

From the Archives

Edited by Nikolai Zlobin

Installing Soviet Power in the Caucasus

The opening up of the Russian Archives of Modern and Contemporary History was one of the real results of the “Russian” August of 1991, especially for the many researchers who were denied any access to them previously. These documents, many of which were restricted to a small group of officials even when not categorized as “secret,” give us a chance to realize how important they are and how high their political value is.

I offer to your attention a set of documents from the personal collection of G.K. Orzhonikidze, one of the figures entrusted to carry out the Bolshevik mission in Transcaucasia, taken from the Russian Center for the Preservation and Study of Contemporary Historical Documents (RTsKhIDNI for its Russian initials—the former Central Party Archives, Fund 85). They deal with the 1920s and therefore correspond to one of the most burning eras of Soviet history. *Demokratizatsiya* has signed an agreement of cooperation with the RTsKhIDNI to provide to its readers previously unpublished materials of interest from the archives.

International conflicts following the disintegration of the USSR demonstrated not only the complex historical and ethnic issues of the Caucasus, but also once again showed that the use of force for the solution of social maladies is futile. History repeats itself. The downfall of the Russian empire in 1917 manifested the same ethnic conflicts. Possessed by the idea of world revolution, and perfectly contrary to their original program and to Marxist theory, the Soviets invaded the Caucasus in 1920 to impose in yet another region their power. It was then that the model of invading other states in the Soviet periphery emerged—invasions which sometimes were successful and sometimes not. This history of invasions began with the farce in the Caucasus in 1920 and ended with the Afghan tragedy of 1979.

Recall that the documents which we will present to your attention in this special new *Demokratizatsiya* section have never before been published. In the next issue we will bring to you personal letters from Stalin, including one to the future Party leader of Estonia on how to set up Soviet power in that republic. I once in awhile will interject to explain some hidden meanings. My interjections will be between brackets and in *italics* so as not to confuse the reader with the original materials. Also, the fund and source material references have been included in Russian to facilitate interested researchers.

ALEXANDER KVASHONKIN
Moscow State University

No. 212/111/3300
Moscow, to Lenin.

-Top Secret-

On April 26 our troops crossed the boundary of Azerbaijan knowing that at midnight April 28 the government was ordered to hand over power to the Communist Committee. Our armored trains were at Khachmaso at that time. After a brief meeting, the government handed power over to the Communists, which had formed the Revolutionary Committee of Azerbaijan and Baku, which consisted of Muslims only. The sovereign Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan was proclaimed. As the first act, the Revolutionary Committee asked Soviet Russia to render military assistance and suggested a military alliance with her. Our troops did not meet any resistance. After power was handed over, two hours later our armored trains reached Baku, consisting of an infantry battalion. The next day, our cavalry arrived. The Azerbaijan troops took our side completely. Turkish officers played a very important role; their detachment blocked the government's attempt to escape. The population's enthusiasm, especially the Muslims' and workers', could hardly be described. It could only be compared with that in October in St. Petersburg, the only difference being that there were no clashes here. Order is complete and overwhelming. Mines and fleets are untouched. Stocks of oil and other products are more than 300 million puds [one pud is 16 kg.], and monthly output is 20 million puds. For the time being, 1.5 million puds have been sent to Astrakhan. The first of May gave an outstanding picture in Baku. Tens of thousands of workers and almost the whole population were in the streets. Our army evoked a wave of enthusiasm. In the evening, a tremendous greeting by the workers was held. They greeted us individually, as well as the Russian Army, Russians and Soviets. A tremendous impression was produced by the awarding of the Order of the Red Banner to an Azerbaijani commissar of the Navy and a Turkish Communist who had prevented the government's attempt to escape, as well as by the presentation of the 11th Army Banner to the workers of Baku. The information on our ultimatum to the Armenian government to cease its warfare in Azerbaijan erupted the audience. Each word in the name of Russia evoked enthusiasm. The organization of power is proceeding. Political and military aspects are provided, and we shall cope with that in Azerbaijan in the future too. A rather serious matter is the economy--there is no [word omitted]. It is necessary to send them immediately. otherwise our consolidation is impossible. The same which happened to Azerbaijan will happen to Georgia soon. Don't have any talks with Georgia. Your greetings to Azerbaijan are wanted as is your general recognition of it. We shall carry out economic and military amalgamation with Soviet Russia. Experience demands that we should be given power for the whole Caucasus and further. Give that by radio or send someone immediately. Don't give any powers to Narimanov.

