among the city dwellers. Religiosity in the Russian setting appears to be tied with a skepticism of nonpresidential government institutions. This finding can be interpreted as support for Fedotov’s idea that the faithful have an obligation to serve as government critic and (potentially) to chastise bad (corrupt) government.

In our final table (table 8) we address briefly the theoretical question that relates to the connection between religion and variations in levels of political tolerance. We did not anticipate that Orthodox adherents would be more or less intolerant than nonbelievers—primarily because previous research in this area has been inconclusive. We also thought that the Sullivan concept of “pluralistic intolerance” and the argument put forward by Jelen and Wilcox would reason against expecting a higher level of intolerance among believers: tolerant politics is more likely when there does not exist a consensus concerning the circumstances under which intolerance is appropriate. Such a consensus is least likely when society is marked by diverse social groups that cannot agree on which ideas deserve suppression. Yet, we did demonstrate above that Orthodox adherents are more likely to give negative assessments of non-Russians, and that those with higher levels of religiosity do tend to have stronger in-group identities (table 3, Model D). The question remained as to whether this makes a difference when it comes to tolerating the expression of views and beliefs that are different from one’s own. To find this out, we constructed a political intolerance scale based on questions about organized opposition to the government, competition among political parties, and the rights of minorities. We again employ our set of predictor variables and socioeconomic controls in an effort to determine whether religious adherence makes a difference. In the case of political intolerance, religious adherence does not make a difference (table 8). In table 8, Models A and B, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients associated with Orthodox adherence and religiosity are different from zero. Thus, we have
TABLE 7. Predicting Institutional Support (Evaluations of Main Governmental Institutions and Officials) and Distrust of Government Institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor Variable</th>
<th>Institutional Support</th>
<th>Level of Distrust of Government Institutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model A</td>
<td>Model B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regression Coeff. (SE)</td>
<td>Partial Correlation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>.191 (.193)</td>
<td>.035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural residence</td>
<td>.266** (.125)</td>
<td>.076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.017** (.006)</td>
<td>.107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socioeconomic status</td>
<td>.075** (.031)</td>
<td>.086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Orthodox believer</td>
<td>.249 (.212)</td>
<td>.042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High religiosity*</td>
<td>-.253**** (.056)</td>
<td>-.159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociotropic economic evaluation (negative)</td>
<td>-.022 (.064)</td>
<td>-.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pocketbook evaluation (negative personal finances)</td>
<td>-.051 (.043)</td>
<td>-.042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.596** (.766)</td>
<td>-3.107*** (.484)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of variance explained-$R^2$</td>
<td>.047</td>
<td>.043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>792</td>
<td>1,167</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*aAffect and commonality with Orthodox Church.  
*p < .1.  **p < .05.  ***p < .001.
no evidence that Orthodox believers are less tolerant than nonbelievers. This finding is important for theories of democracy. Religion in the Russian setting does not appear to be detrimental to political tolerance.

In addition, if one looks back to the final two rows of table 2, we see that Orthodox believers and religious nonbelievers do not differ in their Left-Right political orientations. In addition, Orthodox believers and nonbelievers do not differ significantly from one another in their opinion that Russia needs strong leadership more than it needs democracy. Thus, in terms of broad or generalized political orientations, we do not find evidence of a religious divide in Russia. For voting participation and for evaluations of government institutions, however, we can discern the influence of religion.

**Summary**

The data presented above show that Orthodox identity is important to the political behavior of the Russian people. Responses to survey questions indicate that reli-
Religious sentiments do provide a partial foundation for political participation in Russia; however, religious beliefs do not appear to provide the basis for any major attitudinal or ideological cleavages. In the Russian setting, we venture to argue that Orthodoxy is serving as an integrating as well as a motivating ideology. Religious believers vote at higher rates than nonbelievers. Religious believers also support the incumbent leader (Yeltsin) at higher rates than nonbelievers. High religiosity, however, does not imply unconditional acceptance of representative institutions and officials of the government. Religiosity also does not imply political intolerance.

