

Transition to Democracy in Ukraine

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Ukraine's experience in light of the various theories of transition to democracy can be interpreted so as to assess the likelihood of the country's stability, and the prospects for integration with the rest of Europe. This is a practical concern of considerably wider interest than to Ukrainianists alone. Identification of the critical events and conjunctures by which the transition to democracy, its consolidation, and alternative detours away from democracy or around it might be recognized, allows the observer to assess democratic transitions in a given country.

Theories of Transition to Democracy

If it is granted that transition, deliberately or accidentally, is under way, then the task is to sketch out a road map and to identify the signposts indicative of the possible destinations. Various theories of transition to democracy and the consolidation of democracy can be of assistance here, as well as ones dealing with the breakdown of democracy. The major theories relied on in this essay are those of Dankwart Rustow, Adam Przeworski, and the team of Michael Burton, Richard Gunther, and John Higley.¹

"Democracy is a system of rule by temporary majorities," is the simple definition put forth by Dankwart Rustow, following Robert Dahl's notion of "polyarchy."² Similarly, Adam Przeworski defines democracy as being "contestation open to participation," and, beyond that, "outcomes of the democratic process are uncertain, indeterminate *ex ante*; and it is 'the people,' political forces competing to promote their interests and values, who determine what these outcomes will be."³ While one may, as I do, take issue with Przeworski's implicit characterization of people as exclusively, coldly, and rationally motivated by economic interests, it is reasonable to settle on his conception of democracy as involving essentially open political contests and uncertain or uncontrolled outcomes.⁴

According to Rustow, the transition to democracy can be conceived of as proceeding through a series of contingent stages. Beginning with an essential background condition, there follows a phase of preparation. This then leads to a decision deliberately made to institutionalize the procedures of democratic competition. The final stage is one of habituation. None of these stages flows inevitably from the preceding ones, but each is built on the ones

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before, and there is no inevitability to the ultimate outcome. This four-stage conceptualization of the transition process can serve as a basis for our study of Ukraine, or any of the former Soviet republics for that matter.

The process of consolidation in Latin America and southern Europe, within the overall process of democratization, according to Michael Burton and his colleagues, depends critically on the role of political elites. In a consolidated democracy, there is consensus among the members of the elite, and there is also mass participation. If either of these conditions is missing, then democracy is either unconsolidated or limited, or else it is pseudo-democracy. Transition to successfully consolidated democracy requires the achievement of elite consensus; which occurs either through settlement (negotiation of an agreement) or convergence (acceptance of the rules of the game).³

Even though reality is much more complicated than social science, and even though Ukraine may be experiencing several transitional processes at the same time, let us follow the simplified four-stage process outlined above. What does the more readily available evidence about the political situation in the course of the year 1992 indicate as far as progress towards democracy in Ukraine is concerned?

Transition to Democracy in Ukraine:

National Unity

Ukraine is not an ethnically homogeneous country; at the same time, the level of ethnic conflict is comparatively minimal. In the 1989 Soviet census, the population consisted primarily of the following: Ukrainians, 72.7 percent; Russians, 22.1 percent; and others, 5.2 percent.⁶ The primary and potentially significant ethnic cleavage is between Ukrainians and Russians, but owing to such factors as high rates of intermarriage, the high percentage of Ukrainian-speaking Russians, and a long history of cohabitation, the relationship is very stable and without overt conflict. Demographically, Ukrainians are in an insecure position, despite being the dominant group. Their growth over the period 1959-1989 was only 16.2 percent, compared with the republic average of 22.9, and the Russians' 59.9. Their share of the total population in 1959 was 76.8 percent.⁷ Relations between ethnic groups—Ukrainians and Russians, and possibly Ukrainians and other minorities—could become problematical if the post-independence government were to introduce policies favoring Ukrainians, which might then antagonize or politicize the minorities.

