Kings, Queens, Tsars, and Commissars
Russia Gets the Royal Treatment

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Monarchy can be an integral part of democratic state structure and personify spiritual and historical unity of the nation.
—Boris Yeltsin to Queen Elizabeth II, 18 October 1994

For Moscow, the Cold War symbolically ended in October 1994, when Queen Elizabeth II of Great Britain made an historic state visit to Russia. Ending nearly a century of chilly relations between London and Moscow, the state visit was the final stage of a reconciliation process begun by Margaret Thatcher and Mikhail Gorbachev in December 1984. Throughout the twentieth century, the Soviet Union and Russia have received royal rewards for good behavior and royal snubs for actions that displeased the British government. After carefully doling out royal recognition to the USSR, Britain sent its queen to welcome post-communist Russia to the post-Cold War world. For Boris Yeltsin, royalty not only has become a stamp of international approval, but also a safe outlet for Russian nationalism and a convenient shorthand for condemning his Bolshevik ancestors.

As the most visible modern royal family, Britain’s House of Windsor can lend significantly more weight in diplomatic attitudes toward foreign countries than can minor or deposed crowned heads. Dinner with the Emperor of Japan may be nice, for example, but Yeltsin finds more prestige in hosting the British queen. The Windsors also have dynastic and historical ties to Russia. Britain is, of course, a constitutional monarchy. The sovereign may advise the prime minister, but has no real political authority. Instead, as head of state, the monarch represents her government and embodies history, continuity, and national pride.

Modern Western countries typically do not conduct foreign policy based on dynastic considerations, but in 1918 the Bolsheviks gave Britain a convenient excuse to ostracize the new communist regime. As the Economist explained in late 1988,

State visits by a British monarch...have always been highly political. Just as Edward VII was sent to Paris 80 years ago to cement the entente cordiale, so Elizabeth II went to Madrid [in October 1988] to confirm Britain’s newfound closeness to Spain. Mr. Gorbachev may yet get such an accolade; but not until later in Mrs. Thatcher’s reign, and only when she, not the Queen up the road, judges he has earned it.¹

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The British and Russian royal families have strong genealogical connections and frequently had contact through royal weddings and funerals. The mothers of Nicholas II and George V were sisters, princesses from the Danish Court. Princess Alix of Hesse, who took the name Alexandra prior to her wedding to Nicholas, was the granddaughter of Queen Victoria, and had spent much time with her grandmother following her mother’s early death. Nicholas and George shared such a striking physical resemblance that, when Nicholas went to London for George’s wedding, the young Russian heir was congratulated on his marriage by many confused guests. The current Prince Michael of Kent could be Nicholas’s and George’s long-lost triplet.

Prior to 1994, the last visit of a British monarch to Russia had occurred in 1908, when Edward VII met Nicholas aboard the royal yacht outside Reval (now Tallinn, Estonia). The trip was designed to put a “personal touch of royal friendliness . . . to clear away any lingering mistrust” in their bilateral relations following the recent signing of the Anglo-Russian Convention. The two empires had been increasingly expanding toward one another in Asia, but the new Anglo-Russian accord divided Asia and assigned separate spheres of interest to the two empires. In addition to discussions with the Russian foreign minister, the king charmed his cousin Alexandra, a personal diplomatic maneuver that could handsomely pay off for London, as the tsarina held great influence over Nicholas and his governing of Russia.

Edward’s trip caused great consternation in London, as parliament feared the visit would cause unrest in both Russia and Britain. Labour leader Ramsay MacDonald called the tsar “a common murderer” and accused the king of “hobnobbing with a blood-stained killer.” Although members of the Labour and Liberal parties urged that the visit be private, rather than a state occasion, “The government believed that the King’s visit would smooth the path of diplomacy, and to divest it of its official character would be to put a deliberate insult on the Russian government which the Russian people would bitterly resent.”

War and Revolution
Six years later, Britain and Russia found themselves allied against Germany in World War I. Downing Street thought Russian involvement was crucial, as it forced Germany to fight a two-front war, but Russia began to implode. The tsar was forced to abdicate in March 1917, and the Provisional Government that replaced him lasted only until 7 November. For London, convincing the new Bolshevik regime to stay in the war and preventing similar labor unrest at home overshadowed concern for the fate of the Romanovs. Russia eventually signed a separate peace with Germany, causing Britain, Japan, the United States, Canada, France, Italy, and the Czech Legion to invade Russia and pressure the Bolsheviks into reopening the second front.

 Refuge for the Romanovs
While the British government dealt with the Russian revolution’s impact on the war, King George focused his attention on the welfare of his relatives. The resulting dispute over his actions is not historical trivia, rather it serves as the foundation for London’s future condemnation of the Bolsheviks for executing the Romanovs. If Britain denied them refuge, it could be held responsible for their fate as much as the Bolsheviks.
It is accepted that Great Britain offered refuge to the Romanovs on 23 March 1918; great controversy remains, however, as to why that offer was never accepted. In his memoirs, David Lloyd George emphasizes that, at the request of the Provisional Government, Britain offered asylum and never withdrew its offer, despite working class hostility to bringing the tsar to Britain. For Lloyd George, the failure to rescue the Romanovs was a tragic example of bad timing. The prime minister enumerates a variety of reasons for this dilemma, ranging from the Romanov children contracting measles, to a power struggle between the Provisional Government and the Petrograd Soviet. The British War Cabinet feared pressing the issue would prove detrimental to the war effort. At no point does Lloyd George mention any involvement by the king. He emphatically concludes, "The end was a tragedy, the details of which will horrify endless generations of mankind. But for that tragedy this country cannot be in any way held responsible."

Alexander Kerensky, foreign minister and later prime minister of the Russian Provisional Government, recalls the British government backing away from its offer as domestic objections increased. Kerensky recalls seeing a foreign officer statement on 10 April 1918, that coolly stated, "His Majesty's Government does not insist on its former offer of hospitality to the Imperial family." In Kerensky's words, "I can say definitely that this refusal was due exclusively to considerations of internal British politics."

