

# The Tyranny of Small Differences: The Relationship between Ethnic Diversity and Democracy in the Former Socialist Bloc

SCOTT RADNITZ

**W**hen Communism fell, each newly liberated state embarked on a path of creating a new regime from existing institutions. The successor states shared a common history of conquest and Russification (in the case of the former Soviet Union) and several generations as Soviet satellites (in the case of Eastern Europe). They also carried pre-existing legacies shaped by geography and demography which, unlike the similar experience of Communist ideology and administration, varied dramatically from country to country. Did these legacies constrain actors in crafting new institutions, condemning some to authoritarianism and backwardness while providing others with the raw materials for success? Or was this inheritance merely a minor stumbling block easily overcome by actors who were then able to shape institutions as they pleased?<sup>1</sup> Ethnic diversity, although obviously not the only product of historical legacy, is nonetheless thought to be a major factor in determining a variety of outcomes in political science, including economic growth, good governance, public goods distribution, and stability, in addition to democracy.<sup>2</sup> The twenty-eight states of the former socialist bloc, whose regimes range from robust and consolidated democracy to unbridled authoritarianism, provide a strong test of the relationship between ethnic demography and democracy because they were all subject to the same political regime and all underwent regime change at the same time.

To test this proposition, I first lay out several theories pertaining to the problems of consolidating democracy in plural societies, identifying three distinct mechanisms in the literature—violence, majority domination, and trust—through which ethnicity is thought to directly influence democratization. Next, I test each mechanism using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to examine the relationships between ethnic pluralism, level of democracy, and the intervening determinants of democracy. Overall, the results offer little evidence that ethnic plural-

---

Scott Radnitz is a PhD candidate in political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is currently working on his dissertation addressing the interaction of networks, mobilization, and the state in Central Asia.

ism influences democracy. Finally, several case studies illustrate the relative unimportance of demography in determining the level of democratic consolidation and identify alternative explanations for the range of outcomes.

Although a test of the relationship between ethnic pluralism and democracy can be conducted for many regions of the world, there are several reasons to limit this study to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (FSU). First, whereas using a data set composed of different regions of the world would pose a challenge in controlling for the many factors that differ between regions, the shared legacy of Soviet rule in the socialist bloc automatically controls for historical factors and allows for the isolation of structural factors inherent in a polity, such as ethnic fractionalization, wealth, and geography. Although the states of Eastern Europe and the FSU had experienced varying levels of democracy and statehood over their histories, for the most part, the Soviet Union prevented internal conflict and the development of independent institutions and civil society throughout its empire. Between 1989 and 1992, each of the twenty-eight countries in the region began implementing independent policies from the Soviet Union for the first time in generations (with the partial exception of Yugoslavia and Albania, which had started earlier), permitting focused comparison of the natural constraints inherited by political actors and their effect on the choices made in the postindependence period.

Second, using countries that as of eleven years ago all exhibited a common value on the dependent variable (regime type) reduces the chances for endogeneity, which is important in interpreting the results of a statistical analysis. Since I am testing the *effect* of ethnic diversity on democratic consolidation, I can better establish causality if the former is exogenous to the latter in the data set. The data set used in this analysis is advantageous in this regard because it consists of polities that all possessed a single regime type and have only been democratizing for a short time, providing less of a risk for reverse causality. By contrast, if testing countries with a wide variety of regime types over a longer period of political development, there are more opportunities for state policies to influence ethnic group composition.<sup>3</sup> Of course in Eastern Europe since 1990, there have been several large population transfers altering the demographic balance (such as in Yugoslavia and Nagorno-Karabakh), but because these events happened early on in the independence period, when the variation in democratization had not yet emerged, these events cannot be explained by level of democratic consolidation.

Third, the socialist bloc offers wide variation on the independent variable—ethnic pluralism—constituting a virtual laboratory for studies of ethnic diversity. A growing number of scholars are interested in the effects of ethnic diversity on a variety of outcomes, including economic growth, conflict, effective government, and inequality, in addition to democracy, and few have tested these theories in the socialist bloc. Finally, a large body of literature is dedicated to explaining the baffling variation in regime development in the socialist bloc. Scholars have tested the effects of culture, religion, elite structure, post-independence elections, economic potential, geography, and center-regional bargaining in this endeavor, but none have examined the effects of ethnic pluralism in depth.<sup>4</sup> This

article combines a variable of general interest to political scientists with specialized knowledge of the region.

### Theories of Subcultural Pluralism and Democracy

John Stuart Mill wrote that it “is in general a necessary condition of free institutions that the boundaries of governments should coincide in the main with those of nationalities.”<sup>5</sup> This assumption, underlying the norm of the nation-state that developed in the nineteenth century, was part and parcel of the age of nationalism, yet it leaves its legacy to contemporary political theory. In more recent times, empirical work on ethnicity and democracy has led to a more nuanced version of the relationship than in Mill’s time. Whereas Mill assumed that the *social fact* of ethnic pluralism was sufficient to prevent workable democracy, current theories understand only *politically relevant* ethnic cleavages to be a hindrance to democracy. Therefore, only politically relevant ethnic categories will be tested in the following section.

A distillation of the literature on ethnic politics reveals three main mechanisms for why politically relevant ethnic cleavages hinder democratic consolidation—increased risk of violence, domination of the political system by the majority ethnic group, and low levels of trust. Robert Dahl’s *Polyarchy* was one of the first works to systematically spell out the causal link between ethnic pluralism and the difficulty in sustaining a democracy. Dahl argued that it is inherently difficult for different ethnic groups to make the compromises necessary for a stable democracy because ethnicity is indivisible. He states:

Presumably because an ethnic or religious identity is incorporated so early and so deeply into one’s personality, conflicts among ethnic or religious subcultures are specially fraught with danger, particularly if they are also tied to region. Because conflicts among ethnic and religious subcultures are so easily seen as threats to one’s fundamental self, opponents are readily transformed into a malign and inhuman “they”, whose menace stimulates and justifies the violence and savagery that have been the common response of in-group to out-group of all mankind.<sup>6</sup>

Notably, Dahl does not explicitly spell out the final intervening variable that causes democracy to break down, offering only that pluralism “places a dangerous strain on the tolerance and mutual security required for a system of public contestation. . . .”<sup>7</sup> Dahl’s theory contains references to all three of the above mechanisms, positing that ethnic divisions lead to violence, abuse of power by the majority, and lack of trust between groups.

Donald Horowitz makes a similarly encompassing argument in *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. He proposes a psychological theory in which the source of ethnic conflict is competition for status. He takes as a given the existence of several discrete groups inhabiting the same state, differentially constituted by colonial influences but similar enough (and in close enough proximity) to make group comparisons frequent. Due to this particular arrangement, a group tends to see itself as the in-group and another as an out-group, along with the negative feelings inherent in this sociological relationship. The result is the perception on both sides of a special type of zero-sum game, in which the competition is over self-

worth rather than material goods. As each side asserts its superiority, it also fears (or envies) the other, and the stage is set for conflict. The prospects for a workable democracy may be weakened by the majority group's abuse of power, or even the minority group's *fear* of abuse, premised on the assumption that "political power held by members of one community would be used for the exclusive benefit of that community or to the detriment of other communities."<sup>8</sup>

In *The Deadly Ethnic Riot*, Horowitz elaborates on his earlier theory to explain the onset of violence between ethnic groups. Violence results because a minority group, fearing domination, preemptively attacks another group, viewing a precipitating event as a confirmation of the target group's threat to the rioting group, layered on top of a festering hatred that precludes a rational appraisal of the other side's intentions.<sup>9</sup> In these works, once again, all three proposed mechanisms—violence, potential tyranny of the majority, and lack of cooperation—conspire to prevent a workable democracy.

Ted Gurr, in *Minorities at Risk*, argues only for the first of the three explanations by which pluralism prevents democracy. He does not address the functioning of democracy per se, but instead how demographic pluralism within a polity leads to violence or secession, which are negatively associated with democracy. Gurr focuses on "politicized communal groups" in a state, which "experience economic or political discrimination, and . . . have taken political action in support of collective interests."<sup>10</sup> The theory is specifically focused on conflicts between communal groups and the state, not conflicts among rival groups, and problems arise not because groups vie with each other for power, but because groups rebel against the state. Disadvantaged groups can display discontent toward the state through nonviolent protest, violent protest, or rebellion. Although the latter two options are clearly detrimental for the sustenance of democracy by inviting more intensive use of the government's coercive apparatus (and, in the extreme, authoritarianism), nonviolent protest is also dangerous because it may represent a slippery slope. "When tracing minorities over time, we have repeatedly observed that violent political action follows a period of nonviolent activity that was either ignored or dealt with repressively. Political action by minorities is a continuum; understanding its violent manifestations requires analysis of its nonviolent origins."<sup>11</sup> The perils associated with the expression of ethnic grievances range from delegative democracy, as repression becomes the norm, to total democratic breakdown, as the system becomes unable to cope with the demands placed upon it.<sup>12</sup>

Arend Lijphart, in *Democracy in Plural Societies*, advances the second mechanism for pluralism leading to weak democracy or democratic breakdown: the tendency of a majority communal group to distribute resources along ethnic lines or simply tyrannize the minority. Although Lijphart is fundamentally optimistic regarding the prospect for democracy in plural societies, he begins with the assumption that there *is* a danger if plural societies are left to their own devices. This necessitates an institutional solution—consociationalism. Lijphart, like others, assumes that group differences are already socially salient and prone to being politicized. "Segmental cleavages may be of a religious, ideological, linguistic,

regional, cultural, racial, or ethnic nature. A further characteristic . . . is that political parties, interest groups, media of communication, schools, and voluntary associations tend to be organized along lines of segmental cleavages."<sup>13</sup> These segmental cleavages produce a zero-sum game "with clearly separate and potentially hostile population segments, [in which] virtually all decisions are perceived as entailing high stakes, and strict majority rule places a strain on the unity and peace of the system."<sup>14</sup> The majority will be tempted to change the electoral rules in its favor. This and other abuses of the system can lead to a backlash by the minority group, resulting in a spiral of conflict, or even systemic breakdown. Only consociationalism can remedy the tendency toward majority domination inherent in plural societies.