The 1989 Law on Languages in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, establishing Ukrainian as the state language, and its implementing regulations, promulgated in 1991, could have had such an effect.⁸ In November 1991, however, the republic's Parliament issued a Declaration of the Rights of Nationalities of Ukraine, which guaranteed citizens of all nationalities equal rights, including the preservation of their traditional settlements and

the freedom to use their native languages in all spheres of social life.⁹ Insofar as the state was offering to treat all ethnic groups equally, while elevating the Ukrainian language to official status, the only real bases for political opposition that might undermine national unity would have been fear of equality or denial of Ukrainian sovereignty, sentiments that could be attributed not unfairly to some in the Russian minority.

Rather than the overall societal ethnic composition and its potential for creating cleavages such as might threaten national unity, a real problem has been regionalism. On the eve of the independence referendum, this combination of ethnic and territorial claims to autonomous or even separate political status made its appearance in several places. Among these, the most serious was the case of the Crimea, but there were also "centrifugal tendencies" in: eastern Ukraine, in the Donbass area; southern Ukraine, where the idea of "New Russia" had been revived; and Transcarpathia, home of the Ruthenian (Rusyn) movement.¹⁰

In January 1991, the Crimea voted for autonomous republic status for itself within Ukraine, a change which was acknowledged the following month by the Ukrainian Parliament. The only predominantly Russian administrative region or *oblast* in Ukraine (67.0 percent Russians in 1989, as compared to 25.8 percent Ukrainians), thereafter developed a further move to secession on the pretext of a nonexistent threat of "forced Ukrainianization" and the danger of "a Tatar invasion." These were "exploited by the local Communist-dominated administration," as Roman Solchanyk says, with the likely motive of trying "to isolate themselves from the democratic changes being wrought by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet and safeguard their status and privileges by transforming the peninsula into an autonomous 'preservation' where they can operate more or less undisturbed by developments in the Ukrainian capital."¹¹ The campaign for Crimean self-determination moved into high gear in September 1991, with the principal local political groupings all coming out in favor, with groups in the RSFSR offering moral support, and with tension mounting thereafter.

In the Donbass and southern parts of Ukraine, where there are significant concentrations of Russians, and where Russian is the dominant language, movements in favor of autonomy emerged in 1990. These included the idea of a revival of the Donetsk-Kryvyi Rih republic, harking back to 1918, the creation of a Donetsk-Dnipro autonomous region, and the Novorossiya movement (which would combine the *oblasti* of Odessa, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Dnipropetrovsk, and the Crimea, as well as part of Moldova's Dniester region, into a unit with "special state status"). Here the idea of federation was mooted, but there was no consensus. These movements were not very successful.

Because of the recency of its incorporation into Ukraine (1945), and its history of being under Slovak and Hungarian influence, the Transcarpathian

oblast has been understandably the least well-integrated region of the republic. There, a local Ruthenian (Rusyn) identity has survived, and a movement for autonomy which began in 1990 was accelerated by the declaration of Ukraine's independence in August 1991. Autonomy was also supported by the region's Hungarian minority (12.5 percent of the population), which likewise demanded its own Hungarian autonomous district. Transcarpathian autonomy has been supported by groups in the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

The referendum on independence, held on 1 December 1991, showed that national unity at that point in time was stronger, and that by implication secessionist sentiment was much weaker, than the climate of political discussion on the eve would have led one to believe.¹² Overall, 90.3 percent of voters favored independence; 84.1 percent of eligible electors cast ballots; and in no *oblast* did the "yes" side obtain less than a majority. The lowest percentage for independence was in the Crimea, but at 54.1 this was obviously not an exclusively ethnic vote. Other potentially troublesome regions with autonomist movements in them registered the following percentages: Luhansk and Donesk, 83.9; Odessa, 85.4; Kharkiv, 96.3; Mykolaiv, 89.5; Kherson, 90.1; Dnipropetrovsk, 90.4; and Zaporizhzhia, 90.7. In Transcarpathia, the "yes" vote was 92.6 percent; on Chernivtsi, 92.8.

