

Undemocratic Past, Unnamed Present, Undecided Future

KEN JOWITT

Our political marketing of democracy in Russia and other parts of the former Soviet empire has been dogmatic in its attempted export of an idealized notion of Western capitalist democracy. And all too often our conceptual imaging of political development(s) has a mechanical acontextual cast. I have in mind rational choice notions along with the “transitology/consolidology” literature.

In their place I propose a perspective that takes the nation as its starting point, and characterizes the nation as a partially conflictual trinity comprised of state, civic, and ethnic forces whose respective weight, character, and relations are fundamentally shaped by the incidence of individual or corporate identities in society. This conceptual perspective simultaneously relativizes the civic (or democratic) dimension of national development, and relates it integrally and problematically to state, ethnic, and socio-cultural forces. Framed in this manner, national (dis)organization in Russia and other countries of the former Soviet empire manifests itself as a political gestalt of state, civic, and ethnic fragmentation (not differentiation or relativization), the weakness of civic and state forces, and the relative strength of ethnic forces.

The Past

This gestalt can best be understood by factors that Guillermo O’Donnell tells us to dismiss. O’Donnell argues that “recent typologies of the new democracies based on characteristics of the preceding authoritarian regime and/or on the modalities of the first transition have little predictive power concerning what happens after the first democratically elected government has been installed.”¹ I wish to argue that quite the reverse is true; that in order to understand the substantial political disconnection between electoral regimes and the privatized societies they co-exist with, as well as the overall pattern of national fragmentation in the former Soviet empire, one must start with the type of regime that dominated the area for nearly half a century in Eastern Europe and three-quarters of a century in Russia.

Leninist regimes politically conflated and confused state and civic elements by simultaneously compressing and isolating them within the confines of a monopolistic party organization.² Political coordination was dependent on a central point of authority, e.g., the oblast secretary, the general secretary in each country, or Moscow Center for the Bloc as a whole. This form of organization has a fancy conceptual name, “pooled interdependence.” But its practical significance is that when the center fails, nothing else exists to hold the parts

Ken Jowitt is the Robson Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley. Support for this research was provided by the National Council for Soviet and East European Research.

together authoritatively.³ Without an authoritative center, mutual isolation becomes general fragmentation. Without a powerful center, individually weak parts no longer add up to a powerful whole. Individual weakness becomes generalized weakness.⁴ The institutional breakdown—a concept as telling as, or more telling than, “transition”—of the Soviet party left its constituent social, political, and economic parts of the regime weak and fragmented. Political, social, and economic relations became and remain tenuous, ad hoc, and instrumental. State and civic orientations existed; state and civic institutions did not. Only in Poland were civic forces robust, not anemic. Outside of Poland there were no institutional sanctuaries, no democratic “Yenans” where political forces could articulate, associate, coagulate, and test themselves in partisan “combat” as alternative, distinct, nascent institutions.⁵

But how do you explain the relative strength of ethnic orientations and forces in the aftermath of the Leninist extinction? Any explanation must begin with the recognition that neotraditional Leninist institutions “fused” work, health, politics, vacations, and residence in a single unit—the *kollektiv* (in China the *danwei*). The destruction of these neotraditional institutions created a social-psychological disposition, for many an imperative, to select a proximate, comparable identity that offered predictability, protection, resources, and “wholeness.” Ethnicity fills those quasi-corporate needs.⁶ Second, and much less recognized, is the fact that Communist parties were themselves ethnic-like in definition and character. While for the most part genuinely opposed to ethnicity as a central, let alone primary, base of political or social identity,⁷ party organization, like ethnic organization, combined the formal equality of its members with corporate opposition to outside social groups who were viewed as lesser not simply other. Bolshevik membership and identification unintentionally and effectively sustained the idea, the experience of, and familiarity with a corporate, quasi-ethnic identity, in Russia and throughout the Soviet empire.