Robert Putnam's mechanism—low levels of inter-group trust—does not explain the breakdown of democracy, but does explain its low performance. A functional democracy requires that its citizens not only accept a social contract, but also cooperate to maintain democratic institutions. For cooperation

---

***"To make democracy work in a polity, cooperation must also take place across groups."***

to occur, people must be able to overcome an  $n$ -person prisoner's dilemma, in which it is individually rational to defect in any transaction. Cooperation is assumed in communal groups, because the threat of sanction within the group makes it too costly to defect. "In a small, highly personalized community . . . the threat of ostracism from the socioeconomic system is a powerful, credible sanction."<sup>15</sup> However, to make democracy work in a polity, cooperation must also take place *across* groups. Putnam's solution is the development of horizontally based civic networks (clubs, organizations, unions) that extend across communal lines. This starts a virtuous circle of trust, mutually beneficial transactions, stable and functioning institutions, and effective government in motion. Failing this, "we should expect the Hobbesian, hierarchical solution to dilemmas of collective action—coercion, exploitation, and dependence—to predominate. This oppressive state of affairs is clearly inferior to a cooperative outcome."<sup>16</sup> This state of affairs is also a failure of democracy. Putnam's theory predicts that in societies where ethnic groups do not often interact, trust would be scarce and the collective action problem exacerbated, necessitating greater use of the state's coercive power, and authoritarianism at the extreme. Figure 1 shows the three paths from ethnic pluralism to democratic weakness or breakdown.

All of the above theories assume that ethnic groups are difficult to change once constituted and that ethnicity tends to be politically salient. The constructivist literature on ethnic politics takes a more nuanced view of identity, explaining how ethnic groups form and why some cleavages become socially or politically salient instead of merely assuming the salience of nominal group



affiliation. If the primordial assumption is unrealistic, as current research indicates, it is a major limitation for large-*n* studies of ethnicity, which do not capture politically relevant cleavages or ascriptive identities other than ethnicity (such as tribe or clan) that may nonetheless be more relevant for political behavior. Given this insight, how much doubt does this cast on the data used here? There is good reason to believe that in the socialist bloc, ethnic groups *are* most often the most relevant cleavage. The Soviet Union recognized the autonomy of its fifteen republics based on ethnicity, which became the basis for mobilization when political expression became tolerated. In Eastern Europe, ethnicity has usually been the basis of political competition, as evidenced by the dissolution of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia along ethnic lines. In Central Asia and the Caucasus, subethnic identity may be more useful for understanding daily interaction, but ethnic cleavages are also important to explain large-scale events in these states, such as the war in Nagorno-Karabakh and each Central Asia country's determined efforts to supplant Russian with the titular national language.<sup>17</sup> Therefore, ethnic groups are the most appropriate unit for the cases in this analysis.

One final theoretical issue that needs to be addressed is what demographic division of the population is predicted to be least favorable for democracy. Most scholars agree that it is decidedly worse if there are a small number of dominant groups. Dahl states that, in a polity with only two subcultures, "members of the

minority may see no prospect of ever freeing themselves from the political domination of the majority; hence they, too, have little incentive to be conciliatory.”<sup>18</sup> Horowitz does not identify a specific number of groups but does refer to group size. When “a few groups are so large that their interactions are a constant theme of politics at the center,” we see that “the claims of one group tend to be made at the expense of another.”<sup>19</sup> Finally, for Lijphart, it initially appears that the grand coalition of the elites of each community would most easily be achieved if there were fewer participants in the coalition. This may be the case if the parties accept a consociational arrangement but, short of that, having fewer groups is more precarious. In fact, the grand coalition is necessary because of the dynamics that result from the intense competition between a small number of groups. “When there are two major segmental parties, two stable alliance parties, or a majority party confronting two or more smaller parties, a grand coalition offers the only possibility of avoiding the permanent exclusion of the minority from the government.”<sup>20</sup> I take this into account in statistical section by constructing an index that measures deviation from a fifty-fifty ethnic split.

### Testing the Hypotheses

The independent variable of interest for this study is ethnic diversity. To measure diversity, I used the data from James Fearon’s Cross-National Data Set for Ethnic Groups, compiled from several sources, including the CIA’s World Factbook, Encyclopedia Britannica, Library of Congress Country Studies, and the Minorities at Risk (MAR) data set.<sup>21</sup> Fearon tallies ethnic groups of over 1 percent of the population by percentage in each country and combines the data into an ethnic fractionalization index (EF), defined as  $F = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^n p_i^2$ , or the probability of two randomly selected people in a polity belonging to different ethnic groups. For example, the population of Hungary is 90 percent Hungarian, 5 percent Roma, 2.6 percent German, and 2 percent Serb, yielding an EF score of .186. This means that there is an 18.6 percent probability of two randomly selected individuals being of different ethnicities. In Kazakhstan, by contrast, where Kazakhs and Russians make up 45 percent and 35.8 percent of the population, respectively, that EF probability is 66.4 percent. The cultural fractionalization index (CF) begins with the EF data, except that it includes a parameter adjusting for the resemblance of languages spoken by ethnic groups. This measure of cultural distance is higher when no ethnic group is demographically dominant and groups are culturally distant, and lower when one ethnic group predominates and groups are culturally similar.<sup>22</sup>

There are also theoretical reasons (suggested by Dahl, Horowitz, and Lijphart) to believe that the probability that randomly selected individuals in a polity are from different ethnic groups is not as important as the asymmetry between the two largest groups. Therefore, I also used a fifth measure—2DIFF—that proxies for how close the society is to a fifty-fifty ethnic division, by calculating the difference between the two largest groups in a polity. The lower the number, the smaller the difference between the sizes of the largest two ethnic groups, and the closer a polity approaches the dangerously divided state of numerical equality of the dominant groups. The data from these five indices are listed in Table 1.

There are several legitimate concerns with using this type of data. First, although the CIA World Factbook is a reliable source, there are limitations in its methodology. Instead of using trained ethnographers to interview people to ascertain ethnicity, they mainly rely on the governments' own reporting. Second, even if foreign governments do not purposely misrepresent their data, many do not use the most up-to-date gathering techniques. They may not have the manpower for large-scale surveys or provide sufficient coverage of territory to ensure that no region gets underrepresented. Depending on how often censuses are conducted, information may be inaccurate owing to population movements, natural growth or decline, or redefinition of categories unrelated to census-taking. The way categories are designed can also impact on the results obtained through a census; a biased or incomplete choice of categories may fail to capture how people actually perceive themselves, or individuals may place themselves into census categories in a manner that does not reflect their actual identity differences.<sup>23</sup> Despite this concern, in

**TABLE 1. Data for Ethnic and Cultural Fractionalization**

| Country        | EF       | CF       | 2DIFF |
|----------------|----------|----------|-------|
| Albania        | 0.0966   | 0.080791 | 92    |
| Armenia        | 0.1338   | 0.123483 | 90    |
| Azerbaijan     | 0.187547 | 0.187164 | 86.8  |
| Belarus        | 0.371654 | 0.217057 | 64.8  |
| Bosnia         | 0.680506 | 0.146224 | 12.3  |
| Bulgaria       | 0.299485 | 0.24828  | 73.6  |
| Croatia        | 0.375155 | 0.184591 | 65.9  |
| Czech Republic | 0.504643 | 0.27442  | 78.1  |
| Estonia        | 0.51105  | 0.490537 | 36    |
| Georgia        | 0.490126 | 0.403423 | 62    |
| Hungary        | 0.186424 | 0.18486  | 85    |
| Kazakhstan     | 0.664359 | 0.616434 | 9.2   |
| Kyrgyzstan     | 0.679358 | 0.619684 | 34    |
| Latvia         | 0.58505  | 0.429832 | 26.1  |
| Lithuania      | 0.337639 | 0.253299 | 71.9  |
| Macedonia      | 0.5349   | 0.423951 | 43.6  |
| Moldova        | 0.510301 | 0.392548 | 37.7  |
| Mongolia       | 0.271775 | 0.223745 | 79.7  |
| Poland         | 0.047255 | 0.040217 | 96.3  |
| Romania        | 0.299761 | 0.262388 | 74.7  |
| Russia         | 0.332998 | 0.30915  | 77.7  |
| Slovakia       | 0.331514 | 0.289935 | 70.5  |
| Slovenia       | 0.231123 | 0.16523  | 84.9  |
| Tajikistan     | 0.513434 | 0.489964 | 39.9  |
| Turkmenistan   | 0.391836 | 0.32274  | 67.8  |
| Ukraine        | 0.4186   | 0.247587 | 51    |
| Uzbekistan     | 0.484775 | 0.439031 | 63    |
| Yugoslavia     | 0.574716 | 0.386586 | 46.1  |



the Soviet Union, where ethnicity was institutionally reified in federal institutions and on passports for seventy years, there is good reason to believe that reported ethnic data reflects people's self-conceived identity, and that the categories used by Fearon are the appropriate operations to test those theories.