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Additional questions on local autonomy in the latter two *oblasti* were approved, however, by votes of 78 percent, and 89.3 percent, respectively.¹³ Although the percentages of Ukrainians and of Russians resident in the various *oblasti* correlated very strongly with the "yes" and

"no" votes, respectively, the overwhelming republic-wide endorsement of independence obscured, or could be interpreted as reducing the political significance of, the Ukrainian-Russian cleavages.¹⁴

The issue of the Crimea continued to be politically relevant throughout 1992, while the other claims to autonomy subsided. It was involved in the ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia over the division of the armed forces among the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, and specifically over rights to the Black Sea Fleet.¹⁵ Russia's involvement was not only strategic, but had to do with its own unresolved crisis of identity and with the interdependence of Ukraine's and Russia's sovereignties. Russian leaders apparently found it difficult to separate and to accept the "idea of Ukraine" as distinct from the "idea of Russia."¹⁶ Claims were made that the Crimea was historically Russian territory which never should have been granted to Ukraine. A summit meeting between Presidents Leonid Kravchuk and Boris Yeltsin in June resulted in the signing of an agreement and gave

some signs of hope that relations between the two states would improve, but also provided little basis for optimism. The omission of the Crimean question from the agenda was construed as an implicit victory for the Ukrainian side, meaning that the peninsula's fate was being left in the hands of Ukraine, but it could equally have been interpreted as having been left unresolved.¹⁷ Meanwhile, a confrontation between the Kravchuk government in Kiev and the Crimea government in Simferopol was at long last suspended when the Crimean side placed a moratorium on the holding of an independence referendum scheduled for August. Kravchuk has to be given some credit for exhibiting good negotiating skills which thus far have prevented the secession of the Crimea from Ukraine. A complicating factor is that, while Kiev and Simferopol and Moscow have been battling over jurisdictions and sovereignties, the issue of the rights of the growing numbers of Crimean Tatars has been ignored and will have to be faced.¹⁸ The Tatars' claims have to be reconciled somehow with those of Ukraine, the Russians in the Crimea, and Russia. Russian leaders have taken an active interest in the issue of the Crimea, some asserting that the peninsula is Russian territory and must be reunited with Russia.¹⁹ Yeltsin's position in all this is ambivalent; he seems to be following in Gorbachev's footsteps in catering to his domestic Russian patriotic opposition, which might bring about his downfall.²⁰

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Any revision of Ukraine's borders has been vigorously resisted by the Kiev leadership, and it appears that this stand is strongly supported by the general public. Sentiment to change the borders is too weak to be exploited from outside, for example, by Russia. A survey conducted in September-October 1991 revealed that 83 percent of Ukraine's inhabitants were in favor of keeping the borders intact. Of ethnic Ukrainians, the percentage was 85; among Russians, 78. Even in the following heavily Russian *oblasti*, the percentages were: Kharkiv, 61; Crimea, 73; Kherson, 79; and Luhansk, 81.²¹ In May-June 1992, the survey was repeated, with similar results. Of respondents, 82 percent were in favor of keeping borders intact, a decline of one percentage point; the same 85 percent of Ukrainians held this opinion as in the earlier survey. Russian support, perhaps significantly, had declined to 74 percent.²² About the effect on public opinion in Ukraine over the conflict over the Crimea, including the intrusion of Russia into the dispute, it has made the Russian population have some reservations about living in an independent Ukraine, but conversely has had no strengthening effect on Ukrainians.

A serious problem with respect to the integrity of the borders of Ukraine has been the fighting in Moldova, and the establishment there of the

breakaway Russian enclave known as the "Dniester Republic." While Ukraine has sealed the border, and attempted to contain the fighting, the breakaway fragment of Moldova has been receiving moral and material support from Moscow, and the conflict threatens to spill over onto Ukraine's territory. At the same time, the instability in the region has brought Romania into the picture reviving claims to Northern Bukovyna (Chernivtsi *oblast*) and to Southern Bessarabia (the extension of the Odessa *oblast* which cuts Moldova off from the Black Sea).²³ Moldova itself, along with the adjoining lands, is thus engaged in a three-way struggle for ownership with Ukraine's doorstep; armed conflict spilling over into Ukraine at this time would be a setback for democratization as it might reopen a whole series of secessionist and irredentist battles.

