The modern system of international relations is undergoing the most profound changes since the time of its birth amid the wreckage of World War II and its conclusion. The ongoing changes fundamentally affect the interests and influence of all the members of the international community, first and foremost the Russian Federation and the United States.

After the end of World War II and up to the mid-1980s, the bilateral relations of the USSR and the United States basically defined the direction and the hue of international relations. The end of wartime cooperation and alliance marked the beginning of the confrontational politics of the cold war between Washington and Moscow, which served as the basis for a prolonged conflict between the superpowers in the global arena. This period was characterized by the heated struggle between the USSR and the United States to strengthen their influence in the post-war world. This struggle between two socioeconomic, political, and ideological systems led at times to nearly disastrous crises.

The global split between two opposing poles and enemy camps represented a serious threat to the security of the planet. At the same time, however, the division of the world into two opposing camps provided a certain stability in international relations.

The period from 1945 to the mid-1980s clearly demonstrated that only through dialogue and the pursuit of constant contacts between the leaders of the superpowers—and not through the use or threat of use of force—can the problems facing both powers be solved.

However—and this we must emphasize—the possibility of a successful and effective dialogue depended directly on the level of might, influence, and authority of the superpowers. The parity of the two superpowers always served as the basis for negotiations on problems—most importantly the most dangerous and threatening ones—and for the long-term development of international relations.

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The postwar period clearly demonstrated that the maintenance of peace was closely linked to the correlation of forces. Before World War II, the course of international relations was determined largely by the Western powers, and the USSR had but a minor role. But after the war, Soviet power reached parity with that of the Western powers. As a consequence of the superpower struggle, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was formed in April 1949 between the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Canada, Belgium, Holland, Portugal, Denmark, Norway, Iceland, and Luxembourg, joined later by Turkey, Greece (1952), and West Germany (1955). The NATO military bloc was created to exert military and political pressure on the Soviet Union and its partners.

NATO’s Original Mission
During the formation of the Atlantic alliance, NATO leaders repeatedly emphasized the organization’s “purely defensive” character, oriented toward restraining the “threat of Communist aggression.”

The treaty begins with the expression, “The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.” Many articles of the NATO treaty refer to the UN and its charter. However, attempts at American domination over the resolution of international issues were already then distinctly evident.

Article 3 of the NATO document states that NATO members, “separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.” However, the military obligations of the member-states were defined in article 5, which grants full liberty to the United States to decide at its own discretion when to act in case of an armed conflict. Dean Acheson, who was secretary of state during the creation of NATO, underscored in a radio address broadcast 18 May 1949 that the treaty “does not mean that the United States will automatically enter into an armed conflict during an attack against a NATO member-state. That decision will be taken in compliance with the statutes of our Constitution.” Secretary Acheson referred to the twenty-year timeline of the treaty the following way: “The agreement is not limited by time. Upon the expiration of its activities, the agreement will be automatically extended.”

One of the authors of the NATO agreement, then chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, A. Vandenberg, in a speech during the ratification of the treaty on 6 July 1949, explained that, “at the present time we have become the inevitable leader and bearer of all free people in all the free world. We cannot escape from our prestige and from our exposure to this risk.” NATO’s top military leader declared, “Whether we like it or not, the mantle of world leadership rests on our shoulders. The success of this alliance will depend to what degree we can carry out this leadership.”

In response to the establishment of NATO, Bulgaria, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic, Poland, Romania, the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Albania (which stopped participating in 1962 and withdrew from the alliance in September 1968) gathered in Warsaw on 14 May 1955 to sign an agreement on
friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance. The Warsaw Pact came into force on 5 June 1955. This pact sought to guarantee the security of its member-states and to counter the strengthening power of the United States and NATO.

The success of the Soviet Union in the economic and military spheres nudged the ruling circles of the United States to reevaluate their traditional goals and make some serious adjustments in America's foreign policy. One example is the secret research *Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age*, better known as the *Gaiter Report*, which was prepared for the U.S. president by a commission of representatives from business, scientific, and political circles in October 1957. Its authors aimed to achieve concrete military, political, and psychological advantages. That was before wide deployment by the Soviets of intercontinental ballistic missiles forced the United States to bid farewell to its “position of strength.”