The EF index is not simply a measure of the social landscape of a country, if such thing exists. Instead, by using qualitative sources that take into account actual events, Fearon's data set defines ethnic groups as those that "members and non-members [of an ethnic group] recognize the distinction and anticipate that significant actions are or could be conditioned on it."<sup>24</sup> This indicates that groups used to make up the EF index are politically relevant categories. On the other hand, the CF index adds an objective component of social distance based on when languages diverged into separate branches of the language tree. Testing these two indices against each other indicates whether objective cultural difference (*à la* Mill) is more or less important in determining political outcomes than subjective understandings of the political relevance of different groups.

To operationalize violence, majority domination, and trust, I used data sources independent from those used to operationalize either ethnic pluralism or level of democracy. For violence, I used Gurr's MAR database to compute the average level of intercommunal conflict by polity for the years 1990–2000. The scale runs from 0–6 to measure a group's involvement in conflict, ranging from "none manifest" (0) to "communal warfare" (6). The mean is 1.033 for all countries in the sample, ranging from 0 for Albania, Estonia, Lithuania, Belarus, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan to 3.27 for Bosnia-Herzegovina. There are two difficulties with this data. First, data is gathered by activities of the communal group rather than by the whole polity. I changed this into a polity score by taking the average scores of all minorities in each country for all the years in the sample. Second, only minorities at risk are included in the sample, which excludes many minority groups—and therefore does not include countries without threatened minorities—and biases the sample toward higher conflict scores.<sup>25</sup>

Despite the potential bias, the MAR data is a useful operationalization of the violence mechanism of democratic breakdown. First, the theories of violence predict that ethnically divided societies are not necessarily conducive to conflict of a generic kind, such as conflict based on ideology, but to conflict occurring between different ethnic groups or between an ethnic group and the state. Therefore, this data is even closer to measuring the mechanism of interest than a blanket measure of violence. Second, the types of conflict measured by MAR are consistent with the theoretical conflict stemming from ethnic division. Extracting from Dahl, Horowitz, and Gurr, the types of conflict expected may run the gamut from protests, discrimination, assassinations, and riots to genocides. The MAR index, measuring seven levels of intensity, provides a way of testing the expected variation in severity from polities with differing levels of fragmentation. It has the added advantage over other databases on violence of using a low threshold for conflict. Other databases on conflict exclude many countries in this sample that did experience low-level conflict but not large-scale conflict or instability.<sup>26</sup>

The second mechanism by which ethnic pluralism theoretically limits democracy is by tyranny of the majority. In this structure, we would expect to see a preponderance of power in a political system held by one group. I operationalized this variable by gathering data on the percentage share of seats in a country's parliament held by parties representing a country's largest ethnic group. When the legislature is bicameral, I took data from the lower house (since it is usually the principal house for making laws). The shares of the parliament in east bloc countries held by parties of the majority ethnic group range from zero (in fourteen countries) to 40.1 percent in Slovakia.<sup>27</sup> This is a useful, but imperfect, operationalization for domination by the majority ethnic group. In a system with free

---

***“Ethnically divided societies are not necessarily conducive to conflict of a generic kind, such as conflict based on ideology, but to conflict occurring between different ethnic groups or between an ethnic group and the state.”***

and fair elections, the makeup of the parliament would be a good indicator of whether a single ethnic group dominates the political process, since the parliament would actually be making policy. However, even if the parliament is mostly symbolic (as is the case in approximately one-quarter of the countries in this survey), it is not unreasonable to expect

that the dominant ethnic group would pack the parliament anyway, as a reflection of its political power. One can imagine this would be the case especially where seats in parliament were awarded as political favors to the dominant group's members.

The proxy for the third mechanism, cooperation, is the World Values Survey (WVS) index of trust. Results from the 1995–97 survey, which includes data from sixteen of the twenty-eight countries in this analysis, are used.<sup>28</sup> The question asked to gauge trust in a polity was, “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?” The respondents were assigned 1 for the former and 2 for the latter.<sup>29</sup> The percentage of respondents in each country answering “most people can be trusted” was used as a proxy for testing the third mechanism. The FSU and Eastern Europe fall near the bottom of world regions in trust, possibly as a result of animosity generated from many years of nonresponsive government-thwarted civil society.<sup>30</sup> The ideal measure for this analysis, capturing the theoretical predictions, would be one asking survey respondents to differentiate their feelings of trust by ethnic group. Putnam and others would predict more trust toward one's co-ethnics than toward other groups.<sup>31</sup> Nonetheless, the “colorblind” WVS data does indicate overall variation in levels of trust by polity, which the theories predict should correlate with ethnic fragmentation.

Table 2 shows the three intervening variables for each country that I correlated with the pluralism indices. I also correlated two independent indices of democracy with ethnic pluralism. The first is Freedom House's measures of political rights

and civil liberties, both scaled from 1 to 7. The former measures “the extent to which the system offers the voter the chance to make a free choice among candidates, and to what extent the candidates are chosen independently of the state.” The latter includes freedom of expression and organization, human rights, and property rights. Countries receiving a “one” are “distinguished by an established and generally equitable system of rule of law and are comparatively free of extreme government indifference and corruption. Countries and territories with this rating enjoy free economic activity and tend to strive for equality of opportunity.” By contrast, countries with a “seven” “have virtually no freedom. An overwhelming and justified fear of repression characterizes these societies.”<sup>32</sup> I added the two indices, yielding a cumulative index of 2 to 14, which is then sub-

**TABLE 2. Intervening Variable Scores**

| Country        | Minorities at risk | Party share | Trust |
|----------------|--------------------|-------------|-------|
| Albania        | 0                  | 0           |       |
| Armenia        | 0                  | 7.6         | 24.68 |
| Azerbaijan     | 1.36               | 0           | 20.53 |
| Belarus        | 0                  | 0           | 24.07 |
| Bosnia         | 3.27               | 33.1        |       |
| Bulgaria       | 1.72               | 0           | 28.6  |
| Croatia        | 2.23               | 33.1        | 25.09 |
| Czech Republic | 1.5                | 0           |       |
| Estonia        | 0                  | 17.8        | 21.52 |
| Georgia        | 0.5                | 27.2        | 23.39 |
| Hungary        | 2.36               | 0           |       |
| Kazakhstan     | 0                  | 0           |       |
| Kyrgyzstan     | 0                  | 0           |       |
| Latvia         | 0.45               | 17.0        | 24.74 |
| Lithuania      | 0                  | 1.4         | 21.52 |
| Macedonia      | 0.88               | 35.8        | 82.06 |
| Moldova        | 0.19               | 0           | 22.21 |
| Mongolia       | 0                  | 0           |       |
| Poland         | 0                  | 0           | 17.91 |
| Romania        | 1.68               | 26.4        |       |
| Russia         | 0.84               | 7.6         | 23.94 |
| Slovakia       | 2.05               | 40.1        | 15.54 |
| Slovenia       | 0                  | 4.6         |       |
| Tajikistan     | 0.86               | 0           |       |
| Turkmenistan   | 0                  | 0           |       |
| Ukraine        | 1.21               | 24.9        | 30.97 |
| Uzbekistan     | 0.05               | 0           |       |
| Yugoslavia     | 1.56               | 3.6         | 29.79 |

\*Because Bosnia has had two separate parliaments since being partitioned into Republica Serbska and the Muslim-Croat Federation, I took data from the last parliamentary election of a united Bosnia, from 1990.

tracted from fourteen so that fourteen is the most democratic of countries and two is the least democratic.

The other independent measure of democracy is Polity IV's index of institutionalized democracy and autocracy. Their measure includes three components. First is the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders. Second is the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive. Third is the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation.

An autocracy "sharply restrict[s] or suppress[es] competitive political participation."<sup>33</sup> Each is coded from 1 to 10, and an aggregated polity score of democracy is obtained by subtracting institutionalized autocracy from institutionalized democracy, yielding a score of -10 to 10. For the sake of simplicity, I added ten to each of these scores, making twenty the most democratic and zero the least democratic. Table 3 shows each country's democracy scores.

The data for both these sources have some of the same flaws as data for the intervening variables. Most important, both these indices are subjective, the result of the aggregate opinions of experts on democracy. For this reason I chose to use both indices instead of just one, and the high and significant correlation of .83 (in Table 4) should give some confidence to their reliability. Another critique is whether it is wise to collapse measures of all attributes of democracy into one index. That is, instead of one score subsuming free and fair elections, freedom of speech and press, human and minority rights, a functioning state apparatus, and others, why not consider each attribute separately? One reason is that the theories being tested offer mechanisms explaining democratic consolidation (or breakdown) generally instead of the breakdown of a specific aspect of democratization. Another is that the intervening variables measured already capture some of these specific attributes, such as violence and majority domination. Instead of correlating these variables with indicators conceptually very close (human rights abuses and unfair elections, respectively) and not fully independent, we can better evaluate the theories by testing their mechanisms directly on both ethnic fractionalization and level of democracy.