Preparation: Contending Political Forces

At present rates of progress, Ukraine will have to wait a very long time before it sees the arrival on the political scene of those critical contending forces, in the form of social classes and their political expression (organized parties), which are necessary for the start of the democratization process. On the one hand, there is a vast array of groups, some calling themselves political parties, but with little apparent connection to recognizable social categories, let alone social classes. Their platforms are equally difficult to distinguish. Insofar as they can be arranged on the conventional ideological spectrum, and their popular support estimated impressionistically, they probably are not balanced against each other.²⁴ There is a unipolar alignment which at this time makes contestation improbable. On the one hand, the one group which had spearheaded the independence drive, Rukh, is now perceived as having given its role as opposition to the Communists and moved to become part of the presidential party. The disappearance of the Communist Party, leaving behind a lot of *apparatchiki* displaced from the *apparat* although not from positions of power, has further obscured the picture as far as political contest between opposing sides is concerned. There may, in fact, be no contenders in terms of our model of democratization until after the marketization of the economy gets under way.

Early in 1991, a handbook on Ukraine's emerging multipartism contained the program and rules of over a dozen parties other than the then ruling Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU).²⁵ The book's compiler, O. V. Haran, attempted to classify these parties along the left-right ideological spectrum and in relation to the conservative CPU. Among the "right radical" parties, those which were the most nationalistic and anti-Communist, could be found: the Universal Ukrainian National-Radical Party; the Republican Party of Ukraine (not to be confused with the better-known Ukrainian Republican Party); the Ukrainian National Party; the Ukrainian Popular-Democratic Party; the Union "State Independence for Ukraine"; and the Ukrainian

Christian-Democratic Party. These parties were based primarily in Western Ukraine, and took their inspiration largely from the rather notorious Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists.

The "right-of-center" position was occupied by the Ukrainian Republican Party, an outgrowth of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union. In the center, and shading off towards the left of center, were: the Liberal-Democratic Party of Ukraine; the People's Party of Ukraine; the Ukrainian Peasant Democratic Party; the Democratic Party of Ukraine; the Party of Democratic Rebirth of Ukraine, formed on the basis of the reformist "Democratic Platform" fraction of the CPU; the Social-Democratic Party of Ukraine and the United SDPU, these being "right" and "left" social democrats, respectively; and the Green Party of Ukraine.²⁶ At that time, except for the right-wing nationalists, these were little more than intellectual currents rather than full-fledged political parties with well-defined social bases and expressing specific interests. In all, a very fragmented party system, if it could be called a system at all.

On the eve of the independence referendum, there was little to distinguish the five major political parties of Ukraine. The Democratic Party of Ukraine had 23 deputies in the Parliament (out of a total of 450), and a membership of 3,000. Its objectives were "the establishment of a democratic, constitutionally governed state in Ukraine, the free development of all forms of property, and the complete economic independence of Ukraine as a precondition for political sovereignty."²⁷ The Party of Democratic Rebirth of Ukraine had 18 deputies and 2,340 members. Its program emphasized "its support for the campaign for an independent, democratic, and sovereign Ukrainian state that respects the principles of humanism, freedom, social justice, the primacy of human rights, and the supremacy of the law."²⁸ It was said to be closely tied to the Social-Democratic Party of Ukraine, which had 3 seats in Parliament and 1,300 members. As a social democratic party, the SDPU promoted democracy in all three of its guises—economic, social, and political. By political democracy it was said to mean "political rights and freedoms for citizens, a multiparty system, a state based on law, and a free press."²⁹ The supposedly "strongest and best organized" party, the Ukrainian Republican Party, had exactly two deputies in Parliament and 10,000 members.³⁰ Its main objectives were sovereignty, democracy, national renewal, development of a civil society, and the promotion of the welfare of the public.³¹ The Ukrainian Popular-Democratic Party, with no seats and only 1,000 members, was promoting the continuation of the tradition of the Ukrainian People's Republic, privatization, sovereignty, and the building of state institutions on historical bases.³² Not only were these parties insufficiently differentiated to provide the basis for meaningful political contestation, but they were also miniscule in comparison with the major parliamentary blocks; the Communists' Group of 239 and the Democratic Block's Narodna Rada (People's Council) consisting of 125 deputies.³³