The *Gaiter Report* maintained that it would be impossible to achieve victory over the USSR with conventional forces alone. It recommended that the Communist system be confronted and destroyed from within, giving fundamental consideration to psychological persuasion aimed at the population of the USSR and its socialist allies. This was to include propaganda on the American way of life, American goals, and the American model of democracy, as well as strengthening reconnaissance and subversion activities on the territory of the socialist bloc. It was stated that this policy was to be of a long-term nature. Together with this “psychological war” against the USSR, the arms race would also wreak long-term havoc on the Soviet economy.

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the United States took the course (hand-in-hand with continuation of the arms race and buildup of military might) of destroying the Soviet state from within. The politico-military lever of NATO was to serve as an instrument with which the United States intended to achieve that goal. The intended result of this policy, along with the internal processes in the socialist system, was the destruction of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.

**NATO's Post-Soviet Mission**


On the territory of the former USSR and Yugoslavia appeared more than two dozen “independent” countries and diverse ethnic amalgamations, as well as the beginning of bloody armed conflicts—both between states and within states between national formations.

However, the cold war never ended—it became latent but kept its destructive abilities, just as NATO kept not only its structure but also its fundamental political and military orientation. The significant concessions and accords by the Soviet and Russian leaderships on the most important external and internal issues did
not lead to a radical transformation of the activities of NATO. Testimony to this is the document sent by President Clinton to Congress, which reflects the highly dangerous tendency in Washington of destroying the global balance of power (a tendency greatly aided by the collapse of the USSR and socialism) and applying force wherever it thinks necessary. This tendency was thoroughly examined at a meeting of the State Duma on 5 December 1994.

The Duma passed a special resolution approving the analytical information prepared by the committees on International Affairs, Geopolitics, and Defense and Security. The Duma also passed a resolution to prepare information directed to the president of Russia, the Federation Council, and the government. The materials prepared by the Duma committees declared that the “Strategy of National Security” that Clinton sent to the Congress, was a victorious communiqué of Washington’s completion of the cold war to its benefit and successful deterrence of Communist expansion. This point of view in Washington, guided by the “exceptional” role played by the United States in today’s world, foresees concrete tasks and aims of the U.S. administration in the areas of internal and foreign policies for the near term. On the basis of the American strategy, as reflected in the White House document, lies the “faith in the achieved superiority of the United States.

The status of Russia in this White House document was, in essence, passed over in silence. Russia’s position is seen as limited and fixed, whereas “the United States is the only country capable of carrying out wide-ranging and successful operations far from its shores” and “does not have an equal in military potential.”

The “Strategy for National Security” is a reflection of America’s tradition of seeing itself as the only global leader. Only the United States has the right to use force without UN sanction, impose on other countries its own system of sociopolitics, and proclaim others’ internal problems to be a threat to the national security of the United States.

Since the collapse of the USSR, fourteen new states have appeared alongside the Russian Federation. Although Russia remains the most powerful, and a natural heir to the old Soviet Union, by international law it is an equal with the other former Soviet republics. Immediately following the euphoria of their sudden gain of sovereignty and independence, Russia stood to lose influence over the bulk of these republics, even within the limits of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In the aggregate, Russia lost its position and authority in the international arena.

With the liquidation of the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), Russia lost all of its former allies in Central and Eastern Europe which, according to Western military and political analysts, fulfilled the important role of guaranteeing security for Russia against NATO, providing a “strategic buffer” or cordon sanitaire, as a strategic space for the operational deployment of armed forces and infrastructure. The loss of the former East Germany, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, which had stationed in their territories entire legions of Russian armed forces, represented a loss for Russia of its former, dominating position in Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe. The division of the Soviet armed forces between all of the new sovereign, post-Soviet
republics, and the removal of Russian forces and bases from these new states, also weakened Russia considerably in the Baltics, in the Caucasus, and in Central Asia.