To avoid omitted variable bias, I added three control variables that correlate with the dependent variables. The first is gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. For many years, scholars have theorized that economic development causes (or some suggest is correlated with) democracy, due to a rising middle class and the necessity for information exchange to conduct business, the dispersion of power resulting from the dispersion of wealth, and the concomitant increases in education, literacy, and access to information.<sup>34</sup> The second control is distance of a country's capital city from the prime meridian. Because democracy is strong in Europe, and because the cultural and geographic factors that are present in Europe are more common in European postcommunist countries than in Asian ones, I controlled for distance from Europe. This also acts as a proxy for higher percentages of Christians in the West and Muslims in the East.<sup>35</sup> Finally, I included a dummy variable for the presence of a presidential system. Scholars have claimed that presidential

**TABLE 3. Democracy Scores**

| Country        | Freedom House | Polity IV |
|----------------|---------------|-----------|
| Albania        | 5             | 15        |
| Armenia        | 6             | 15        |
| Azerbaijan     | 4             | 13        |
| Belarus        | 2             | 3         |
| Bosnia         | 4             | 9.38      |
| Bulgaria       | 9             | 18        |
| Croatia        | 6             | 17        |
| Czech Republic | 11            | 20        |
| Estonia        | 11            | 16        |
| Georgia        | 7             | 15        |
| Hungary        | 11            | 20        |
| Kazakhstan     | 3             | 6         |
| Kyrgyzstan     | 4             | 7         |
| Latvia         | 11            | 18        |
| Lithuania      | 11            | 20        |
| Macedonia      | 8             | 16        |
| Moldova        | 8             | 17        |
| Mongolia       | 9             | 20        |
| Poland         | 11            | 19        |
| Romania        | 10            | 18        |
| Russia         | 5             | 17        |
| Slovakia       | 11            | 19        |
| Slovenia       | 11            | 20        |
| Tajikistan     | 3             | 9         |
| Turkmenistan   | 0             | 1         |
| Ukraine        | 7             | 17        |
| Uzbekistan     | 1             | 1         |
| Yugoslavia     | 8.44          | 4         |

\*Polity IV data were unavailable for Bosnia and Freedom House data for Yugoslavia, so I obtained a hypothetical score for each by plugging its score on one index into the regression equation of the other.

systems in democratizing states are prone to deadlock and therefore associated with instability.<sup>36</sup> It can also be plausibly claimed that federal systems tend to have parliamentary systems and mechanisms for power sharing that would skew the data on plurality parties. Only five countries in this study have parliamentary systems.<sup>37</sup>

Table 5 shows summary statistics for all of the data used in this study: the fractionalization indices, the three hypothesized intervening variables, the three controls, and the two measures of the democracy. Table 4 shows the result of bivariate correlations.

Not surprisingly, there are strong and significant correlations between the EF and CF indices and between 2DIFF and both fractionalization indices, along with a .83 correlation between the two indices of democracy and a -.60 correlation

TABLE 4. Bivariate Correlations

|       | EF       | CF       | 2DIFF | MAR    | MAJ   | TRUST | GDP      | DIST      | PRES   | FH      | P4  |
|-------|----------|----------|-------|--------|-------|-------|----------|-----------|--------|---------|-----|
| EF    | 1.0      |          |       |        |       |       |          |           |        |         |     |
| CF    | 0.79***  | 1.0      |       |        |       |       |          |           |        |         |     |
| 2DIFF | -0.91*** | -0.71*** | 1.0   |        |       |       |          |           |        |         |     |
| MAR   | 0.11     | -0.25    | -0.08 | 1.0    |       |       |          |           |        |         |     |
| MAJ   | 0.23     | -0.02    | -0.26 | 0.51** | 1.0   |       |          |           |        |         |     |
| TRUST | 0.35     | 0.32     | -0.31 | 0.08   | 0.37  | 1.0   |          |           |        |         |     |
| GDP   | -0.23    | -0.18    | 0.30  | 0.10   | 0.06  | -0.29 | 1.0      |           |        |         |     |
| DIST  | 0.19     | 0.42*    | -0.16 | -0.37  | -0.36 | -0.07 | -0.60*** | 1.0       |        |         |     |
| PRES  | 0.06     | 0.06     | -0.17 | -0.45  | -0.18 | -0.48 | -0.47*   | 0.32      | 1.0    |         |     |
| FH    | -0.24    | -0.23    | 0.23  | 0.16   | 0.21  | -0.06 | 0.61***  | -0.059*** | -0.40* | 1.0     |     |
| P4    | -0.44*   | -0.41*   | 0.40* | 0.18   | 0.25  | -0.05 | 0.49***  | -0.48*    | -0.36  | 0.83*** | 1.0 |

\* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

TABLE 5. Summary Statistics for All Data

| Variable | Obs | Mean      | Standard deviation | Minimum   | Maximum   |
|----------|-----|-----------|--------------------|-----------|-----------|
| EF       | 28  | 0.3945137 | 0.1753798          | 0.047255  | 0.680506  |
| CF       | 28  | 0.3018982 | 0.1495439          | 0.0402169 | 0.6196835 |
| 2DIFF    | 28  | 61.45     | 24.08417           | 9.2       | 96.3      |
| MAR      | 28  | 0.8110714 | .9330807           | 0         | 3.27      |
| MAJ      | 28  | 10.00714  | 13.73171           | 0         | 40.1      |
| TRUST    | 16  | 27.285    | 15.14453           | 15.54     | 82.06     |
| GDP      | 28  | 5613.214  | 3391.72            | 1140      | 12900     |
| DIST     | 28  | 1740.099  | 1134.186           | 686.8     | 4626.5    |
| PRES     | 28  | 0.8214286 | 0.390021           | 0         | 1         |
| FH       | 28  | 7.051429  | 3.485417           | 0         | 11        |
| P4       | 28  | 13.94214  | 6.218999           | 1         | 20        |

between GDP per capita and distance from the West, significant at the .001 level; that is, the further east one goes, the more the GDP decreases. Also predictable are the high and significant correlations between democracy and both GDP and distance. Somewhat unexpected are the strong (negative) correlation of  $-.48$  between presidential systems and trust, the significant relationship between presidentialism and MAR, and the high and significant correlation between MAR and dominant party, MAJ (.51). Also striking is the low and insignificant correlation between the Freedom House measure of democracy and the ethnic and cultural fractionalization indices ( $-.24$  and  $-.23$ , respectively), whereas the Polity IV data is significantly associated with EF and CF ( $-.44$  and  $-.41$ ). I explore these relationships further with multivariate regressions.

### Multivariate Regressions

I ran three sets of multivariate regressions: 1) level of democracy (from both sources) on the fractionalization indices EF, CF, and 2DIFF, controlling for the three factors discussed above, 2) trust, violence, and majority domination on the fractionalization indices, using controls, and 3) the democracy indices on the intervening variables. Including every combination of control variables, there are more than one hundred regressions in all, but I only show the results of a representative sample in the tables. I started by regressing the main event—is ethnic heterogeneity a good predictor of democracy, intervening variables aside? Using the controls, it is significant only in one case, that of the Polity IV index on EF, although just barely ( $t = 2.09$ ). As shown in Model 1, an increase of .1 in EF (increased likelihood that two randomly selected individuals are from different ethnic groups) is associated with a 1.2-point decrease in level of democracy. There is also a significant relationship between Polity IV and the difference between largest groups (2DIFF) when nothing is controlled for (Model 2), indicating that when the asymmetry between the largest groups increases by one point, democracy as measured by the Polity IV study should increase by one-tenth of a point. However, this significance disappears when GDP or presidentialism is added to the equation (Model 3). The increased  $R^2$  (.27 as opposed to .12) when controls are added indicates that the initial regression was picking up the effects of GDP and presidentialism. Nothing else from this set of regressions is significant, including those using both linear and nonlinear indices of fractionalization, both indices of democracy, and every combination of control variables. Models 1–3 in Table 6 show some of the regression data for democracy and ethnic fractionalization.

Next I regressed the intervening variables—violence, majority party, and trust—on the independent variables—EF, CF, and 2DIFF—using all three controls. MAR shows a significant relationship with distance and presidentialism, but not with ethnic fragmentation (Model 4). Party share also shows a significant relationship with the controls, but not with any of the independent variables. The third intervening variable, trust, correlates with controls, but not with the variables of interest. Cultural distance does not have any significant effect on trust, a refutation of Putnam's hypothesis. Besides this, the adjusted  $R^2$  values for these regressions are very low. See Models 4–5 for some of the results.



TABLE 6. Multivariate Regressions I

| Model                    | Dependent variable    |                       |                       |                 |                         |
|--------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------|-------------------------|
|                          | 1                     | 2                     | 3                     | 4               | 5                       |
| Independent variables    | Polity IV<br>(N = 28) | Polity IV<br>(N = 28) | Polity IV<br>(N = 28) | MAR<br>(N = 28) | Party share<br>(N = 28) |
| Intercept                | 21.3*                 | 7.66*                 | 12.33*                | 3.34**          | 22.87                   |
| Ethnic fractionalization | -12.1*                |                       |                       |                 | 21.7                    |
| 2DIFF                    |                       | .102*                 | .07                   | -.005           |                         |
| GDP                      | .00035                |                       | .0003                 | -.0001          | -.001                   |
| Distance                 | -.0013                |                       | -.002                 | -.0003*         | -.007*                  |
| PRES                     | -2.66                 |                       | -2.17                 | -1.21*          | -5.3                    |
| Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>  | .32                   | .12                   | .27                   | .26             | .12                     |

\* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ .

Next I regressed the dependent variables on the intervening variables. The three mechanisms show no significant relationship with either of the democracy indices. Only the strong correlations between these indices and control variables lend any confidence to their merit at all. On the whole, the variables of violence, majority party share, and trust are disappointing. See Models 6–9 for some of these results.