A third powerful and (again) unintentional reinforcement of ethnic identity in all Leninist regimes was Stalin’s idea of “socialism in one country.” In effect, “socialism in one country” conflated ethnic and ideological identity. I don’t mean it simply provided cover for an unreconstructed Russian ethnic identity. Rather, the idea and practice of “socialism in one country” subtly reinforced the latent strength of ethnic identity by assimilating it to an ideological one. A striking example of this was the expression in the early 1930s that “one Russian tractor is worth ten foreign Communists.” The replication in Eastern Europe of the Soviet model meant that “socialism in *each* country” provided the same largely unintended and latent support for ethnic parochialism found in the Soviet Union.⁸ To be sure, regimes varied significantly in the degree to which this parochialism became manifest. However, as a latent mode of identification it was unintentionally but continuously sustained by one of the Soviet bloc’s defining features. Fourth, during the neotraditional period of Brezhnev’s rule, when party impersonalism disintegrated in favor of party nepotism, the affinity of party organization, membership, and policy with family and ethnic identity often became literal and explicit.

Currently, ethnicity has greater success than state or civic frames of reference in making membership and identity claims in many parts of the former Soviet empire. However, political ethnicity itself is relatively weak, even in certain instances violently weak.⁹ One must balance the relative strength of ethnic feeling and organization with the reality of ethnic parochialization and

fragmentation. A reality that in Czechoslovakia was handled without violence, in Georgia with prolonged violence, and in Bosnia with genocidal violence. The common denominator in the former Soviet empire is the polytheistic fragmentation of the national trinity. State, civic, and ethnic political forces confront each other as shards in a fragmented, not shares in an integrated, nation. And the shards themselves are internally fragmented. This pattern of state, civic, and for that matter ethnic weakness and fragmentation is due in good part to the peculiar and novel organization of the Leninist polity.

A second contributing factor has to do with the way in which the constituent nations of the former Soviet empire became independent. Everywhere but in Poland the Leninist extinction was the result of a political breakdown not breakthrough.¹⁰ Nowhere, except in Poland, did one see the creation and elaboration of a new “way of life,” of what Toynbee called an “internal proletariat” challenging a “dominant minority.”¹¹ And even in Poland it took Soviet disorganization to create the conditions for a revived Polish breakthrough. If one wishes to explain the fragmentation of state, civic, and ethnic forces—the weakness of the first, the fragility of the second, and the volatility of the third—one must appreciate the brief duration, limited scope, and elite character of political opposition to the Soviet and other Leninist regimes prior to their extinction.¹²

An historical comparison might help. After World War II, a group of formally independent “third world” regimes emerged whose institutional façades—whether “democratic” or “Leninist”¹³—failed to either disguise or transform what in fact were ethnically, regionally, religiously, and politically fragmented societies. Relatively passive decolonization produced weak states and weaker nations.

In contrast, the longer, more intense and comprehensive resistance to alien rule is, the greater the likelihood of creating a tested, mutually tolerant leadership that will select and create a set of political practices, ideological tenets, and nascent institutions that resonate culturally and socially with strategic parts of the indigenous population—if not with international funding agencies. Prolonged and overt resistance provides the occasion for effecting a “fit” between the innovational qualities of the polity *in nuce* and strategic elements of the existing society. It favors the appearance of a “practical ideology”: one that is more than a pure or formal statement of proposed identity. A “practical ideology” is one “through which effective organization can be created.”¹⁴ In this regard, consider Communist China’s Yanan, democratic Poland’s Solidarity experiences, and the ANC-SACP experience in South Africa. The significance of a “fit” between a new regime’s political features and strategic facets of a society’s culture should be obvious to all but the most extreme political voluntarists. A political constitution’s integrity depends on a complementary social constitution. This is what Durkheim meant when he said: “whenever we find ourselves in the presence of a governmental system endowed with great authority we must seek the reason for it, not in the particular situation of the governing, but in the nature of the societies they govern.”¹⁵ Finally, the extent to which prolonged and overt resistance transforms existing social organization in the direction of a more individuated population the greater the potential for a liberal democracy. Individualism is liberty practically constituted. It is the necessary basis for a stable and viable liberal democracy. Consequently, the degree to which traditional corporate identities have, in Deutschian terms, been uprooted, the greater the socio-cultural potential for individualism and consequent support