In Central and Eastern Europe, as well as in the Baltic states, the influence of the West and of NATO is increasing. NATO is advancing to the East, toward the Russian border, to fill a vacuum. The countries of this region, having been liberated from Soviet and Russian influence (most importantly as the result of the inactivity of Russian diplomats and former political leaders, who were unable to use Russia’s power and influence as a lever on events), fixed their eyes on the West—on the West European powers, on the United States and on NATO—for economic development and for the guarantee of security against the Eastern threat (Russia), as well as the Western one (Germany). These liberated states leaned toward unification with NATO in the hope that this would facilitate their entry into the European Union and strengthen their political, economic, and security positions.

NATO’s leadership made the firm political decision to expand the alliance by absorbing former Warsaw Pact members, and later perhaps Baltic countries, without properly considering the negative impact that would have on relations with the Russian Federation. The option to include former member-states of the Soviet Union (such as Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova) was not excluded, and neither was expanding the alliance even further by adding former Warsaw Pact countries (Romania and Bulgaria—both of which have already applied to become NATO members).

The question of NATO expansion began the evolution into its present form in Prague, in a speech by President Clinton on 13 October 1993 before the Visehrad (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary) leaders. He declared then that the question was not whether NATO was to expand, but when and under what conditions. The U.S. State Department later stated that this decision would be made exclusively by NATO members, without consulting other members of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Such a rigid line served only to provoke a negative reaction from the Russian Federation, tending to confirm its worst fears about NATO expansion.

Many member-states of NATO, however, did not take such a hard-line approach. Moscow’s reaction also was not what the diplomats in Washington expected. Most of the European NATO member-states, and later the United States itself, subsequently modified their stance toward Russia and the question of NATO expansion.

The Legitimacy of the Expansion

In 1990, the NATO council decided to transform the North Atlantic alliance to accommodate new global tendencies and cast it as one of the bastions of European
security. From this came a decision at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE—OSCE’s predecessor) conference on 10 July 1992 attended by the top leaders of the Helsinki process, to endorse NATO’s role as a supporting element of European security. In 1994, during a conference in Budapest of the top Helsinki process leaders it was declared that in the European transformation toward a new era of democracy, peace, and unity, the right of selecting alliances should be used in an “evolutionary” way. The subsequent decision by NATO to expand was a contradiction of the spirit of collaboration within the Helsinki process.

The then member-states of the Warsaw Pact, during the negotiations on the Conventional Forces in Europe on 19 November 1990, agreed in article 21, paragraph 2 that, “In the event that a country of a given alliance chooses to join another alliance, then any member of the OSCE has the right to demand the convening of an emergency conference.” The CSCE/OSCE agreements, including the Budapest resolution of 6 December 1994, speak of the illegality of the decision of the NATO member-states and the Central European states who wish to join, to exclude the other member-states of the OSCE, including the Russian Federation.

The expansion of NATO to the east is fraught with dangerous, far-reaching political consequences. The expansion was also brought up on 12 September 1990 during the four-power negotiations to end the division of Germany, which was supposed to mark a new and fundamental peaceful order on the European continent. One main part of those agreements was the pledge that foreign troops, nuclear weapons, and their transports would not be deployed in the former GDR.

It is also worth mentioning that the former Warsaw Pact members’ participation in NATO could very negatively affect the system of weaponry control, the confidence-building measures, and other measures of security taken by the Helsinki process, and that serious changes are needed in the agreements on START I, START II, CSCE, and others.

According to figures published by the U.S. General Accounting Office, the admittance of new members into NATO will entail a huge sum for military expenditures. The United States stands to pay $18.5 billion; the West European allies, $54 billion; and the new troika of member-states, $51.8 billion.\(^1\) The total sum stands at $124.3 billion. These numbers indicate that the new members of NATO will have to procure for military expenditures sums beyond their means. In addition, the Russian Federation will need to take active measures, which may lead to a new arms race.

There is one additional important fact. The decisions of the three new members to participate in NATO were made with almost no consultation with their national parliaments. That cannot serve as an example of observance of the principles of democracy in the resolution of global problems of peace and security.

It is also well known that the decision by the top executive organs of the United States to expand NATO was made without the advice and consent of the U.S. Congress. It is not entirely clear whether the U.S. Senate will approve the presidential decision, since it represents a difficult burden on the shoulders of Americans.