In contrast to other European countries, religion in Russia provides more of a basis for societal consensus than for societal conflict. Representative of this societal consensus is an agreement between Orthodox Patriarch Aleksii II and Russian Minister of Social Defense L. F. Bezlipkina. The agreement is “directed toward the merging of efforts of the Russian state and the Russian Orthodox Church for restoring moral norms of social life and establishing social protection for the population in keeping with the high historical mission which the Russian Orthodox Church has fulfilled in the course of centuries.”

The role of the church in providing a guiding ideology may be quite positive from the perspective of state-building. The church may well be providing a needed unifying ideology during a difficult transition period. The church appears to be relatively stable and secure. To put this into a Gramscian perspective, the new ideology that is emerging as a result of changes in authority structures over the past decade is the replacement of communism with Orthodoxy as the state religion. There is no transformation in Orthodoxy per se. Rather, according to the patriarch, the church is now able to “perform, on a basis that almost has the force of law, the kind of thing that for a long time it has been forbidden to do, namely to perform social good.”

In conclusion, we need to reemphasize those findings that serve to challenge some previous thinking about the Soviet Union. Nearly two-thirds of old people in Russia are religious believers, in spite of nearly seventy years of socialization under communism. Thus, we need to rethink some of our assumptions about the effectiveness of regime-sponsored socialization programs. In addition, Orthodox adherents are found as frequently in urban areas as in rural areas. Thus, religious adherence is not solely an attribute of those less touched by the forces of modernization. The fact that those with closer attachments to the Orthodox Church are less trustful of government institutions (given relevant control variables) also provides a more positive outlook for the operation of a friendly opposition to the Yeltsin regime. Finally, we return to the demonstrated link between religious beliefs and higher levels of voter participation. In the 1988 U.S. presidential election, those who scored highest on a religious commitment scale were also the most likely to vote. Thus, this link between religiosity and turnout may well be an important addition to our understanding of political behavior cross-nationally.

NOTES
2. The research reported in this paper is funded by the National Science Foundation and represents part of a long-term collaboration between political scientists at the University of Iowa and scholars associated with the former USSR Academy of Sciences.


5. Ibid., 163.


9. Wald, *Crosses on the Ballot*.


12. Ibid., 245.

13. Ibid., 328.


24. Other theoretical orientations have approached the study of religion and politics through the interest group framework. Various religions are represented by organizations or
Religion and Political Choice in Russia

institutions that have identifiable interests. Because we are exploring political behavior at the individual level, our focus will not be on an interest group or institutional perspective.


27. The classical statement on symphonia is provided in Justinian’s Codex. See John Meyendorff, Byzantine Theology (New York: Fordham University Press, 1979), 213.


30. Ibid.

31. In the early days of Bolshevik rule, when Patriarch Sergey declared the allegiance of the Russian Orthodox Church to the Soviet government, the metropolitan of Leningrad and several dioceses disassociated themselves and went underground. Several Orthodox sects operated illegally during the Soviet period. Also many open letters of protest appeared during the Soviet period including those of Nikolai Eshliman and Gleb Yakunin, “Otkrytoe pis’ moee Patriarkhu Alekseyu,” Grani 61 (October 1966): 122–67. The impact of such efforts on the population, if not on the government, is affirmed by Yakunin’s subsequent election to parliament.


36. See *Current Digest* 46 (1994), and Nickles, “Will Growing Nationalism Stall Christian Outreach?”


39. Ivanov, “Auditing the Soul of Russia.”


41. In 1997, Alevtina Aparina, head of the Duma Committee on Women, Family and Youth and a member of the Communist faction, labeled sex education and family planning programs as aimed at “destroying morality, corrupting children, and reducing birth rates in our country.” She also noted that her committee shares this position with the Russian Orthodox Church. *RFE/RL Newsline*, 5 September 1997.