Orzhonikidze, Kirov
Deciphered at the Secretary Board
of the Deputy Chairman of the Republic
Military Soviet [council]

[continued from previous page]

A. Serebrennikov

May 4, 1920

Sent to Comrade Lenin 4/U

[Ф.85, оп.13, д.12, лл.1,1 об.,
2,2 об., 3,3 об., 4,5,6,7,8]

Telegram to Lenin and Stalin
May 8, 1920 (from Baku)

I regard Comrade Kirov as the best candidate, the second candidate is Mdivani. The chairman of the Control Commission is Khavtaradze. The members of the Commission are Dumbadze and Tsintsadze. Lenin's telegram has produced tremendous impression. Today the Azerbaijani Army has been placed under our command in the sphere of organization, administration and mission. There is a deficit of officers for the Sovnarkhoz [Council of People's Economy]. I have just received a telegram from Vladikavkaz with some abstracts from the letter of Nazaretyan, the secretary of the area Committee:

"On the second of May an attempt to capture power in Tiflis [Tbilisi] took place but failed. It was caused by the discontent of the soldiers refusing to go to the front. On our side the losses were one killed, two wounded, three arrested. The general-governor Sulakvelidze last night shot them. Sandro Makharadze, the one heading the operation, escaped. The government is going to introduce marshal law today. Work is rather difficult now, but the spirit of the masses and of the detachments is rising now. A coup is expected. In Batum, the British command is compromising. The workers of Batum support us. On April 30, three fellows killed General Lyakhov. Gubeli was arrested for that, but the British command freed him at the insistence of the workers and on May 1 he was delivered directly from prison to the meeting and the next day he came to us.

Inform the center about that. In Abkhazia the attack is expected by May 10. The directions will be from north Svanetia and Gory, which should disperse their forces. Mikha Tskhakaya is under arrest again in Kutais. All Tiflis prisoners have been transferred to Kutais. On May 2 our speakers attracted large audiences, 4 trucks decorated with slogans and posters went to Golovinsky. They were attacked by special detachments and militia. 55 men were beaten within an inch of their lives, and then arrested. There is official information that 12 Communists were shot. Through the whole of Armenia the mood is high and ceremonial in connection with the declaration of Soviet power in Baku. In Yerevan and Alexandropol the [word illegible] buildings were destroyed. The leaders' portraits were smashed and burnt."

Orzhonikidze

[Ф.85, оп.13, д.17, л.2,3]

To Moscow, the Kremlin
Attn: Lenin, Stalin
Baku 31/U-20, 8 PM.

On the night of May 25-26 the Musavatists organized a mutiny in Elisavetpol. The Azerbaijani troops supported the mutineers. At the same time our troops were attacked in some places in the region. After six days of persistent fighting the mutiny was suppressed in the cruelest way, and we have occupied the city. I hope we shall cope with the situation in the future.

Orzhonikidze
31/5 23-10 Ret. 183
Chistyakov

[ф.85, оп.13, д.28, лл.1-2]

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To Baku
Attn: Orzhonikidze

1. In response to No. 556 I inform you of Lenin's answer: "the quickest, most resolute and drastic measures are wanted to disarm the bourgeoisie and the peasants completely, as well as suspicious elements. Inform of what is being done and of the results."
2. The 18th division and the 28th infantry division are staying subordinated by Kavfront [*the Caucasian front*]. That gives us all the opportunities to establish firm order in the Caucasus after having disarmed the local population.
3. Inform of the relations with the Vladikavkaz road, what is being done to render it all-round assistance.