K. Kamp, one of the directors of the Adenauer Foundation of Germany, asked the right question: Has the idea for NATO expansion originated from representa-
tive ranks in the population, without whose support the security guarantees for the new states are illusory? He concludes that, with the possibility of ethnic conflicts in Eastern Europe, the U.S. Congress will be loath to approve NATO’s expansion.\textsuperscript{15}

Public opinion polls report that the percentage of average citizens in NATO countries, as well as in the newly invited countries, in favor of NATO expansion to the east has noticeably declined. One analysis, published in the influential journal *Foreign Affairs*, explores the changing views of U.S. congressmen on the question of NATO expansion. In particular, the article mentioned that after the hoopla of the presidential elections of November 1996, when both sides were courting the votes of 20 million Americans of East-Central European and Baltic origin, many politicians who campaigned for NATO expansion are now changing their minds. The author of the article, furthermore, says that it is far from clear whether congressional ratification is a “foregone conclusion,” as many of the NATO enthusiasts insist.\textsuperscript{16} After the U.S. presidential elections, when the bulk of the U.S. electorate calmed down and the populist promises of the election were a thing of the past, congressional representatives began a heated attack on the White House initiative on extending NATO’s infrastructure to the east. Many eminent congressmen spoke out against NATO expansion, fearing the huge military burden and arguing that the threat does not justify the increases in military expenditures requested in the next budget.

There is no consensus among the most prominent American politicians and other leaders on the question of NATO expansion. One of the main opponents of the idea is former U.S. ambassador to Moscow Jack Matlock. In a speech to the Brooklyn Institute on 5 December 1996, he declared that “NATO’s expansion is a strategic mistake for the West, based on the lack of understanding of the Russian mentality.” By this token, “Russia should have the right to vote on the resolutions and decisions on the expansion of the alliance.” Matlock also believes that inclusion of the Central European trio in NATO will weaken the alliance. He further argued that promises by the NATO leadership not to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of the new members are unsustainable. In addition, added Matlock, the United States and West Germany promised not to extend NATO beyond a unified Germany. “I was witness to that; we deceived the Russians then. Why should they believe us now?”\textsuperscript{17}

It would not be prudent to exclude from this analysis the string of destructive comments by both U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher and NATO Secretary General Javier Solana that NATO expansion to the east could serve the goal of slowing down the integration process of the CIS. Otherwise, how can one explain their invitation to Kazakhstan in October 1993 and to Ukraine in April 1996 to replenish the line of alliance members? These acts do not conform to the guarantee of security and cooperation within the framework of the OSCE, which is impossible to carry out without the close cooperation of the OSCE.

**Beyond Europe**

The extension of the North Atlantic alliance and the concurrent expansion of its geographic borders is fraught with the danger of involving its members in armed
conflicts in the middle of Europe. This, in turn, could add to the destabilization of the Pacific Rim region. During a March 1996 visit of Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov to India, both sides expressed “uneasiness about the division of the world into military blocs.” An analogous understanding of the threat of NATO expansion was reached during the visit of President Yeltsin to the People’s Republic of China. A joint Russian-Chinese statement of 25 April 1996 condemned the “new display of bloc politics” as a “serious challenge” to the strengthening of peace throughout the world.

The policy to expand NATO’s borders to the east already has a parallel in history. The example is the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, which served as one of several reasons to deploy Jupiter medium-range nuclear missiles in Turkey and to create an atomic circle around the European part of Russia; from the UK, from Italy, and then from Turkey. The Soviet answer to NATO expansion at that time was an operation code-named “Anadyr,” whose goal was to deploy medium-range missiles in Cuba, able to strike important targets in the United States. This allowed the Soviets to reach certain parity. The Anadyr operation achieved its mission: it forced the reconsideration of the expansion of NATO to the borders of the USSR and removal of the Jupiter missiles.

It is quite obvious that at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, the world stood on the verge of a thermonuclear war. In the event of a careless act of either participant in the conflict, nuclear weapons could have been used. The real risk for the United States in that case was the full destruction of the eastern part of the United States and ecological devastation in North America. The risk for the Soviets was the annihilation of the European part of the USSR.