47. When the dependent variable is dichotomous, the interpretation of the OLS regression equation is problematic. Logistic models, in contrast, assume that individuals are faced with a choice between alternatives and that their choice depends on their characteristics.

48. By testing both the more parsimonious model (with fewer variables and therefore fewer missing responses) and the more fully specified model (which is beset with missing data because of the large number of predictor variables) we are able to demonstrate the stability of the regression coefficients. In order to avoid specification error in selecting the “best” model, we have not simply deleted the non-significant variables from the full model, but have rather examined numerous variants of both the full and reduced models, with selected variables added and deleted, until we were able to identify the model with the best fit and the most meaningful and statistically robust combination of independent variables. (Christopher H. Achen, *Interpreting and Using Regression, Series: Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences* [Newbury Park: Sage, 1982]), 51–77.

49. We use affective evaluations of the church as our measure of religiosity because of the controversy in the literature about the frequency of church attendance as an operationalization of this concept. Although Wald (*Crosses on the Ballot*, 198) uses statistics on Sunday school attendance and the proportion of the population enrolled in day schools as measures of exposure to “the political world view associated with the denominations” and with the Anglican socialization effort, frequency of attendance has many problems as a measure. Most notably, in a society such as Russia, church attendance actually got one into trouble for many years; when we asked Russians about their frequency of church attendance, 47 percent of respondents did not answer this question. In addition, the majority among those who did respond (69 percent) reported that they do not attend services at all.

50. Raymond Duch, “Economic Chaos and the Fragility of Democratic Transition in
51. Because sociotropic and pocketbook evaluations are correlated with one another we were careful to test the significance of the coefficients attached to each of these predictors both with and without the other one included in the model. The same procedure was used for testing the significance of our measure of religiosity and the dummy variable for Orthodox adherence, as these two predictors are also correlated with one another.


REFERENCES


Religion and Political Choice in Russia

Appendix A: Description of the Scales

PERSFINA: The pocketbook evaluation (personal financial situation) index consists of three variables. Q18 asks: "Would you say that you and your family (living here) are much better off (1), somewhat better off (2), about the same (3), somewhat worse off (4), or much worse off (5) economically than you were a year ago?" Q21 asks: "Now looking ahead, do you think that a year from now you and your family will be much better off economically (1), somewhat better off (2), about the same (3), somewhat worse off (4) or much worse off (5)?" Q19 is worded as: "Now, thinking back to the period before Perestroika, would you say that you and your family (living here) were better off financially before Perestroika (1), are you better off now (2), or is there not much difference (3)?" This question is re-coded such that "better off now" is 1, "not much difference" is 3, and "better off before Perestroika" is 5. The variables measure the evaluation of the personal financial situation retrospectively, prospectively and also with reference to perestroika. High values indicate negative assessments. They are combined in a simple additive index, which has an alpha coefficient of .627.

SOCIOTRO: The sociotropic evaluation index (overall economic situation) is a simple additive index of two variables and has an alpha coefficient of .6868. The two variables are intended to measure the retrospective and prospective evaluations of the national economy respectively. Q25 asks "And as for the country in general, do you think that the condition of the economy has gotten much better (1), somewhat better (2), stayed the same (3), somewhat worse (4), or gotten much worse (5) in comparison with the past year?" Q26 asks "What about in the next 12 months: do you think that the economy of the Russian Federation will get much better (1), get somewhat better (2), stay about the same (3), get somewhat worse (4), or get much worse (5)?"

VOTEPAR: This additive index combines the three variables on participation in elections and the alpha coefficient is .7763. The questions ask whether the respondent has participated in the two rounds of the presidential elections and the parliamentary elections. They are worded as: "Q4. During elections, some people are not able to participate due to illness or problems in their family. What about you, did you participate in the first round of presidential elections which took place on June 16th?" "Q5. Did you participate in the second round of elections on July 3rd?" "Q6. Now, do you remember if you were voted in the most recent parliamentary elections on 12 December 1995?" All three questions were re-coded (1) for the affirmative and (0) for the negative.