### Discussion of Results

With one exception, the significant results obtained from the multivariate regressions involve the intervening variables and the indices of democracy, but not the ethnic indices. The only positive and significant finding was the relationship between Polity IV democracy and ethnic fractionalization (Model 1); this deserves an explanation. This result may provide some support not that fifty-fifty divisions are unfavorable for democracy, but that more fragmentation leads to less democracy. Mill wrote that ethnic homogeneity was a prerequisite for a democracy, and we have seen in recent years how ethnically divided countries in Eastern Europe were unable to hold together. Eastern Europe's history in the age of nationalism is the story of massive population transfers and efforts to create state boundaries that conform to an ethnic group's area of inhabitation—the evidence for the success of this project can be seen in the high number of countries with a large differential between the two largest ethnic groups; that is, countries that are nearly “ethnically pure.” The finding in Model 2, that a greater difference between the two largest ethnic groups is associated with higher levels of democracy, partially confirms this result. Although this finding ceases to be significant when other factors are controlled for, the fact that it confirms the significant finding from Model 1 means that it should not go ignored. As to the mechanism that produces this result, since none of the intervening variables was found to be significantly related to either ethnic

**TABLE 7. Multivariate Regressions II**

| Model                           | 6                                    | 7                             | 8                                    | 9                             |
|---------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Dependent variables/<br>results | Freedom<br>House<br>( <i>N</i> = 28) | Polity IV<br>( <i>N</i> = 28) | Freedom<br>House<br>( <i>N</i> = 28) | Polity IV<br>( <i>N</i> = 28) |
| Intercept                       | 8.69*                                | 13.87*                        | 7.29*                                | 14.17                         |
| MAR                             | -0.30                                |                               |                                      |                               |
| Party share                     |                                      | 0.06                          | 0.014                                |                               |
| Trust                           |                                      |                               |                                      | -0.02                         |
| GDP                             | 0.0003                               | 0.0006                        | 0.0004                               | 0.0006                        |
| Distance                        | -0.001                               | -0.001                        | -0.0009                              | 0.0007                        |
| PRES                            | -1.52                                | -1.97                         | -1.07                                | -2.89                         |
| Adjusted <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>  | 0.38                                 | 0.21                          | 0.37                                 | -0.17                         |

\**p* < .05.

fragmentation or democracy, there are no grounds for privileging any mechanism over the others.

The fact that EF performed better than CF indicates that a more nuanced view of identity, that is, an awareness of relevance, does better than relying on objective differences alone. To cite several examples, the greatest discrepancies between the values of EF and CF are found in Yugoslavia, Bosnia, the Czech Republic, and Ukraine (see Table 1). In all four cases, the value of CF is smaller than EF, indicating that if we take into account the objective fact of language similarity (between Serbs and Croats or between the Russians and Ukrainians), these different ethnic groups are collapsed into a single category (or close to it). However, this alteration of EF conflicts with reality. Despite the similarity of Serbian Serbo-Croatian and Croatian Serbo-Croatian, we know for a fact that ethnic categories that placed Serbs and Croats in distinct and politically relevant groups were closer measures of reality. Ethnic categories that distinguish groups are also more relevant in the other three countries listed above than historical categories that collapse group identities into a single category. In fact, groups exhibiting the “tyranny of small differences” may be more politically relevant, and more likely to be involved in conflict, than groups sharing little cultural baggage.

Given the relatively small number of cases used in this analysis, it is possible that the significance of this result, and possibly others, may have been lost due to degree-of-freedom problems. Although twenty-eight cases still leave twenty-two degrees of freedom for regressions using all three controls, considering the likelihood of random error, there exists the possibility that an actual relationship might be missed. Further research on this question could expand the data set to include other regions, gaining in statistical rigor what is lost from using cases where there are no automatic controls. The finding that ethnically homogeneous countries may be more democratic on average calls out for further explanation and exploration. For the time being, however, nothing conclusive can be said, and the glaring result of numerous negative findings requires explanation as well.

From both the bivariate and multivariate regressions, there is good reason to believe that the control variables—GDP, distance, and presidentialism—and the Polity IV data are the only useful variables in testing for the relationship between ethnic fragmentation and democracy. What stands out in this study is the fact that the MAR, majority party, and trust data failed on all counts and the ethnic indices performed badly in all cases except the ones discussed above. That result aside, ethnic fragmentation does not appear to be a good predictor of democracy in the Eastern Europe and the FSU. However, when one examines the cases, this is not a counterintuitive result. Ethnically heterogeneous countries in Eastern Europe and the FSU are home to both weak and strong democracies, as are homogeneous ones. To take one example, Croatia and Azerbaijan have roughly the same demographic breakdown (CF = .185 and .187, respectively), but Croatia is a consolidated democracy and Azerbaijan is strongly autocratic.

This conclusion is supported by the work of Robert Barro, who regresses ethnolinguistic fractionalization, among other factors, on democracy in 138 countries. He finds that the coefficient on the variable is close to zero, therefore there

is no relationship.<sup>38</sup> On the other hand, Philip G. Roeder, focusing only on the socialist bloc countries, reaches a different conclusion. He argues that ethnic diversity and lack of prior experience as an independent state doom new republics to stunted democratic development. In a matrix capturing these variables, he finds that none of the six most diverse countries exhibit democracy, three of nine moderately diverse countries show illiberal democracy, and one possesses full democracy, whereas the majority of homogeneous states have developed some type of democracy. From this he concludes, “. . . a consolidated nation as the core of the state is a precondition . . . of successful democratization.”<sup>39</sup> He later runs regressions showing the significant relationship between cultural distance and the probability of an extraconstitutional crisis.

Although Roeder’s conclusions somewhat contradict those of this analysis, there are reasons to be skeptical. First, by showing the relationship between ethnic diversity and democratization graphically instead of statistically, it does not permit controlling for other variables that may bias the results, such as geography. Indeed, most of Roeder’s “old” nation-states—Poland, Hungary, Albania, Romania, Bulgaria, and Mongolia—are ethnically homogeneous because of processes that took place in Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a location that now draws these countries toward the European Union and acts as a force for democratization. A second problem is the lack of attention to mechanisms. Roeder gives the example of heterogeneous and unconsolidated Estonia and Latvia, which passed laws to restrict political participation, but is this the only causal path (ethnic diversity causes lawmakers to pass undemocratic laws) by which ethnic diversity influences democracy? Although this may seem convincing on the surface, the devil is in the details of democratization, and Roeder provides little discussion of the reasons for these decisions to be taken. Finally, in the regression where he controls for confounding variables, the dependent variable is ethnopolitical conflict and not democratization per se. Since the former is only one aspect of the latter, the findings that conflict are significantly correlated with a titular group’s proportion of the population and the cultural distance between the dominant group and minorities, which are worthy of attention but constitute only one piece of the puzzle.<sup>40</sup>

Previous studies have pointed in the right direction in seeking determinants of successful or unsuccessful democratization in the region.<sup>41</sup> However, they often neglect the causal mechanisms that drive the outcome, and rely on overly deterministic models that leave out politics that can aggravate or alleviate a problematic demographic inheritance. In the final section, I present three brief case studies to illustrate that ethnic fractionalization must be complemented by a subtler understanding of the political significance of identities and the character of ethnic relations.

### **Why Ethnic Fractionalization Alone is Not Enough**

The logic behind these three case studies is as follows. If ethnic fractionalization alone is a major determinant of democratic consolidation, we would expect countries with similar ethnic distributions to have similar levels of democracy. How-

ever, this assertion is untenable—if there is variation in the dependent variable, some other factor must account for the variation. By examining the character of ethnic relations in each country and tracing state policies toward minority groups, I hope to explain the negative findings of the previous section—that the structure of ethnic groups does not deterministically predict regime outcomes. Tracing each country's political development, especially with regard to ethnic issues, will show that a conjuncture of geographic, historical, and cultural factors, together with political decisions, is necessary to explain the divergence in regime outcomes. Does this political variable act alone, or can there be interaction with ethnic distribution? For most cases, such as explaining variation in democratic outcomes in the Baltic countries, the prevalence of a particular group (Russians) is necessary in addition to historical and political variables. In a small number of cases, such as in Russia, a very small minority (Chechens) can cause big problems, implying that sometimes history alone can explain (non)democratic outcomes without reference to proportions of ethnic groups. The case studies will support this.

Lithuania, Russia, and Uzbekistan have roughly similar ethnic breakdowns, as the majority titular group comprises 80.6 percent, 81.5 percent, and 80.0 percent of each polity, respectively. They also span the range of institutionalized democracies. Lithuania, by both the Freedom House and Polity IV indices, is considered very democratic; Uzbekistan is considered an autocracy; and Russia is somewhere in between. This section will not pinpoint the precise variables that determine the level of democracy in each country; it will support three observations concerning ethnicity and democracy. First, countries with similar proportions of ethnic groups may be faced with drastically different challenges toward democratization based on factors such as geography, culture, and history. Second, policies matter—where ethnicity has the potential to be a divisive issue, policies of moderation can reduce problems, whereas policies of repression can exacerbate them. And third, if ethnicity does have an influence on democracy, it may be necessary to know more than the relative percentages of ethnic groups in a country. A knowledge of an ethnic groups, historical relationship, the salience of particular identities, and the cultural practices of ethnic groups may be required to make confident predictions.