[Leon] Trotsky

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To V.I. Lenin
Baku, June 5, 1920

To No. 639 I inform you that the whole Azerbaijan is divided into division sections and disarmament is being carried out. After the mutiny in Gandzhinsky, which was very cruelly suppressed, delegations from many villages came expressing their willingness to hand in their arms. Despite the difficulties, I'll cope with the task. The commander-in-chief of the 11th Army, Livandovsky, personally directs all the operations.

Orzhonikidze

[ф.85, оп.13, д.33, л.3.]

Suicide in the Early Red Army

The following compilation of documents do not belong in the category of “light” reading. They represent statistics of suicide in the Red Army—a jealously guarded secret during the Soviet period. The introduction of these documents into the world of scholarship is important since they are quite encompassing: several tables with comments, mass data and a relatively long period (1.5 years) are used. It is interesting that the Military Procuracy surfaced the need to gather data on the suicide rates as a symptom of the moral state in the Red Army in December of 1924, the first year without Vladimir Lenin.

The enclosed letter addressed to G. K. Orzhonikidze (member of the Revolutionary Military Council) shows that, first, the figures which follow are lower than the actual rates since the survey does not include the information on the Navy and the OGPU forces, and, second, that the same problem was studied by the Political Department. Thus, it is possible to conclude that the problem was indeed a burning one. Certainly, the Army did not reflect the situation in the whole country, but it was a force spread out through the various republics and regions.

One of the merits of the survey is the large quantity of comparative data of the suicide rate per 10,000 men in 1924-25, and the rates in the tsarist army in 1903, 1905, 1906, 1907, 1908 and 1912. The suicide rate was gradually growing after the revolution in 1905 and reached its peak in 1912, a manifestation of the growing psychological crisis in the Army due to the lengthy and intensifying political instability. It is logical to see a higher suicide rate in 1924-25 due to the effects of rebuilding the country after two devastating wars (World War I and the Civil War) and three years of New Economic Policy (NEP) therapy. Millions of military men and women could not adjust to the new situation. This is shown by the tables presented below which show the data of the first half of 1925-26 (October to March), where the suicide rate was visibly growing. This was so because the Army was going through major reductions at the time.

Recall that my personal notes will be within brackets and in italics. A careful effort was made to translate this material without losing its original essence, which is why the text was not polished and the figures were not corroborated for statistical accuracy, only copied as found in the original Russian archival documents.

ALEXANDER KVASHONKIN
Moscow State University

-Confidential Memo-

USSR

Procurator of the USSR
Supreme CourtTo the Procurator
of the Red Army2/6 December 1924
No. 0931010
Moscow
Spririnonyevskaya St. #30Copy to the Revolutionary
Military Soviet [Council]
member c. [comrade] Orzhonikidze

Suicides as a symptomatic phenomenon reflecting the moral state of the Red Army.

The Central Office of the Military Procurator has not yet obtained, however, material staff to throw light on suicides regarding their quantity and reasons. The majority of locations have presented brief reports and some of them have avoided the topic.

Taking into consideration the need to study the matter and for the purposes of generalizing the information, the Office of the Military Procurator suggests carrying on statistical analyses of the data according to the following scheme:

1) Total of suicides and attempts for the period under review per each month.

2) The number of suicides in detachments, units and establishments. It may be divided according to arms and branches, the more important is to focus on the units' garrisons under extreme service conditions as regards their mission assigned or their location and where the suicide rate is the highest (guards, frontier guards, etc.).

3) The distribution of cases according to the service position:

- a/ the command
 - political instructors
 - administrative service
 - general officers
 - field officers
 - company officers
 - non-commissioned officers
- b/ students
- c/ privates

4) Party affiliation: a/ members of the Communist Party, b/ candidates, c/ non-Party.

5) Age: a/ younger than 20, b/ 20-25, c/ 25-30, d/ 30-40, e/ over 40.

6) Family situation: a/ married, b/ single.

It is necessary to indicate absolute figures and the percentage (%) of the total suicide rate and percentage of suicides based on the average size of some unit or Army group.

Small groups are not taken.

If you wish, you may, alongside with the main reports, include statistical tables, diagrams, etc., if they promote a careful study of the problem. Special attention should be paid to the motives of suicide and their correct estimation. Suicide is a phenomenon of everyday life, and the studies of the motives should help to open up the underlying reasons for this phenomenon in the environment of a serviceman.