for a liberal democratic polity.¹⁶

However, for most countries in the former Soviet bloc, independence came quickly and unexpectedly. This is not to ignore those who fought corrupt tyrannical rule, the substantial difference between the Baltics and the Balkans, or between the Romanian and Czechoslovak "exit." It is to say that overall resistance was brief, not particularly intense or socially comprehensive. It is to say that resistance throughout the area was largely private and oblique. Private and oblique, rather than public and explicit, opposition creates a feeble base for a democratic nation. Consider Russia!

The Present

Less than a decade ago, Russia had the world's third largest economy and largest conventional armed forces. It was one of only two global thermonuclear powers in history, and exercised international control or influence from Cuba to China to Czechoslovakia to Congo-Brazzaville. Today, Russia is politically, economically, socially, and in most respects, militarily *weak*. Since the failed coup against Gorbachev and Yeltsin in August 1991, political fragmentation has characterized Russian political life. Initially, its most striking expression was the split between President Yeltsin and a Parliament led by his former supporters, Ruslan Khasbulatov and Aleksander Rutskoi. It took Yeltsin until October 1993 to find the occasion and support to overcome this opposition, two years to get his military chief, General Grachev, to agree to attack the opposition, two years to find four divisions in the entire former Soviet army—Tula, Kantemirovsky, Dzherzhinsky, and Kaman—to attack his weak, fragmented opponents. On the Parliament side, the forces around Khasbulatov and Rutskoi amounted for the most part to a mob of ex-Soviet soldiers who had fought in Afghanistan, some right-wing nationalists, old Communists, young hoodlums, and a small number of democrats.

Perhaps the most remarkable thing about the Yeltsin and parliamentary forces was their respective weakness. The encounter between a Yeltsin unable to command or count on regional support, and an equally isolated Parliament had more in common with an inner city gang battle or Latin American coup than the resolution of "dual power" à la 1917, let alone the historical encounter between Parliament and king in seventeenth century England. A critical question at the time was whether or not General Grachev could or would use the political leverage gained by delivering crucial military support to Yeltsin in fall 1993 to restore central discipline in the army, or even attempt to displace Yeltsin. Neither outcome was likely. This battle for Moscow was the opposite of those fought against Napoleon and Hitler. It was too short, too easy, and most of all an embarrassing victory for Grachev and Yeltsin.

Russian military weakness parallels and interacts with Russian political weakness. There is no unified, disciplined, self-confident Russian military. Little more than a year ago, the ground forces commander, Semenov, "stated that the Russian army was deteriorating to the level of a Third World army." Low morale, lack of discipline, crimes by the military and against military personnel, low budgets, inadequate training, no operational strategic doctrine, and an extraordinarily high degree of negligence in connection with weapons have combined to produce what one expert describes as a growing sense of hopelessness, a "feeling that the situation is deteriorating across the board to the point where collapse of the army is becoming a possibility."¹⁷

In certain respects, the Russian army resembles a feudal army whose head

has to bargain with rather than order his commanders. In fact, at least one of them, General Lebed, former commander of the Fourteenth Army and now prospective presidential candidate, acted like a sovereign warlord or nineteenth-century colonial governor in the self-proclaimed mini-state of Transdnestria. The recent war waged by Moscow against one of its provinces, Chechnya, provides a striking example of Russia's *violent weakness*. An area of less than two million people that "South Carolina like" declared its independence three years ago from Russia has successfully prevented the Russian army—one that fifty years ago defeated Nazi Germany—from subduing it.¹⁸ In the course of Russia's invasion of Chechnya, the political and military fragmentation of Russia's leaders and institutions were on full display. At least seven generals openly attacked the war, while the president of the Chuvash region allowed his region's servicemen to refuse to fight.¹⁹