Instead of the development of an ideological or class-based principal political cleavage, what has happened in 1992 is the coalescence of a presidential party and a coalition mildly in opposition to it, somewhat along the Mexican model. Whereas hitherto the main confrontation was between the Kravchuk government and the democratic opposition led by Rukh, Kravchuk has managed to coopt some of the leading Rukh activists in the name of national unity and this has provoked an irreconcilable three-way split in Rukh. Calling together a round table (but, significantly, not a meeting of equals, as in the East European model) of all major political parties, he

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created a new State Council within the presidency to which he appointed his former opponents.³⁴ This resulted in a major break in the Rukh movement, its leaders divided over the question of supporting the president, a break papered over by the election of three co-chairmen and a resolution of conditional support for Kravchuk. Thus Rukh has in effect become, in spite of itself, the presidential party; the Russian threat does not hurt Kravchuk's strategy.³⁵ In response to these developments, there occurred the formation of a centrist block of members of parliament which calls itself New Ukraine (ex-Democratic Platform of the CPU). While rejecting the label of opposition party, New Ukraine emphasizes economic reform; one of its initial leaders was the then deputy prime minister and minister of the economy, Volodymyr Lanovyi, since fired by Kravchuk.³⁶ It may be, therefore, that the principal political cleavage taking shape in Ukraine is over the key question of economic reform, with the conservative presidential party on one side and the somewhat more radical economic reformers on the other.

The good news is that there are as yet no political parties based primarily on ethnicity, because that would unravel whatever degree of national unity already exists. The bad news is that the growth of presidentialism indicates a very long-term transition to democracy, a transition that could very well become stuck in the sort of pseudo-democracy that has characterized Mexico: a dominant presidential party; controlled participation on the corporatist rather than pluralist model; highly centralized government; an authoritarian tradition; and corruption.³⁷

Decisions and Constitutions

A new constitution for Ukraine has been a long time in the making, and has as yet not been approved. A draft completed last summer apparently proposes combining presidentialism with parliamentarism, but giving the president greater powers.³⁸ As Linz has pointed out, this may tilt the game more in the direction of zero-sum. This may not be favorable for democracy,

although it may be easier to implement economic reforms which are going to be quite painful. But it would be a step in a more authoritarian direction. In general, Ukraine seems to be finding the French example attractive.³⁹ While Charles De Gaulle's Fifth Republic may have been appropriate for France where the fragmentation of the party system and the irresponsibility of the deputies of the National Assembly had gotten out of hand, it may be an inappropriate model for Ukraine where political parties, parliamentarism and public participation have hardly had a chance to begin to develop. The shoots of democracy, one might say, could be cut off prematurely. A step of a similar sort has already been taken with the

If Ukraine adopts the French presidentialist model, "The shoots of democracy . . . could be cut off prematurely."

institution of the president's viceroys in the *oblasti*, recalling the days of the *obkom* first secretaries as the "prefects" of central authority in the localities.⁴⁰ Here we see what is perhaps one of the imprints of old institutions mentioned by Przeworski, which can have an inhibiting effect on democratization. Another problem with the consequences of former Soviet institutions has to do with the armed forces. Officers rendered redundant by reductions in the establishment will be affected, and since many of them will be Russians this complicates the picture.⁴¹ A conscious decision to institutionalize political conflict has not yet been made in Ukraine, and a great deal of uncertainty about the rules of the game still prevails despite the common commitment to the rule of law and to the notion of a law-based state.⁴²

Habituation and Consolidation

One of the requirements for the consolidation of democracy is unity or consensus of the elites. It is difficult to tell, however, whether the rallying around the president in 1992 in Ukraine is to be interpreted as just such a consensus, or rather a placing on hold of the process of democratization. Even if it is a consensus, democratic development could become stalled if elite unity is not accompanied by mass participation; in which case, it can become merely what Burton *et al.* call "stable limited democracy," of which Mexico is one of their examples.⁴³ Perhaps it is too early to talk of consolidation altogether when the previous stages are so clearly short of completion. But a stuck transition could very well become a permanent feature.