The main reasons for suicide are outward reasons. Only a small number of suicides are caused by inward motives such as the personality of the victim, his state or qualities (mental disease, chronic ailment, serious fatal illness).

Since a serviceman's life consists of two sides, it seems necessary to divide the main group of motives into two sections:

Service Life

- a/ Lack of perspectives
- b/ Degradation and transfer to reserve
- c/ Service burden
- d/ Fear of punishment
- e/ Service troubles

Out-of-Service Life

- a/ Material difficulties
- b/ Ideological discord in the family
- c/ Relations with fellow comrades
- d/ Loneliness
- e/ Lack of distinct world outlook
- f/ Disappointment in the perspectives of the world revolution and expectations lost connected with an early establishment of socialism

Statistics should be supplied with description of the main acts of the most striking examples, which would permit us to generalize the motives.

All the information should be included into the section on the moral and political state of the Army. The Procuracy is obliged to undertake certain measures through political bodies after studying the motives. Therefore it is necessary to give the information about all the general arrangements in the section of the report devoted to general supervision.

The current directions should be taken into consideration in the process of report-making for the current year with the data on the total suicide rate by January 1 and complete data on the rate for the year under review up to December 1. Future statistics should be calculated every third of a year.

The Military Procurator
of the USSR Supreme Court (Kuzmin)
Official: Secretary (Marshak)

Suicide in the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army
For 1924-25

The report on suicides in the Red Army for 1924-25 is made on the basis of brief reports on extraordinary accidents submitted under the Order of the Revolutionary Military Soviet of the Republic No. 557 of 1924.

The order did not introduce any common report form and each unit has submitted the document in the form it wishes, without indicating many cases of tremendous importance for studying the phenomenon, giving only the information on quantity. Thus, 54 reports of 100 do not contain the motive, 89 do not show Party affiliation and so on.

The lack of a common report form and insufficient information make statistical analysis difficult and restrictive. Nevertheless, the current report gives some characteristics of the phenomenon regarding its distribution through units, military districts and so on.

The total of suicides in the Red Army according to the reports on extraordinary accidents is 384; 273 of which were fatal, and 111 of which were unsuccessful attempts.

The cases are distributed in military districts in absolute figures and the % of the total is in the following way [see key to abbreviations at the end of the article]:

	MMD	LMD	UMD	WMD	NCMD	VMD	SMD	CRBA	T/fr.	Total
Suic.	54	35	68	41	17	12	13	18	15	273
	19.44	12.45	24.91	15.72	6.24	4.39	4.47	6.59	5.49	100%
Att.	13	24	23	17	13	5	5	9	2	111
	11.71	21.62	20.72	15.31	11.71	4.50	4.50	3.12	1.81	100%
Total	67	59	91	58	30	17	18	27	17	384
	17.52	15.17	23.77	15.12	7.84	4.42	4.69	7.05	4.43	100%

[РЦХИДНИ, ф.85, оп.22, д.49, л.3]

The rate is highest in the UMD, with 23.77%. The second is in the MMD with 17.52%. Then follows the LMD with 15.17%. The rate is lowest in the Volga Military District, with 4.4%.

If we take the proportion of suicides regarding the total numeric strength of the military district we see the following picture:

Figures are for every 10,000 men in the district

	MMD	LMD	UMD	WMD	NCMD	VMD	SMD	CRBA	T/fr.	Total
Suic.	6.3	5.5	6.4	6.6	5.3	5.5	2.6	4.1	3.1	5.1
Att.	1.5	3.7	2.2	2.7	4.1	2.3	0.2	2.4	0.4	2.1
Total	8.07	9.21	8.24	9.35	9.37	6.92	3.57	7.1	0.67	7.2

The rate is highest in the NCMD with 9.37 per each 10,000 men and the lowest is in the SMD with 3.57. The average is 7.2 suicides per each 10,000 servicemen. The distribution of cases in absolute figures per month is given below:

	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	Jun.	Jul.	Aug.	Sep.
Suic.	24	14	22	27	29	30	26	16	29	29	13	14
Att.	4	9	13	11	17	11	7	5	10	10	9	5
Total	28	23	35	38	46	41	33	21	39	39	22	19

[РЦХИДНИ, ф.85, п.22, д.49, л.3]

The number of suicides in different branches in absolute figures and in percentage of the total rate is as follows:

		If.	Cav.	Art.	Tch.	AF	TrF.	Gua.	Sup.	H.Q.	H.S.	N.I.	Total
Com.	Abs.	100	28	33	30	6	3	8	7	32	23	3	273
Suic.	%	36.6	10.3	12.2	10.9	2.2	1.1	2.9	2.6	11.7	8.4	1.1	100%
Att.	Abs.	45	16	14	10	1	2	7	2	6	8	-	111
	%	40.5	14.4	12.6	9.0	0.9	1.8	6.3	1.8	5.4	7.1	-	100%
Total	Abs.	145	44	47	40	7	5	15	9	38	31	3	384
	%	37.8	11.4	12.2	10.4	1.8	1.4	3.9	2.4	9.8	8.1	0.8	100%

[РЦХИДНИ, ф.85, оп.22, д.49, л.4]

The rate is highest in the infantry; the lowest in territorial formations.

The number of suicides relative to the total strength of each branch is a little bit different, that is per each 10,000 men there were:

	If.	Cav.	Art.	Tch.	AF	TrF.	Gua.	Sup.	H.Q.	H.S.
Suic.	5.7	4.5	5.4	4.6	8.6	0.4	2.1	1.8	8.0	7.6
Att.	2.6	2.5	2.3	1.5	1.4	0.3	1.8	0.5	1.5	2.7
Total	8.3	6.9	7.7	6.1	10.0	0.7	3.9	2.3	9.5	10.3

These figures mean that the highest rate is among the high-school students, then the Air Force follows, the headquarters are on the third place, institutions and establishments

follow, the infantry is the fourth, the lowest is the rate in the territorial formations.

The distribution of cases according to Party affiliation based on the information we have does not show the character of the phenomenon, since in the majority of cases there are no indications of Party affiliation.

By components, the suicide rate in absolute figures and in percentage is:

		Commanders			Adm. Pol.	NCO		M.V.	CHS	Civ.	Rcr.	N.I.	Total
		Gr.	F.C.	Co.		J.A.	Pvt.						
Suic.	Abs.	-	5	62	24	20	134	6	13	5	3	1	273
	%	-	1.81	23.07	8.66	7.36	49.06	2.16	4.66	1.81	1.07	0.34	100%
Att.	Abs.	2	-	16	6	5	72	4	5	1	-	-	111
	%	1.80	-	14.4	5.40	4.50	6.49	3.60	4.50	0.90	-	-	100%
Total	Abs.	2	5	78	30	25	206	10	18	6	3	1	384
	%	0.5	1.4	20.3	7.8	6.5	53.6	2.6	4.6	1.6	0.8	0.3	100%

As we can see, more than half of the cases (53.6%) refer to the privates and non-commissioned officers together with the junior administrative services; about 1/4 (22.4%) to the company officers (with 20.3% referring to the commanders) and the remaining 24.2% to the others.

The number of suicides relating to the strength of each group are:

Figures for each 10,000 servicemen

	Commanders			Adm. Pol.	NCO	M.V.	CHS	Civ.	
	Gr.	F.C.	Co.						
	0.9	0.3	1.3	0.6	0.5	0.2	0.4	0.3	0.1

[РЦХИДНИ, ф.85, п.22, д.49, л.40б]

So, the rate is highest among the company officers.

Passing to the motives, it is necessary to note that the rate of suicides with an unknown motive is rather high, 52.09%, which diminishes the value of conclusions.