In his own memoirs, George Buchanan, the British ambassador to Russia, follows Lloyd George's assertions that the offer was never withdrawn. "If advantage was not taken of it, it was because the Provisional Government failed to overcome the opposition of the Soviet." Meriel Buchanan believes Downing Street repudiated the invitation based on a curious experience of her father. After his retirement, the senior Buchanan went to the Foreign Office to examine documents in connection with writing his memoirs. Meriel claims that her father was threatened with the Official Secrets Act and loss of his pension if he told the truth about the Romanov incident.

The king did not write his memoirs, but his biographers and even his family have begun to point accusing fingers at him. The invitation to his cousins had not come at the king's request, although as the plan had become known, Britons objecting to asylum for the Romanovs would turn their anger on Buckingham Palace. On 3 April, the king instructed his personal secretary to inform the prime minister that:

Every day, the King is becoming more concerned about the question of the Emperor and Empress coming to this country.

His Majesty receives letters from people in all classes of life, known or unknown to him, saying how much the matter is being discussed, not only in clubs, but by working men, and that Labour Members in the House of Commons are expressing adverse opinions to the proposal.

As you know, from the first the King has thought the presence of the Imperial Family, (especially of the Empress) in this country would raise all sorts of difficulties, and I feel sure that you appreciate how awkward it will be for our Royal Family who are closely connected both with the Emperor and the Empress.

You probably also are aware that the subject has become more or less public property, and that people are either assuming that it has been initiated by the King, or deprecating the very unfair position in which His Majesty will be placed if the arrangement is carried out.
The King desires me to ask you whether after consulting with the prime minister, Sir George Buchanan should not be communicated with, with a view to approaching the Russian Government to make some other plan for the future residence of their Imperial Majesties?\footnote{22}

By 10 April, the king instructed his prime minister to consider withdrawing the invitation. He came to regret this decision, and to conveniently forget who suggested it.\footnote{13}

"The Anglo-Soviet trade agreement . . . was a significant achievement for a state previously considered an international outcast."

The treaty was a significant achievement for a state previously considered an international outcast. In 1923 Stanley Baldwin, leader of the Conservative Party, led a delegation of British industrialists on a tour of the USSR. "Representatives of the biggest British companies were displaying a growing interest in the expansion of trade with our country," Izvestiya recalled.\footnote{16} Some economic interaction between the two countries began immediately, but the main impetus to bilateral trade came after diplomatic relations were established on 2 February 1924 by the Labour government of Ramsay MacDonald. The king was not happy by this development and MacDonald remembers that during his first audience with the king, the sovereign stated that he "hoped I would do nothing to compel him to shake hands with the murderers of his relatives."\footnote{17} In consideration of the king’s attitude, the British representative in Moscow held the rank of chargé d’affaires, in hopes that Moscow would dispatch a similar “sub-ambassador” who would not be required to present his credentials to the king.\footnote{18}

Although it seemed to benefit all parties, diplomatic recognition backfired on MacDonald. Britons knew little about Russia other than that it was communist, and as in the United States during the Depression, there was some sympathy for alternatives to capitalism. MacDonald thought recognition would increase British trade, which would appeal to his Labour Party. Soviet leaders saw recognition as a great diplomatic accomplishment and also hoped for trade, especially for British industrial equipment. Excitement about the agreement and any good will toward the Soviet people evaporated with the Zinoviev letter incident. Allegedly written by
Communist International leader Grigory Zinoviev to the British Communist Party, the letter advocated establishing communist party cells within the British armed forces. Coming weeks before parliamentary elections, MacDonald and his Labour Party were sunk. When the Conservative government took office in November 1924, the earlier trade agreements were immediately repudiated. Little contact between London and Moscow occurred for the next two decades.

Both Great Britain and the Soviet Union consider their cooperation during World War II to be a highlight of their diplomatic histories. Stalin initially had denounced the Munich agreement for excluding both the USSR and Czechoslovakia and was decidedly "unimpressed" by Paris's and London's "belated" guarantees to Poland. After allying the Soviets with Hitler, Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov defended the non-aggression pact by citing the "howling contradictions" in British and French efforts to cooperate with Moscow. When Hitler abrogated the non-aggression pact by invading Soviet territory, Britain took decisive action favoring Moscow.

One day after the Nazi invasion, Winston Churchill contacted Stalin offering assistance. This commitment was formalized on 12 July 1941, with a protocol pledging both sides neither "to negotiate nor conclude an armistice or treaty of peace except by mutual agreement" and "to render each other assistance and support of all kinds in the present war against Hitlerite Germany." Churchill began immediate shipments of tanks, planes, and other supplies to the Soviets. The Grand Alliance that formed among Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt in order to defeat Hitler proved that communist and capitalist states could successfully overcome their ideological differences and work toward common goals. The Alliance, though, did not survive the war, despite a royal appeal. According to Andrei Gromyko, King George VI took it upon himself to encourage Moscow to continue the successful wartime alliance. "On his own initiative, the British sovereign started urging me earnestly that it was essential that the wartime contact between the USSR and Britain not be lost . . . I will not hide the fact that the conversation with the King made a good impression on me." In 1946, Winston Churchill verbally drew the Iron Curtain in Europe, signalling the beginning of the Cold War. From the end of World War II onward, Anglo-Soviet relations were "correct and polite but never genuinely cordial" and have always been firmly anchored within the larger context of East-West relations. Between the 1950s and the late 1970s, Clarke characterizes Anglo-Soviet relations as "indirect yet remarkably consistent," indirect, because most issues had been solved within a multilateral setting but consistently cautious and of moderate expectation.

A brief thaw in bilateral relations came shortly after Nikita Khrushchev's anti-Stalinist Secret Speech in February 1956. Downing Street soon had an opportunity to applaud this new direction. While Khrushchev and Nikolai Bulganin were on an official trip to London—the first visit to a Western country by any top Soviet leader—they were invited to tea at Windsor Castle. Khrushchev was quite taken with the young queen and remembered
British civility toward Moscow abruptly halted in October 1956, when the Soviets invaded Hungary. The Archbishop of Canterbury called the Soviet leadership “instruments and slaves of the devil,” the Labour Party equated the invasion with Stalinist practices, and many members resigned from the British Communist Party. Three decades would pass before another Soviet leader would have tea with the queen.