Russia is economically weak. There is of course the enormously difficult task of transforming a neotraditional political economy into a capitalist market economy. This task is complicated by the simultaneous use of opposed types of economic exchange—monetary and barter—and related attempts of greater or lesser ingenuity to somehow combine local autarchy with an open economy. It is further complicated by the unequal competition between weak indigenous representatives of market capitalism and powerful alliances of criminal, crony, and political capitalism, an excellent example being "Godfather" Chernomyrdin's "family members," Gazprom, the new governmental political party Our Home Is Russia, and Oleg Boiko of the Big Eight. This pattern is replicated at the regional level, a striking example being Primorsky Krai where on his appointment governor Yevgeny Nazdratenko "managed to appoint a new team in his administration in which a number of deputies were, at the same time, leading executive members of the joint stock company PAKT."²⁰ Nazdratenko and his *khoroshie rebjata* evaded taxes, embezzled public funds, and continue to monopolize political power.²¹

A critical element in the syndrome of Russian weakness is the relative but substantial external and internal weakness of the Russian state. Certainly, the novelties and difficulties in Russia's domestic political economy are exacerbated by Yeltsin's neocolonial dependence on Western political as well as economic capital, loans, and finance; on the slew of Western ideological and political designations and expectations accompanying them. If, as I once suggested, neocolonialism refers to the "premature but imperative adoption of a political format for which the appropriate social base is lacking,"²² then one should expect, and indeed find, ingenious instances of dissimulation by Russian officials: formalistic, ritual-like use of democratic phrases and organizational façades to accommodate Western expectations.

More significantly, Yeltsin, as the leader of Russia's state administration, is unable to exercise regular personal or official authority over Russia's eighty-nine regions—a situation caused in part by the very successful strategy he pursued in becoming Russia's president. While many point correctly to Yeltsin's authoritarian, anti-constitutional, and anti-democratic actions, to his cabal-like group of personal advisors, and to the role of former party apparatchiki in the central administration, they don't adequately emphasize what a weak authoritarian he is. It isn't simply his illness and the continuity it provides with the late Soviet pattern of leadership decrepitude;²³ it is his inability to centralize and command. In fact any analogy—even one as evocative and substantial as that recently elaborated by Vladimir Shlapentokh—between the current Russian state and medieval feudalism may be too generous.²⁴ It is not at all clear that Yeltsin's

missi dominici are as effective as Charlemagne's in the ninth century.²⁵ Not all governors were as badly mauled as Vladimir Kuznetsov, the first governor of Primorsky Krai, or Vasily Dyakonov in the Krasnodar region,²⁶ by resilient, adaptive, mutually connected "political companions" from the former Soviet regime. *khorošie rebjata*, whose alliances are bounded by past career experience, shared political style, mutual recognition, comparable situations, and personal ambitions. But Kuznetsov's and Dyakonov's experiences do speak to the relative but genuine weakness of the Russian state. It weakly approximates Weber's notion of a political-administrative entity characterized by a "monopoly of [legitimate] force . . . compulsory jurisdiction and . . . continuous operation."²⁷ The Russian state's effectiveness is intermittent: at this point it is incapable of maintaining Russia's territorial integrity (witness Chechnya), and its actions are inconsistent and arbitrary. So, when my colleague Steve Fish correctly argues that the Russian state places "severe limits on the degree and quality of popular political participation and control over the state," the point is not strong state/weak democracy. The point is weak state/weaker democracy. For as Fish notes, "while commands issue relentlessly from an overweening center [they] stick only irregularly; and central authorities, while undoubtedly constituting the strongest organ in the body politic, are rarely capable of fully implementing their policies and realizing their goals in the country as a whole."²⁸