The distribution of suicides according to their reasons in % is as follows:

	Suic. Comm.	Att.	Total
Degrading to transfer to reserve	1.1	2.7	1.56

Lack of perspectives	1.5	0.9	1.3
Service burden	1.1	3.6	1.82
Fear of Punishment	10.3	6.3	9.11
Service troubles	1.9	2.7	2.09
Material difficulties	2.9	1.8	2.6
Ideological discord in the family	2.9	9.0	4.68
Loneliness	1.1	0.9	1.05
Lack of distinct world outlook	2.0	1.8	2.60
Disappointment in the perspectives of the world revolution and expectations lost connected with an early establishment of socialism	0.7	0.9	0.78
Mental diseases	3.7	3.6	3.65
Physical suffering, illness	8.1	9.0	8.59
Romantic motive	6.6	11.8	8.08
No indication	54.9	45.0	52.09
Total	100%	100%	100%

As is seen from the table, the fear of punishment is the most serious motive leading to suicide (9.11%), the second is physical suffering and illness (8.59%), the third place belongs to so-called romantic reasons (8.08%).

Taking the distribution of cases caused by each group of motives in each component it is necessary to note that among generals and field officers the rate is rather low, the reasons are not indicated for the bulk of the cases (60-100%) that is why it is difficult to give any characteristic of the phenomenon regarding those groups of servicemen.

More representative are the data referring to company officers, administrative services and non-commissioned officers and other ranks. Therefore the distribution of suicides according to their motives is further given for these components only.

The distribution of suicides among the company officers with the total 78 cases is given in the table below:

	Suic. Comm.	Att.	Total
Service burden	3.22	-	2.56
Fear of Punishment	14.53	-	11.53
Service troubles	1.61	-	1.28
Material difficulties	1.61	6.25	2.56
Ideological discord in the family	8.22	25.0	7.69
Loneliness	1.61	-	1.28
Lack of distinct world outlook	3.22	6.25	5.12
Mental diseases	3.22	-	2.56
Physical suffering, illness	4.84	6.25	5.12
Romantic motive	12.92	12.5	12.84
No indication	50.0	43.75	48.74
Total	100%	100%	100%

Romantic reasons give the highest rate of suicide (12.84%), the second being fear of punishment (11.53%), the third place is occupied by ideological discord in the family (7.69%), then a rather high percentage is brought about by physical suffering and illnesses (5.2%).

The following table shows the suicide rates among the administrative services:

	Suic. Comm.	Att.	Total
Service burden	-	16.67	3.34
Fear of Punishment	4.163	-	3.34
Material difficulties	20.83	16.67	20.0
Ideological discord in the family	4.16	-	3.34
Lack of distinct world outlook	8.34	16.66	10.0
Mental diseases	8.34	-	6.66
Physical suffering, illness	8.34	-	6.66
No indication	41.67	50.0	43.32
Total	100%	100%	100%

Fear of punishment as the motive of suicide is the first (20%), followed by the lack of distinct world outlook (10%), then comes mental diseases and physical suffering (6.66% each).

At last, 206 cases among the non-commissioned officers and other ranks, as well as junior administrative services are as follows:

	Suic. Comm.	Att.	Total
Degrading to transfer to reserve	1.49	1.38	1.46
Lack of perspectives	1.49	1.38	1.46
Service burden	-	2.78	0.97
Fear of Punishment	8.97	8.34	8.74
Service troubles	2.23	2.78	2.42
Material difficulties	2.23	1.38	1.94
Ideological discord in the family	3.78	5.56	4.37
Loneliness	0.76	1.38	0.97
Lack of distinct world outlook	2.98	-	1.94
Disappointment in the perspectives of the world revolution and expectations lost connected with an early establishment of socialism	1.49	-	0.97
Mental diseases	2.23	5.56	8.39
Physical suffering, illness	8.21	9.72	8.74
Romantic motive	5.22	12.5	7.78
No indication	58.97	47.24	54.85
Total	100%	100%	100%

Tied in first place are fear of punishment and physical suffering (8.74%), followed by romantic reasons (7.78%). Comparing the data of the tables given above we see that for all the groups of the servicemen the fear of punishment is the main motive. Romantic reasons causes the majority of suicides among the company officers. For the administrative services, the lack of distinct world outlook is the most serious motive. Physical illnesses and sufferings play a considerable role for all the groups but especially for non-commissioned officers and other ranks. Then for administrative services and company officers.