When speaking about NATO’s expansion to the borders of the Russian Federation, it would be irresponsible not to mention Soviet-American bilateral relations. Handling a crisis situation is much more difficult and dangerous than addressing the potential problems at their initial stage. This immutable conclusion should serve as a good understanding for the current proponents to expand the North Atlantic alliance’s structure to the east.

NATO expansion will have serious consequences for the situation in Europe and the world not only in the short term, but in the twenty-first century as well. Ignoring Russia’s position in such a critical decision concerning European security represents a strategic mistake and could breed distrust and tension in the whole continent.

The State Duma and NATO

The State Duma of the Russian Federation more than once has spoken out against NATO expansion in appeals and declarations of 25 December 1996, 12 and 14 March 1997, and 23 May 1997. In particular, the declaration of the State Duma “On the Relations Between the Russian Federation and NATO,” of 23 May 1997, states that “the Basic Act on mutual relations, cooperation and security between Russia and NATO in some way allays, but in no way removes the existing anxieties in Russian society of the consequences of the possible expansion of NATO and of the threat of weakening Russia’s security and its role in European affairs.”
Suspicions concerning NATO’s intentions are aggravated by the alliance’s attempts to deviate from adopting a basic act with juridical and legal guarantees that provide a pledge not to expand the NATO military machine to the Russian border. The State Duma declared that the intended position of the act not to deploy nuclear weapons, supplementary military forces, or the corresponding infrastructure in the territory of the new members is a guarantee, and that it will actively oppose any attempt to revise this position. The Duma will see the inclusion in the NATO orbit of a neighboring country to Russia as a step incompatible with the basic act, and will consider this in its position toward any future agreement in the area of arms reduction and disarmament.

The State Duma and the Federation Council should not limit themselves to protests concerning the expansion of NATO to the Russian borders, but should undertake proactive measures, such as engaging in a wide-ranging dialogue with all of the parliaments of the OSCE member-states, as well as with the assembly of that organization. Another important step would be to carry out an exchange of opinions with the legislators of Asian countries, first and foremost China, India, and Iran, in order to conclude that the NATO expansion will present a threat to the politico-military situation in the Eurasian continent.

The “Basic Act of the Mutual Relations of Cooperation and Security between the Russian Federation and the Member-states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization” was signed on 27 May 1997 in Paris. The Duma is supposed to ratify this document. The Duma expects that the president and the government of the Russian Federation will also provide a plan of action to strengthen the security of the Russian Federation. It is the opinion of many Duma deputies that without this program, signing of the basic act could give grounds for interpreting it as an agreement for NATO expansion, which is absolutely not the case.

**Argument/Counterargument**

We would like to demonstrate how those opposing NATO expansion could strengthen their arguments. Following are the three most common reasons for NATO expansion given by the supporters of this process, followed by some logical counterarguments:

**Argument 1:** Transforming NATO represents a beneficial goal—the support of democracy and the protection of human rights in Europe and the world. Therefore, its expansion to the east will serve the democratization of international relations and the achievement of stability in the newly democratic Europe.

**Counterargument:** The main contradiction of that hypothesis rests in the fact that the “protection of human rights” will be carried out through military means and force. The cold war, whose favorite child NATO is, was from the start conducted not only against the “Communist threat,” but against the fundamental democratic principles of freedom to choose social systems—against freedom of development.

In all of the military, ideological, and political confrontations between the USSR and the United States in the recent past, the foreign policies of both superpowers were characterized by a general line peculiar to them. The Soviet Union aspired not only to promote the spread of communism in the “struggle with imperialism,” but
to implant its system in other countries. The United States and its leaders aimed not only to promote the spread of democracy and “restrain communism,” but to implant the American model of democracy (according to the famous phrase by Harry Truman, “build a world which seems like the American standard at least 85 percent”). The eastward expansion of NATO to many seems like the realization of that goal of American foreign policy in modern times, but by forceful methods. That has little in common with the declared mission of “supporting democracy and freedom,” but it does have much in common with the basic postulates of the cold war. As was already mentioned, this process contradicts the Helsinki declaration and other documents that promote security and cooperation in Europe. This, finally, does not conform to common sense. Why was it NATO and the United States who took it upon themselves to carry out the all-encompassing responsibility of supporting peace and democracy rather than the United Nations and other international organizations whose vocations are to support a democratic and stable world order?