The Pretenders Emerge
Starting in the mid 1920s, European royal houses found themselves faced with a variety of purported surviving Romanovs. Having turned away Nicholas and his family in 1918, Buckingham Palace now literally faced the ghosts of the past seeking recognition from their “cousins.” The claimants caused a thorny problem: the Soviets could not be blamed for murdering all of the Romanovs if some were still alive.

The most famous claimant was Anna Anderson, who was believed to be the tsar’s youngest daughter, Anastasia. Taken to a Berlin insane asylum following a suicide attempt in 1920, Anderson was initially recognized by Anastasia’s aunt, the Grand Duchess Olga Alexandrovna, who later denied such rumors. Anderson took her claim to court in trials lasting from 1938 to 1967. Conducted in Germany, the case technically sought to overturn the inheritance claims of other Romanov survivors. Initially, the anti-Anderson side was led by the Grand Duke Ernest of Hesse, Empress Alexandra’s brother. When the grand duke died in 1937, the cause was taken up by his nephew, Lord Louis Mountbatten of England, uncle of the current Duke of Edinburgh.

Mountbatten had met the four Romanov daughters when he was thirteen and was smitten. “I was crackers about Marie and was determined to marry her,” Mountbatten recalled when he was an old man. He had been saddened, but not surprised, by the execution and unwaveringly blocked Anderson’s claims. When the BBC planned a 1958 documentary on Anderson’s court case, Mountbatten lobbied the director of Overseas Services to stop the project, arguing that “I can assure you that there is not the remotest doubt that this woman is not my cousin.” In 1971, he admitted that opposing the “Anastasia” claim had cost him “thousands of pounds.”

Another Thaw
Relations showed a marked improvement in the 1970s and were given a cautious endorsement from Buckingham Palace. Andrei Gromyko visited London in 1971 and a return visit was paid to Moscow by British Foreign Secretary Alec Douglas-Home two years afterward. The SALT I agreement was signed by Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev in Moscow on 26 May 1972, signaling a new era in East-West relations.

A new phase in Windsor-Moscow ties began the following year, when Prince Philip paid a private visit to Moscow and Kiev. Strictly speaking, Prince Philip was not the first member of the British royal family to set foot on Soviet soil. That honor went to Princess Anne, who had arrived two days
ahead of her father for an international equestrian competition in Kiev. The prince’s schedule included visits to equestrian research facilities, laying a wreath at the tomb of the unknown soldier, and watching his daughter compete in Kiev. During a visit to the tombs of early Romanov tsars, Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny remarked, “We got rid of them, you know.” To which the prince replied, “They were my relatives, you know.” The two men did discuss the possibilities of a future visit from the queen. While the Soviet press largely ignored the prince, the prospects of a state visit were front page news in London.

The oil crisis of 1973-74 seemed to bode well for the Soviets, as did the 1975 conclusion of the Helsinki Final Act. In 1975 Prime Minister Harold Wilson took a £1 billion trade and credit package to a summit with Leonid Brezhnev, which also produced protocols on trade and science, regular ministerial contacts, and established an Anglo-Soviet Round Table. Little came of the much touted economic package and the détente process as a whole slowed after 1975. Prince Philip made a second trip to the USSR in 1979 as head of the International Equestrian Foundation, but Moscow’s invasion of Afghanistan caused the USSR—and its hosting of the 1980 Olympic Games—to be regarded as international pariahs. Sir Curtis Keeble, London’s ambassador to Moscow from 1978-82, views this phase as an important step in bilateral relations. “The détente of the 1970s was not illusory,” he recalls. “It was a necessary stage in the gradual maturing of the relationship with the Soviet Union, but another cycle in the evolutionary process was necessary.”

Overall, the USSR has regarded Britain as an important international player. London has a strong position in the world’s economy due to its control over a large sum of export capital from multinational corporations based in the United Kingdom and as the center of the Commonwealth economy. Above all, Britain’s strong link to Washington kept it an influential world player. Therefore, the Soviets have always been receptive to working with Britain; the problem has been British responsiveness. Moscow has always tended to view British foreign policy as an ongoing battle transcending party lines between hardliners ideologically opposed to communism and realists who accept the USSR as a country too strong to ignore. When she became head of the Conservative Party in 1975, Margaret Thatcher was set to lead the next cycle of relations.

**The Iron Lady Appears**

On 19 January 1976, Thatcher made a speech to Kensington Town Hall in London that earned her the epithet “Iron Lady” from *Krasnaia Zvezda*. The speech proved so inflammatory that it sparked an official protest from the Soviet ambassador. Rather than toning down her comments, Thatcher basked in the uproar and incorporated her hardline into the 1976 Conservative Party program.

Margaret Thatcher holds a unique place in Soviet relations with the West. Although Ronald Reagan also had the opportunity to deal with Brezhnev, Andropov, Chernenko, and Gorbachev, Thatcher actually did. Rather than hiding behind a script of Cold War rhetoric, Prime Minister Thatcher boarded her airplane and went to make her own evaluations. She had even visited the USSR prior to becoming prime minister, having participated in a parliamentary exchange in 1969. Anglo-Soviet relations reached new heights during Thatcher’s reign. Through the 1980s, Moscow
watched Thatcher warm to the East, greatly increased its contact with her, and eventually saw the prime minister become a regular visitor and good chum of General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev.

During the late 1980s, Soviet foreign policy changed both its general objectives and its application in regard to Great Britain. For the first half of the decade, Soviet leaders continued to work for peaceful coexistence and equality with the West and saw Britain as a potential lever on Washington. Upon ascending to the general secretary post in March 1985, Gorbachev realized that previous arms policies were too costly for the USSR. Expenditures to maintain military parity with the West and political hegemony in the communist world had ruined the domestic Soviet economy. Gorbachev, therefore, directed his primary attention on economic reform and created a foreign program that could assist achievement of the domestic agenda. Talk of peace and avoidance of nuclear holocaust may be good international propaganda, but peace is also cheaper than war. In Great Britain, Gorbachev found a leader responsive to his domestic agenda.