It is possible to compare the suicide rate of the old army with the Red Army only regarding the total of suicides since there is no information on the distribution of cases through the different branches and according to the motives:

Suicide in the tsarist army and in the Red Army
(absolute figures)

	Old Army						Red Army
	1903	1905	1906	1907	1908	1912	1924/25
Suic.	237	283	383	337	130	580	273
Att.	70	66	79	89	363	181	111
Total	307	349	462	426	493	761	384

Now calculating the data referring to the numbers of suicides per 10,000 servicemen we obtain the following table:

Figures for each 10,000 men in the:

	Old Army						Red Army
	1903	1905	1906	1907	1908	1912	1924/25
Suic.	2.1	3.9	2.9	2.6	3.2	4.4	5.1
Att.	0.6	0.9	0.6	0.7	0.9	1.4	2.1
Total	2.7	4.8	3.5	3.3	4.1	5.8	7.2

Paying no attention to the relative rate of suicides in 1905 because in calculation the army was taken without the units engaged in the Far East, and comparing the data we see that before the Russo-Japanese War, the relative number of suicides was lower than after it. After this war, the relative number

of suicides was growing and from 3.5 in 1906 they reached 5.8 per each 10,000 servicemen in 1912. However, comparing the latter with the relative number of suicides in the Red Army in 1924/25 we see that it is 1.4 more per each 10,000.

Such increase of suicides in the Red Army in comparison with the tsarist army is connected with the consequences of the Imperialist War and then the Civil War, and the ensuing famines.

Made by the Department of Military Legislature and Statistics of the Head Department of the Red Army.

[РЦХИДНИ, ф.85, оп.22, д.49, л.6/60б]

Suicides in the Red Army by method
For the first half of 1925/26 (October-March)

	Suic.	Att.	Tot.
Shooting	97	45	142
Hanging	17	19	36
Cutting	2	14	16
Poison	5	6	11
Drowning	2	-	2
Falling	-	2	2
Other	-	1	1
No ind.	22	12	34
Total	145	99	244

[РЦХИДНИ, ф.85, оп.22, д.49, л.7]

Suicides in the Red Army
1924-25 (October-March)

Branches	Absolute Figures			Per 10,000 of each branch		
	Suic.	Att.	Total	Suic.	Att.	Total
Infantry	64	36	100	3.65	2.06	5.72
Cavalry	14	7	21	2.23	1.12	3.34
Artillery	12	7	19	1.96	1.14	3.11
Signals	2	3	5	0.76	1.15	1.92
Railway	5	5	10	3.57	3.57	7.14
Engineers	6	2	8	2.72	0.31	3.63
Air Force	1	3	4	1.42	4.28	5.85
Navy	2	5	7	0.83	2.08	2.91
Local infantry	6	2	8	2.31	0.77	3.08
High Schools	16	15	31	2.85	2.67	5.53
Headquarter Establishments	13	13	26	1.64	1.64	3.29
Total for Red Army	145	99	244	2.6	1.79	4.40

Abbreviations:

Ab.f. - Absolute figures
Adm. - Administrative
AF - Air Force
Art. - Artillery
Att. - Attempts
CHS - changing components of high schools (students)
Cav. - Cavalry
Civ. - Civilian
Co. - Company
Com. suic. - Suicide successfully committed
CRBA - Caucasus Red Banner Army
Eng. - Engineers
Est. - Establishments
Fld. - Field
Grl. - General
Gua. - Guard
H.Q. - Headquarters establishment
H.S. - High schools
If. - Infantry
J.A. - Junior administrative
LMD - Leningrad Military District
M.V. - Medical and veterinary
MMD - Moscow Military District
NCMD - North Caucasus Military District
N.I. - No indications
NCO - Non-commissioned officers
Pol. - Political
Pvt. - Private
Recr. - Recruits
Sig. - Signals
SMD - Siberian Military District
Suic. - Suicide
Sup. - Support services
T/fr. - Turkestan Front
Tch. - Technical service
TrF. - Territorial formation
UMD - Ukrainian Military District
VMD - Volga Military District
WMD - Western Military District