In the meantime, since life does not wait for the timetable prescribed by political scientists' stages of development, and since economic performance is the critical determinant of the survival of democracies, the signs from this quarter were not at all encouraging. In the first quarter of 1992, Ukraine's gross national product declined by 18 percent from the year before; produced

national income, by 20 percent; and labor productivity, by 19 percent. As of April 1, official unemployment stood at 24,100, or three times higher than a year earlier. For the first quarter of 1992, the state budget revenues were 98.3 billion karbovantsi; expenditures, 106.6 billion. In the first three months of the year, consumer prices rose 29.2 percent; liberalization of prices in

Ukraine could become a case of "stable limited democracy," like Mexico.

January brought a three- to 10- fold increase in various goods.⁴⁴ The state budget was said to be unrealistic in anticipating revenues of 917.4 billion, and expenditures of 711.2 billion, for the entire year; taxes were expected to be unbearably high.⁴⁵ During the first half of 1992, wholesale prices rose by a factor of 23; salaries and wages, by seven; and manufacture of consumer goods was down by 17 percent.⁴⁶ Hyperinflation, as the Ukrainian press has pointed out, is a sure route to dictatorship.⁴⁷

An immediate practical task is for the government of Ukraine to implement an economic reform program. According to one of Kravchuk's critics, Volodymyr Grinev, however, "In Ukraine, reforms are practically not occurring."⁴⁸ While playing it safe in this manner, Kravchuk could be setting himself up for a revolutionary upset in the extreme case or for an electoral defeat at the least.

Last summer, a privatization program was promulgated, but its chances of success are uncertain. Insiders are favored, which would have an adverse effect on public support not only for the government and its economic program, but also for democracy. Given its already known defeats, the privatization scheme could fail altogether.⁴⁹

Conclusions

Of course, we should expect democracy in Ukraine. But until leaders come forward to play that game and challenge rather than rally behind the president, and until interests among the public and the people themselves become politicized, then it will be democracy in form and not in substance, the democracy of a developing country, not yet of a modern European state. It may turn out like the democracy of Mexico, or perhaps like that of Turkey, something short of fully consolidated democracy, some form of plebiscitarian authoritarianism. The proximity of Turkey, the experience of Ottoman rule (albeit limited) both direct and indirect, and the parallels between Ottoman and Soviet systems of rule, all suggest democracy with a definitely southern flavor for Ukraine: a centralized, overpowering state, with a large role in the national economy; a bureaucratic tradition; a political culture uneasy with the notion of opposition or dissent; a zero-sum notion of political competition; and a fragmented party system.⁵⁰ More than a few elements are in place for Ukraine to become a Christian variant of modern Turkey. In Ukraine, the

transition to democracy means the limitation of democracy: a state that has spent 75 years in a time warp cannot help but mimic other states which are today's less modern ones.

Notes

¹ Dankwart A. Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model," *Comparative Politics*, 2 (April 1970): 337-63; Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms on Eastern Europe and Latin America* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991); and Michael Burton, Richard Gunther, and John Higley, "Introduction: Elite Transformations and Democratic Regimes," and "Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe: An Overview," in *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe*, ed. Higley and Gunther (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 1-37, and 323-48, respectively.

² Rustow, p. 351.

³ Przeworski, p. 10. For a fuller elaboration, see *ibid.*, chap. 1.