**Maggie and Mikhail**

In December 1984, the Kremlin accepted a long-standing invitation for a high-ranking official to visit London as a guest of the British Section of the Inter-Parliamentary Union. Officially, Mikhail Gorbachev was selected to attend in his capacity as chairman of the Supreme Soviet Foreign Affairs Commission. The visit was expected to give the world its first close examination of the man rumored to be Chernenko’s heir-apparent. A few observers predicted that Moscow might use the trip to express its concerns over the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative to the prime minister “in the hope that she may be an influence on Reagan.”

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Gorbachev. We can do business together.” As world leaders assembled for Chernenko’s funeral in March 1985, all were anxious to determine whether they, too, could do business with Gorbachev. The Iron Lady’s endorsement provided the new communist leader with strong international credentials from the outset.

For the remainder of the 1980s, Thatcher served as a vital link between Washington and Moscow. Following the Reykjavik debacle in October 1986, Thatcher made quick trips to Washington (November) and Moscow (March-April 1987) to try to repair the damage. “Somehow I had to get the Americans back onto the firm ground of a credible policy of nuclear deterrence,” Thatcher recalled of her American trip. Her own Moscow summit with Gorbachev in 1987 clarified her role in the ongoing Soviet-American dialogue. Even with U.S.-Soviet relations improving, Thatcher’s insight toward Reagan was valued by Soviet leaders who hoped she would foreshadow Washington’s opinions and encourage Reagan to continue a dialogue based on realism.
When Reagan left the White House, Gorbachev approached Thatcher for her insights in dealing with George Bush. During Gorbachev’s April 1989 visit to London, he privately expressed his worries that Bush might stall the recent momentum in Soviet-American relations. Although he realized that Thatcher did not have the special closeness with Bush that she did with Reagan, Gorbachev sought her help. Her positive reaction to the USSR could serve as a strong example for the junior Western leader. In the end, such a conversation proved unnecessary; neither leader survived until the end of Bush’s presidency.

Royal Roadblocks Lifted
As Anglo-Soviet relations warmed in the 1980s, Downing Street gradually gave Gorbachev the “royal” seal of approval. One long-standing Romanov problem was resolved during the July 1986 foreign ministry summit. Apparently Nicholas II had issued bonds for railroad construction just prior to his abdication and many had been purchased by British investors. Upon seizing power, the Bolsheviks had repudiated this and other tsarist debts, costing British bondholders an estimated $75 million. Further antagonizing London, the Bolsheviks had nationalized $1.35 billion worth of British property located in Russia. Whitehall responded by freezing Russian assets in London banks with a value of approximately $68 million. After years of stubbornness, officials from the two countries worked out an agreement whereby both sides waived their claims to the seized property and London banks would divide the frozen Russian assets among survivors of the original shareholders. Only investors who had filed a claim to the Russian property in 1917, however, would be eligible; hence very little money would in fact be distributed. The 1984 death of Anna Anderson also made it much easier for London to admit to having Romanov money in England. While this may seem a trivial footnote to history, it actually had a great deal of significance to current affairs, because settlement of this issue cleared the last obstacle for Moscow to begin its own issues in the London bond market. Now Gorbachev could follow the tsar in buying pounds sterling to fund major projects.

Gorbachev was scheduled to visit London again in December of 1988. Unlike his previous trips to Britain, Gorbachev was scheduled to meet Queen Elizabeth this time. Speculation immediately arose that the queen would soon pay a profoundly symbolic visit to Moscow. Apparently the queen was more willing to forgive and forget than Thatcher; Downing Street quickly stressed that Anglo-Soviet relations had not yet reached that high a level and feared the trip would be a propaganda coup for Gorbachev. Rumors of a heated dispute between the queen and the prime minister led to an indignant response from Thatcher during Question Time. At the last minute, Gorbachev’s visit was postponed due to a severe earthquake in Armenia.

Gorbachev made his third trip to Great Britain from 5-7 April 1989. His itinerary included private meetings with Thatcher and Labour leader Neil Kinnock, an appointment with the Communist Party of Great Britain, talks with British businessmen, a major speech at the London Guildhall, and luncheon with Queen Elizabeth II. The royal dimension impressed both the Soviet leader and the Soviet press. “In England,” Raisa Gorbachev later remembered, “an audience with the queen is the highest mark of diplomatic esteem.” Beyond the visit to Westminster Abbey and sidewalk talks with British citizens, the pageantry at Windsor Castle “symbolically reflected
how far the horizons of trust and mutual understanding have broadened.” Izvestiya observed. As expected, Gorbachev invited the queen to visit the USSR at her leisure and the monarch replied with interest.

The invitation was headline news in London. “Queen Will Go to Russia: Moscow Invitation Marks High Point of Gorbachev's Visit” was the banner headline for the once-staid Times. Companion stories and editorials ran stressing that this development showed the high level of Anglo-Soviet relations and the favorable developments brought on by Gorbachev. “It should be regarded as an occasion for revising Russian and Soviet history and setting the record straight,” said the lead editorial. Other articles suggested that other members of the royal family had encouraged the queen to go to Russia and ask the “difficult” questions about the end of the Romanovs. The Washington Post called it the “last and ultimate conquest” of Gorbymania.

The pace of British royalty visiting the USSR increased as bilateral relations improved. In 1990, a huge exhibition of British products and daily life opened in Kiev with Princess Anne presiding. The princess's thirteen-day trip included a meeting with Gorbachev, a tour of the tsar's Kremlin apartments, speaking to students at Moscow State University, and an environmental trip to Lake Baikal. Pravda noted the “openness and amicability” of the princess's meeting with Gorbachev and TASS reported that “Moscow believes that the development of contacts between the British royal court and the USSR will give important human and public impetus to the development of understanding between the two nations.”