Today, Russia is a "pre-feudal" polity not made up in the first instance of "consolidating" democrats, or even stable let alone authoritative hierarchies of state patrons and clients, but of overlapping, interacting, and splitting central and regional cliques of political companions, practically (not authoritatively) constrained by inertia, fear, and self-interest.²⁹ I prefer the terms "companions" and "khorošie rebjata" to networks, clans, and regional politicians. Network has a universal, acontextual quality that fails to capture the ethos of political groupings in Russia. Clan is colorful and its traditional connotation is more valuable than the more misleading idea of regional politicians with its sense that one is dealing with midwestern Republicans. However, clan implies a degree of hierarchy, persistence, and loyalty that doesn't appear to characterize Russian politics.³⁰

The Future

The incidence of crime, democratic mimicry,³¹ feeble state decrees, "companion" politics, and overall violent weakness speak to the absence of authoritative political, military, and economic institutions; to the prevalence of what Durkheim referred to as exchanges, conventions, and "mutualism."³² This absence of authoritative institutions eliciting legitimate support, and/or powerful institutions compelling obedience explains the remarkable success to date of the politically hysterical and vulgar Vladimir Zhirinovskiy. Zhirinovskiy is a classic example of a plebescitarian demagogue, who, due to the absence of *disciplining state and public institutions*, can directly focus the mass emotions of millions who are disoriented, frustrated, angry, and in many cases, desperate. However, the absence of disciplining power-generating institutions simultaneously lessens his ability to translate mass anger into personal tyranny.³³

The imperative confronting Russia is to create powerful and authoritative institutions *out of and in opposition to* the existing set of weakly articulated and bounded political and economic exchanges; to institutionally coagulate weakly clotted political, social, and economic practices.³⁴ I will use an historical analogy to analytically annotate this point. In the eighth century, there were a number of fragmented, violent, but relatively weak Viking war bands in northern France.

They lacked central organization and an authoritative leader. They had no clear purpose other than raiding and looting, and no clear institutional identity. However, within a relatively short period of time, seventy-five years, a territorially bounded, institutionally coherent, and self-confidently named entity, the Normans, emerged. They quickly became the most powerful and innovative people in all of Europe.³⁵ Why did the Normans succeed? More generally, how do some societies, or groups in society succeed in articulating an ideological purpose, defining it politically, and translating the ideological and political “word” into institutional “flesh”; while other societies succeed only in maintaining the basic routines of social, economic, and administrative life; and still others don’t manage even that?³⁶

Currently Russia is more “Viking” than “Norman.” And an examination of Russian life provides little evidence of forces working to transform Russia’s uncivil and uncivic “Viking” politicians, businessmen, and climate of violent weakness into “Norman” self-confidence, stability, and development. If anything, the background conditions of Russian life suggest the opposite. It is hard to grasp the fact that the average life expectancy for Russian men is now said to be less than sixty years.³⁷ According to published reports, Russia is the first industrial country where in the absence of war, famine, and disease, deaths now exceed births by some 800,000. Death rates are up due to suicide, alcoholism, and accompanying industrial accidents. And it seems there are only six districts in Russia that continue to grow demographically at historical rates.³⁸

In these circumstances, what probable political futures can one outline? One possibility is the incremental success and consolidation of democratic and capitalist practices. However, if a stable and viable liberal democratic regime requires a social constitution based on the individual as the most consistent base for autonomous interest groups, a legally constituted order, and a political class and citizenry who behave in a politically tolerant manner, then Russia needs more than economic growth and political stability. It needs a cultural revolution. But, if in general revolutions are rare, then cultural revolutions are rarest of all (and as Stalin, Mao and Hitler demonstrated, they can be genocidal, not democratic). This is not to say there is no support for democracy in Russia. One can point to the significant electoral support democratic figures, organizations, and platforms received in the 1993 elections. “Democratic” parties garnered around 30 percent of the vote. But the quotation marks are as significant as the vote. And the recent much weaker showing³⁹ of liberal parties should be followed by exclamation marks, not quotation marks. Only two Russian democratic parties—Yavlinsky’s Yabloko and Gaidar’s DVR—have articulated national organizations. The democratic media has a largely Muscovite and Petersburg audience. Democratic leaders act more like notables than politicians, seem unable to sacrifice their egos in favor of joint democratic organization,⁴⁰ and while intermittently they demonstrate a practical capacity for mutual forbearance, there is little evidence of a politically tolerant elite culture. This is one reason that “more than three-quarters of Russians do not identify with any political party.”⁴¹ Indeed, one is justified in wondering to what degree Russian democrats are like (or likely to become) the Milyukov Trotsky once described. “The goal of his party was always the triumph in Russia of European civilization. But the farther he went, the more he feared those revolutionary paths upon which the Western people were traveling. His ‘Westernism’ therefore reduced itself to an impotent envy of the West.”⁴² The point is not simply that Western democracy is an unlikely outcome in Russia. More troubling is the difficulty I have in discerning the base for even an unstable Russian democracy.