### Lithuania

Ethnic minorities have not been a barrier to Lithuania's maintenance of a democratic system. Russians and Poles constitute 8.7 percent and 7.0 percent of Lithuania's population, respectively, and 20.2 percent and 18.8 percent in the capital of Vilnius.<sup>42</sup> Unlike in its Baltic neighbors, Estonia and Latvia, Lithuanian citizenship laws granted automatic citizenship to "persons . . . living on the territory of the republic and having a continuing place of work or a continuing legal source of existence," which most ethnic non-Lithuanians accepted.<sup>43</sup> The Minorities at Risk database awarded Lithuania a zero in each year between 1990 and 2000 for relations with Russians and Poles. No parties articulating Lithuanian exclusionism currently hold any seats in the legislature. Although interpersonal trust is low (a

mere 21.5 percent admitted to trusting most people most of the time), this does not necessarily reflect on interethnic relations; it may simply be a vestige of resentment during Soviet rule. What factors explain these moderate policies toward ethnic minorities? Geographic proximity to Europe would have to be part of the explanation, since the European Union puts pressure on prospective members to practice moderation toward minorities, and it also pays to examine the specific character of relations between Lithuanians, Poles, and Russians.

The European Union (EU) has been a powerful force in Lithuania's ethnic relations. The EU requires that states "undertake to take appropriate measures to protect persons who may be subject to threats or acts of discrimination, hostility, or violence as a result of their ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious identity" as a criterion for membership.<sup>44</sup> Every government in Lithuania since independence has advocated EU membership, consciously adopting reforms that conform with EU standards. Ex-Communist Algirdas Brazauskas, Lithuania's president (1992–98) and prime minister (2001–present), said:

The future of Lithuania's national legal system lies in its harmonisation with the European Union legislation. . . . In addition, our laws have to respond to the needs of society, they have to protect and safeguard human rights and freedoms, be in conformity with the principles of international law and enjoy stability.<sup>45</sup>

Lithuania began negotiations toward EU membership in 1995, and finally acceded to the body in May 2004.<sup>46</sup> The European Commission in 1997 determined that "Lithuania demonstrates the characteristics of a democracy, with stable institutions guaranteeing the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities," although further work was demanded in curtailing corruption and reforming the judiciary.<sup>47</sup>

The EU agenda is mirrored in Lithuania's internal policies. Although protest in Lithuania for independence from the Soviet Union was the earliest and most vehement among the republics, nationalism has not been directed inward against its minority groups. Since independence, Lithuanian citizenship policies have continued to be among the most accommodating of the former Soviet republics, and ethnicity has not been an issue in post-Soviet statebuilding. Language laws passed in 1995, establishing Lithuanian as the sole official language of the country and requiring that all public officials speak fluent Lithuanian, mirrored the nationalizing policies of other post-Soviet states. However, Lithuania has made more of an effort to support minority rights, allowing minority cultural and linguistic schools and mass media to proliferate. In 1992, there were 188 Russian- and 123 Polish-language schools, and entrance exams to Lithuanian universities were administered in Lithuanian, Russian, and Polish.<sup>48</sup> Net emigration of Russians has also been on a smaller scale than in most other republics, declining from 9.4 percent to 8.5 percent between 1989 and 1996, facilitated in part by financial incentives for Russians to remain in the country.<sup>49</sup>

One puzzle that emerges is the difference between Lithuania's citizenship policies on one hand and those of its Baltic neighbors, Estonia and Latvia, on the other. Unlike Lithuania, the latter two both denied citizenship to most of their ethnic Russians. Estonia's policy is the harsher of the two, granting citizenship only

to individuals whose ancestors were living in Estonia in 1940 (before the Russian annexation), and permitting “Russians” to vote in local, but not national, elections.<sup>50</sup> Why do we see these laws appear in Estonia and Latvia but not in Lithuania? Linz and Stepan offer a demographic explanation. “As a result of the small proportion of non-Lithuanians and the heterogeneity of minorities, the Lithuanians were never compelled to introduce an exclusionary policy on citizenship,”<sup>51</sup> implying that Estonia’s 28 percent and Latvia’s 30 percent proportions of Russians were sufficient grounds for adopting these policies. Although there may be some truth in this, it is not the whole story. In 1998, Estonia relaxed its citizenship laws in response to pressure from the EU, granting citizenship to all children born after 1992, regardless of the status of their parents and without requiring a language test. There is continuing pressure from the EU on both countries to further relax the laws.<sup>52</sup> Second, if the large size of the minority ethnic group were sufficient cause to adopt exclusionary policies, we should see the same policies in other countries with similar ethnic breakdowns. However, we do not see this in the policies of Kazakhstan, where ethnic Russians at the time of independence made up nearly 40 percent of the population, or Ukraine, with the world’s largest population of Russians outside of Russia, neither of which discriminated by ethnicity in their citizenship policies.<sup>53</sup> Clearly, ethnic structure is not a sufficient explanation for this variation. To explain Lithuania’s choices, it is necessary to discuss not only how many, but who inhabits the country.

Because it is not possible to do justice in explaining the differences between the policies of the Baltic countries in this paper, I seek only to demonstrate that country-specific cultural and geographic factors explain more variation than does demographic structure. Like Latvia and Estonia, Lithuania was invaded and annexed by the Soviet Union in 1940. All three countries saw massive resistance in the early war years and large demonstrations against the Soviet Union in the glasnost period, leading the wave of seceding republics. All three republics feared a resurgence of Russian imperialism, both from within and the East, but whereas Estonia and Latvia surveyed their internal security situation and saw a potential threat in the Russian minority, Lithuania did not. It is not so much that Lithuania was home to fewer minorities than the other two; the fact that there were fewer Russians reassured the Lithuanian state. With Russians constituting only one-third of non-Lithuanians, there was less fear of Russian disloyalty to the regime and a decreased danger of collective action. Besides this, Lithuanian nationalists have historically been at least as preoccupied with maintaining Lithuania’s independence from the cultural attraction of Poland as they have from Russia or the Soviet Union’s political power. The result in the postindependence period has been “a massive Lithuanian inferiority complex and a sense of cultural vulnerability vis-à-vis the Poles . . .”<sup>54</sup> which if anything pushed Lithuania culturally toward the East, and may in part explain why Lithuania has had the best relations of the Baltics with Russia since independence.<sup>55</sup>

What is the relationship between ethnicity and democracy in Lithuania? The size of ethnic groups is not as important as the quality of relations, which is not figured into numerical breakdowns. There are several theories why Lithuania accommodated its Russians and Poles, despite its strident anti-Soviet national-

ism. The demographic argument says that because Lithuania possessed a comparatively small number of minority groups (less than 20 percent), it could accommodate without fear of subversion. However, percentages alone do not determine the treatment of ethnic minorities or the state of democracy, as will be seen in the cases of Uzbekistan and Russia. Depending on many historical factors, identities can acquire political significance that colors interethnic relations in the present day. This nuance is not captured by primordial assumptions of ethnicity or theories that assume all identities are equally politically meaningful. A complete explanation of Lithuania's path requires an understanding of cultural, historical, and geographical particulars, which a deterministic understanding based on ethnic structure alone fails to have. This point will be emphasized by a comparison with two countries of the same ethnic structure.

### **Uzbekistan**

Uzbekistan's political development has taken place in a completely different context. Uzbekistan receives low scores for democracy from both Freedom House and Polity IV, and a closer examination shows that it fails to meet minimal democratic standards across the board. Most notable of its failures in the West is its low marks for human rights. The alleged threat of Islamic terrorism has led to a crackdown on Muslim worshippers in general, and strict state control over all organized religion in the country. Not only Islamic organizations have come under attack, however. Non-governmental organizations, such as The Committee to Save the Aral Sea and the Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan, were declared illegal in the mid-1990s and have been unable to register ever since.<sup>56</sup> Likewise, the local office of the Soros Foundation was shut down in 2004 on dubious grounds. This has been accompanied by the arbitrary arrest of numerous opposition figures and total government control of the media.<sup>57</sup> Human rights groups have consistently documented cases of torture, beatings, arbitrary arrests, and extrajudicial executions.<sup>58</sup>

Despite Uzbekistan's abysmal human rights record, official state policies have been tolerant of minority ethnic groups. For instance, policies toward the Russian minority have been warm, in large part due to Karimov's desire to maintain good relations with Russia. Its 1989 language laws provided for the "development and usage of Russian as the language of inter-ethnic communication for the peoples of the USSR."<sup>59</sup> Rising nationalism, however, led to the 1995 language laws, which ordered all government employees to learn and use only Uzbek by 1997, relegated the status of Russian to mere equality with other languages spoken in Uzbekistan, and mandated that the Uzbek script be changed from Cyrillic to Latin. However, the law dictating the sole use of Uzbek was delayed because a large portion of the elite running the state sector consisted of primarily Russian speakers, and also because of a lack of standardized language training in Uzbek. Karimov's pragmatism on this issue indicates his strategy of appeasing innocuous nationalist forces and boosting his national (and Islamic) credentials, while discouraging the extreme elements.

There has been ethnic conflict, however. The Fergana Valley, a region of porous borders that Uzbekistan shares with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, has been the scene



of rising fundamentalism and internecine violence. In 1989, a conflict involving Meskhetian Turks and Uzbeks claimed more than one hundred lives, and more recently, a terrorist group called the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), made up of ethnic Uzbeks, Tajiks, Afghans, and others, has established bases in the valley, carried out a bombing in the Uzbekistani capital of Tashkent in 1999, and launched a series of incursions in the southern part of the country.<sup>60</sup> This surge in violence has led Karimov to crack down on all inhabitants of the valley, terrorists or not. Through this mechanism, ethnic diversity has hindered the consolidation of democracy. However, there are two caveats to the claim that ethnic pluralism in Uzbekistan has contributed to autocracy. First, Meskhetian Turks (and other groups involved in Fergana violence) are only a tiny fraction of Uzbekistan's population (not even counted in Fearon's list). Second, it is unlikely that Karimov would be a democrat if ethnic conflict and the threat of Islamic fundamentalism disappeared.