⁴ "In sum, in a democracy all forces must struggle repeatedly for the realization of their interests. None are protected by virtue of their political positions. No one can wait to modify outcomes ex post; everyone must subject interests to competition and uncertainty." *Ibid.*, p. 14.

⁵ Burton, Gunther, and Higley, "Introduction," pp. 4-30.

⁶ I.M. Prybytkova, "Children of Various Nations . . ." *Filosofska i Sotsiologichna Dumka*, no. 4 (1990): pp. 77-83, translated in JPRA-UPA-91-001, 14 January 1991, pp. 31-37, at p. 32.

⁷ *Narodne Hospodarstvo Ukrainoskoi RSR u 1974 Rotsi: Starysechnyi Shehorichnyk* (Kiev: Vydavnytstvo "Tekhnika," 1975), p. 14; and *Soizt*, no. 32 (1990), pp. 12-13, translated in JPRS-UPA-066, 4 December 1990: pp. 16-23.

⁸ "O iazykakh v Ukrainoskoi SSR," *Pravda Ukrainy*, 3 November 1989; "Proderzhavnu prohramu rozvytku ukrainoskoi movy ta inshykh natsionalnykh mov v Ukrainoskii RSR na period do 2000 roku (Postanove Rady Ministriv Ukrainoskoi RSR vid 12 liutoho 1991 r., No. 41)," *Ukrainska Mova i Literaturu v Shkoli*, no. 6 (1991): p. 3; and "Derzhavna prohrama rozvytku ukrainoskoi movy ta inshykh natsionalnykh mov Ukrainoskoi RSR do 2000 roku (Skhvalena postanovuiu Rady Ministriv URSR vid 12 liutoho 1991 r., No. 41)," *ibid.*, pp. 4-17.

⁹ *Pravda Ukrainy*, 5 November 1991. For groups living in compact settlements, the declaration allowed their language to be used as well as the state or official language. It also assured citizens of their right to use the Russian language (but perhaps significantly did not guarantee it), and provided that in polyglot regions another acceptable language could be used alongside Ukrainian.

¹⁰ Roman Solchanyk, "Centrifugal Movements in Ukraine on the Eve of the Independence Referendum," *Report on the USSR*, 29 November 1991, pp. 8-13. My next three paragraphs are drawn from this source, in addition to any explicit references.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

¹² Public opinion polls conducted in September and October 1991, showed, however, that sentiment in favor of independence was growing. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

¹³ Bohdan Nahaylo, "The Birth of an Independent Ukraine," *Report on the USSR*, 13 December 1991, pp. 1-5.

¹⁴ The values of the correlation coefficient r^2 for the percentage of "yes" votes and of ethnic Ukrainians, by oblast, was 0.8009; for "no" and Russians, 0.7919, according to my calculations.

¹⁵ Stephen Foye, "CIS: Kiev and Moscow Clash over Armed Forces," *RFE/RL Research Report*, 17 January 1992, pp. 1-3.

¹⁶ Solchanyk, "Ukraine and Russia: The Politics of Independence," *ibid.*, 8 May 1992, pp. 13-16.

¹⁷ Solchanyk, "Ukrainian-Russian Summit at Dagomys," *ibid.*, 24 July 1992, pp. 36-9.

¹⁸ Solchanyk, "The Crimea Imbroglío: Kiev and Simferopol," *ibid.*, 21 August 1992, pp. 13-16.

¹⁹ Solchanyk, "The Crimean Imbroglío: Kiev and Moscow," *ibid.*, p. 9 October 1992, pp. 6-10.

²⁰ Jim Hoagland, "Yeltsin is Playing Gorbachev's Game," *Edmonton Journal*, 11 November 1992.

²¹ Jaroslav Martyniuk, "Ukrainian Independence and Territorial Integrity," *RFE/RL Research Report*, 27 March 1992, pp. 67-8.

²² Martyniuk, "Roundup: Attitudes Toward Ukraine's Borders," *ibid.*, 4 September 1992, pp. 66-7.