The Gorbachevs came to Buckingham Palace during their 1991 visit to London in connection with the G-7 meeting. Valery Krasov, head of the USSR Foreign Ministry's European Department noted that such royal meetings are definitely useful. As far as discussion of the tsar's execution, Krasov noted “the issue does not crop up in bilateral relations.”

Post-Imperial Trauma Syndrome

As Gorbachev’s glasnost policy began to “fill in the blank spots” of Soviet history, curiosity about royalty in general—and the Romanovs in particular—emerged. Just prior to Thatcher’s 1987 visit to Moscow, the BBC Russian Service ceased to be jammed. As a result, BBC headquarters in London soon was flooded by Soviet listeners anxious to learn more about British society. Not only did Soviet citizens want to learn more about Thatcher, but also about British politics, pop music, soccer, and the British royal family.

For years, Soviets knew little or nothing about the Romanovs. The official account published in Pravda on 19 July 1918 insisted that only the tsar had been executed; no mention was made of the fate of the tsarina or their children. Gely Ryabov, the Soviet police inspector who eventually located the Romanov burial site, commented to Moskovskii novosti that, “I had read probably all the works [about the execution] that had been published in our country and abroad—although, in fact, there were
practically none of the former." A museum about the Russian Revolution, erected in the Ipatiev House, the Romanov’s last prison and execution site, was closed following World War II. In 1977, the Ipatiev House was becoming a tourist attraction for foreigners, so the Politburo ordered the head of the Sverdlovsk communist party, Boris Yeltsin, to destroy it.

More information about the Romanovs and their final days began to emerge in 1987-88. In 1987, Genrikh Ioffe, a noted historian specializing in post-revolutionary Bolshevik opposition movements, published a book entitled *The Great October Revolution and the Era of Tsarisin.* Published by the Nauka press, the book drew upon archival materials, but stuck to the official story that the advancing White forces compelled the Urals soviet to eliminate the entire family. The book did offer some new insights, such as avoiding the stereotype of Alexandra dominating Nicholas, and discussed their experiences in captivity. A new approach to the Romanovs was advanced by Pyotr Cherkasov when he reviewed Ioffe’s book for *Novyi Mir.*

For the first time in the Soviet press, a historian argued that executing the entire family without a trial was wrong:

> But along with the bloody one [Nicholas] and his evil genius Alexandra Fedorovna, all their children were shot—four daughters and an incurably sick son. What was their guilt before the Russian people and the revolution? Let us remember that the revolution in England and the more drastic great French Revolution were humane towards the children of monarchs, who were executed in accordance with the verdicts of open courts.

In April 1989, *Moskovskie novosti* reported that the remains of Nicholas and his family had been discovered near Yekaterinburg. Police inspector Gely Ryabov claimed to have discovered the burial site in 1979, but kept it to himself for the next decade. He reasoned that the exact location had been kept a secret because the Communist Party wanted to avoid its becoming a monarchist shrine, as had happened with the Ipatiev House. According to Georgi Edelshtein, a Russian Orthodox priest and others, Moscow could have had three motives for announcing the discovery. “Such a find could inspire a productive Russian nationalism and earn Mr. Gorbachev a new title, rehabilitator of the imperial family. It could also restore relations with the British royal family, which is related to the Romanovs.”

A cult began to form around Nicholas and his family. By 1990, sidewalk vendors in Leningrad were selling portraits of Nicholas and his portrait was carried into Red Square for the May Day parade. The site of the Ipatiev House was progressively marked by a wooden cross, then an iron cross. In the summer of 1990, the Sverdlovsk city government authorized construction of a modest chapel on the site. That same year, a Moscow exhibit at a Communist Youth League Hall, “The Last Days of the Romanovs,” attracted numerous visitors to view photographs, family documents, and a model of the execution room. “I Will Repay,” a play reenacting the last days and execution of the Romanovs packed Moscow’s Maly theater during 1990. Yuri Solomin, the actor portraying Nicholas, explained the play’s popularity: “I know what I was taught about Nicholas in school. Now I want to find out what I was not taught.”

Ryabov’s claims were not taken seriously until 1991, when geologist Alexandr Avdonin approached the Yekaterinburg government about excavating the burial site. In July 1991, Russian President Boris Yeltsin
authorized the exhumation of the remains and verification of their identity began.\textsuperscript{57}

**The First Martyrs of the Revolution**

Russians are more interested in Nicholas and his family than in the living Romanovs. As details of the execution have become known, Nicholas, Alexandra, and their children have come to be viewed as the first victims of the Bolsheviks. Citing the crowds drawn to the burial site, the Russian Orthodox Archbishop of Yekaterinburg explained, “This is the place where the suffering of the Russian people began.”\textsuperscript{58}

historian Veniamin Alekseev, a corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, gave the following answer when an Associated Press reporter asked why the West is more interested in the Romanovs than the Russians:

It would be wrong to claim that there is more interest in the West or that there is less interest. But some strata of Russian society, brought up in an anti-tsarist tradition, got used to cursing the tsars. Perhaps this is a factor. I myself know very highly educated people who dismiss this issue regarding the tsar and his family does not matter. Russia faces far more urgent problems. That is true. \textit{But I believe that without understanding what happened in 1918, Russia today cannot be fully understood.}

As to why there is greater interest in the West, the reason is obvious. The people who emigrated from Russia associate Russia with Orthodoxy and with the Romanov dynasty. And they feel much more strongly about this. They would like to know the truth about the events that happened in Russia. I may sound a little too blunt, but they were telling me they will decide whether the whole truth has been told about what happened in Russia only after the whole truth had been said about the death of the Emperor. \textit{It is a kind of acid test of glasnost and transparency in today’s Russia.}\textsuperscript{59}