Uzbekistan's differing path from Lithuania's cannot be explained by ethnic structure, since theirs are similar. Instead, we must look to other factors such as Islam, poverty, or geography, all of which contribute to Uzbekistan's current predicament. Whereas Lithuania was being enticed by the EU to liberalize and democratize, Uzbekistan had to respond to events to its south, namely the ongoing war in Afghanistan between the Northern Alliance and the fundamentalist Taliban regime, and the civil war in Tajikistan from 1992 to 1997 that claimed more than 50,000 lives. These events and several bombings in the capital in 1999 provided either a justification or political cover for President Islam Karimov to launch an internal offensive against so-called Wahhabis, or radical fundamentalist groups, when he colorfully averred, "Such people must be shot in their foreheads. If necessary I'll shoot them myself."<sup>61</sup> He also passed a law in May 1998 banning all unregistered religious communities, religious social movements, and religious education in schools, prohibiting the wearing of religious garb by anyone other than clergy, and requiring the re-application of religious institutions.<sup>62</sup>

Economically, Lithuania's GDP per capita after independence was nearly on par with the economies of Central Europe; Uzbekistan's was half of Lithuania's, and the gap has increased. Uzbekistan has no emergent middle class to sound the clarion for democracy; its economy is still centrally planned, and until recently it was illegal to transport dollars outside of the country. Lithuania received the benefit of the so-called demonstration effect from neighboring nascent democracies in Central Europe, which encouraged its awakening civil society.<sup>63</sup> Uzbekistan was one of the last republics to declare independence from the Soviet Union, and received little encouragement in developing an autonomous civil society. Finally, as Europe's borders have opened, Central Asia's have tightened. As encouragement to strengthen its democracy, Lithuania had the incentive of joining the EU to further increase its wealth, while Uzbekistan, in the center of Central Asia, had more immediate concerns, such as its territorial integrity, the spillover of refugees from the Tajik Civil War, and rising Islamic fundamentalism. These factors provide a partial explanation for Uzbekistan's weak democracy that its 80/20 division of ethnic groups does not.

## Russia

The case of Russia presents a stark example of why it is more important to know more of the specific character of interethnic relations than mere demographics. With a population of nearly 150 million stretching across eleven time zones, Russia is home to many diverse ethnic groups. However, relations between the state and these groups have not hindered democratic development, with the exception of one group. The two wars in Chechnya have been one of the greatest hindrances in Russia's democratic consolidation, a tremendous strain on its military, a cause of international disdain, and a calamity for both Russians and Chechens—this despite the fact that Chechens comprise less than 1 percent of Russia's population. A comparison with Lithuania and Uzbekistan might seem unreasonable due to Russia's imperial past, vast size, and great military power, but because its ethnic structure is nearly identical to the other two, it must be explained why Russia's democratization has been hindered by a problem of a (nominally) ethnic nature, whereas the other states have been able to cope. Russia's problem with Chechnya indicates that historical grievances, institutions, and contemporary policies are necessary to explain its variation from the other two.

Russia began its political development in 1992 after the Soviet Union split into fifteen ethnically defined republics. Internally, Russia risked further fragmentation because of its federal system coupled with a weak central state. According to the system, among Russia's eighty-nine "federal subjects" are twenty-one ethnically based republics that are given significant fiscal and cultural autonomy, and sixty-eight non-ethnic regions of varying levels of autonomy. In order to stave off secession of the more restive regions, President Boris Yeltsin negotiated numerous bilateral deals, offering more sovereignty, local fiscal control, and outright bribes if necessary. This strategy may have prevented secession in some cases, but at the cost of ceding *de facto* independence by way of excessive autonomy, as several ethnorepublics' constitutions were in violation of Russia's.<sup>64</sup> This institutional factor, federalism, introduces the possibility of exacerbated interethnic tensions beyond those in a unitary system by offering incentives for elites in autonomous republics to play up nationalist sentiment and emphasize ethnic differences. This perverse incentive can lead to lower levels of interethnic trust and a higher incidence of violence over time, which would not necessarily be the case in a unitary system. However, despite these risks, federalism has probably been an overall asset for Russian democracy by providing a structure within which to negotiate and avoid a greater threat, secession, which could have precipitated civil war.

One republic that was not assuaged by federalism is Chechnya, whose ongoing conflict with the state has been probably the single most detrimental one for Russia's development of democracy. Chechnya had long been a thorn in Russia's side. In the Russian empire's expansion south into the Caucasus, Chechnya, a mountainous region of numerous tribes rarely united under a single leader, resisted subjugation for nearly fifty years, finally succumbing to Russia's conquest in 1864. In modern times, after the victory at Stalingrad, Stalin deported nearly half a million Chechens to the Kazakh steppe as punishment for many Chechens having sided with the Nazis.<sup>65</sup> These deportees were rehabilitated in 1957 under Khrushchev, and

most returned to Chechnya, but not without bitter memories. Up until the breakup of the Soviet Union, Chechnya was mostly kept under control through the settlement of ethnic Russians, Moscow's co-optation of Chechen elites, and the ever-present threat of coercion. Taking a cue from the other Soviet republics, only when Gorbachev allowed Eastern Europe to leave the Soviet sphere of influence and demonstrated a reluctance to deploy the military against secessionist movements, did nationalism in Chechnya assert itself. Clearly, Chechnya's historical experience with Russians has been dysfunctional, akin to that of the Baltic countries, all of whose histories color interethnic relations today.

Chechnya's nationalist resurgence coincided with that of the Soviet republics, but it was not allowed to secede because it lacked union republican status. Not long after the attempted coup on Gorbachev, in November of 1991, Chechnya declared independence from the Soviet Union. After Soviet (soon Russian) leadership refrained from forcibly intervening in Chechnya, the republic's *de facto* independence allowed it to retain the profits from its oil and natural gas, and to claim the Soviet Union's property on Chechen territory as Chechnya's own. The republic existed in a state of near anarchy until 1994, during which time train robberies, kidnappings, and hijackings encroached on neighboring republics and deterred commerce through the region, all the while proceeding undisturbed by Moscow, which was distracted by its own problems.

Beginning in 1994, Russia fought a brutal and ultimately futile war that cost 30,000 lives and uprooted 300,000 Chechen civilians. Reports from western journalists of rampant human rights violations turned world public opinion against the war. Yeltsin decided to withdraw the military in 1996 because the invasion had become a guerilla conflict, Russian public opinion had turned against the war, and the 1996 presidential election was approaching. Russia may have thought that it was out of the mire and free to work on building a democracy, but that was not to be. In 1998, the Asian financial crisis spread to Russia and led to a 4.6 percent economic contraction.<sup>66</sup> And in 1999, after several acts of terrorism were blamed on Chechens, Russia again invaded Chechnya. The second Chechen war was more successful from a military standpoint, but human rights violations were equally flagrant, and guerilla attacks continue on Russian soldiers despite the installation of a puppet president.<sup>67</sup> Unlike Lithuania and Uzbekistan, Russia has had a major civil war between an ethnic group and the state, a development with major implications for the Russian state and democracy, and to explain it requires reference to historical, institutional, and political variables rather than deterministic demographic structure.

### Conclusion

This article has been an attempt to determine the effect of ethnic pluralism on democracy. If there is a relationship between ethnicity and democracy, it takes more than numbers to determine that relationship. Ethnic pluralism in the former Communist world was calculated using the most up-to-date and nuanced data available and correlated with intervening variables from three widely accepted hypotheses, and with democracy indices from two independent organizations.

The results conclusively show that knowing the ethnic breakdown of a country is not a good predictor of that country's democratization.

The cases of Lithuania, Uzbekistan, and Russia serve to illustrate why this is the case. These countries possess nearly identical levels of ethnic pluralism, but have sustained drastically different levels of democracy. If having an 80 percent titular majority has helped Lithuania consolidate a democracy, it did not help Russia, and it had a ruinous effect on Uzbekistan. A more logical explanation is that other factors are more decisive for the consolidation of democracy. It has not been the concern of this article to build a theory about what those factors are, but an examination of the case studies, as opposed to the quantitative data, produces the not too surprising notion that history, geography, and politics are also necessary to account for variation in consolidation of democracy.

This result should call into question the conventional notion that ethnic heterogeneity alone is not conducive to democracy. However, this does not mean that other ethnic variables have no effect on democracy. In fact, it is not unreasonable to expect that a history of ethnic conflict, interactions involving ethnic groups possessing anti-democratic values, the manner in which ethnic groups are dispersed, or even the changing salience of ethnicity over time, may have implications for democracy, although they are not tested here. It is also possible that religious affiliation, linguistic group, or subethnic identity may be more salient than ethnicity in particular places or at particular times. To test these factors would require a greater subtlety of knowledge about identity, and may be more difficult to quantify, but it would probably provide a better framework for predicting democracy than the crude data on ethnic groups reported in most sources. This article has shown that the degree of fragmentation on a nationwide scale is not sufficiently subtle to provide explanatory power for the consolidation of democracy.

### NOTES

I would like to thank Chappel Lawson and Ranchan Chandra for their advice in helping to improve this article.

1. A new work exploring structure and agency in the post-Communist world is Grzegorz Ekiet and Stephen Hanson, ed., *Capitalism and Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

2. Recent scholarship using ethnicity as an independent variable includes William Easterly and Ross Levine, "Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 112 (November 1997): 1203–50; Alberto Alesina, Reza Baqir, and William Easterly, "Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 114, no. 4 (1999): 1243–84; Stephen W. Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," *International Security* 18 (Spring 1994): 5–39; Ashutosh Varshney, *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002).