**Argument 2:** It is evident that the countries that wish to join the North Atlantic alliance aspire to join Western democracy, obtain economic benefits, and most of all, protect themselves from their eastern neighbors, because in Russia there could be a radical change for the worse, both socially and politically. Moreover, Russia remains a nuclear power, which is a grave danger for the small non-NATO countries of Europe.

**Counterargument:** Joining Western democracy and obtaining economic benefits can be achieved without enrolling in a politico-military alliance. Moreover, since 1983 the United States has had a National Endowment for Democracy, which according to some calculations spends more than $30 billion each year to assist democratic forces in Europe.

Also, if the existing democratic regime in Russia appears to be unable to maintain political and social stability in its own country, why is the West helping it? The logic here is hard to understand: there is assistance to the newly democratic Russia and a simultaneous expansion of NATO toward its borders. The impression can be portrayed that the North Atlantic alliance, with its expansion toward Russia, intends to play a role as the guarantor of the democratic transformations in Russia; either the continuation of Western-style reform or return to the period of hard confrontation, but now under far more favorable conditions for the West in terms of correlation of forces and strategic positioning.

**Argument 3:** The Paris agreement of Russia and NATO, which was signed 27 May 1997, proclaims the military structures of both sides as the most important investments for peace, as a recognition that the newly democratic Russia, togeth-
er with the North Atlantic alliance, can resolve all of the most important issues of mutual security.

**Counterargument:** Taking into account earlier statements by Russian leaders underscoring the inadmissibility of NATO expansion to the east, the Paris treaty can be seen as a partial capitulation of Russia if not a full one. Despite all the talk of recognizing Russia’s sovereign right and anxieties for its security, there lurked in the shadows questions such as the military and strategic isolation of Russia, the deterioration of its geopolitical position, the enhancement of the arms race, and so forth. Therefore, eulogizing the basic act, especially in Russia, should hardly follow.

Moreover, if the NATO member-states, and especially the United States, are genuinely confident of the security and democratic development of Russia, why not invite her to join NATO? Let us recall that this invitation was put forward to the Soviet Union in the early 1950s. The answer then was obvious to everyone, since the goal of NATO was not cooperation, but confrontation with the USSR and with Communist expansion. It is harder to explain the negative disposition toward Russia today. The excuse of internal instability in Russia has already been examined. From the other explanations, one can make the assumption that the Russian Federation is seen as an Eurasian country and that is why it has no right to become a member of the North Atlantic bloc. That also provokes bewilderment, because in 1952 a Eurasian country became a member of NATO—Turkey.

These are the most general arguments put forth by the proponents and the detractors of NATO’s eastward expansion.

**Conclusion**

It seems to us that both the United States and the Russian Federation should take a long hard look at NATO expansion from an internal politics angle. For the United States, this would include the added expenditures to support the increased size and power of the North Atlantic monster, to guarantee its continuing role as the leading guarantor of the global democratic order, and to mediate the social, international, and other conflicts in the new member-states. For Russia, the growth of the alliance toward its borders represents additional impetus in the intensification of political conflicts and toward strengthening the criticism of the president’s and government’s foreign policy course.

**NOTES**

3. Article 5 of the NATO Charter reads: “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.
“Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.” See http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm.

4. Strengthening the Forces of Freedom: Selected Speeches and Statements of Secretary of State Acheson, February 1949-April 1950 (Washington, D.C.: 1950), 85. (Editor’s note: The translation back to English from the Russian-language article may not be exact.)

5. Ibid.

6. The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg (Boston: 1952), 494. (Editor’s note: The translation back to English from the Russian-language article may not be exact.)

7. The Department of State Bulletin, 27 February 1956, Vol. 34, No. 870, 334. (Editor’s note: The translation back to English from the Russian-language article may not be exact.)


12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.