In March-April 1992, a Russian Orthodox Church council began consideration of canonizing Nicholas and his family, a move already taken by the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad in 1981.\textsuperscript{60} Edvard Radzinsky’s 1992 \textit{The Last Tsar: The Life and Death of Nicholas II} was a best seller in both Russian and English. Radzinsky told the \textit{Washington Post} that Russians, “Want to find out about the way of life that was destroyed by the Bolshevik Revolution, before all those promises of the bright, shining future that were never kept.”\textsuperscript{61}

**“Symbolic of Our Russian Tradition”**

Grand Duke Vladimir Kirillovich, then claimant to the Russian throne, made an unprecedented visit to the Soviet Union in November 1991 at the invitation of St. Petersburg Mayor Anatoly Sobchak. It was the grand duke’s first visit to Russia, and coincided with ceremonies renaming Leningrad St.
Petersburg. "I am not a monarchist, nor do I wish to resurrect a deceased institution," Sobchak said when the invitation was issued. "But Grand Duke Vladimir is symbolic of our Russian tradition. Without respect for our traditions, the future becomes even cloudier that it is already." Six months later, Sobchak allowed the grand duke to be buried along with other Romanovs at the Peter and Paul Fortress. His funeral attracted little interest in Russia, but marked the first visit of many Romanovs to Russia, including his daughter Maria and grandson and heir Georgy. A similar disinterest occurred when the remains of Grand Duke Kyrill and his wife the Grand Duchess Victoria were moved to the Fortress in March 1995, but once again Mayor Sobchak and surviving Romanovs attended.

Russia has experienced a revival of royal titles and nobility associations. The founding assembly of the Union of the Russian Nobles’ Assembly was held just off Red Square on 10 May 1990. The group, which aims “to establish links with Russian aristocrats abroad and to research genealogies” is headed by Prince Andrei Kirillovich Golitsyn. The union advocates electing a new tsar, as was done in 1613. Also active is the All-Russia Monarchist Center, led by Nikolai Lukyanov. Assembly meetings have been attended by Gennady Zyuganov, leader of the Russian Communist Party, and former Vice President Alexander Rutskoi, who led the October 1993 parliamentary revolt against Yeltsin. In 1991, Aleksei Brumel, regent of the Russian Monarchy, made Boris Yeltsin a grand prince for his heroism in the abortive August 1991 coup. There is also a new heraldic commission that reports to Yeltsin, who has created a special order for himself, “For Exceptional Merits for the Fatherland.”

For the most part, these are exercises in nostalgia, a chance to pull old uniforms out of the closet and dabble in a long-banned era. The October 1994 meeting of the All-Russian Monarchical Assembly was described as “a fancy dress party gone mad. There were Cossacks, Orthodox priests, all forms of archaic crosses, flags, insignia, peaked caps, and much hugging and kissing. It was part rally, part prayer meeting.” Even the nobility associations are not pushing for restoration. In an era of social upheaval, however, symbolism remains a powerful force and can be used for various political ends.

The loudest calls for restoration have come from the Majority Party, led by Vyacheslav Grechnev. Founded 15 February 1994, the party has suggested a popular referendum on establishing a constitutional monarchy and restoring a Romanov to the throne. Grechnev reportedly has 800,000 signatures on his petition and has received encouragement from Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov.

Actual restoration of the Romanov dynasty is a long shot, although the Kremlin has begun an international search to locate missing crown jewels, just in case they are needed. Most importantly, there are few good candidates. The leading claimant is fourteen-year-old Prince Georgy Romanov, who plans to enroll this year at the St. Petersburg Nakhimov Naya Academy. Georgy is the grandson of the Grand Duke Vladimir Kirillovich, whose claim was uncertain as his father’s marriage was initially denounced by Nicholas II. Grand Duchess Maria and her son Georgy were among the Romanovs who went to Yekaterinburg in 1992 to commemorate the execution. Also making claims is Prince Nicholas Romanov of France, who bases his claim on being the family’s older male. As the remains of two Romanov children have never been found, there are many people
turning up claiming to be their descendants. Anna Anderson may be dead, but her “nieces and nephews” are everywhere. These include Prince Alexei d’Anjou de Bourbon-Conde and his mother, Princess Olga-Beata, claiming to be the grandson and daughter of the Grand Duchess Maria Nikolaevna; and Russian opera singer Nikolai Dalsky, who claims to be the son of the tsarevich Alexei.76 Anna Anderson supporter James Blair Lovell even uncovered a Dutch family claiming to be descended from a fifth daughter!'77 “The truth is that the monarchist movement is itself split into myriads of pretenders, oddballs, Cossacks, extreme rightwing and openly fascist groups, all of whom eye each other with deep suspicion, and claim to be sole owners of the Holy Grail.”78

Political Tool
Most talk of monarchy is tied to politicians with their own political aims. Many Russian political figures have paid tribute to the Romanovs as a way of differentiating themselves from the Communist Party, which carried out and covered up the executions. Alexander Rutskoi, long in conflict with Yeltsin, praised Nicholas as early as 1992, writing the introduction to The Reign of Nicholas II, 1894-1917: Facts and Figures.79 As head of the Russian Communist Party, Gennady Zyuganov leads the descendant of the party that murdered the Romanovs, but he has found the monarchist movement a convenient way to attack Yeltsin. “Russia needs a ruler with a tsar in his head,” Zyuganov told the Guardian, making a pun as “tsar” can also mean “brains.” He further belittled Yeltsin by reminding the reporter that the Russian president had demolished the Ipatiev house. Zyuganov told the Christian Science Monitor that, “We want people to gel together in the spirit of togetherness and to work out a form of government characteristic of Russian traditions”80 In the wake of ultra-nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s surprising support in the 1993 Russian parliamentary elections, support for the Romanovs seems one of the least-bizarre forms of expressing nationalism.