A second possible Russian future involves more political and territorial (i.e., regional) fragmentation, until a point is reached where political and economic units with nondivisible membership, centralized power, and integral economies are finally delineated.

A third possibility that should be seriously considered is a successful war followed by the emergence of a stable, even legally based, authoritarian Russian regime. Sooner or later, wars produce winners whose confidence is greater for having risked, fought, and won. Military winners are likely to have the authority to stabilize their country. And military victory often speaks to the winner's greater competence and originality, qualities that might facilitate political, social, and economic development. But some wars, like chronic illnesses, can persist for a long time without resolution. Furthermore, a victory by the weak over the weak (Russia over Chechnya) may not add significantly to Russia's resources or confidence. Plus, in the contemporary world there is a unique problem attached to wars fought by a country that has nuclear weapons. The possession of nuclear weapons may be the only strength an otherwise weak country has, but one it can't use precisely because that would threaten genuinely powerful countries.

A fourth possibility is that Russia will become Europe's national ghetto. A Russian society marked by extremes of luxury and poverty, by acts of violent weakness and more "scavenger" than civil features.⁴³ A Russian elite that combines and confuses criminal, political, and entrepreneurial behaviors, and a regime made up of unstable, unpredictable, persistently feeble authoritarian and democratic contradictions is a dangerous political laboratory in good measure because Russia is not North Korea, let alone Myanmar—countries whose greatest threat is to themselves. Unlike them, Russia remains an industrial, technological, thermonuclear, scientific, high-culture society. If enough educated and skilled Russians respond to perceived ghetto conditions and status with frustration, embarrassment, resentment, and rage, then one might see Zhirinovskiy as a John the Baptist figure prefiguring someone much more powerful, but not benign. One slightly reassuring consideration even in this bleak scenario is that constructing a regime of rage from the elemental social, political, and economic realities of contemporary Russia is almost as difficult a task as "consolidating" capitalist democracy.

Notes

1. Guillermo O'Donnell, "On the State, Democratization and Some Conceptual Problems: A Latin American view with Glances at Some Postcommunist Countries," *World Development*, 21.8 (1993): 1356. In a later piece on "Delegative Democracy," *Journal of Democracy*, 5.1 (January 1994): 68. O'Donnell recognizes that "like all emerging democracies past and present, they must cope with the manifold negative legacies of their authoritarian past." This certainly is true for post-communist countries. See "The Leninist Legacy," in Ken Jowitt, *New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).

2. See T.H. Rigby's "Politics in the Mono-Organizational Society," in Andrew C. Janos ed. *Authoritarian Politics in Communist Europe* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1976), 31-81; and Ken Jowitt, "Neotraditionalism," in *New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 121-59.

3. See James D. Thompson, *Organizations in Action* (New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1967), 54; in the same vein but with quite different references see Alexis deTocqueville, *The Old Regime and the French Revolution* (New York: Anchor

Books, 1955); and Ken Jowitt, "Moscow Centre" in *New World Disorder*.