DISTRUST: The distrust of government institutions index has six items, is additive, and has an alpha coefficient of .6269. The included variables measure respondents' view of the fairness and correctness of the government decisions. Q22 asks, "When the central organs of power make a policy decision, how often do you think they consider the views of all sides before making the decision, always (1), sometimes (2), rarely (3), or never (4)?" Q23 asks, "Do you think the procedures followed by the parliament when making decisions are fair and unbiased, always (1), sometimes (2), rarely (3), or never (4)?" Q45 is worded as: "Do you think that the Russian government makes correct decisions, almost always (1), in most cases (2), in some cases (3), or almost never (4)?" Q55 as: "Do you think that the government of our oblast [republic or krai] makes correct decisions, almost always (1), in most cases (2), in some cases (3), or almost never (4)?" Q57 as: "How often do you think the judicial powers in Russia make just and fair decisions: Very often (1), sometimes (2), only rarely (3) or never (4)?" Q58 as: "To what degree do you think that elections make the government take into account the opinions of voters: A good deal (1), Some (2), or Not much (3)?"

INTOLERANCE: The political intolerance index is an additive measure that includes three items from the agree/disagree battery: Q68, "Any individual or organization has the right to organize opposition or resistance to any governmental initiative" Q69, "Competition among many political parties will make the political system stronger" Q70, "The government has the responsibility to see that the rights of all minorities are protected."
Increasing values indicate increasing intolerance. The scale has a reliability coefficient of .3197.

SES: The socioeconomic status index includes the conventional occupation, income, and education variables. Occupation is asked through the question: “Q227. What is your main occupation?” The coding was director, supervisor, manager (1), specialist (doctor, engineer, priest, writer, artist, jurist, teacher, scientific worker) (2), service worker (bookkeeper, secretary, civil servant, including lower echelon government agencies, army and militia, and also other workers not engaged in manual labor) (3), qualified worker (4), unqualified worker in manufacturing (5), unqualified worker in agriculture (6), pensioner (7), student (8), on maternity leave/leave to take care of a child (9), housekeeper (10), temporarily unemployed, looking for work (11). We re-coded the responses so that unqualified workers in manufacturing and unqualified workers in agriculture are coded (1), qualified workers are coded (2), specialists are coded (4), directors, supervisors and managers are coded (5), and the rest are coded (3). The income variable is a combination of the responses to three questions. “Q223. What was your family’s total income last month? Please total all sources of income for all family members living with you.” “Q224. How many adults, 18 years old and older, live with you, including yourself?” “Q225. How many children younger than 18 years old live with you?” The total income is divided by the number of people in the household, that is, by the sum of responses to Q224 and Q225. The cutpoints for five equal percentiles are identified and each income grouping is re-coded from 1 through 5, each category including approximately 20 percent of the responses. Increasing codes correspond with increasing income. Finally, the education question is worded: “Q211. What is the highest level of education you have reached?” and is coded as primary or less (1), incomplete secondary (8–10th class) (2), PTU (without secondary education) (3), general secondary (4), SPTU (with secondary education) (5), Secondary specialized (tekhnicum, military school) (6), incomplete higher (no less than 3 courses) (7), and higher (8). The SES index is the simple additive index of these three variables and has an alpha coefficient of .3112.

The next five indices utilize standardized variables. The survey includes a set of feeling thermometer items (Questions 72 through 100). They are seven-point scales that have the introductory question: “Now we would like to get your feelings toward certain groups using a seven-point scale, where 1 indicates a very negative view, 7 indicates a very positive view and 4 is neutral. You may use any number between 1 and 7 to tell me how favorable or unfavorable your feelings are for each group. If you have difficulty answering, just tell me and we will go on to the next one.” The survey also includes a set of commonality items (Questions 128 through 141) and they are four point scales with the introductory question: “Our society is made up of many different kinds of people. Next we would like to find out how much you have in common (share their ideas, interests, their outlook on different events) with these different sorts of people. For each one, tell me if you have a great deal (1), some (2), very little (3), or nothing (4) in common with this group.” We first reorder the commonality items so that nothing is (1), very little is (2), some is (3), and a great deal is (4). Then, we compute two separate means for the responses that a respondent has given for the two sets of items. We subtract the corresponding means from the items of relevance. This standardization process corrects the scales to be constructed for individual biases toward overall positive or negative evaluations.