3. Some constructivist works explaining identity change as a result of state policies include David D. Laitin, *Hegemony and Culture: Politics and Religious Change Among the Yoruba* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1986); David D. Laitin, *Identity in Formation* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); Melissa Nobles, *Shades of Citizenship* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000); Daniel Posner, "The Institutional Origins of Ethnic Politics in Zambia" (PhD diss. Harvard University, 1999); Pauline Jones Luong, *Institutional Change and Political Continuity in Post-Soviet Central Asia: Power, Perceptions, and Pacts* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

4. The work on democratization in the post-Communist region is abundant and ever-growing: See Richard D. Anderson Jr., M. Steven Fish, and Stephen E. Hanson, *Postcommunism and the Theory of Democracy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001); Zoltan Barany and Robert G. Moser, eds., *Russian Politics: Challenges of Democratization* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Michael McFaul, "What Went Wrong in Russia? The Perils of a Protracted Transition," *Journal of Democracy* 10, no. 2 (April 1999): 4–18; Bruce Parrott, "Perspectives on Post-Communist Democratization," in *The Consolidation of Democracy in East-Central Europe*, ed. Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). Linz and Stepan do the most thorough examination of ethnicity and democracy in the post-Communist world, explaining the "stateness problem" of new states but emphasizing resolving problems of citizenship as a prerequisite for democracy, rather than ethnic diversity per se, in *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).

5. John Stuart Mill, "Considerations on Representative Government," in *Utilitarianism, Liberty, Representative Government*, ed. H. B. Acton (London: J. M. Dent, 1972), 233.

6. Robert Dahl, *Polyarchy* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1971), 108.

7. *Ibid.*

8. Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 188.

9. Donald Horowitz, *The Deadly Ethnic Riot* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).

10. Ted Robert Gurr, *Minorities at Risk* (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1993), 6.

11. *Ibid.*, 94.

12. Guillermo O'Donnell coined the term *delegative democracy*: "Delegative democracies rest on the premise that whoever wins election to the presidency is thereby entitled to govern as he or she sees fit, constrained by the hard facts of existing power relations and a constitutionally limited term of office." Guillermo O'Donnell, "Delegative Democracy," in *The Global Resurgence of Democracy*, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 98.

13. Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977), 3–4.

14. *Ibid.*, 28.

15. Robert Putnam, *Making Democracy Work* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 168.

16. *Ibid.*, 177.

17. Brubaker argues that republican status and the use of ethnicity in Soviet passports created the institutional and intellectual preconditions for a nationalist resurgence. Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

18. Dahl, *Polyarchy*, 116.

19. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, 39.

20. Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies*, 30.

21. Dataset acquired by personal correspondence. I thank James Fearon for the data.

22. See James Fearon, "Ethnic Structure and Cultural Diversity around the World: A Cross-National Data Set on Ethnic Groups" (paper presented at 2002 APSA Conference, Boston, MA, August 11, 2002).

23. For research on censuses as a cause of identity change, see Nobles, *Shades of Citizenship*; and Bernard S. Cohn, "The Census, Social Structure and Objectification in South Asia," in *An Anthropologist Among the Historians and Other Essays*, ed. Bernard S. Cohn (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1987).

24. Fearon, "Ethnic Structure," 5.

25. The countries in this analysis not included in Gurr's sample because they lack minorities at risk are Armenia, Poland, Slovenia, and Mongolia. I compensate for the bias

by including these excluded countries as zero, since not having minorities at risk is tantamount to “no conflict manifest.” The MAR categories are: 0—none manifest, 1—acts of harassment, 2—political agitation, 3—sporadic violent acts, 4—anti-group demonstrations, 5—communal rioting, and 6—communal warfare.

26. In searching for alternative indices of violence, I rejected the State Failure Project, which includes only countries that crossed a threshold of 1,000 conflict-related deaths, thereby excluding many cases of interest to this study (*SFTF Problem Set Codebook: Internal Wars and Failures of Governance, 1955–2001*, <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/>). The World Bank’s study of civil wars also excludes cases below a 1,000-death threshold.

27. As criteria for coding ethnic parties, I use those of Kanchan Chandra and Daniel Metz, “A New Cross-National Database on Ethnic Parties” (paper, presented at 2002 APSA Conference, Boston, MA, August 2002): “An ethnic party . . . overtly represents itself to voters as the champion of the interests of one ethnic group or set of groups to the exclusion of another or others, and makes such a representation central to its mobilizing strategy” (5). Sources used for coding include Janusz Bugajski, *Political Parties of Eastern Europe* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2002); Janusz Bugajski, *Ethnic Politics in Eastern Europe: A Guide to Nationality, Policies, Organizations, and Parties* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1994); *Central and South-Eastern Europe* (London: Europa Publications, 2000); <http://www.electionworld.org/>; <http://www.europeforum.bot-consul.se/>; *Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia* (London: Europa Publications, 2000).

28. The countries included are Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Poland, Slovakia, Yugoslavia, Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. The Czech Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Slovenia, and the “stans” were not surveyed in the 1995–97 round.

29. *1995–1997 World Values Survey Questionnaire* (Ann Arbor, MI: Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan).

30. This is the theory of Marc-Marjorie Howard, who argues that Communist regimes engendered distrust in voluntary organizations and encouraged the use of private friendship networks over public organizations. Marc-Marjorie Howard, “Free Not to Participate: The Weakness of Civil Society in Postcommunist Europe,” *Studies in Public Policy*, no. 325, Center for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde. The WVS shows that, indeed, the post-Communist countries fall near the bottom in interpersonal trust. Ronald Inglehart, “Trust, Well-Being, and Democracy,” in *Democracy and Trust*, ed. Mark Warren (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 91.

31. This assumption is on the basis of Fearon and Laitin’s formal model in James D. Fearon and David Laitin, “Explaining Interethnic Cooperation,” *American Political Science Review* 90, no. 4 (December 1996): 715–35. Varshney’s study of intercommunal networks in India refutes this assumption, see Ashutosh Varshney, *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002).

32. <http://www.freedomhouse.org/>.

33. *Polity IV Project: Data User’s Manual*, 22–23.

34. See Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1960); Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, “Modernization: Theories and Facts,” *World Politics* 49 (January 1997): 155–83; Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John Stephens, *Capitalist Development and Democracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

35. For the relationship between culture and democracy, see Lawrence E. Harrison, *Who Prospers? How Cultural Values Shape Economic and Political Success* (New York: Basic Books, 1992); David S. Landes, *The Wealth and Poverty of Nations* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1998); John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999).

36. For the chief proponents of this argument, see Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*.

37. Presidential systems are considered those in which the head of government is directly elected, so semi-presidential systems are also considered presidential.

38. Robert J. Barro, *Determinants of Economic Growth* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), 70.

39. Philip G. Roeder, "People and States after 1989: The Political Costs of Incomplete National Revolutions," *Slavic Review* 58, no. 4 (Winter 1999): 863.

40. *Ibid.*, 874.

41. See note 4 and especially the "first elections" theory of democratization: M. Steven Fish, "Determinants of Economic Reform in the Post-Communist World," *East European Politics and Societies* 12, no. 1 (1998).

42. Walter R. Iwaskiw, ed., *Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania* (Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1995), 191–92.

43. Alfred Erich Senn, "Lithuania and the Lithuanians," in *The Nationalities: Question in the Post-Soviet States*, ed. Graham Smith (London: Longman, 1996), 178.

44. From "Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities," <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/157.htm>.

45. From the text of "Annual address by Algirdas Brazauskas, President of the Republic of Lithuania at the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania," February 1997, <http://www.pdi.net/>.

46. "The Weekly Crier: News Highlights from Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia," May 1–8, 2000.

47. <http://www.euro.lt/>.

48. Jeff Chinn and Robert Kaiser, *Russians as the New Minority: Ethnicity and Nationalism in the Soviet Successor States* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 121.

49. *Ibid.*, 117.

50. Laitin, *Identity in Formation*, 5.

51. Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition*, 405.

52. "Freedom in the World 1998–1999: Estonia," <http://www.freedomhouse.org/>.

53. Bohdan Krawchanko, "Ukraine: The Politics of Independence," in *Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States*, ed. Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 85.

54. Anatol Lieven, *The Baltic Revolution* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993), 48.

55. "Kaliningrad: Uncertain Future of Russia's Enclave in the Baltics," *Transitions Newsletter* (World Bank, 2001).

56. <http://www.freedomhouse.org/>.

57. Glenn E. Curtis, ed., *Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan: Country Studies* (Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1997), 452.

58. "Human Rights Developments 2002: Uzbekistan," <http://www.hrw.org/>.

59. Graham Smith, Vivien Law, Andrew Wilson, Annette Bohr, and Edward Allworth, *Nation-Building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 201.

60. Curtis, *Kazakhstan*, 410.

61. *The Economist*, July 4, 1998, 60.

62. *Transitions*, July 1998, 8.

63. Huntington, *The Third Wave*, 100–06.

64. On federal bargaining in Russia, see Daniel Treisman, *After the Deluge* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1999); Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, *Local Heroes: The Political Economy of Regionalism in Russia* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997); Henry Hale, *The Rational National: The Political Economy of Secessionism*, book manuscript, 2002.

65. Anatol Lieven, *Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), 319.

66. *CIA World Factbook 2000*.

67. "Winning at last?" *The Economist*, February 3, 2000.