²³ Nahaylo, "Ukraine and Moldova: The View from Kiev," *ibid.*, 1 May 1992, pp. 39-45; and *idem*, "Moldovan Conflict Creates New Dilemmas for Ukraine," *ibid.*, 15 May 1992, pp. 1-8.

²⁴ *Ukraina Bahatopartina: Programni Dokumenty Novykh Partii* (Kiev: MF "Pamiatky Ukrainy," 1991), pp. 19-27.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, *passim*.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 13-25.

²⁷ Eberhard Schneider, "The New Political Forces in Russia, Ukraine, and Belorussia," *Report*

of the USSR, 13 December 1991, pp. 15-16.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 15.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid., pp. 14-17.

³¹ *Ukraina Bahatopartina*, p. 63.

³² Schneider, p. 15.

³³ Dominique Arel, "The Parliamentary Blocks in the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet: Who and What Do They Represent?" *Journal of Soviet Nationalities* 1 (Winter 1990-91): pp. 108-9.

³⁴ Solchanyk, "Ukraine: Political Reform and Political Change," *RFE/RL Research Report*, 22 May 1992, pp. 1-5. At the roundtable, "the participants were from Rukh, the Democratic Party of Ukraine, the Party of Democratic Rebirth of Ukraine, the Ukrainian Republican Party, both social democratic parties, the Greens, the two major trade union organizations, and other groups . . . With [one] exception, . . . the state councilors are prominent figures in Rukh who played important roles in the democratic opposition in Ukraine before the attempted coup." Ibid., pp. 3-4.

³⁵ Ibid., pp. 4-5.

³⁶ Alexi Sekarev, "Ukraine's Policy Structure," *ibid.*, 14 August 1992, pp. 60-3.

³⁷ Daniel C. Levy, "Mexico: Sustained Civilian Rule Without Democracy," in *Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy*, ed. Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990), pp. 135-73.

³⁸ Nahaylo, "Ukraine," *RFE/RL Research Reports*, 3 July 1992, p. 55.

³⁹ Oleksandr Yemets, "Nasha pravova systema shche duzhe nedoskonala," *Uriadovyi Kuryer*, 15 May 1992.

⁴⁰ Solchanyk, "Ukraine: Political Reform and Political Change," p. 3.

⁴¹ Foye, "The Ukrainian Armed Forces: Prospects and Problems," 26 June 1992, pp. 58-9.

⁴² There are doubts about the independence of the judiciary under the draft constitution now being considered for adoption. Ihor Hediukha, "Hezalezhnist sudovoi vlady: Mif chy realnist?" *Literaturna Ukraina*, 24 September 1992. On the rule of law in Ukraine, see Nahaylo, "Ukraine," pp. 50-6, and Oleksandr Yemets, "Nasha pravova systema shche duzhe nedoskonala," *Uriadovyi Kuryer*, 15 May 1992.

⁴³ Burton, Higley, and Gunther, "Introduction," pp. 5-6.

⁴⁴ Ukraine, Ministry of Statistics, *Sotsialno-Ekonomichne Stanovlyshche Ukrainy: u Pershomu Kvartali 1992 Roku* (n.p., n.d.), pp. 1-4.

⁴⁵ Oleksandr Barabash and Ostap Vasylyk, "Biudzet pid mikroskopom," *Holos Ukrainy*, 20 May 1992.

⁴⁶ Stanislav Romanenko, "Tsiny rivnovahy—de vony?" *Literaturna Ukraina*, 1 October 1992.

⁴⁷ Volodymyr Cheriak, "Hiperinflatsiia—shlach do dykatary: My ne obyrayemo dorozhu, nas vedat," *Holos Ukrainy*, 12 May 1992.

⁴⁸ *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, 1 November 1992.

⁴⁹ Simon Johnson and Santiago Eder, "Prospects for Privatization in Ukraine," *RFE/RL Research Reports*, 18 September 1992, pp. 46-9.

⁵⁰ Ergun Ozbudun, "Turkey: Crises, Interruptions, and Reequilibrations," in *Politics in Developing Countries*, pp. 175-217.