4. A significant, but much less dramatic outcome than that posited by Yeats: "Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold; Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world." "The Second Coming" *The Collected Poems of W.B. Yeats*, Richard J. Finneran, ed. (New York: Collier Books, 1989), 187. The remarkable feature about most of the societies, economies, polities, and states in the former Soviet Empire is they are to varying degrees disordered, not anarchic.

5. The consequence is significant. In Poland one finds vibrant "inductive" local democratic forces. See Tomek Grabowski, "From a Civic Movement to Political Parties: the Rise and Fall of the Solidarity Committees in Poland, 1989-1991." Paper delivered at the American Political Science Association meeting, August 1995.

6. Katherine Verdery makes this very point about "wholeness" from a somewhat different but closely related perspective. See "Nationalism and National Sentiment in Post-Socialist Romania," in *What Was Socialism And What Comes Next?* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996), 97-100.

7. While valid, this statement must recognize what Yuri Slezkine describes as "the earnestness of bolshevik efforts on behalf of ethnic particularism . . . secure within their border, all Soviet nationalities were encouraged to develop, and, if necessary, create their own autonomous cultures." In short, the creation, recognition, and development of ethnicity was a central emphasis for the Soviet Union (and other Leninist regimes) at particular points in its (and their) history. However, the intention behind this was to develop and exhaust the significance of ethnicity. The unintended consequence was socialist in form, national in content. See Yuri Slezkine's exceptional piece, "The USSR and Ethnic Particularism," in *Slavic Review* 53 (Summer 1994): 414-52.

8. I first identified the phenomenon of Leninist regimes unintentionally reinforcing traditional cultural orientations in "An Organizational Approach to the Study of Political Culture in Marxist-Leninist Systems," *American Political Science Review* 68.3 (September 1974): 1171-91 reprinted in chapter 5 of *New World Disorder*. In her article, Katherine Verdery stresses "how the organization of socialism enhanced national consciousness and how aspects of the supposed exit to democratic politics and market economies aggravate it further." My own sense is that she is more successful in generalizing about the effects of the exit than on how "socialist" organization reinforced national consciousness.

9. On the notion of "violent weakness," see Ken Jowitt, "Our Republic of Fear," *Times Literary Supplement* (10 February 1995).

10. Why do democracies "break down," while authoritarian regimes "transit"? The speculations offered by Guillermo O'Donnell and Phillippe C. Schmitter about the different roles of external/internal forces: presence and extent of enthusiasm and hope; and degree of openness in the two situations are not very compelling. Nor do they address the issue of terminology. See Philippe Schmitter & Guillermo O'Donnell, *Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 18-19.

11. Arnold Toynbee, *A Study of History* (Abridgment of Volumes I-VI by D.C. Somervell)(New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 371-428

12. The example of democratic Russia is an excellent one. See Marc Garcelon's "Democrats and Apparatchiks: The Democratic Russia Movement and the Specialist Rebellion in Moscow, 1989-1991." Doctoral Dissertation, Department of Sociology, University of California, Berkeley, 1994.

13. On the latter, see Ken Jowitt, "Scientific Socialist Regimes in Africa: Political Differentiation, Avoidance, and Unawareness," in Carl G. Rosberg and Thomas M. Callaghy, eds. *Socialism in Sub-Saharan Africa: A New Assessment* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1979).

14. See Franz Schurmann's very valuable distinction between pure and practical ideology in *Ideology and Organization in Communist China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968) 22-23.

15. Emile Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society* (New York: The Free Press, 1964), 196.

16. Karl Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," *American Political Science Review*, 55(September, 1961).

17. Dale R. Herspring, "The Russian military: three years on," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 28.2 (June 1995): 170, 178, and passim for the several points made in this section about the Russian military.

18. Consider Sherman Garnett's point: "Dry statistics [say] that Russia has at least 1.5 million men under arms and more than 100 divisions' worth of equipment . . . however, it is doubtful whether the Russian army could field a multidivisional force for large-scale offensive action in the near future." *The Washington Quarterly*, 18.2 (Spring 1995): 40.