In addition to appealing to Russian tradition, the monarchy has one feature attractive to politicians: because of his youth, the current claimant would need a regent to rule on his behalf for several years to come. Under the Majority Party plan, Yeltsin would be regent until Prince Georgy becomes of age. As the popular press increasingly refer to Yeltsin as “Tsar Boris” for his authoritarian actions, Yeltsin himself has carefully cultivated the Romanovs, inviting Grand Duchess Maria and Prince Georgy to Russia and meeting with them in Moscow.81 Former Soviet economist Vladimir Kvint predicts a return to monarchy, because “it will prove to be the only way Yeltsin can hang on to power.”82 Prince Golitsyn is not as convinced that Yeltsin is behind the movement. “The initiative about creating a regent is not coming from presidential circles,” he told the Guardian. “I think it is strange to think the president can be a regent, and in such a contrived manner help restore the monarchy in Russia. All the polls show support for the monarchy is running at about 18 percent. My personal opinion is that some day Russia will become a monarchy, but that time has not yet arrived.”83

Adding Some Sparkle
If home-grown royalty are unavailable, foreign royalty will suffice. Just as Mikhail Gorbachev before him, Yeltsin looked to London for international
prestige. While visiting Great Britain in 1992, Yeltsin extended his own invitation for a state visit to Queen Elizabeth.\textsuperscript{84} \textit{Nezavisimaia gazeta} later remarked, "Russia's international prestige is pretty low as it is to have its level accentuated by the sparkle of the British Crown."\textsuperscript{85}

Western sparkle seems to be preferred. Yeltsin was invited to a dinner with the Japanese royal family in connection with the July 1993 Group of Seven meeting in Tokyo. While the Western media all showed the exact same photo—of Crown Princess Masako seated between Yeltsin and Bill Clinton, evidently speaking to both in their native languages—the Russian press made no mention of the dinner, much less the multilingual princess.

During a February 1994 official visit to Russia, British Prime Minister John Major stressed the strong ties between Britain and Russia and announced that a state visit would be forthcoming. "The relationship between the U.K. and Russia has been getting closer for some time. This will set the seal on the much closer relations," Major said. As with Thatcher in 1984, Major's endorsement of the Kremlin leader came at a crucial time; Yeltsin was receiving much criticism at home and abroad for his handling of the parliamentary revolt in October 1993. Britain again took the lead, with Major becoming "the first Western leader to back publicly Moscow's request to become a political member of the G-7 group of industrialized nations." Major and Yeltsin also signed agreements on joint military maneuvers, taxation, and trade.\textsuperscript{56}

"Most talk of monarchy is tied to politicians with their own political aims. Many Russian political figures have paid tribute to the Romanovs as a way of differentiating themselves from the Communist Party, which carried out and covered up the executions."

Prince Charles's 16-19 May 1994 trip thus became a dress rehearsal for the fall state visit. St. Petersburg Mayor Anatoly Sobchak had invited the Prince of Wales in 1993, because he had expressed his concern that the "impending ruin of Russia's second largest city would result in the loss of a significant part of world culture." The prince responded through his Business Leaders Forum, sending health care, tourism, and business experts to offer assistance. His four-day visit was to check on their progress and he also expressed great interest in preserving the city's architecture and literary treasures.\textsuperscript{87} His visit attracted many members of the press, but not many Russians. One British reporter attributed the small turnout not to the unpopularity of royalty in Russia, but to the fact that "Russians are not used to turning out anywhere in large numbers unless someone officially orders them to."\textsuperscript{88} Within a week of the prince's successful trip, the queen formally accepted Yeltsin's invitation.

One last issue remained to clear the Windsor's conscience about their actions toward the Romanovs. After the Yekaterinburg remains had been identified through DNA comparisons with a blood sample from Prince Philip, genetic testing was underway to determine if Anna Anderson had really been Anastasia. The results were to be announced just prior to the queen's trip, and finding out that they had turned their backs on a relative could prove awkward for the royal party. Scientists in Moscow generously tried to provide a solution. On 6 September 1994, Deputy Prime Minster Yuri Yarov
revealed the findings of a Russian government commission: Anastasia's remains were accounted for; it was Marie who was missing. Since Anna Anderson never claimed to be Marie, case closed. On 6 October 1994 British scientists again using Prince Philip's DNA refuted Anna Anderson's claim.

State Visit, Not Family Visit
The queen's trip was almost canceled when the Russian government tried to make it a "family" trip. During Prince Charles' visit, St. Petersburg officials delicately suggested that perhaps the Romanov remains could be buried in a ceremony coinciding with the queen's visit. Buckingham Palace immediately rejected this plan. "The state visit and the question of the reburial of the Tsar and his family are entirely separate issues. There is no connection between the two," said a palace spokesman.

The queen's visit was seen as historic by both sides. The British press called it a "diplomatic coup" rivalling the queen's trip to China in 1986. Moscow saw it the same way. "For Russia, this visit is the utmost recognition that our country is on the road to democracy," Yeltsin said. Nezavisimia Gazeta saw three benefits from the trip: it would recognize the current leadership's achievements and break with the past, it would raise Russian popular opinion on Yeltsin, and it would erase Yeltsin's recent drunken bungles in Ireland and Germany.

The royal visit nearly sparked a diplomatic incident at the beginning. Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin failed to meet the queen upon her arrival, preferring to remain on holiday at the Black Sea. Speculation quickly erupted that Chernomyrdin had submitted his resignation. The Kremlin soothed the disturbance, pointing out that this was a meeting between heads of state, not prime ministers. When Yeltsin dismissed the resignation rumor as a "wild canard," the New York Times politely noted that Yeltsin, "has much to learn from the Queen, should he wish, about indirection and euphemism.

The visitors took great efforts to not dwell on the murder of their relatives. Even the British Foreign Office sidestepped the issue, entirely omitting the death of Nicholas from its official background notes. It was a state visit, not a family reunion. The Romanov murders were "part of family folklore," Prince Philip told the Daily Telegraph, "but I don't look at this as a family occasion. . . . You can't condemn a whole nation for what a few extremists do or did." In Moscow, Yeltsin literally thrust the Romanovs on the queen when he presented her with a copy of The Romanovs: Love, Power, and Tragedy, a beautiful book of Romanov photos with text by Russian historians and published in a joint venture with the British Leippi Press.