INSTFEEL: The institutional support index measures the respondents’ evaluations of main governmental institutions and officials. It includes three variables and has an alpha coefficient of .694 for nonstandardized variables and of .4895 for standardized variables. All three items are from the seven-point feeling thermometer set: Q75 is “The Russian Federation Parliament,” Q77 is “Your local legislative body,” and Q78 is “Ministers and other officials of the Russian government.”
RELIGIOS: The religiosity index (for Russian Orthodox believers) includes two variables and has an alpha of .5596 when items are not standardized and .5413 when the items are standardized. The first variable is one of the seven-point feeling thermometer for the item “Q99 Russian Orthodox Church” and the second variable is one of the four-point commonality items asking how much the respondents have in common with certain groups. The item is Q136 “Russian Orthodox Believers.” Higher values indicate positive feelings/more commonality with the Russian Orthodox Church.

OUTGROUP: This six-item additive index combines the respondents’ feelings toward three non-Russian nationality groups and how much they think they have in common with them and has an alpha coefficient of .7448 for standardized items. The first three items are variables of the standardized evaluations of “Q83. Lithuanians,” “Q84. Ukrainians,” “Q85. Jews” on the feeling thermometer introduced earlier. The last three items are the standardized responses for the items “Q130 Jews,” “Q131 Lithuanians,” and “Q135 Ukrainians” from the commonality index mentioned above.

OUTGFRAR: This index of evaluations of foreign powers consists of two standardized items from the feeling thermometer set. The first of the items, Q86 asks, “How do you rate the United States of America on the same scale?” Q87, the second item asks, “How do you rate Germany on the same scale?” The alpha coefficient for the index is .8932 if the items are not standardized and .8697 if they are standardized.

INGROUP: This is an index of evaluation and commonality with the Russians. As in the OUTGROUP index, one of the items is the feeling thermometer question, “Q82. Russians” and the other is the commonality question “Q133 Russians.” The index has an alpha of .3244 for standardized items.

RELIDEN1: This variable is made up of variables Q215 and Q216, which are worded as “What term describes you best: believer (1), non-believer (2), or atheist (3)”? and as “To which religion do you belong?” respectively. The list of denominations for Q216 is Ukrainian Orthodox—Kievan Patriarchate (1), Ukrainian Orthodox—Moscow Patriarchate (2), Ukrainian Autocephalous Church (3), Russian Orthodox (4), Greek Catholic (5), Roman Catholic (6), Protestant (7), Jewish (8), Muslim (9), No organized religion (10), Other (11). Q215 is re-coded such that “believer” is (1) and “non-believer” and “atheist” is combined in (0). Q216 is also re-coded such that “Russian Orthodox” believers are (1) and believers of other denominations are (2). RELIDEN1 is a variable, which is a multiplication of the recoded Q215 and Q216, which results in nonbelievers and atheists being (0), Russian Orthodox believers being (1), and other believers being (2). The respondents who did not answer Q215 are system missing.

RELIDEN2: This variable is a derivation from RELIDEN1. Since only 5 percent of the sample are believers who are non-Russian Orthodox, sometimes these are excluded from the analyses. In this variable, believers who are non-Russian Orthodox are missing and while others are coded the same as in RELIDEN1.

RURAL RESIDENCE: This variable is a collapsed form of Q228 where the interviewer notes residence of respondent. Residences that fell under the category “City” were coded from 1 to 30, “Urban Area” from 201 to 230 and “Rural Area or Village” from 301 to 330. We recoded “City” as (1), “Urban Areas” as (2), and “Rural Area or Village” as (3).