19. See Julia Wishnevsky, "Democratic Opposition in Russia; An Alternative to Yeltsin?" *The Washington Quarterly*, 18.2 (Spring 1995): 25-33.

20. This is certainly not the kind of "pact" transition to democracy writers had in mind.

21. See Peter Kirkow's excellent study, "Regional Warlordism in Russia: The Case of Primorskii 'krai,'" *Europe-Asia Studies*, 47.6 (September 1995): 923-49.

22. See Ken Jowitt, *The Leninist Response to National Dependency* (Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1978).

23. This is perhaps the most unexpected component of the "Leninist Legacy" in contemporary Russia.

24. "Russia: Privatization and Illegalization of Social and Political Life," *The Washington Quarterly*, 19.1 (Winter 1996): 65-89.

25. Heinrich Fichtenau's *The Carolingian Empire* (New York: Harper, 1957) has a nice discussion of the "missi dominici."

26. See Kirkow, "Regional Warlordism," and Steven Erlanger's, "Russia's Old Elites Thwart Reform," the *New York Times*, 13 November 1995.

27. Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, vol 1, Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, eds. (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), 56.

28. M. Steven Fish, "The Advent of Multipartism in Russia, 1993-1995" *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 11.4 (October-December 1995): 358.

29. In this context Shlapentokh's discussion of "Krysha—A Crucial Phenomenon of Russian Life," is very valuable .

30. Perhaps the most remarkable feature of Russian change is precisely the not so peaceful coexistence of opposed, not simply different, political and economic types; and the emergence of hybrid political-economic configurations and figures.

31. See Ken Jowitt, "Dizzy With Democracy," *Problems of Post-Communism* (January-February 1996): 3-8.

32. Émile Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society* (New York: The Free Press, 1964), 282 and passim.

33. Tyranny is not considered conceptually chic by social scientists today. The unfortunate result is that currently it is a neglected political phenomenon. The outstanding exception is Daniel Chirot's *Modern Tyrants* (New York: The Free Press, 1994).

34. A related, but distinct, issue is the creation of democratic institutions. And as Guillermo O'Donnell was among the first to recognize, state-building per se, far from being antithetical to the creation of a democracy, may be an essential and in some sense prior achievement. See footnote 1. In this connection it would not be amiss to examine Hamilton's and the Federalists' authoritarian role in creating the American state and democracy. See Seymour Martin Lipset's *The First New Nation* (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1967), 17-69.

35. See Eleanor Searle, *Predatory Kinship and the Creation of Norman Power 840-1066* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).

36. I examine this issue in "The Uncertain Transition: From Weak Practices to Strong Institutions."

37. I believe that in Europe only Greenland has as low a life expectancy for males.

38. See Michael Specter's article in the *New York Times*, 6 March 1994.

39. Only if one considers the government party "Our Home Is Russia" liberal, did the "democratic" parties equal their performance in 1993.

40. Neither rational choice with its emphasis on incentives nor resource mobilization theory is adequate to explain the political "personalism" of contemporary Russian politics.

41. Richard Rose, "Getting By Without Government: Everyday Life in Russia," *Daedalus*, 123.3 (Summer 1994): 53.

42. Leon Trotsky, *The History of the Russian Revolution* III (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1960), 418.

43. I characterized the Brezhnev regime as consisting of a parasitic party, booty economy, and scavenger society in "Gorbachev: Bolshevik or Menshevik?" in *New World Disorder*, 226. This Soviet scavenger (not civil) society, one in which egoism was constrained only by the inertial power of a corrupt neotraditional Leninist regime, is a major part of the Leninist legacy (see chapter 8 of *New World Disorder*). Apparently, several Russian scholars hold the same opinion. See in this connection the very useful piece by Leon Aron, "Russia Between Revolution and Democracy," in *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 11.4 (October-December 1995), particularly the section titled "The lack of civic virtues," and Aron's discussion of Igor Klyamkin's work.