During their tour of the Romanov burial sites in the Cathedral of Saints Peter and Paul, the royal couple made no reference to their murdered cousins. Philip conspicuously avoided looking at the wooden fence around the open grave of Grand Duke Georgi, his fellow contributor of royal blood DNA samples. According to Natalia Dementieva, director of the Peter and Paul Fortress, the queen did not ask about the reburial of her ancestors. The royal party declined to view a Hermitage exhibition of Romanov memorability. After the sparse crowds for the Prince of Wales, the British consulate distributed Union Jacks and rounded up several hundred children and tourists to cheer for the queen.
The queen's visit to Russia signalled a new stage in Anglo-Russian relations, but the much heralded reconciliation rang hollow. While Prime Minister Chernomyrdin pouted at being blamed for a devalued ruble, Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev abruptly cancelled a meeting with his British counterpart due to a dispute over treatment of Iraq. "The visit was undermined by the two sides' fundamental incompatibility," mused the Sunday Telegraph, "How can you organize a state visit in a country where the prime minister goes on a sulk?"

The queen tried to make the best of the situation. She told Russian schoolchildren that "the ambassadors and merchant venturers of Queen Elizabeth I first came to Russia 400 years ago. Europe was emerging from the long winter of the Middle Ages into an age of discovery and innovation... I should like to think that we stand on the threshold of another such age." More importantly, the visit encouraged Russia to reconsider its imperial past, to recall days of lost national pride.

When the remains of Nicholas and his family were scheduled to be buried on February 25, 1996, Queen Elizabeth indicated she would attend, but as a foreign head of state, not a relative. However, the funeral has now been indefinitely postponed. One obstacle comes from the Russian Orthodox Church, which has refused to accept the DNA ruling on the remains. Russian domestic politics present a more formidable impediment. Since Ziuganov's Russian Communist Party won the 1995 Duma elections, Yeltsin's Commission for Identification and Reburial of the Last Imperial Family has ceased to meet. While a grand pageant of Russian history might have appealed to nationalists, communists cannot honor victims of Bolshevism.

Over a century ago, Walter Bagehot wrote on the value of the monarchy to Great Britain. In The English Constitution, he endorses monarchy because it is an intelligible form of government, it strengthens government with the force of religion, the monarch personifies the nation, it is a source of morality, and the monarchy acts as disguise, allowing the government to change without tumult. For Bagehot, the great "value of constitutional royalty [is] in times of transition... the nation is divided into parties, but the crown is of no party."

Yeltsin seems to understand this principle. During the state dinner in the Kremlin, he told the queen, "Fulfilling your mission with dignity, you confirm an important idea—monarchy can be an integral part of democratic state structure and personify spiritual and historical unity of the nation." It remains to be seen, however, if Yeltsin's comments were polite dinner conversation, a clever political appeal to nationalism, or a preliminary move to return a Romanov to the throne.

Notes


5. Ibid., 588.


17. MacDonald papers, Public Records Office. Quoted in Rose, 334.

18. Keeble, Britain and the Soviet Union, 94.


31. Keeble, Britain and the Soviet Union, 293.

32. Vladimir Aleksandrovich Ryzhikov, Sovetsko-Angliiskie Otnosheniia (Moscow: Mezdunarodnye Otnosheniia, 1987), 258-59; Clarke, “British,” 72; and Duncan, 60.

37. Peter Jenkins, “Gorbachev Reveals Unease at Washington’s Intentions,” Independent, 8 April 1989 and Thatcher, ibid., 786.
42. “Queen will go to Russia,” 1; “Questions Only the Queen Could Ask,” 2; “Invitation to the Queen Recalls Links With the Russian Imperial Family,” 5; “Spirit of Glasnost Finds a Welcome at Windsor,” 5; and “Next Time in Moscow?” 13, all Times, 8 April 1989.
50. Margaret Shapiro, “The Rehabilitation of Tsar Nicholas II,” Washington Post 20 July 1991, A1. The house had been owned by the Ipatiev family before its confiscation as an imperial prison, and it continues to be known as the “Ipatiev House.” It was located in the Urals city of Ekaterinburg, which during the Soviet era was known as Sverdlovsk in honor of Yakov Sverdlov, chair of the Central Executive Committee of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets in 1918. It was Sverdlov who sent the famous telegram announcing the execution of the tsar. See for example, Radzinsky, The Last Tsar, 325-30.
51. Boris Yeltsin, Against the Grain (London: Jonathan Cape, 1990), 64-65.
53. Moskovskie novosti, 16 April 1989, 16.
58. Ibid.
65. Christina Balas, “Russian Nobles Gather to Don the Old Mantles,” New York Times 11 May 1990, A14, and “A Noble Experiment in Russia,” Chicago Tribune, 23 May 1990, 18. In 1613, Russia was recovering from decades of war with Poland and Sweden. The throne was vacant following the 1598 death of Tsar Feodor. Ivan the Terrible’s feeble-minded surviving son Boris Godunov, Feodor’s brother-in-law and regent, seized the throne. Godunov’s brief reign was unstable due to frequent reappearances of young men claiming to be Dmitrii, the younger brother of Feodor and thus the rightful tsar. Prince Dmitrii of Uglich had died under mysterious circumstances in 1591 at the age of nine, reportedly at the order of Godunov. When the Poles had been defeated, a zemskii sobor (assembly of nobles) convened to select the next tsar. Mikhail Romanov, grandson of Metropolitan Philaret, was offered the crown. Ivan the Terrible’s wife had been a Romanov, so the new tsar was related to the old dynasty.


78. Hearst, “The Two-Headed Eagle is Hovering.”


82. Kvint, “Restoring the Romanovs.”

83. Quoted in Hearst, “The Two-Headed Eagle is Hovering.”


99. Ironically, the only apparent coverage of this incident came in *Royalty*, a British monarchist fan magazine that distributes the book. See “A Romanov Souvenir for Queen and the Russian President Yeltsin,” *Royalty*, 13.6 (December 1994): 29. The article is accompanied by photographs of a dour queen accepting the gift, and a large advertisement for the book.


